Chapter 9 8. The conflict between sea power and land power

The policy targets of land powers and sea powers are those regions whose political and social prospects are uncertain.These areas were the Chinese Empire in the east, the Asian part of Turkey and Persia in the west. As regards the impact of land rights on the future of Asia's heartland between the 30th and 40th latitudes, natural circumstances made Russia particularly predisposed to territorial monopoly.And if other countries have a right in the territory occupied by Russia, it is purely accidental, and the size, status and application of this right are only satisfactory.However, there are notable exceptions, which will be mentioned later.By virtue of its overall dominance, Russia can exert its power as it pleases beyond the limits of the scope of sea power.However, even if direct resistance to Russia is not possible in some areas, it can often be adequately constrained by the use of force in other areas.This power is either land or sea, depending on its strength and place of existence.Such pressures are somewhat feasible in any case, because national interests are diverse and widely distributed.This is all too evident in the international arena, where action in one region is perpetually constrained by concerns about its weak position elsewhere.As a military action, this type of restraint is specifically called conversion.

If Russia had pursued a policy of foolish monopolies which led to the above-mentioned pressures, it could easily be distracted and weakened by it.This is not only related to its vast territory, underdeveloped internal transportation, and the many and powerful countries whose interests are damaged by monopoly behavior, but also because these countries have many favorable locations for conversion actions.In this respect, the matter is very simple, since these points, and many other easily occupied areas, are located directly on the Russian flank.Regardless of other circumstances, a certain degree of pressure or attack is more effective on the flanks than on the middle ground. The simple reason is that the distance between the two flanks is much greater than the distance between the center and them, and the concentration of forces The offensive or defensive action of a country is more easily carried out between the center and a wing than between two wings.So, although alliances or cooperation with those countries that oppose it will inevitably look weak compared with the situation where Russia can fully concentrate its power, these countries also have the above-mentioned opportunities, so they can get some compensation.However, from a potential perspective, land power and sea power are also approaching a certain equilibrium.As mentioned earlier, this is one of the two elements to promote a peaceful and permanent solution to the Asian problem.

The disappearance of friction, another factor, stands out because it is extremely difficult to maintain.It is entirely safe to assume that anxiety is the psychological undertone of the friction that is currently pervading governments.In order to effectively prevent this anxiety from leading to the worst outcome of war, it is necessary to take a comprehensive consideration of the situation and the attitude to be adopted.Failure to do so will result in the state acting aimlessly.If one does not recognize the advantages and disadvantages of oneself and others, and the factors that lead to these advantages and disadvantages, the country and the government will not be able to act decisively when the situation requires it, but may be eager for success when the time is not ripe.Both of these states are undesirable, and they will lead to danger; on the contrary, if each country thoroughly and truly understands the facts and the possible changes in them, and prepares according to the needs of the situation, the country will be more effective. There is a general tolerance and more mutual consideration, so that actions will be more correct, and peace will be preserved by preventing war situations.Undoubtedly, an analysis of the relative power among states helps states to guard their own interests more carefully and to view conflict as a purely thankless choice.This is precisely why peace can exist effectively among the nations of Europe at the present time.

In the same way, if the countries closely related to the future of Asia can have a reasonable assessment of their current strengths and weaknesses, vital interests, and cooperation in the East, and determine how much they need and how much they can do , the Asian issue will surely be resolved peacefully.Coordination of forces based on reality and mutual understanding is more likely to be tacit and will lead to the exact opposite of creating friction and psychological fear.In it, as has already happened in Europe, war will be avoided and there will be an appropriate check and balance between competing wills.Next, having examined Russia's inherent strengths and weaknesses, we shall do the same with those countries whose instinct is to limit Russia's exclusive dominance.In this work it is necessary from time to time to deal with natural conditions as well as with man-made associations or alliances which actually exist.But whether coalition building is wise in the real national interest is not a matter for discussion here, although it will be touched upon briefly.

The most decisive way to effectively transform the ocean from a natural state to a state in which sea power exists is commercial control.It corresponds to and reacts to the exclusive rule of land rights over inland areas that cannot be reached by water.Mere possession of the surface of the ocean, where sea power resides, cannot compensate for the loss of a foothold on the continent.The sea produces little in itself, but it is uniquely valuable as a major commercial thoroughfare and place of communication.The unique significance of the sea is reflected in the goods being transshipped, and the profits of the exchange bring the material prosperity of the country.Therefore, it is absolutely impossible to give up control of commerce, give up maritime empire.So, as maritime powers have aligned interests for the foreseeable future, they should carefully consider how much they can concede in the face of growing calls for them to loosen their grip on commerce.Because maritime powers have limited means to implement their necessary policies, it is necessary for them to maintain the above-mentioned unique advantages. They should not respond prematurely to the clamoring voices, but should take a slow and careful attitude.Relinquishing its long-recognized privilege will not happen overnight.Seizure of so-called private property is such a right that has existed since the days of commercial ventures, although the term private is debatable.A precise definition of a concept as inherently elusive as wartime contraband is also hard to gain.In studying this concept, it would be an even greater mistake to think that the material of the enemy at sea can be carried by neutral countries.Sea Empire is undoubtedly a world empire, and its scepter can undoubtedly be relinquished, but is it wise to do so?

Goods that belong to individuals, in the ordinary sense of the word, but are shipped to other countries for exchange are not private.We all know that money is the blood of war.Once participating in foreign trade, the property of individual citizens has played a role in the increase of national wealth, so personal wealth plays a decisive role in the blood circulation of the country in wartime.This is not at all the same as the case of domestic trade, which is carried on within one country without the participation of other countries, and thus serves only as a functional activity in the body of an organism, merely distributing what the body possesses to the different body parts .However, an organism can never feed itself, it has to digest, assimilate, and distribute those things from outside, and these indispensable external nutrients are equivalent to the foreign commercial activities of political or economic groups, which make the country obtain external resources. Resource support.Maritime commerce is the main circulation channel for such resources, so it is very important to support the war.Disturbance of domestic trade leads to a disturbance of functional processes which may or may not hinder the object of war, but the former has been complained of as causing unnecessary losses.The effect is even more self-evident if foreign commerce is interrupted by so-called looting of private property.Interfering with other countries' foreign trade directly promotes their own war goals. It makes the other party exhausted by blood loss and forced to comply with us, and the cost of implementing it is extremely small.

As mentioned earlier, if Russia is regarded as a unified country corresponding to the central region of Asia, its expansion is and will continue to be carried out from the two wings rather than from the middle.This is indeed the case.Therefore, Russia can only be effectively contained by mainly targeting Russia's flank.This restraint was very effective not only because of the advantages of the flanking attack, as mentioned above, but also because it was aimed at the Russian coast, that is, the outlet to the sea.The inland regions need to maintain unhindered communication with these coasts to benefit as much as possible.And this must be determined by the powerful maritime powers that occupy a better geographical location.

Now, let us examine the situation of Russia's flanks again: first, because they are related to the interests and policy goals of the countries concerned, everyone has a heart for them; It is to prevent the advancement of other countries and thus play a role according to its own strength. If Russia's geographical situation and goals are indeed as stated above, its interests can be expressed in one sentence, which is to seek the widest and most open outlets to the sea: the goal in the east is the coast of China; There are two directions, one is to reach the Persian Gulf via Persia, and the other is to set foot in the Mediterranean Sea via the Black Sea or Asia Minor.From the information from the Russian government that recent history and the natural conditions of the Russian advance zone have no natural obstacles or popular resistance to deter Russia, the above plan is logical.Moreover, in addition to these plans, many people speculate that Russia also has ambitions for India.If this is true, it is advancing from the middle ground rather than the wings.A study of the map shows that Russian advances in Persia would bring it not only closer to the Gulf, but also possibly across the mountains of Afghanistan, if one ignores the difficulties posed by the harsh conditions of Afghanistan and the indomitable character of its inhabitants.In this way, Russia can obtain a good location in Afghanistan and its communication with the northern regions, so as to facilitate operations against India.

These actions of Russia will affect the interests of other countries and arouse strong and reasonable hostility in the latter, and they will use all powerful means to confront Russia.The basis of these means is sea power.Sea power, however, unless seriously strengthened, could not compete with Russia's land supremacy, owing to geographical proximity and other circumstances.In addition, because of Russia's political unity and territorial sprawl, influence over Russia may have been scattered.However, the countries concerned have recognized that they have a common interest in maintaining freedom of commerce and transportation in the disputed areas.The correctness of these national policies and the success of coordination among them depend on their ability to recognize the above-mentioned interests and accurately assess their own strengths.The effectiveness of interstate cooperation depends on the necessity arising from common interests.Therefore, the clearer and more comprehensive the understanding of the interests and the conditions for their realization, the more stable and long-term the cooperation will be.

The policies of land and sea powers target regions whose political and social prospects are uncertain, as determined by the influence each power exerts on the people of the region.These areas include the Chinese Empire in the east, especially the Han areas; and the Asian part of Turkey and Persia in the west.The latter two are adjacent to each other, and the dividing line is a mountain chain that is tall but has little barrier effect. It extends southeast from the Armenian mountains to the Persian Gulf.With no railroads, the area was relatively backward commercial in modern terms.Its area, excluding the Arabian region, is about one million square miles. It borders the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf to the south, and the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea to the north. The width from north to south is about 500 miles, equivalent to half the distance from New York to Chicago.The region has great potential for development, and a railway can be built to connect the Mediterranean Sea with the apex of the Persian Gulf first, and then another railway can be built through Persia to the Indian border.If such a trunk line were to become operational, it would naturally be expanded subsequently.

In the above-mentioned regions as well as in China, the government and the people are equally content with the status quo, neither knowing nor expecting development and progress.Dealing with the problems of these countries is therefore very tricky, and it is better to wait until the outer civilized and progressive countries really need to deal with them.However, as far as China is concerned, given that countries have a realistic understanding of the urgency of the problem and are working hard to gain a piece of territory from China to exert control or influence, they have attached great importance to their own future needs.No matter what influence countries seek to achieve, one thing is always the same: they want some kind of advantage, some real power and turf.That's the only reason why what some native Asians consider a powerful country wants some sort of franchise.If this motive, from both the north and the south, is strong, it will obviously shape the behavior of states.Of course, it is neither practical nor necessary to deprive the local people of their rights at all, and the only reasonable intention is to induce them to accept a situation that will promote their progress and their interests as well as that of the world.How to achieve this situation, whether to gradually take over local rule as in India, or to spur the government that maintains nominal rule, as in Egypt, is a matter of detail that cannot be predicted.The answer to it is not so much predetermined as it depends on actual evolution. Historically, the above changes have generally been led by private commercial enterprises; moreover, local government incompetence has led to a large number of illegal activities.The latter situation requires foreign governments to intervene to protect the rights of their citizens, not only by asking local governments to correct past mistakes and promise never to repeat them, but also by asking for some kind of guarantee for this, such as being granted some kind of the degree of local dominion which the vigor of the suzerain tends to strengthen.This is like if a seed is sown, its germination and growth are determined more by itself than by the conditions of the soil, and once it takes root, it is not easy to be pulled out.It is not local resistance that determines whether a nation can dominate a land, but the countervailing effects of nations of its kind. The above is present in India's past history. India was in a state of tension when there was a confrontation between Britain and France, represented by Clive and Dubray, and there are plenty of them in the present era.In Egypt, the process of confronting the influence of different countries has just ended, contrary to what was first estimated.The result is a one-country dominance situation, as in the case of India.In China, the above-mentioned process has already started and continues.However, with several countries competing, it remains to be seen whether this situation will be fundamentally reversed by some unexpected events, as in India and Egypt.As for Asia Minor, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Persia, it should not be considered that they will always be outside the above process.We do not know the reasons for this, but circumstances have clearly shown that this process must have begun with its associated consequences, although it is not yet possible to predict when it will begin or what it will be. No matter what specific results such processes lead to.The prevailing circumstances amply demonstrate that it is an objective reality.For this reason, the present should be studied to make the future a little more certain than the past.This study begins with and is based on two basic circumstances that have already been stated: first, that the present struggle is being waged on both wings of the Asian heartland and will be sustained by the expansion of Russia; Between the sea power and the land power.But recognizing that there are two major competitors does not mean ignoring the fact that neither sea power nor land power exists in isolation, but complement each other.That is to say; land powers also need to advance to the sea to use the sea for their own services, while sea powers must also rely on land and control the inhabitants on it.Regarding the second base case, though, there is one notable exception.France, whose fundamental interest was a maritime power, became Russia's supporter in the East because of its formal alliance with Russia.In addition, it is natural interests that determine the inclination of the state, which is a reasonable and long-standing situation.So Germany, Britain, Japan and the United States have aligned interests, and this is by no means a one-time situation, as some situations seem to be long-term. These situations are discussed here.The above-mentioned countries and Russia jointly determined the military and political situation in the flank area.Among these countries, Britain, Japan, and the United States are definitely maritime countries, and their military power mainly lies in the navy.Germany is not the same, but its commercial development in recent years makes it also want to implement free trade in underdeveloped regions.Germany, like others, is bound to oppose exclusive control in a scenario that it cannot imagine.Germany's position is well known and reflected in its plans to expand its navy.Therefore, we can expect the same kind of naval-backed action to be taken by the four countries in China should the situation call for it.These countries can support such operations with bases in their hands, and their naval power is enough to make these bases safe from land attack.However, the situation in Germany is somewhat different. Its Jiaozhou Bay base is more vulnerable.Japan is safer because of its island status, and Hong Kong is far from the center of gravity of land-based enemies.The United States, which occupies the Philippines, also has an equally secure base. The above conditions ensured that the seas were kept under naval control.In terms of bases, ships, defensive and offensive forces, lower-level officers and soldiers, and upper-level decision-makers, the navies of the four countries have surpassed the Russian and French navies.Moreover, the navies of the four countries can also be supported by the army.On one wing of Russia there was the Japanese army, and on the other, five thousand miles away, the German army.The significance of the German army to the Asian problem just explains why the United States cares so much about Germany's long-term prosperity.In addition, there is still a lack of rail links between the vulnerable ends of Russia; the Philippines and Hong Kong are both close to Russia's eastern flank; and it is only a small distance by absolutely safe water.In addition to these, the Yangtze River also provides maritime powers with long access to the inland.Battleships went as far as Nanking, 230 miles out to sea, and other capable ships as far as Hankow, 400 miles further.Steamboats widely used in the American Civil War can even sail to Yichang, which is a thousand miles away from the mouth of the sea. The military situation is the political situation, and its correct understanding contributes to peace.Notwithstanding these advantages, there is reason to believe that they cannot be used for political aggression, however effectively they may function in time of war.On the other hand, they can of course be used to thwart attempts to acquire commercial monopolies by force.However, for a maritime power, there is also an obvious disadvantage, that is, the location of China's capital.Due to the characteristics of their own power, the maritime powers are unable to expand their territory. They can only develop China through the Chinese, which can only inspire but not replace the existing ruling authority.Therefore, they hope that the seat of the Chinese government can be moved to the Yangtze River Basin, and right along the Yangtze River, so that the latter can become the center of China's development.Unless this happens when the Beijing government bows to strong pressure, it is likely that a regime in opposition to Beijing will gradually emerge in the Yangtze River Basin.The weakness of the Chinese central government would facilitate such a revolution, which would be but an additional development of the already manifest local independence movements.A period of political division in the Chinese people and its territories may have been conducive to the growth of patriotism, as was the case in Germany before the French Revolution, and in the present age patriotism brings people together into broader blocs than existing nationalities.The unification or division of China is not predetermined by man, but statesmen need to take both scenarios into account. From our exposition, it is evident that the four mentioned maritime states, by virtue of their geographical presence in East Asia, were able to effectively resist expansion from the north.But on the western flank, which includes Persia, the Asian part of Turkey, and the Levant basin on the Mediterranean Sea, the situation is less clear.The proximity to Russia's centers of power and the ease with which France's naval power could assist Russia's Black Sea Fleet helped to establish Russian dominance, which had been France's main goal for centuries.In this regard, as a counterbalance, Italy will actively support any cooperative behavior that can ensure the balance of power in the Mediterranean region and the freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal due to its inclination on the current League of Nations issue and its national sentiment based on obvious interests.With their outstanding political wisdom, the Italian people will not fail to realize that its geographical location near Malta and in the center of the Mediterranean basin enables them to rely on its powerful navy to play a decisive role in the region, and at the same time makes Italy It has become the most important and therefore not stable link in the transportation chain connecting Europe and the Far East.As for Japan or the United States, they have no vital interests or privileged positions in the Mediterranean and therefore have no reason to expend forces there that should be devoted to more pressing tasks.Moreover, the American people certainly objected to helping the Turkish sultan maintain his abused power, not to mention their reluctance to destroy the traditional friendship with Russia unless the latter pursued a policy clearly contrary to American interests.Nevertheless, Americans still need to accept and become familiar with the fact that the United States has been irreversibly involved in world affairs, it issued the Monroe Doctrine, and then occupied some islands, mainly the Philippines, and has key interests in China, The Americans are thus by no means free from their own relevance to issues such as the balance of power in the Levant or the entrance to the Persian Gulf.These areas are closely related to the interests of the United States, at least for the time being, because the United States wants to control the shortest route from the Atlantic coast to the newly acquired areas of the United States. China's policy toward China is the same, which helps the United States.Therefore, the factors that affect Britain and Germany in one area will inevitably affect the interests of the United States in other areas. From the perspective of our research, the problems of Persia and Asia Minor are related to the security of the shortest passage between Britain and Germany and their common interests as well as that of the United States.However, since this is not the only channel for these countries, it is not very important.Given the vulnerability of the passage in wartime, the narrow Mediterranean waters, the even narrower Red Sea and the vulnerable Suez Canal connecting the two, it is of even less value to the countries involved.Considering that the length of the Mediterranean Sea is 2,000 miles from Gibraltar to Suez, and the strong presence of the French Navy on the north and south coasts of the Mediterranean Sea, it would not have opposed the quite representative British proposition that the above-mentioned dangerous route should be abandoned and that the Suez Canal could only be The idea of ​​convenience in peacetime felt sudden.However, if the countries concerned continue to strengthen and expand their political turf, especially along the current route, the threat to this route will be reduced to a point where it is beneficial to establish a certain balance.At this time, the above-mentioned route can be used at least as a temporary route for military purposes, compared with the safer, but also longer route around the Cape of Good Hope. Military security in the above sense depends primarily on naval power, but it is obvious that the navy needs to acquire lands in the eastern Mediterranean region, which is the strategic center of the above-mentioned routes, as a base, and also needs a way to protect strongholds such as Gibraltar and Malta. security, and can also contribute to a political situation that wins broad popular support through interest linkages.This situation already existed in British Egypt, as in India and the Philippines, and it gave the country concerned both an advantage and an impetus to further efforts.If the Suez Canal was less secure, Britain would have to work hard to keep it open even in wartime, and efforts to promote stability in Egypt would necessarily benefit the Canal.Temporary closures of the canal due to deliberate shipwrecks need to be guarded against, but this doom would not have come if there had been strict military control over boats and diversions on the river.In addition, even if the canal is blocked, a relatively short passage can still be found to complete military tasks in time, as long as troops or munitions are transported through the narrow land neck. In wartime, the maintenance of the status quo in Egypt and the security of the shortest route to the East depended ultimately on what is today known as the Asian part of Turkey and to some extent on the long-term political preferences of the Persian region.If we can imagine Turkey in Asia, Asia Minor, Syria and Mesopotamia, as a highly developed modern country with a well-trained army and navy, the above understanding will come naturally.Now, not even France in the western Mediterranean can influence more problems than such a country.If such a state existed, Egypt would also be insecure, as the Ottoman Empire was at its height, since Egypt's strategic importance has been known throughout the ages.Such an imaginary state bordered the Black Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Levant, and had a powerful influence on the affairs of the region and beyond.This country does not exist now, but whether such a political entity can be formed and developed healthily is a very important Asian issue, just like the issue about China.However, China is mainly an output region, and although the former is not barren, a more important role is still in terms of impact on traffic.Therefore, it is far more important than China in terms of importance to the interests of the world. In these regions, in order to foster a political environment suitable for sustainable development, the development process that replaces the existing irrational rule must start from the outside.For it has been amply shown that, under the present regime, there is no progressive drive within the country.Whatever happens, the existing inhabitants will continue to exist, but the fate of the government depends on its ability to adapt to powerful external pressures.In the progress of China, even if the military organization and economic management are based on foreign Russian or Western intellectual achievements, for a certain period of time, the fleet stationed in China will still be foreign rather than domestic, because the navy is the most technological Therefore, it is impossible for the Chinese navy to mature and operate independently early.However, during the regulatory period, the military strategic domain is affected in the same way as when China's naval and army organizations were composed entirely of Chinese.If learning has a positive effect on China's army and navy, their combination will allow China to determine the fate of its own country according to its own interests. It is clear that in China, Egypt, or any country with a large population, development aimed at full civilization can only be undertaken by the peoples already living in the land.There should be no objection to this.What is more or less certain, however, is that these areas are currently not equipped to implement the necessary changes, either for the population or for existing governments.So there is this question: what kind of impetus, what kind of race or organization should such a change be carried out under the guidance of?The answer depends on peaceful or other forms of competition among external forces.This confrontation is inevitable and irrepressible, because the political behavior of countries is opposed to each other, and this behavior is the reflection of different national identities that play a key role.Regardless of the manifestation and nature of the above-mentioned struggles, whether they take place in the disputed area itself or outside it, on land or at sea, through peaceful competition or war, the solution of the problem ultimately depends on the balance of power.The fact that predictions cannot yet be made does not mean that a serious analysis of the situation is not warranted.On the contrary, it is not only the unknown, but also the tendency of the mind that determines the outcome.These tendencies can be given deliberate guidance in the face of recurring tensions by carefully considering the importance and nature of the problem, and by defining desired goals.This is even more important for maritime powers with common interests.These countries do not have a unified leadership, and whether they can coordinate their actions or not can do this. Their vulnerability depends on whether they can accurately understand the relevant issues and form a consensus. It should be noted that in the Levant region of Turkey, there is no waterway to connect the interior with the sea like the Yangtze River in China, although there is a waterway near the island of British Cyprus on the coast of Syria and Karamania. The bay that folds inland.Therefore, the development of the region's interior, which is a prerequisite for bringing local people into the international community, can only be achieved by land transportation, especially railways.In the absence of waterways for large ships to navigate, civilization spread its influence around railroads.Without the direct participation of foreign governments, railway construction will be largely carried out by private enterprise, and the priority will naturally be the least difficult and most profitable routes, especially those easily accessible by sea between the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf. nation.Whichever direction a railway goes depends largely on local considerations, and it must quickly play a political and strategic role.This necessarily sparked competition for road concessions for both military and commercial reasons. If the maritime powers are aware of the commonality of their interests, they should carefully prevent the above-mentioned competition between them from turning into hostility.If this is done, it clearly shows that the long-term overall view has a good influence on the immediate specific actions.The day-to-day benefits of the railway to the country that possesses it will touch the neighboring countries, so that the latter will gradually strengthen the railway construction, so that a large amount of territorial resources will be developed.If a dominant maritime power possesses these resources, it will have greater control.Needless to say, in the regions mentioned, there are abundant and excellent military raw materials. The above analysis illustrates the basic situation and its possible changes at both ends of the middle zone of Asia between 30 and 40 degrees north latitude.It can be deduced succinctly from this that although China and its dependent states in the eastern region have obvious commercial significance for the rest of the world, and their future needs to be determined early, the western region centered on the Levant and Suez has much greater interests. Of military and decisive significance, as it relates to transport links between Europe, India and China, not to mention the relatively independent Australia.Unless Great Britain and Germany want to close the sea route to India and the Far East via the Suez Canal in time of war, they will not make the Levant and the Persian Gulf a potential naval base for adversaries, especially if the latter is in the Pacific with them. time of serious confrontation.Since the above-mentioned route is relatively narrow from the beginning to the end, relying on its left and right strongholds, such as Gibraltar, Algiers, Toulon, Malta, Aden and the Persian Gulf, this route can be effectively controlled.Even a slight detour to the route could not counteract the above-mentioned effect of the relatively close proximity of these strongholds.In the western Mediterranean, France held control in terms of geography rather than sea power.Once Sicily and Malta were passed, the situation at sea changed again with the distribution of geographical and political power.The local states in this region do not have a strong navy, and whether they will have one in the future depends on the political prospects of the Asian part of Turkey and Persia. There was objection that Britain and Germany maintained a naval presence in the Levant, supplying it with supplies and supplies from the mother country.Since the route from Gibraltar to Malta is relatively exposed, the traffic in the above situation is very defective, and the strength of a chain is actually determined by the strength of its weakest link.Such an objection is entirely correct, and while it does not change the present reality, it clearly reflects the need for a secure land base in the Levant, where naval operations can be supplemented locally.In connection with this, nothing, not even the silting of the canals, could alter these conditions that turned Egypt into a strategic center for the main route between East and West.As Nelson and Napoleon recognized, Egypt had this status in the age of sail; the use of steamboats made it even more so.Before the canal was dug, Egypt became a necessary place for navigation.In the era of great powers, Egypt must become an appendage of great powers because of its limited habitable areas.Which big country?Does whoever gets closer has more control because it's easier to consolidate gains?At present, it seems that Britain has solid power in the Levant region, and with a powerful fleet, it manipulates the entire Mediterranean Sea.As far as the Mediterranean is a small sea area, a good fleet deployed in the center can control the entire sea area and complete general military tasks without difficulty.Having ports at either end of the Mediterranean is not overly important to the fleet, although in an emergency it may sail to and get replenished from Gibraltar or Suez, but need not be stationed there to defend them.With a firm base in the Levant, Italy, or Malta, these fleets could dominate the Mediterranean from east to west. England holds Egypt for its own great needs.In addition, Egypt is also in a central position for the entire Eastern world.In any case, supplies from all regions could flow into Egypt.在軍事上，埃及是個理想之地，因為從四面八方流向埃及的物資供應是任何海軍都很難完全切斷的，這就十分有益於在埃及集中力量以進行針對直布羅陀或印度的防禦或進攻行動。上述供應至少也可來自於兩個方向：紅海和地中海，有哪一支艦隊能同時切斷它們呢？即使地中海遭到封鎖，紅海對印度、澳大利亞和好望角來說依舊是最短的支援路線。在上述情況下，英國還有經過好望角的航線可用，如果嫌這條航線過長，那就更沒有理由過早放棄蘇伊士航線了。難道一些臨時的原因或災難只會使英國艦隊暫時處於劣勢？有什麼能比經由蘇伊士運河在地中海與紅海之間進行調動更加保險？一旦英國海軍處於了長期劣勢之中，不管何時何地，英國的抵抗也就瓦解了。 總而言之，根據嚴格的軍事分析，看來放棄地中海和蘇伊士航線卻青睞好望角航線的觀點是防禦性而非進攻性的戰略考慮。它和這種認識有關，那就是，引用拿破侖的譏諷之語，可以毫不冒險地進行戰爭。對一個業已握有馬爾他和直布羅陀的國家來說，正確的方針看來就是牢牢抓住埃及，鞏固對其統治，在印度、澳大利亞和好望角建立必需物資的供應基地，以預防可能的對英國的切斷行為。在英國孤立的情形下需要如此，在義大利、德國與英國利益大體趨同的今天，更是如此。 不管根據國家的能力，針對現實應作出什麼決定，上述討論已有力地表明瞭針對潛在侵略的幾個頗為重要的特點，在利凡特的戰略中心有著決定一切的長期意義。很難不認為上述幾個特點可能出現在該地區，它們作為整體，在過去的時代中圍繞的是亞歷山大和君士坦丁堡這兩個地名在它們身上，具體體現著眾多的複雜事實。在當今時代，蘇伊士這個詞更多地具有這種意義，因為歐洲與東方的交通聯繫取決於蘇伊士地峽及運河。前面之所以對亞洲土耳其、波斯、埃及與地中海盆地談論很多，就是因為它們和蘇伊士通連，這些地區的重要性就在於對所討論的交通線的影響方面，這條線的最關鍵點就是在連接亞非兩洲的頸狀地帶。那麼，是否可以謹慎地認為，經過好望角的環形航線可被放棄？或者問得更直率點，較短的航線是否是唯一一條對各國有用的航線？鑒於國家間的利益衝突，這樣的認識是否正確？還有，英國享有的全人類施惠者的長期榮譽是否與日俱增地維繫在了蘇伊士航線上？ 以現實所能提供的盡可能長遠的觀點來展望將來，世界的同化進步運動不是南北向的，而是東西向的，而東亞和西亞正給發展潮流以最大的推動。東亞和西亞的發展過程與影響離不開巴拿馬和蘇伊士這兩個地峽。它們作為捷徑所在推動了人力對自然障礙的克服，而蘇伊士運河業已開鑿成功。大致說來，這兩條運河也標誌著一種分界線，這條線以南地區的商業和政治活動一直比以北地區的要次要得多。另外，儘管兩條運河都非常重要，但蘇伊士運河更有意義，既因為沒有近期內也不會有象橫跨北美大陸鐵路這樣的交通途徑可供替代，也是因為在蘇伊士附近有著直布羅陀海峽、黑海、達達尼爾海峽、紅海及曼德海峽，土耳其也處於衰落之中，而對美洲地峽來說則沒有類似的情形。另外，圍繞著蘇伊士運河，有一股國家間的嫉妒心理，而西半球的政治格局則多少防止了這種局面的出現。 假如上面的分析正確，就會自然有這個問題：政治思維習慣能否受到上述情形的影響？答案是這些情形是決定對外政策方向時的首要考慮所在；其他考慮並未被排斥在外，但只是第二位的，應嚴格服從於前者。這種情況左右了英國對南非的重要性的認識及對蘇伊士運河的關注。對美國來說，與中美洲地峽鄰接的加勒比海的價值在各方面都大有上升，必須認真注意任何哪怕稍稍地影響了它的政治變化。不過，在美國大陸從其南端可對地峽施加影響，門羅主義已失去了往日風光。雖然如果出於國家榮譽的需要，美國可以繼續執行門羅主義，但鑒於世界上的機會與注意力已顯而易見地轉移到了亞洲，不可否認，無論對美國還是其他國家來說，利益中心已極大地發生了偏轉。如果新的利益所在十分巨大且需馬上著手處理，那就需要考慮一下，請求對我們並無感情的國家的政治保護是否會削弱我們有效行動的能力。國家政策以及軍事活動要想取得成功，就必須集中精力、始終如一。如沒有看錯的話，和在其他地區發生的重要進程相比，東西半球南端的情形只有次要意義。 到此，我們的討論集中於亞洲之外的民族和國家以及人口眾多的所謂中部爭執地帶。毫無疑問的似乎是，後者連棋局中的小卒都不是，僅僅是使有關國家變得更為強大的賭注而已。但這並不是事實。爭執地帶的民族、國家儘管在某些方面就像一群沒有牧羊人的羊，但它們並不是一群為他人所有的羊。通過個人體現出來的這些國家的國民性格可能是堅強、果敢的，不過，發展的停滯使這些國家喪失了應有的力量，最終喪失了進行自我更新的能力。假如這些論斷大體正確現在有充分的理由相信這點，這些國家在將來的某段時間內將依然止步不前，這自然是不可想像的；即使有進步，其動力也必定來自外部。在後一種情況下，外來推動的源泉和特點以及所導致的變化，顯然對世界有著重要意義。斯拉夫式的、條頓式的或亞洲式的推動力所產生的結果是不同的。另外，同樣十分重要的是，本質上並無不同的一個種族的成員現在是生活在一個國家之內，還是由於暫時的差異，分為了幾個獨立的國家乃至敵對的集團。由於答案遠在我們的視野之外，很難平靜地想像中國的四億居民能被收納在一個有效的現代政治體制之內，並共同生活於一塊並不寬敞的國土之上。來自四面八方的對中國的影響將改變中華文明的特性，而這又將對世界的未來產生深遠影響。總之，外來影響對一個國家的作用不是最終體現在物質發展上，而是在個人性格的變化以及由此而來的國民性格的變化上。 所以，未來發展方向對於亞洲國家至關重要。從此出發，外來競爭者的特性與相對能力頗令人關注。這方面的差異決定著一段長期的歷史進程將如何開始，而其歸宿在很大程度上正蘊含於開端之中。所以應該具備長期的眼光，不過現在尚根本無法預測結局。不過，可以確切認為，由於影響未來的積極的或消極的因素是如此之多，所以必須耐心觀察、認真思索、並積極行動，以形成嚴謹的認識。這樣才能保證不會有什麼事情令人措手不及，因為上述作法給我們贏得了時間，而時間的充分是處事穩妥的保證，它將變化過程變為了有序的緩進。這個過程並不排斥其他種族特性的作用，而將曾一直單獨存在的它們溶入自身文明之中。就是在這種情況下，作為本質上不同的種族特性相互影響的結果，條頓文明的一些因素通過漸近的過程而不是突然的變化注入了羅馬文明之中。這個至今依然使我們受益的歷史結果可歸功於愷撒的高瞻遠矚。不過，愷撒自己並沒有有意識地要造成上述結果，他只是看到了現實中隱藏的危險，從而想到應該推進羅馬的邊界、鞏固羅馬國家的週邊地區以阻滯敵人的進犯，為羅馬建立一道可靠屏障，完全是從防禦目的出發的。 需要認識到，歐洲文明也已發展到了一個需要進行對外交流的重要時期。這個過程已經開始，它將以本無共同之處的東西方文明的交匯而告終。儘管按大家所希望的，也如拉丁人和條頓人已在做的，歐洲文明應保持它的獨特性，但它也需要吸收新的因素，尤其是在長期接觸中一直受歐洲深刻影響的中國文明因素，它們間的更進一步融合將潛移默化地產生應有影響。這些並不要求歐洲各國的特性趨於同一，但確實需要有一種共同的精神，這是比物質進步更緩慢的過程的產物。當拉丁文明與條頓精神相碰撞之時，拉丁的特色就體現在了羅馬法和帝制思想上教會集權是其自然衍變，而歐洲儘管有許多國家，它們卻有著一致的神聖基督教傳統。這不是一成不變地從某一代那裡繼承下來的，也不是一時的奇想，而是一套時刻發展的固有精神信念和代代相傳的思想傳統，其完美的生命力已體現在世代沿襲之中。 我們已經和東方國家發生了接觸，但它們對於我們的文明的內涵還是一竅不通，因而把它們融進我們的文明之中是人類要解決的主要問題之一。不過，由於有著過去的經驗，我們不必對此心存疑問，更不用說恐懼了。在我們的世界中，拉丁文明和條頓文明成功地相互融合，同時又未喪失各自的獨特性及影響區域。這主要是因為一種精神滲入了這兩個不盡相同且長期疏遠的文明的內心世界並成為它們共同的所有。兩類文明打碎了相互間的分隔之牆，消弭了相互問的長期對立，同時依然保持了各自的永恆。所以，我們應明白，單單從商業利益的角度這是圍繞眼前利益的短期觀點來考察所面臨的如長期的隔離、相互理解的缺乏、不易實現最終的統一等問題是不夠的。當然，短期考慮也有助於針對近期需要採取措施，但這必須和正確的基本方向相一致，而這個方向的確定是必須單獨考慮的。對所有文中已提及或將提及的因素，不僅要根據眼前的得失，也要參照長遠的未來進行研究。未來的東方國家，尤其是中國，將具備權力意識並為適當的歐洲方法所管理，它們能發揮與其大小相稱的影響並分享普遍的利益。它們還將認識到不過我們對它們的責任要求我們現在就認識到，它們的發展對世界有著極大的物質和精神意義，而且它們需要有充足的時間以吸納我們這裡的幾個世紀基督教發展的成果。 就贏得必要的時間而言，我們及我們的後代可以從現實中找到不少希望。我們當今的世界由許多國家組成，而不是處於一個龐大的、統一的主宰權威之下。愷撒曾為這種統治的建立奠定基礎，這是因為羅馬公民的個人主義傾向使早些時候的更英明的體制難以重建。由於愷撒及其幾位卓越的後繼者的天才和智慧，他們以熟練的協調技巧使一種體制在已長久地失去活力之後仍能得以維持。內部的變化為人所知的是動亂，使該結構在紛爭中繼續存在並且免於陷入僵滯與隨之而來的衰亡之中。羅馬時代的集權、一統的世界就如同一座大廈，其穩定取決的不是基礎的堅固，而是由一屋子卡片決定的平衡。上述例子可以送給某些人，他們以國際組織的增加及隨之國家的單個活動的減少為理由，要把世界置於一個中央權威之下，實現某種要命的統一。其實我們的世界已經為某種傳統和規範所左右，在它之下，各種政治的或個人的行為是像分類架中的檔那樣被收集的。查理曼大帝的去世導致了中央集權的瓦解，從而破壞了國家的統一，將查理曼帝國推入了混亂之中。可是，分裂的、戰爭頻繁的歐洲社會卻有能力擊退阿拉伯人的入侵，並逐步確立後來的社會秩序。在該秩序中，國家間的長久競爭帶來了興旺的活力。 對當代的文明國家以及文明本身來說，沒有什麼比企圖憑藉中央權威來解決疑難和調節利益的作法更加致命，這和由政府操縱個人的家長式作風異曲同工。和公民社會一樣，國家社會正常與否取決於個體成員的活力，而它很大程度上由成員的理性的自我實現能力所決定。國家間的利益鬥爭及由此而起的激烈競賽使各國間在種族特性和政治方式上的明顯差異長期化。而在衝突中產生並得以保持的強烈民族特性一方面會加強亞洲國家的內在自覺，另一方面也會激起它們的反作用，以防範為外部所同化的局面的出現。這種局面如果僅僅是形式而非本質的完美，其過早出現就令人憂慮了。