Chapter 8 Chapter V Permanent Shareholding

Buffett said: As long as the company's return on shareholders' equity is promising and satisfactory, or the management is competent and honest, and the market price does not overestimate the company, then he is quite satisfied with holding any security for a long time. Regardless of the outcome of Berkshire's investment actions for the time being, Warren.Buffett's investment motivation is to obtain investment information from the operating results of enterprises, not from their short-term stock market conditions.He is convinced that the stock market may temporarily ignore the financial results of a business, but over time, as the company provides shareholders with more equity value, the market price will eventually confirm the success or failure of a company.Buffett remembers Ben.Graham had told him that the market was a voting machine in the short run, but a weighing machine in the long run, and he was happy to suffer.In fact, when the value of Berkshire's equity was rising at a satisfactory rate, he wanted the stock market to be slow to get the news, so that he could have the opportunity to buy more shares at a cheap price.

Sometimes, when Buffett judges that a certain company will be a good investment target, the stock market will quickly respond positively.When this happens, he will not be forced to sell his stocks because of the short-term rise in stock prices. He believes that the famous Wall Street saying: As long as there are profits, you will not go bankrupt is a stupid suggestion.Fisher once told him that the investment (stock) you hold must be better than cash, otherwise it is not a good investment.Buffett said: As long as the company's return on shareholders' equity is promising and satisfactory, or the management is competent and honest, and the market price does not overestimate the company, then he is quite satisfied with holding any security for a long time.If the stock market really overvalued a business, he would sell the stock.Also, if he needs cash to buy a stake in another business that may be undervalued or equally valuable but he understands better, Buffett will sell fair or undervalued securities to cash in.

However, under this investment strategy, Buffett also admitted in 1987 that there were three common stocks that he would not sell no matter how overvalued their stock prices were by the stock market, namely the Washington Post Company, GEICO and Capital / ABC.In 1990, he listed Coca-Cola's common stock as a permanent holding. This attitude of leaving until death makes these four investments equal to the enterprises controlled by Berkshire.Buffett does not arbitrarily grant this permanent status.And it's worth noting that a company isn't automatically considered a perpetual holding once Buffett buys it.Berkshire Hathaway has owned shares of The Washington Post Company for 20 years and GEICO for 18 years; Buffett first bought Capital Corporation in 1977; It was not until 1990 that it was promoted to permanent shareholding status.

At the time of the acquisition, all four companies had buying attributes.These properties are worth exploring. washington post company The main business activities of The Washington Post Company include distribution of newspapers, television broadcasts, cable television systems and magazines.The newspaper department publishes "The Washington Post", "The Everett Herald", some current affairs newspapers and 14 weekly newspapers.The television broadcasting division has six stations located in Detroit, Miami, Houston and San Antonio, Texas, Hartford, Connecticut, and Jacksonville, Florida. Jacksonville).The cable TV segment has 463,000 viewers in 15 states in the Midwest, South, and West.Newsweek, published by the magazine publishing department, has a domestic circulation of more than 3 million and 700,000 overseas subscribers.

The Washington Post Company also has a company called Stanley.Kaplan (Stanley H. Kaplan) Education Center, which is a series of schools dedicated to teaching students how to prepare for the college entrance examination.The Post Company also owns Legi|Slate, a company that provides computerized information on U.S. government legislative activity and general affairs; it also owns 5 percent of the International Herald Tribune Ten and 28 percent of Cowles Media, publisher of the Minneapolis Star and Tribune; Also formed a limited partnership with American Personal Communications to develop a personal communications system in Washington, DC.

At the end of 1993, the capital of The Washington Post Company was 3 billion U.S. dollars, and its annual sales were 1.5 billion U.S. dollars.Its achievements are especially impressive when you consider that sixty years ago it had only one business: publishing a newspaper. In 1931, there were five daily newspapers in the United States competing for the readership market, and the Washington Post was one of them.Two years later, unable to afford the printing costs, the Post's estate was put into custody and sold at an auction that summer to pay creditors.Eugene.Eugene Meyer, a big capitalist and financier, bought The Washington Post for $825,000.For the next two decades, he supported the paper until it turned a profit.Then the company was handed over to Philip.It was run by Philip Graham, a bright Harvard-educated lawyer married to Meyer's daughter, Katherine.In 1954, Graham persuaded Eugene.Meyer bought another competitor, the Time|Herald.Graham later bought Newsweek and two television stations before his death in 1963.Under Graham's efforts, The Washington Post expanded from a newspaper to an advertising media company and a communications company.

Following Graham's death, control of The Washington Post passed to Catherine C.on Graham.Although she has no experience in managing a large company, she quickly built a reputation for confronting business challenges head-on.Much of her success is attributable to her love of the Post.She watches how her father and husband struggle to keep the company afloat.She also learned that if a company is to be successful, it must have a decision maker rather than a manager."I learned very quickly that things don't stand still, you have to make a decision," she said.Two decisions have had a notable impact on The Washington Post, one is the hiring of classes.Bradley (Ben Bradlee) served as the editor-in-chief of the newspaper, and the other invited Warren.Buffett became a director of the company.Bradley encouraged Catherine to publish confidential documents of the Pentagon (US Department of Defense) in the newspaper and tracked the investigation of the Watergate case.The action earned The Washington Post a Pulitzer Prize for journalism.Buffett taught Catherine how to run a successful business.

Buffett first met Katherine in 1971, when Buffett owned shares in The New Yorker. When he heard the magazine was up for sale, he asked Katherine if the Washington Post would be interested in buying it. It; while the deal didn't go through, Buffett was impressed with the Post's publisher. At that time, the Post's financial structure faced drastic changes.Eugene and Agnes (Agnes).According to the trust fund established by Meyer, Catherine and Philip.Graham owns all of the voting stock in The Washington Post.After Graham's death, Catherine inherited control of the company.Before that, Eugene.Meyer gifted his personal thousands of shares of Post stock to hundreds of employees as a token of appreciation for their loyalty and service to the company.He established the company's dividend plan for privately held shares.When the company's business was booming, the "Washington Post" stock soared from $50 per share in the 1950s to $1,154 per share in 1971. Individual shareholding forces the company to maintain the stock market price at a certain level. It was later proved that this management method is not helpful for the company's cash.In addition, the Graham and Meyer families are facing an inescapable estate tax.

In 1971, Catherine decided to take The Washington Post public, which would not only eliminate the burden of maintaining her own stock market, but also allow family heirs to plan their assets more favorably.Shares in The Washington Post Company are divided into two classes, with Class A common stock electing a majority of the decision-making board.Catherine owns 50 percent of the Class A shares and thus effectively controls the company; the Class B shares elect a minority seat on the decision-making board.In June 1971, The Washington Post Company issued 1,354,000 Class B shares.Two days later, despite threats from the government, Catherine agreed to Ben.Bradley publishes the Pentagon Papers.

In 1972, the Post's share price climbed steadily, from $24.75 in January to $38 in December.While the newspaper's business was gaining momentum, Wall Street's tone turned pessimistic.At the beginning of 1973, the Dow Jones Industrial Average began to decline; by the spring, it fell more than 100 points to 921, and the stock price of "Washington Post" also fell; by May, its price fell Fourteen to twenty-three dollars.With IBM's stock down more than 69 points, below its 200-day moving average, Wall Street brokers sounded the alarm that the breakdown would bode ill for the rest of the market.In the same month, gold fell below the $100 an ounce mark, the Federal Reserve raised the discount rate to 6 percent, and the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 18 points, the largest drop in three years; in June, the discount rate Higher again, the Dow Jones Industrial Average faces the 900-point mark.At this point, Buffett quietly bought shares in The Washington Post.By June, he had bought 467,150 shares of Post stock at an average price of $22.75 apiece, for a total of $10,628,000. dollars (see Figure 5.1).

Today, Philip and Catherine.Graham's son, Donald.Donald E. Graham becomes publisher, executive general manager, and chairman of The Washington Post Company newspapers.Don.Graham graduated with honors from Harvard in 1966, where he majored in British History and Literature.At Harvard, he was editor of the school's Crimson; after graduation, Graham served two years in the military.Knowing that he would eventually lead The Washington Post, Graham decided to learn more about the city.He chose an unusual route: entering the Washington Metropolitan Police Department.After four months of training at the police academy, he spent fourteen months as a patrol officer, walking the Ninth Precinct on a beat.In 1971 Graham joined the Post as a city reporter.He later spent ten months as a reporter for Newsweek in the Los Angeles City Council.Graham returned to the Post as assistant managing editor of sports in 1974, the same year he was elected to the company's governing board. When Buffett first started buying shares in the Post in 1973, Catherine.Graham isn't worried, but the thought of non-family members owning so much Post stock, even shares she doesn't control, shakes her.Buffett assured Catherine that Berkshire's purchase of its stock was purely an investment, and to reassure her, he suggested that Don.Graham's proposal resolved the issue by proxying Berkshire's voting rights.Catherine reciprocated by inviting Buffett to join the decision-making board in 1974, and quickly made him chairman of the finance committee. Buffett played an extraordinary role in the "Washington Post", leaving a profound record in all aspects.During the strikes of the 1970s, he insisted on helping Catherine to get through, and he also taught Don.Graham some business tips to help him understand the role of a manager and his responsibilities to the shareholders of the business.Buffett's influence on the Post can be seen in some of the actions of Catherine and Donald. Don.Graham was well aware of the main goals of The Washington Post Company.He wrote: We will continue to operate in the interests of shareholders, especially long-term shareholders, whose prospects are not only quarter-end or year-end, but even long-term prospects are optimistic.We don't measure our success by annual sales, or by the number of companies we control.Graham vowed to strictly manage expenses and discipline himself in spending money. □Principle: Simple and easy to understand Buffett's grandfather owned and edited the Cuming County Democrat, a weekly newspaper in West Point, Nebraska; his grandmother helped out at the paper and did typesetting at the family's printing shop his father edited the Daily Nebraskan when he was a student at the University of Nebraska; Buffett was the sales director of the Lincoln Journal.It's often said that if Buffett isn't in business, he's most likely in journalism. In 1969, Buffett bought his first major newspaper, the Omaha Sun, along with several weekly papers.While he respects high-quality journalism, Buffett always thinks of newspapers as a business.He expected a newspaper owner to be rewarded with profit, not influence.Owning the Omaha Sun taught Buffett something about newspaper business dynamics.Before he started buying shares in The Washington Post, he had four years of hands-on newspaper experience. □Principle: Stable management history Buffett told Berkshire shareholders that he first had a financial relationship with The Washington Post Company when he was thirteen years old, when his father was serving in Congress, and he delivered Washington Post as a newspaper delivery boy. The Post and The Times Herald.Buffett always likes to remind others: Before Graham bought the Times Vanguard, I had already merged these two newspapers. It's clear that Buffett is well aware of the newspaper's rich history, and he sees Newsweek as a business that can predict its future.He also quickly learned about the performance of the company's TV station.The Washington Post Company has reported on the major performance of their broadcast division for years.Buffett judges based on his own experience and the company's successful history. He believes that this company has a consistently good operating history and its future performance will be predictable. □Principle: long-term prospects are promising Buffett wrote in 1984: The economic strength of a strong newspaper is unmatched and one of the most powerful economic forces in the world.There are approximately 1,700 newspapers in the United States, of which nearly 1,600 have no direct competitors.He noticed that the owners of those newspapers believed that the reason why they could make more than expected profits every year was because their newspapers had a certain journalistic quality.In fact, Buffett says, even a third-rate newspaper can make enough money if it's the only newspaper in town.It is undeniable that a high-quality newspaper will have greater market penetration, but he explained that even an ordinary newspaper is very important to the public because it can spread the news widely.Every business in town, every home seller, or anyone who wants to get their message out to the public needs newspapers to do it.Like Viscount Thomson, Buffett believed that owning a newspaper was like monopolizing the right to place an ad from every business in town that wanted a newspaper ad. In addition to some exclusive characteristics, newspapers also have a high value of economic goodwill.As Buffett points out, newspapers require little capital to distribute, so they can easily turn sales into profits.Even if a newspaper office adds an expensive computer-assisted printing press, or an editorial office adds an electronic system, the outlay is quickly recouped by a reduction in fixed wage costs.It is also easier for newspapers to increase their selling prices, and thus generate higher returns than ordinary businesses on invested capital, reducing the damage caused by inflation.In Buffett's judgment, a typical newspaper could double the price of its paper and still retain 90 percent of its readers, like USA Today. □Principle: Determining Substantial Value In 1973, the total listing value of The Washington Post Company was $80 million.However, Buffett claims that most securities analysts, advertising media brokers and advertising media executives should estimate the real value of WPC (Washington Post Company) between 400 million and 500 million US dollars.How did Buffett arrive at these estimates?Let's run through some numbers with Buffett's reasoning. We start with shareholder earnings for the year (see Chapter 4): net income ($13.3 million) plus depreciation and amortization ($3.7 million), less capital expenditures ($6.6 million) ten thousand US dollars), and the shareholders' profit in 1973 was US$10.4 million.If we divide these surpluses by the yield on long-term U.S. government bonds (6.81%), The Washington Post Company is worth $150 million, almost twice the market price, but still far less than Buffett's estimate. Buffett tells us that, over time, a newspaper's capital expenditures will equal its depreciation and amortization expense, so net income should approach shareholder earnings.Knowing this, we can simply divide the net return by the risk-free rate, and thus arrive at an estimate of $196 million. If we stop there, we assume that the growth rate of shareholders' earnings equals the growth rate of inflation.But we know that newspapers have extraordinary price adjustment space, because most newspapers are monopolies in the community, and their prices can rise faster than inflation.If we make one final assumption: that The Washington Post has the ability to raise its actual price by three percent, it is worth closer to $350 million.Buffett also knows that the pre-tax gross profit of 10% is lower than its historical average pre-tax gross profit of 15%, and he knows that Catherine.Graham decided to make the post's pre-tax gross profit reach that amount again.If the pre-tax gross profit increased to 15 percent, the present value of the company would increase by an additional $135 million, bringing the total real value to $485 million. □Principle: buy at an ideal price Even the most conservative calculations on the company's price show Buffett paying at least half what the Post is worth in real terms.He maintains the rule of buying the Post when its market price is less than a quarter of its total real value.In any case, he was quick to buy the company when its price was substantially below its intrinsic value.Buffett stays true to his class.The premise of Graham's investment is to buy at a discount to maintain a margin of safety. □Principle: return on shareholders' equity When Buffett bought The Washington Post stock, its return on shareholders' equity was 15.Seven percent, such a result is very common, most newspapers can do it, and it is only slightly higher than the return on average shareholders' equity of the S&P Industrial Index.But within five years, the Post's return on shareholders' equity doubled, was twice the return on equity of the S&P Industrial Average at the time, and was 50 percent higher than the average newspaper.For the next decade, the Post maintained its leading position.By 1988, its return on shareholders' equity had reached 36.three%. These above-average earnings are all the more impressive when you consider that the company has been deliberately reducing its debt over time.In 1973, the ratio of long-term debt to shareholders' equity was 37.5%.Two percent, the second highest percentage in the newspaper industry.Surprisingly, by 1978, Catherine.Graham reduced the company's debt by 70%.In 1983, the ratio of long-term debt to shareholders' equity was reduced to two.Seven percent, which is one-tenth of the average value of the newspaper industry, so the return on shareholders' equity created by the Post is 10% higher than that of other peers.In 1986, after the Post invested in the cellular telephone system and purchased 53 cable TV systems from the Capital Corporation, the company's debt amounted to US$336 million, but within a year, the Reduced to $155 million.By 1992, its long-term debt was $51 million, and its long-term debt-to-equity ratio was five.Five percent, the newspaper industry's average is forty-two.seven%. □Principle: gross profit margin Six months after WPC went public, Catherine.Graham met with Wall Street security analysts and told them that the first requirement of business is to make the most profit under the company's existing business activities.Profits for television stations and Newsweek continued to rise, but those for newspapers were leveling off.Ms Graham said the main reason was high production costs, meaning wages were too high.After buying the Times Herald, the company's profits began to surge.Whenever trade unions went on strike against newspapers (1949, 1958, 1966, 1968, 1969), the operators chose to fulfill the strikers' demands rather than risk a lockout danger.At this time, there were still only three newspapers in Washington, DC.Through the 1950s and 1960s, increasing wage costs shrunk profits.Ms. Graham told the analysts that the issue must be addressed. When union contracts began to expire in the 1970s, Ms. Graham called in labor negotiators who carried the union's tradition of divisiveness.In 1974, after lengthy negotiations with the help of newspaper trade unions, the company quelled a strike, and the printers accepted new contracts. During the printing workers' strike in 1975, Ms Graham's firm position on labor contracts began to take shape.The strike was violent and intense, and sympathy for their demands evaporated as they arbitrarily vandalized the press room prior to the strike.The managers themselves operated the printing presses, and the newspaper and printing unions crossed their boundaries and helped each other.Four months later, Ms. Graham announced that the company was hiring non-union printers, a victory for the company. In the early 1970s, the financial press wrote that the best thing to say about The Washington Post Company's performance was that it should be a gentlemanly C on the profit scale.In 1973, the post-tax gross profit margin was 10.8%, which is far lower than the 15% gross profit rate of the company over the years in the 1960s.The Post's fortunes increased after successfully renegotiating labor contracts.By 1978, the gross profit rate had jumped to 19.Three percent, an increase of 80 percent in five years, and Buffett's bet has paid off.By 1988, the Post's pre-tax gross profit margin reached 31.8%, much higher than the newspaper average of 16.Nine percent and eight of the S&P average.six%.Although the company's gross profit margin had declined somewhat in the early 1990s, it was still higher than the industry average. □Principle: rational operation The Washington Post Company generates substantial cash flow for its shareholders.Because the cash earned is much larger than the funds required to invest in the industry, the management level is faced with two choices that require rational judgment: return the excess surplus to shareholders, or use the money in new investments Opportunities for profit.Buffett prefers to return the company's excess earnings to shareholders.When Catherine.During Graham's tenure as general manager, The Washington Post Company was the first newspaper company in the newspaper industry to buy back a substantial amount of its own stock.Between 1975 and 1991, the company bought 43 percent of its own shares at an incredible price of $60 a share (see Figure 5.2). Companies can also choose to return excess earnings to shareholders by increasing dividend payments.In 1990, with its large cash pile, The Washington Post Company voted to increase its annual dividends to shareholders from 1.5 to 1.5 million.$84 increased to $4, an increase of 117 percent (see Figure 5.3). In addition to returning excess earnings to shareholders, The Washington Post Company has also purchased several profitable businesses.In 1986, the company purchased the cable TV business from the Capital Group, which enabled the Capital Group to have sufficient financial resources to acquire the ABC Television Network; the Post was also an early investor in the cellular phone industry; in 1993 , the company also purchased two television stations in Texas. Don.Graham's goal is to make the most of his cash by engaging in low-cost, profitable investments.Knowing that shares in countless companies are eager to sell, Graham has developed special guidelines to help him say no to a buying opportunity, which he admits is more important than saying yes.He was looking for a business that was challenging, did not require huge capital expenditures, and had reasonable bargaining power.In addition, he emphasized that we have a strong preference for businesses we know and give them a chance, and we prefer to invest our money in one big bet rather than spread our money widely across many small investments.Graham's approach to acquisitions mimics Buffett's strategy at Berkshire Hathaway. In the early 1990s, the ecology of newspaper companies changed.In 1990, the United States faced an economic downturn, especially in the Mid-Atlantic region.Sales and earnings at The Washington Post fell sharply that year.Buffett admits he's been surprised by the economic downturn, which has hurt both the Buffalo News and the Washington Post.He asked himself a question: Is this drop part of an expected economic cycle, or a worrying sign of a long-term change in the newspaper business landscape. Buffett's conclusion is that newspapers will still maintain their above-average performance relative to the average U.S. industry, but will be worth less in real terms than he or any other media analyst had earlier predicted as newspapers lose their price elasticity.In a few years when economic activity slowed and advertisers cut back on spending, newspapers were still able to maintain profits by raising advertising rates.Now that newspapers are no longer a monopoly, advertisers have found cheaper ways to reach their customers: cable TV, direct mail order, and inserts inside newspapers.Advertising dollars are spread over a wider selection of media, so the newspaper's dominance as an advertising medium no longer exists. By 1991, Buffett was convinced that changes in newspaper profitability represented not only long-term permanent environmental changes, but also temporary changes in the business cycle.He acknowledged the fact that the economics of newspapers, television, and magazines had begun to resemble businesses in general rather than privileged classes with franchises.A change in the economic cycle hurts short-term earnings without reducing the company's real value; a permanent change reduces not only earnings but also the company's real value.Buffett, however, said the change in Washington Post's real value was modest compared with other media companies.There are two reasons: First, the Post's $50 million in long-term liabilities and its $400 million in cash on hand are more than sufficient to pay off the debt.Of the publicly traded newspapers, The Washington Post is indeed the only one without debt.As a result, Buffett said, the value of their assets did not decline significantly due to debt.Secondly, he emphasized that the operating conditions of the Washington Post Company are very good. □Principle: A dollar assumption Buffett's goal: to choose companies that can convert every dollar of retained earnings into at least one dollar of market value.If the company's operators have been investing their company's money in the best possible way over a long period of time, this test will quickly reveal its excellent rate of return.If all the retained earnings were invested in such a company and received above-average returns, the market value of the company's stock would rise proportionally. From 1973 to 1992, The Washington Post Company earned $1,755 million for its owners, and from these earnings the company distributed $299 million to shareholders, and then Keep 1.456 billion and reinvest in the company itself.In 1973, the total market value of WPC was $80 million.Since then, its market value has risen all the way to US$2.71 billion (see Table 5.1).From 1973 to 1992, its market value increased by a total of 2.63 billion US dollars.During those two decades, for every dollar of surplus WPC retained for its shareholders, its market value increased by one after reinvestment.eight dollars. □Summary report Buffett once told us that even a third-rate newspaper can make considerable profits, because the market does not require high standards for newspapers, it is entirely the self-demand of the operators; and among its peers, the high standards of the operators and ability, determine the amount of corporate profits.In 1973, if Buffett had invested $10 million in newspapers such as Gannett, Knight︱Ridder, New York Times, and Times Mirror Group, as he had done in the Washington Post Company If the investment is the same, his return on investment will be higher than the average (see Figure 5.4), which reflects the unique economic ecology of newspaper companies during this period.But Buffett emphasized that much of WPC's $200 million to $300 million premium in market value over its peers is due to management decisions made by Kay (Katherine Graham), compared with most other media company operators. , with better quality.Catherine.Graham was shrewd and bought a large number of WPC stocks at low prices.Buffett also thinks she has the courage to face those labor unions, reduce expenses and increase the enterprise value of the newspaper. Investors have also shown their common sense by buying shares of The Washington Post Company over the past few years, pushing the stock price close to its real value.Buffett says Berkshire benefits threefold from its investment in WPC.First, the corporate value of media has been soaring in the past two decades; second, the discount space of the real value of the company has shrunk; third, the corporate value per share of the company has increased rapidly due to the company's actions to buy back stocks.Overall, the rise in stock prices has outpaced the rise in the real value of the company. In 1985, when WPC's market value was $1.5 billion, Buffett worried that the company's per-share value would not reflect its previous growth rate.This is especially true today, with a market value approaching $3 billion.Now that media companies have lost their privileged position as a franchise, managers should look elsewhere for the company's future.The shareholders of The Washington Post Company are lucky because they have Catherine.Graham does the proper positioning for the company. In fact, WPC has no debts, and has been able to effectively control costs. In addition, the company also attaches great importance to the interests of shareholders.These characteristics make WPC stand out even more when joining this highly competitive corporate environment. When the Capital Group bought ABC, Buffett was forced to resign from the Washington Post's corporate board.Yet eight years later, his influence remains deeply embedded in the company's operating philosophy. GEICO Enterprise GEICO Enterprises is an insurance organization whose business includes personal property and casualty insurance.Its largest subsidiary, Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO), underwrites private auto passenger accident insurance for government employees and military personnel.The company also writes a variety of policies for homeowners and other qualified applicants.Another subsidiary, GEICO General Insurance Company, underwrites private auto insurance for other applicants.今天，ＧＥＩＣＯ是國內第八大承保私用汽車乘客意外的保險業。 ＧＥＩＣＯ於一九三六年由利奧．葛德溫（Ｌｅｏ Ｇｏｏｄｗｉｎ）建立，他原來是一名保險會計師。葛德溫的想法是成立一家直接以郵寄方式往來，且只為駕駛者承保意外事故險的公司。葛德溫發現政府員工這個族群，發生事故的次數較一般大眾少。他也知道藉由直接銷售保單給駕駛者，公司能夠免除與保險經紀人有關的經常性費用，這個支出一般佔保費的百分之十至二十五。葛德溫計算，如果他將那些開車小心的駕駛人區隔出來自成一群，而且直接經由儲金發行保單，他有機會成功。 葛德溫邀請德州渥斯堡（Ｆｏｒｔ Ｗｏｒｔｈ）的銀行業者，克李夫．瑞亞（Ｃｌｅａｖｅｓ Ｒｈｅａ）做為他的合夥人。葛德溫投資二萬五千美元，而且擁有百分之二十五的股票；瑞亞投資七萬五千美元，擁有ＧＥＩＣＯ百分之七十五的股票。一九四八年，公司從德州搬到華盛頓，那一年，瑞亞家族決定賣出它們的股份。瑞亞雇請洛瑞默．大衛森（Ｌｏｒｉｍｅｒ Ｄａｖｉｄｓｏｎ），一位巴爾的摩的債券交易員，來協助他出售手上的股票。大衛森則邀請華盛頓特區的律師大衛．克里傑（Ｄａｖｉｄ Ｋｒｅｅｇｅｒ）幫他找買主，於是克里傑與葛蘭姆︱紐曼公司接洽。class.葛蘭姆決定以七十二萬美元購買瑞亞一半的股票；瑞亞另一半的持股被克里傑和大衛森巴爾的摩機構收購。 由於葛蘭姆︱紐曼公司是投資基金，因此證券交易委員會限制它對ＧＥＩＣＯ的持股只能佔保險公司總值的百分之十，所以葛蘭姆必須將ＧＥＩＣＯ的股票分配給基金的合夥人。幾年後，當ＧＥＩＣＯ變成資本額十億美元的公司時，葛蘭姆個人持有的股票價值亦有數百萬美元。 洛瑞默．大衛森在葛德溫的邀請下，加入ＧＥＩＣＯ的管理小組。一九五八年，他成為董事長並且領導公司直到一九七○年。在這段期間，委員會將ＧＥＩＣＯ的車險業務擴展到專業、管理、技術和行政工作人員。新策略出擊成功，ＧＥＩＣＯ的市場佔有率從原來的一五％，成長到目前含括所有汽車車主五○％的市場。由於新的被保險人族群，最後被定位在像政府員工之類的小心駕駛者，所以承保利潤大幅上揚。這個時期是ＧＥＩＣＯ的黃金年代，在一九六○和一九七○年代之間，政府的保險管理單位被ＧＥＩＣＯ的成功所迷惑，而它的股東們則看著股價上漲。公司的保費／理賠比例超過五：一。這個數字反映出公司所承担的風險，傳統中這個比例不超過三：一，因為政府的保險業管理單位對ＧＥＩＣＯ印象深刻，所以允許它超過該產業的平均比例。 一九六○年代晚期，ＧＥＩＣＯ的運氣開始轉壞。一九六九年，公司宣布它當年度的準備金低估了一千萬美元。雖然賺進了二百五十萬美元，公司實際上仍是虧損的。下一個年度，雖然它們已調整收益金額，但是，公司仍舊低列準備金，這次少了二千五百萬美元，所以一九七○年代不但無保險收益，反而出現慘重的損失。 保險公司從保險客戶身上得到的年度總收入稱做保費收入。從這些保費中，公司負責在此年度期間對汽車駕駛提供保障。保險公司的支出包括保險損失、給付駕駛者的理賠或損失費用及處理理賠的行政費用。這些總花費不僅必須反映當年所需的支付費用，而且也要評估尚需支付的理賠金額。評估項目區分為兩類：理賠成本和費用支出，也就是公司當年度預期的支付費用；調整準備金，用來彌補前幾年短缺的準備金。一些保險理賠由於進入訴訟程序多年未獲解決，所以時常牽涉許多法庭和醫療方面的事務，而必須支付相當龐大的費用。ＧＥＩＣＯ面臨的問題不只是它所簽的保單不穩定，因而必須認列損失，還有它對早期準備金估算之不足。 一九七○年，大衛森退休而由華盛頓的律師大衛．克里傑（Ｄａｖｉｄ Ｋｒｅｅｇｅｒ）接替，公司的經營責任落到諾曼．吉登（Ｎｏｒｍａｎ Ｇｉｄｄｅｎ）身上，他身兼董事長和總經理，他接下公司後的一些作為，都顯示ＧＥＩＣＯ正試圖從它在一九六九和一九七○所造成的準備金混亂中跳出。在一九七○到一九七四年間，新汽車保單的數量以年增率百分之十一的比率成長，而在一九六五到一九七○年時，平均只有百分之七。此外在一九七二年，公司正進行一項花費龐大且極具野心的管理分權計劃，這個計劃需要在不動產、電腦設備和人事費用上做龐大的投資。 到了一九七三年，公司在面臨激烈的競爭狀況下，降低了承保標準而且擴大它的市場佔有率。ＧＥＩＣＯ所保的汽車駕駛，首次包括藍領階級工人和年齡在二十一歲以下的駕駛，這二個族群都有不穩定的駕駛歷史。執行公司擴充計劃和增加汽車駕駛保單數目這兩個策略性改變的同時，美國也剛好於一九七三年取消價格控制。不久，汽車修理和醫療照顧費用暴增。 一九七四年第四季，ＧＥＩＣＯ承保的保單開始出現損失。那一年，公司宣布了六百萬美元的保險損失，二十八年來它第一次認列虧損。令人驚訝的是，該年度保費對理賠的比例是五：一。儘管如此，但是公司仍繼續追求成長；一九七五年第二季，ＧＥＩＣＯ宣布公司虧損更嚴重，而且宣稱要刪減公司股利○．八美元。吉登請米利曼暨羅勃森（Ｍｉｌｌｉｍａｎ ＆ Ｒｏｂｅｒｔｓｏｎ）顧問公司研究使ＧＥＩＣＯ逆轉此下滑趨勢的方法，並提出建議。但研究的結果顯示，公司的前景並不是很樂觀。該顧問公司表示，ＧＥＩＣＯ的準備金欠缺三千五百萬到七千萬美元，而且需要引入資金維持生存。委員會接受米利曼暨羅勃森的研究結果，並向公司股東宣布。此外，委員會預計一九七五年的保單損失，會接近令人震驚的一億四千萬美元（實際結果是一億二千六百萬美元），股東和政府保險業管理單位都為此而驚惶失措。 一九七二年，ＧＥＩＣＯ的股價上漲到有史以來的最高點：六十一美元（見圖５．５）；到一九七三年，股價減半；一九七四年，更進一步下跌到十美元；一九七五年，當委員會宣布預期損失金額的時候，股票跌至七美元。一些股東控告公司詐欺，提出共同起訴案對抗公司。ＧＥＩＣＯ的主管認為公司所遭遇到的災禍，完全是因為通貨膨脹及法庭、醫藥費用的增加所造成的，但其實所有的保險公司都面臨到這些問題，ＧＥＩＣＯ的問題是以前它只為細心的駕駛者投保，而現在卻從這種成功的傳統中偏離開來。此外它沒有再核對相關的費用，當公司擴大業務時，它對預期虧損的假設嚴重失當，以至無法涵蓋那些更新、更頻繁的理賠情況。在公司低估它保險虧損的同時，卻又逐漸增加固定費用的支出。 一九七六年三月在ＧＥＩＣＯ的年會上，吉登承認別的總經理應該可以將公司的問題處理地更好。他宣布公司董事會曾經指示專門委員會，尋找新的經營者。ＧＥＩＣＯ的股價仍然疲軟，股價已經降至五美元，而且繼續下跌。 在一九七六年年會之後，ＧＥＩＣＯ宣布旅行者公司（Ｔｒａｖｅｌｅｒ'ｓ Ｃｏｒｐｏｒａｔｉｏｎ）四十五歲的行銷主管約翰．伯恩（Ｊｏｈｎ Ｊ．Ｂｙｒｎｅ），將成為ＧＥＩＣＯ的新總經理。伯恩被任命之後不久，公司宣布上市出售七千六百萬美元的特別股，以增加它的資本。但是股東已經不抱希望，所以股價下滑到每股二美元。在此時期，巴菲特不動聲色且堅定地購買ＧＥＩＣＯ的股票。當公司即將破產之際，他投資四百一十萬美元，以平均每股三．一八美元的價格買進一百二十九萬四千三百零八股。 □原則：簡單且易於了解 一九五○年，巴菲特還在哥倫比亞大學唸書的時候，他注意到他的老師班．葛蘭姆是ＧＥＩＣＯ董事之一。好奇心刺激巴菲特花一個週末去華盛頓拜訪這家公司。某一個星期六，他敲公司的門，一名守衛讓他進入；守衛帶領他去見當天唯一在營業處的主管洛瑞默．大衛森。巴菲特有許多問題，大衛森花了五個小時告訴巴菲特ＧＥＩＣＯ的特點，菲利普．費雪因此對巴菲特留下深刻的印象。 後來當巴菲特回到奧瑪哈他父親的經紀公司時，他推薦公司顧客購買ＧＥＩＣＯ的股票，而他自己也投資一萬美元在ＧＥＩＣＯ的股票上，大約是他所有財產的三分之二。然而，許多投資人拒絕了巴菲特的建議。奧瑪哈的保險經紀人向霍華德．巴菲特抱怨他的兒子竟推薦一家無人敢當經紀人的保險公司，讓他感到非常灰心。一年後，巴菲特賣掉手上的ＧＥＩＣＯ股票，賺得百分之五十的利潤，然後一直到一九七六年以前都沒有再買ＧＥＩＣＯ的股票。 巴菲特毫無畏懼地繼續向他的委託人推薦保險業股。他以它盈餘的三倍，購買堪城人壽（Ｋａｎｓａｓ Ｃｉｔｙ Ｌｉｆｅ）的股票；他在波克夏哈薩威的有價證券投資組合裡，擁有麻薩諸塞州損害賠償暨人壽保險公司（Ｍａｓｓａｃｈｕｓｅｔｔｓ Ｉｎｄｅｍｎｉｔｙ ＆ Ｌｉｆｅ Ｉｎｓｕｒａｎｃｅ Ｃｏｍｐａｎｙ）。一九六七年他購買國家償金公司的控股權。在之後的十年中，傑克．林華特教導巴菲特如何經營保險公司，這次的經驗幫助巴菲特了解保險公司如何賺錢，這種經驗不易從其他地方得到。儘管ＧＥＩＣＯ的財務狀況仍是搖搖欲墜，它也給予巴菲特信心購買其股票。 除了波克夏控股公司持有的四百一十萬美元普通股投資之外，巴菲特也投資一千九百四十萬美元在ＧＥＩＣＯ新發行的可轉換特別股上，這次的股票發行為公司增加新的資本。二年之後，波克夏將這些特別股轉成普通股，並於一九八○年，他以波克夏的錢轉投資一千九百萬美元到ＧＥＩＣＯ。在一九七六和一九八○年之間，波克夏對ＧＥＩＣＯ的投資總額為四千七百萬美元，以每股平均六．六七美元的價格購買七百二十萬股ＧＥＩＣＯ的股票。波克夏現在擁有ＧＥＩＣＯ百分之三十三的股份。到了一九八○年，波克夏對ＧＥＩＣＯ的投資增值了百分之一百二十三，價值達一億零五百萬美元，變成巴菲特最大的持股。 □原則：穩定的經營史 看了巴菲特的表現，我們的第一個反應可能是巴菲特違背了他關於公司穩定經營史的原則；很明顯的，ＧＥＩＣＯ的營運在一九七五和一九七六年完全不具一致性。當伯恩成為ＧＥＩＣＯ總經理的時候，巴菲特說，他的工作目標是使公司業績起死回生。但是，巴菲特提及起死回生是一件非常困難的事。所以我們如何解釋波克夏對ＧＥＩＣＯ的購買行為？ 就某方面看來，它似乎是項例外。伯恩成功地讓公司起死回生，而且重新將其定位以投入保險業的競爭中。但更重要的是，巴菲特表示ＧＥＩＣＯ還未壽終正寢，只是受創而已。它在提供低價、無中間代理的保險商品上所具有的特許權仍然是獨一無二的。此外，市場上仍然存在著小心駕駛的族群，公司仍可提供其保險需求賺取利潤；在價格基礎上，ＧＥＩＣＯ一定可以打敗它的競爭者。十年來，ＧＥＩＣＯ將資金投注在其競爭優勢上，並為它的股東賺取了豐厚的利潤，巴菲特認為這些優點仍然存在。ＧＥＩＣＯ在一九七○年代所遭遇的困境，與其是否還保有市場上的特許權毫無關係，而是因為業務上以及財務上的問題使公司誤入歧途。即使沒有任何資產淨值，ＧＥＩＣＯ還是非常值錢，因為它的特許權仍在。 □原則：長期前景看好 雖然汽車保險是日常必需品，但巴菲特說，這樣的企業如果在定價上有穩定及高度彈性的優勢，就一定能賺錢。這個描述非常符合ＧＥＩＣＯ的情況。我們也知道一家銷售日常必需品之企業的成敗，經營管理能力是最重要的變數。自從波克夏買入ＧＥＩＣＯ的股票後，從其領導階層的實際表現來看，ＧＥＩＣＯ的確有它的競爭優勢。 □原則：坦誠 當約翰（傑克）．伯恩在一九七六年接管ＧＥＩＣＯ的時候，他使政府的保險管理單位和競爭對手深信，如果ＧＥＩＣＯ破產將會對全體的保險業造成傷害。他拯救公司的計劃包括提高資本、得到其他公司再保險的合約，使ＧＥＩＣＯ部分的保單獲得再保，並積極削減成本。自力更生，伯恩如此稱呼它，這個作戰計劃的目的是推動公司轉虧為盈。 在他上任的第一個年度，伯恩關閉了一百個營業處，將營業員從七千人減少到四千人，並且更改它的執照許可證，以便在紐澤西州和麻薩諸塞州銷售保險。伯恩告訴紐澤西州的政府管理單位，他將不會更新該州二十五萬份的保單，這將使公司每年花費三千萬美元。然後，他撤除這套使保險客戶可以不必提供新的資料，就能更新他們的保險電腦化系統。當伯恩下令執行這個新命令的時候，他發現公司百分之九的更新保單所定的保費過低，當ＧＥＩＣＯ對這些保單重新定價的時候，四十萬個保險客戶決定中止他們的保險。伯恩的行動使保險客戶的總數，由二百七十萬減到一百五十萬，ＧＥＩＣＯ在一九七五年是國內排名第十八位的保險公司，一年後降為第三十一位。儘管人數減少，ＧＥＩＣＯ在一九七六年損失一億二千六百萬美元之後，一九七七年，伯恩的第一個責任年度，就從年度營收的四億六千三百萬美元中，賺了五千八百六十萬美元，令人印象深刻。 很明顯地，ＧＥＩＣＯ能迅速恢復是伯恩努力的成果，而他在公司成本支出上所堅持的原則，使ＧＥＩＣＯ能持續改善其營運情況。伯恩告訴股東，公司必須重新實行剛開始創立時的原則，提供保費低廉的保險商品。他的報告詳細說明了如何持續減少公司的成本，即使是在一九八一年，當ＧＥＩＣＯ還是全國第七大汽車保險承保者的時候，伯恩仍與另外二個主管共用一個祕書；他極力宣傳公司如何從一年前每個員工負責二百五十份保單，進步到每個員工負責三百七十八份保單。在進行改革的幾年中，他是一個主要的推動者。巴菲特表示，伯恩像雞場的農夫，滾著一顆鴕鳥蛋進入女舍並說：女士，這正是競爭下的產品。 過去幾年來，伯恩很高興向股東們報告ＧＥＩＣＯ成功的進展，當情況變壞的時候，他也坦白相告。一九八五年，公司因為低估虧損而暫時不穩定。在給股東的第一季報告中，有一段文字如此寫道，伯恩比喻公司的情況就像領航員告訴他的乘客：壞消息是我們迷失了，但是好消息是我們有很多的時間。公司很快地重新站穩腳步，並在下半年度發布獲利的消息。但同樣重要的是，公司因為對它的股東坦白而贏得聲譽。 雖然在一九八八年傑克．伯恩離開ＧＥＩＣＯ，轉去領導消防員基金（Ｆｉｒｅｍａｎ'ｓ Ｆｕｎｄ），ＧＥＩＣＯ坦誠報告其營運狀況的聲譽始終不墜。一九九一年，ＧＥＩＣＯ博得《華盛頓郵報》一篇名為鼓勵據實以告的報導之正面評價，郵報寫道：主席比爾．史奈德（Ｂｉｌｌ Ｓｎｙｄｅｒ）和副主席路．辛普森（Ｌｏｕ Ｓｉｍｐｓｏｎ）再度讓股東看到公司毫無修飾的優點和缺點。 □原則：不盲從其他法人機構 保險公司能以二種方式獲利：（一）藉由他們發行的保單賺進利潤；（二）藉由保險客戶支付的保費做明智地投資。一般的情形是來自保單的利潤遠少於投資產生的利潤，於是當金融市場可以提供較高的報酬時，保險公司甚至賠售保單以聚集更多的保費投資其中。投資部門的主管必須為公司的盈餘負絕大部份的責任。 Louis.辛普森（Ｌｏｕｉｓ Ｓｉｍｐｓｏｎ），ＧＥＩＣＯ的副總經理，專門負責公司資金的運用，包括合資經營。辛普森是普林斯頓大學的經濟學碩士，畢業後他雖然有些捨不得放棄母校所提供的教職，最後還是選擇了史坦羅暨法爾漢姆（Ｓｔｅｉｎ Ｒｏｅ ＆ Ｆａｒｎｈａｍ）投資公司的工作。一九六九年，他加入西方資產管理公司（Ｗｅｓｔｅｒｎ Ａｓｓｅｔ Ｍａｎａｇｅｍｅｎｔ），一九七九年他跳到ＧＥＩＣＯ前，他已經是西方資產管理公司的董事長和總經理。巴菲特和傑克．伯恩在與辛普森面談時，巴菲特說他記得辛普森獨立的個性，他具備從事投資工作所需的理想氣質，在與群眾合作或抗衡時他也不會特別地開心；他有自己的想法，也樂於其中。巴菲特的直覺告訴他辛普森具備的性格，使他能夠抵抗法人機構的壓力，及避免未經思考的模仿。 在辛普森為ＧＥＩＣＯ所建立的投資指導方針中，可以發現他希望能夠做到獨立行動及思考。第一個方針是獨立的思考。辛普森非常懷疑華爾街的傳統銘言，他想找到自己的準則，所以像巴菲特一樣，他貪婪地閱讀日報、雜誌、期刊和年度報告，他相信一個投資經理人在接受基本財務的訓練之後，最重要的工作是保持閱讀和汲取資訊，直到概念實現。辛普森經常面對許多好的概念而不知如何取捨，但他不願接受多數經濟分析師公然的建議。一位ＧＥＩＣＯ的前決策者說：路易斯是一個安靜的人。在這個現代化的世界裡，每個人都寧願用電話談天，也不願花心思在基本研究上，而路易斯就在作這種基本研究。 ＧＥＩＣＯ的第二個方針是投資是為股東經營高報酬率的企業。辛普森在看到一家能維持高於平均獲利能力的公司後，他會找公司的管理者面談，以確定他們心目中優先考慮的是讓股東價值達到最高，還是擴張公司的規模。辛普森希望找到的管理者，是在他們自己的公司中有一定數量的投資金額。在與公司股東接觸時，他表現的非常率直，就像對夥伴一樣。最後，他測試管理者是否有意願放棄已經失去獲利能力的企業，而以多餘的現金為股東買回公司股份。 ＧＥＩＣＯ的第三個方針是即使對評價很高的企業，也只支付合理的價格。辛普森是個很有耐心的投資人，他願意等到企業的價格變得有吸引力時才購買股票。辛普森認為最龐大的交易是價格過高的不良投資。第四個方針是長期的投資。辛普森並不注意股票市場，也從不預測短期市場的變動，他寫道：股票市場在許多方面就像是天氣，如果你不喜歡目前的情況，你所能做的就是再等下去。 ＧＥＩＣＯ的最後一條方針是不過度分散。辛普森認為太過廣泛且多變的投資組合，反而只會造成平庸的結果。他承認與巴菲特的談話對他很有幫助，使他在這個題目上的想法能夠澄明下來；辛普森的作法是將他的持股集中。一九九一年，在ＧＥＩＣＯ八億美元的投資組合中，只包括八種股票。 從一九七九年起，辛普森所控制的股票投資組合，到一九八九年，產生的年複利報酬率為二六．一％，而史坦普五百大工業指數僅有一七．四％；從一九九○年開始，ＧＥＩＣＯ的投資組合都以一六．五％的年成長率上漲，而史坦普指數則為一○．八％。多年來辛普森引領ＧＥＩＣＯ脫離垃圾債券，以及高風險的不動產持股行列。當其他的保險投資經理人盲從其他法人機構的行為，而危及他們公司資產淨值的時候，辛普森以保守的投資方式，為ＧＥＩＣＯ的股東創造高於平均的報酬。巴菲特宣傳說：在產物和意外保險公司界裡，路易斯．辛普森是最好的投資經理人。 □原則：理性經營 Jack.伯恩和他的繼承人，比爾．史奈德與路．辛普森，多年來已經示範了理性經營ＧＥＩＣＯ的整體資產。伯恩接下ＧＥＩＣＯ保險理賠危機這個擔子之後，他為公司重新定位，以追求穩定的成長。伯恩認為以較緩慢的速度成長，可以小心地監控公司的承保損失和費用，這比公司以兩倍的速度成長卻無法控制財務，更為有利。從那時起，ＧＥＩＣＯ已經為它的股東不斷地賺取承保利潤。 事實上，辛普森在投資上的成就所產生出的大量盈餘，已經足以用來彌補預估損失；簡單言之，公司資本的累積速度遠超過資本的使用。 一個能夠適當判斷經營者理性決策的能力，以及對股東忠誠度的指標，是看管理者是否願意利用多餘的現金，增加股利發放或買回股份，而不是毫無益處地轉投資，擴大整個公司的規模。 一九八三年，ＧＥＩＣＯ無法將它的現金做有利的投資，於是決定利用買回股份的方式，將現金回饋給股東。路易斯表示：可能是我們的標準定的太高，或者是我們願意支付的價錢（收購）太低。自一九八三年起，在股權未稀釋的基礎上，ＧＥＩＣＯ已買回三千萬股股票，縮減了公司三○％流通在外的普通股股票（見圖５．６）。 除了買回股票之外，ＧＥＩＣＯ也大方地增加它支付給股東的股利。在一九八○年，公司的股利是每股○．○九美元（見圖５．７）；到一九九二年，支付的股息是每股○．六美元。從一九八○年開始，ＧＥＩＣＯ支付給股東的股利每年增加三％。 □原則：股東權益報酬率 自一九八二年以來，ＧＥＩＣＯ的股東權益報酬率平均為二一．二％，是同業平均值的兩倍。在一九九○年代早期，由於公司股東權益的增加速度比盈餘還快，所以股東權益報酬率降低；因此根據財務邏輯，公司必須增加支付的股利和買回股票，其目的是減少資本，以維持一個令人可以接受的股東權益報酬率。 儘管ＧＥＩＣＯ股東權益報酬率最近呈現衰退的現象，但仍高過其他產物︱意外保險公司的指數。一九八○年，公司股東權益報酬率是三○．八％，幾乎是同業間平均值的兩倍。雖然在一九八四年和一九八八年股東權益報酬率都下跌，ＧＥＩＣＯ的表現仍優於業界的平均值。一九九二年，公司股東權益報酬率滑落到一四．○％，主因是當年美國遭受到多次的天然災害，包括安德魯颶風。 □原則：毛利率 投資人可以利用幾種方式來比較保險公司的獲利能力。稅前毛利率是其中一個最好的參考，過去十年裡，ＧＥＩＣＯ的稅前毛利率是同業間最穩定的（有最小的標準差）。 ＧＥＩＣＯ嚴密控制它所有的花費，同時仔細追蹤處理保險理賠所需的相關費用。ＧＥＩＣＯ的企業支出平均佔保費收入的一五％，是同業平均值的一半（見附錄表Ａ．１９）。這麼低的比例多少反映出一些ＧＥＩＣＯ不必負擔的保險經紀人成本。 ＧＥＩＣＯ的企業支出和保險理賠損失（見附錄表Ａ．２○）合計的比例，明顯的優於同業平均值。從一九七七年到一九九二年，同業平均值只在一九七七年唯一一次超過ＧＥＩＣＯ；在那之後，ＧＥＩＣＯ的合計比例平均為九七．一％，優於同業平均值十幾個百分點。ＧＥＩＣＯ只有兩次出現保單理賠損失，一次在一九八五年，另一次在一九九二年。一九九二年那次是由於當年美國遭受到異常頻繁的天然災害，以至加重了保單簽約的損失，如果沒有安德魯颶風和其他嚴重的暴風雨，ＧＥＩＣＯ公司的合計比例會更低，約為九三．八％。 □原則：決定實質價值 當巴菲特開始買進ＧＥＩＣＯ股票的時候，公司正瀕臨破產，但是他說，因為ＧＥＩＣＯ公司有保險市場的特許權（有能力提供差異化商品），所以即使其淨值是負的，整體上仍有一定的價值。在一九七六年，由於根本沒有盈餘，公司拒絕約翰．威廉斯（Ｊｏｈｎ Ｂｕｒｒ Ｗｉｌｌｉａｍｓ）所提出的計算公司價值的建議，威廉斯假設企業的價值是決定於企業生存期間，預期的淨現金流量以適當的貼現率折成現值；儘管ＧＥＩＣＯ的未來現金流量是不確定的，巴菲特確信公司會繼續生存下去，而且有一天會開始賺錢，不過能賺多少，或什麼時候開始會賺就值得深思了。 在一九八○年，波克夏哈薩威擁有ＧＥＩＣＯ三分之一的股份，他總共投資了四千七百萬美元，那一年，ＧＥＩＣＯ總市場價值是二億九千六百萬美元。即使這樣，巴菲特估計公司仍有很大的安全邊際。一九八○年，公司從年度營收的七億零五百萬美元中賺了六千萬美元，波克夏從ＧＥＩＣＯ的股票上賺進二千萬美元。根據巴菲特的計算，假使同樣從一個有一流體質及光明前景的企業投資中，要賺進二千萬將花費至少二億美元，如果買的是公司經營的控制權，則成本可能更高。 雖然如此，巴菲特二億美元的假設也很接近事實，讓我們利用這個理論來看威廉斯的例子。假設在沒有任何額外資金的援助下，ＧＥＩＣＯ仍能維持六千萬美元的盈餘，再以當年度美國政府三十年公債為基礎打百分之十二的折扣，ＧＥＩＣＯ的現值應該是五億美元，幾乎是ＧＥＩＣＯ在一九八○年市場價值的兩倍。如果公司的獲利能力可以實質提升百分之二，或在當時的通貨膨脹發生前提升百分之十五，ＧＥＩＣＯ的現值會增加到六億六千六百萬美元，而波克夏的股份就相當於二億二千二百萬美元。換言之，在一九八○年，ＧＥＩＣＯ股票的市場價值還不到其獲利能力折現現值的一半。 □原則：一美元的假設 ＧＥＩＣＯ的市場價值在一九八○年是二億九千六百萬美元，從這一年開始它的市場價值不斷增加，到一九九二年變成四十六億美元（見表５．２），總共增加了四十三億美元，十三年間，ＧＥＩＣＯ賺了十七億美元。公司以支付普通股股利的方式，分給股東二億八千萬美元，而保留十四億美元做轉投資，因此對每一美元的保留盈餘，ＧＥＩＣＯ都為它的股東創造了三．一二美元的市場價值。這種財務上的成就，不僅顯示了ＧＥＩＣＯ擁有優秀的管理階層和適當的市場活動，同時也證明它有能力以最佳的效率，將股東的金錢轉投資。 對ＧＥＩＣＯ優越性的進一步證據是：在一九八○年投資一美元在ＧＥＩＣＯ上，除去股利，到一九九二年會暴增到二七．八九美元，年複利報酬率是二九．二％，這是非常驚人的，遠高於同期業界的平均值八．九％及史坦普指數（見圖５．８）。 □摘要報告 史奈德在一九八六年接替傑克．伯恩成為ＧＥＩＣＯ的董事長和總經理，最近他宣布將提早一年退休，他和伯恩兩個人決定一起成立一家新的保險公司。他們向ＧＥＩＣＯ購買兩家保險企業：田納西州查達努加市（Ｃｈａｔｔａｎｏｏｇａ）的米拉斯達保險公司（Ｍｅｒａｓｔａｒ Ｉｎｓｕｒａｎｃｅ Ｃｏｍｐａｎｙ），以及喬治亞州亞特蘭大市的南方遺產保險公司（Ｓｏｕｔｈｅｒｎ Ｈｅｒｉｔａｇｅ Ｉｎｓｕｒａｎｃｅ）；這兩家公司的年保費收入總計達三千八百萬美元。ＧＥＩＣＯ宣布將聘請東尼．奈斯理（Ｔｏｎｙ Ｎｉｃｅｌｙ）及路易斯．辛普森擔任聯合總經理，奈斯理將負責管理保險營運部門，而辛普森則留任資金營運部門。 ＧＥＩＣＯ所擁有的特許權，包括低廉但仍有利潤的保費，及無經紀人的保險業務行銷方式，使得公司原有的優勢地位仍然存在；公司在控制支出費用上的努力也深植於企業文化中；辛普森傑出的工作紀錄，暗示ＧＥＩＣＯ未來的投資組合，應會有正確的定位，而且公司已經建立了以股東為優先的聲譽。綜合這一些優點，令《富比士》雜誌在它發行的美國產業年度報告中，封ＧＥＩＣＯ為一九九○年代風雲保險公司。 多年來，波克夏在ＧＥＩＣＯ中的地位穩定上升；如今，波克夏擁有公司百分之四十八的股份。 首都／美國廣播公司 首都／美國廣播公司（Ｃａｐｉｔａｌ Ｃｉｔｉｅｓ／ＡＢＣ或Ｃａｐ Ｃｉｔｉｅｓ）是一家媒體通訊公司，它的資本額為十一億美元，擁有和經營電視和廣播網、電視和廣播電臺，同時也為有線電視節目公司製作節目錄影帶。此外公司也發行報紙、購物指南，和各種企業相關的專業雜誌、定期刊物和