Chapter 12 Section 2 The Struggle Between Fiction and Reality

2.1 The Truth About the Washington Conference on Disarmament The beginning of the shipbuilding competition The First World War not only did not eliminate the factors that intensified the confrontation between the navies of various countries, but changed the combination of hostile countries. Before the ink was dry on the armistice of November 11, 1918, the United States had begun drawing up plans for the construction of sixteen Superbow-class battleships.Japan also began to manufacture warships on a large scale. (Note: In 1906, the British Navy built a battleship HMS Dreadnought, with a displacement of 17,900 tons and ten 30-centimeter guns. People called it a crossbow-class ship. Then, various powers set off a frenzy In the shipbuilding competition, super crossbow class ships and super super crossbow class ships were built successively.)

Thus, a few months after the restoration of peace, the rivalry between the two great powers for dominance of the Pacific resumed. Great Britain, too, was helplessly drawn into the contest.This is because the United Kingdom cannot sit back and watch its fleet fall far behind the times under the threat of crazy shipbuilding between Japan and the United States. The effects of this shipbuilding competition also spread to France and Italy.Thus, by September 1921, the competition for naval expansion had resumed its pre-war grandeur.The difference is that the competition has become almost worldwide.

Therefore, during this period, intelligence work is even more useful.With a veil of secrecy hidden from prying eyes at the shipyard, reports of shipbuilding were heavily censored.American spies frequently carry out activities in Japan, and our country's spies are running on the east and west coasts of the United States.Before the Washington Conference on Disarmament began, both sides collected a considerable amount of intelligence, which can prove that the work of spies was not in vain. The United States, in particular, has an advantage in intelligence warfare.On the eve of the meeting, they got all the important projects of all the warships that Japan planned to build.Because Japan is the main target of various preparations by the United States.On the other hand, due to the United States' fear of the Japan-British alliance, Britain was also included in the list of potential enemy countries opened by Washington's naval expansionists.

In July 1921, the United States sent invitations to various countries, suggesting that a meeting be held in Washington in September to discuss the possibility of limiting armaments.This move by the United States is timely, because countries around the world are in the unprecedented large-scale shipbuilding competition. The three major powers are building or preparing to build a total of more than 36 super-crossbow-class battleships, and their total tonnage exceeds the sum of the British and German battle fleets that participated in the largest naval battle in World War I, the Battle of Jutland.The United States is building sixteen giant ships, and Japan is starting to build eight ships, and another eight have been approved (Japan's goal is to build eight battleships, eight cruisers, and realize the eight-eight fleet plan).Britain also drew up plans to add thirteen battleships, the first step of which was to authorize four first.These thirty-six battleships are all huge ships with strong combat effectiveness, all of which surpassed any one in World War I. The average cost of each ship is estimated to be about 150 billion yen when converted into current currency.American politicians never expected that Japan would formulate plans one after another, and resolutely accepted the challenge of the United States.

Japan's latest battleship blueprints The United States claims that its motives for proposing the Washington Conference are solely for other countries.But the reasons that prompted the U.S. government to recommend the meeting are obvious.American newspapers explained in detail the astonishing cost of the new battleship and demanded an answer from the government as to the necessity of building such a warship.Still others with foresight warned the government that a strong Japanese reaction would inevitably lead to war in the Pacific.By 1921, opposition to the Navy's shipbuilding program was growing, and it was doubtful whether the program would be completed.

These were the main motives that prompted the United States to propose a conference on disarmament. However, there are other reasons. In early 1921, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence obtained the latest designs of British and Japanese battleships.This intelligence completely overturned the optimistic estimation of the United States with full confidence: the main fleet of the United States can overwhelm other countries. The battleship that the United States is proud of has to face this fact; not only is it not an outstanding battleship, but it will be labeled as a second-rate battleship before it enters service.The sixteen warships under construction in the United States have been unable to change the design to enhance their combat effectiveness.However, Japan and the United Kingdom have formulated new plans one after another, building powerful new ships that seem to mock the poor performance of American ships.The United States realized that even after spending a huge amount of money, it had no choice but to retreat to a second-rate naval power.

You can imagine the confusion and disappointment of the American navalists and the anxiety and frustration of the US Navy. That being the case, some people may ask: Wouldn’t it be enough for the United States to simply build a series of capital ships that exceed the new designs of Japan and Britain?But such a desperate plan could not be realized at the time.This is because American battleships must be designed according to the size of the gates of the Panama Canal (adjusting the water volume of the canal to adjust the height difference of the water surface).If the United States builds large ships that overwhelm the Japanese and British battleships, the U.S. Navy will have to give up the shortcut of the Panama Canal, which it regards as its largest strategic stronghold.

Soon, U.S. Naval Intelligence received new information about Japan.This made the Washington government firm in its determination to stop the navy's arms expansion race without wasting any time. The United States stated that it would build the Cavite Port in the Philippines and the naval base in Guam, that is, to enable the US Navy to concentrate its efforts in the Far East. This move was considered a fatal threat to Japan. The purpose of Japan's tireless efforts over the past three decades has in fact been to expel foreign naval forces from the Western Pacific and keep them out.In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Japan paid huge sacrifices and finally drove Russia away.Now, when others send their fleets to the Pacific Ocean, which is only a few days away from Japan and is close to their eyes, Japan certainly will not take it lightly.

From the naval point of view, Japan is not yet ready for war, and its economic strength is not sufficient.However, Japan is determined to prevent the United States from building bases, no matter how much sacrifice it makes. From 1920 to the winter of 1921, Washington received reports through both diplomatic and secret intelligence networks: Japan believes that our construction of bases and fortresses in Cavite and Guam will constitute a reason for war. Reports about Japan's determination came flooding in from well-versed American Far East diplomats and intelligence officers. Kill two birds with one stone

However, the United States is not prepared to launch a war against Japan in the near future to satisfy the vanity of grand navalists. There are two paths for the United States to take: either forcibly complete the plan to build new ships and establish a new naval base in the Pacific Ocean according to the predetermined steps; Ranked first. The first path will obviously lead to war.Therefore, the United States decided to temporarily abandon the ambitious plan of the navy, and use half of the Super Crossbow-class battleship as a lever to maintain an appropriate naval force within the scope of the agreement signed with Japan and Britain.Sophisticated spies gathered in Washington from all over the world, closely watching the development of the situation.

The United States took its time and calmly waited for the meeting with confidence.The atmosphere in the confidential rooms in the United States was extremely tense, and people worried that other countries would suddenly use the new code, eagerly waiting for the bell to ring the opening of the meeting. On November 11, 1921, the third anniversary of the signing of the Armistice Agreement of World War I, the Washington Conference opened at the Continental Memorial Hall in Washington. Politicians from all over the world gathered together, and the auditorium was packed.After US President Harding delivered the opening speech, British representative Balfour stood up and said that brevity, honesty and honor should be the purpose of this session.Then he proposed to elect Hughes, the representative of the host country, as the chairman in accordance with international practice, which was unanimously approved by the audience. Hughes served as chairman and delivered a speech.But his speech was completely different from the general courtesy of the chairman's inaugural address.At the beginning of the meeting, he suddenly threw out the specific plan of the United States, as if dropping a bomb.He first put forward three principles: 1. Abandon all plans to build capital ships (battleships and cruisers), including those currently under construction; 2. Abolish some old ships; 3. In the future, restrictions on naval power will generally be determined based on the current naval power of each country. He also went further and very specifically proposed plans to limit Japanese, American, and British capital ships. First of all, you should give up: Japan: Seven ships under construction, 289,130 ​​tons; ten old ships, 159,828 tons.In addition, the construction plan of eight capital ships was cancelled. United States: 15 ships under construction, 618,000 tons (330 million U.S. dollars have been spent for this purpose); 15 old ships, 227,740 tons. Great Britain: four under construction, 172,000 tons, 19 old ships, 411,375 tons. Second, the future maximum tonnage is: Japan: 300,000 tons. United States: 500,000 tons. United Kingdom: 500,000 tons. Behind this plan, the United States is at a double advantage. First, the United States has more than half a million tons of battleships, although not all of them have been built yet.The proportion of ships actually being built is in any case greater than what was planned on paper. Second, the coded telegrams exchanged between the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Plenipotentiary have already been deciphered by American cryptographers.So the United States knew in advance exactly how far Japan was going to make concessions.Therefore, when Japan made a request, the United States could take Japan's deliberately tough attitude at a discount.As a result, our country was fooled by the United States in the Washington Conference. Although it was discovered afterwards that the code had been deciphered, Tokyo felt regret, and the people concerned were shocked. Yardley's Secret Room The detection and deciphering of Japanese diplomatic telegrams made Japan hate it, and the United States was ecstatic.The situation in this regard is described in detail in the book "The Black House" (1931) by H. O. Yardley. From May 1917, Yardley served as Chief of the Eighth Section of the U.S. Army Intelligence Service and head of the Section's Codebreaking Section.After World War I, Division VIII was disbanded.At the time of the Washington Conference, he continued to work on ciphers in the Yardley office in New York, and he was the leading figure in breaking the Japanese ciphers. According to him, during the Disarmament Conference, more than 5,000 Japanese coded telegrams, including secret instructions to the Japanese Plenipotentiary Delegation, were deciphered and handed over to the US authorities.As a result of this vital information, the United States suffered no loss.All the United States has to do is stand still and wait for the opportunity. In July 1919, Yardley devoted himself to the deciphering of the Japanese cipher in a closed dark room at the request of the Director of the Department of State for the Far East.It is said that he knew nothing of Japanese at the time.However, he asked for a deadline of half a year, and finally succeeded in deciphering it through intensive study and painstaking efforts.On January 12, 1920, he submitted the first translation of the Japanese cipher. At the time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cipher used for Japanese state secrets was an extremely simple word-change cipher.Each Japanese letter is represented by two Roman characters.For example, ィ is equal to WO, and □ is equal to PU. There are six hundred and seventy-six symbols for every combination of two Roman letters.However, if the consonants and vowels are distinguished, 252 symbols, letters, and voiced points must be displayed.Yardley carefully sorted out the telegrams and concluded that the most commonly used Japanese letters are: イ, ン, ニ, ノ, オ, シ, ト, ワ.In addition, he also discovered the most used syllables in Japanese telegrams. At the end of Japanese telegrams, most of them end with シ. In this way, Yardley skillfully uncovered the mystery of Japanese codes with his amazing strength, enthusiasm for deciphering codes and skilled technology.If he is proficient in Japanese, he will definitely succeed in deciphering it in a shorter time. During the Washington meeting, a small leather bag with a lock was sent from New York to J. McMurray, Director of Far East Affairs of the State Department, and the representatives of the United States attending the meeting. A young diplomat.He had been called back to Washington from a consular post overseas and appointed as a secret courier.In other words, he sent the detected Japanese diplomatic telegrams from the State Department to Yardley's black room in New York, and then sent the deciphered telegrams to Washington one after another. The Japanese translation was assisted by one of the finest Japanese language scholars in the United States, an old missionary.One day, the missionary translated a telegram sent by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to two ambassadors in Washington and London.He found this sentence in the last paragraph: Regarding the above matters, although some facts are revealed, it will cause trouble if it is leaked to other governments. This seemed to place a heavy burden on the good heart of the compassionate old missionary, who, as if for the first time feeling himself a partner in a spy, finally tendered his resignation.Yardley felt that he had lost a helping hand, but he couldn't keep the old preacher. In the summer of 1921, when the Disarmament Conference entered the preparatory negotiation stage, the Japanese side suddenly activated a new and complex code on July 15 in order to strengthen the confidentiality of communications.Yardley had anticipated this in advance, because it had become customary for any country to change its codes when it was preparing for a major move.Within two months of August and September, this scientific code compiled by Japan put the black house in a complete dilemma. The Intelligence War at the New Bridge Hotel However, the State Department got the lifeboat from an unexpected source.Naval Intelligence managed to get what Secretary of State Hughes needed but what Yardley couldn't get. When it was decided to convene the Washington Conference, the U.S. naval authorities were eager to know exactly the attitude of the Japanese naval authorities towards the limitation of naval armaments.Therefore, Colonel Long, the Chief of Naval Intelligence, instructed Colonel Watson, the U.S. Naval Attaché in Tokyo, to find out to what extent the Japanese would accept a compromise.Watson was a quick-witted, shrewd intelligence officer, ideally suited for the job in a country the United States considered its main imaginary enemy.He had two officers under him, one named Zacharias and the other McCallum.Both men are rare Japanese hands in the United States. Zacharias later rose to prominence as the leader of psychological warfare against Japan in the final stages of the Pacific War.McCallum, as mentioned above, was chief of the Far East Section of the U.S. Naval Intelligence Service at the time of the war in the Pacific. One day in September 1921, Watson called Zacharias to the military attaché and gave him a secret mission: There is an important piece of information that I want to send to Washington.We must try to understand in as much detail as possible the extent to which Japan intends to compromise at the forthcoming Naval Disarmament Conference.Although I have obtained a large amount of information, I need to verify it carefully before reporting it to the Admiralty. I want to leave this work to you and McCallum. Ready to serve. Did you participate in the Shimbashi meeting with Colonel Nomura? Well, I did. good!You and McCallum will hold Newbridge talks as often as possible.I can no longer participate.My public identity no longer allows me to have an intimate, heart-to-heart exchange of views with them.Nomura continued to participate in the talks in order to obtain information from our side.Therefore, I am of no use to him.I had to confine my activities to those of the official mission of Naval Attaché.However, you are free to chat with them on the principle of reciprocity. Is there any other order? That's all.Go to Newbridge immediately with Nomura and others, and find out their plans for the Washington conference.Collect any information for me! Nomura was General Yoshizaburo Nomura, the ambassador to the United States when the Pacific War broke out.At that time, he was the Chief Adjutant (General) of the Ministry of the Navy and had been appointed as the Naval Attaché to the Washington Conference by default. In his book "Secret Mission", Zacharias described the situation when he completed the secret mission Watson gave him: At around six o'clock on September 21st, we took a rickshaw to the front of the Xinqiao Hotel as usual, sat on the clean steps, took off our shoes and put on slippers.They were waiting for us when we were led to the house where Nomura and the others lived.We sipped tea and drank American style cocktails.We apologize diplomatically: Colonel Watson regrets not being able to attend today's banquet.And Nomura didn't seem to mind that Colonel Watson didn't attend the banquet. Nomura estimated: Watson must have kept our mouths shut in order not to let us leak information; if Watson was not present, we might leak information.But the information we brought was prepared in advance for Nomura's inquiry.We practiced beforehand to be able to feign surprise during the conversation and to act as realistically as possible when we asked questions. Our practice is not in vain.During the day's talks, we got the exact intelligence Watson had hoped for.This information provides clues for us to figure out the Japanese plan brought by the plenipotentiary of the Washington Conference, Kato Yusaburo Kaisun.Through clever questioning, we managed to learn from Nomura about the compromise attitude at the Japanese cabinet meeting, and learned that a compromise plan may even be reached on the terms of the United States On October 17, Colonel Watson, the Naval Attaché in Japan, sent a long telegram to the Chief of Naval Intelligence in Washington, reporting with confidence that Japan would eventually accept the ratio proposed by Secretary of State Hughes. Top Secret Telegram No. 13 When the Washington meeting was deadlocked on the issue of ratios, and it seemed impossible to break the deadlock, the Japanese representative suddenly proposed a plan, implying that if the United States agreed to abandon the fortification in the Philippines and Guam, Japan was ready to reconsider the ten to six plan. The U.S. representative feigned surprise at the proposal and was not initially interested.In fact, the United States has long known that Japan will propose this plan sooner or later. For such prescient intelligence, the United States Government must have expressed its profound gratitude to its able codebreakers.Because they quickly deciphered the thirteenth top-secret telegram from Tokyo to the plenipotentiary General Yusaburo Kato: November 28, 1921 Received by Plenipotentiary Kato, sent by Minister of Foreign Affairs Uchida Meeting No. 13 Extremely Secret In Guidian No. 74, your Excellency expressed the opinion that conflicts with the United States, Britain, and especially the United States should be avoided on the issue of arms limitation, and the government shares the same sentiment.Therefore, I hope that you will do your best to implement our policy in an attitude of negotiating to the end.As a last resort, consider accepting the second option, that is, the ratio of ten to six and a half.When your various efforts still have to take into account the progress of the situation and the interests of the overall situation and make concessions to the third plan, please consider as appropriate, seeking to limit the concentration of fleets and the use of troops in the Pacific by ensuring that the defense of the Pacific is reduced or at least maintaining the status quo.At the same time, appropriate reservations were made to show that the imperial government agreed to a ratio of ten to six only under such conditions. This is a telegram of historic significance, indicating that if the United States firmly insists, Japan will abandon the first plan (10 to 7) and even the second plan (10 to 6.5), and is prepared to maintain the status quo of Pacific defense Next, accept the plan of ten to six. In this way, Article 19 of the Washington Five-Power Agreement made the Western Pacific a de facto demilitarized zone for a long time.When the United States and Japan abandoned plans to build large naval bases in the region, the two countries also lost the means to use capital ships to fight each other.A modern fleet, if it does not have a proper overseas base, can only be confined to the coast of the country or nearby bases.The provision to maintain the status quo of the Pacific bases was thus the most notable contribution to peace made by the Washington Conference. In short, in this meeting, the skill and ruthlessness of the active American intelligence agencies finally made an immeasurable contribution to stifling Japanese claims and demands. December 10, 1921 Kato Plenipotentiary received from Minister of Foreign Affairs Uchida Meeting No. 155 top-secret urgent We have always believed that it is absolutely necessary to guarantee the security of the national defense of the Empire by a ratio of ten to seven. However, the United States strongly insists on the Hughes proposal, and Britain also supports this proposal, so in fact there is no hope of implementing our proposal.Accordingly, in view of the overall situation and in the spirit of coordination, there is no other way but to accept the proportion of the US proposal. In this way, the United States has finally won!