Chapter 27 Victory of 1.2 Intelligence Battle of Midway

Solve the mystery of AF In a basement at Pearl Harbor with a double lock on the door, twenty-four Tactical Intelligence Unit operatives pored over mountains of paperwork.The head here, Lieutenant Colonel Rocheford, was a tall man with a good sense of humor in a red jacket that most people wear when they smoke lightly.He had been stationed in Japan as an interpreter officer, and was second only to Captain Safford as a veteran in U.S. Navy communications and intelligence.Rocheford's eyebrows revealed a tragic determination to avenge the failure of Pearl Harbor (misjudged the movement of the Japanese combat forces in Hawaii).

One day in mid-April 1942, Washington issued a completely unexpected order.U.S. Fleet Commander and Chief of Naval Operations Kim asked Rochefort to make a long-term estimate of the Japanese fleet's intentions based on the Japanese Navy's communications currently detected. At that time, the Japanese fleet had just completed its attack on the island of Ceylon in the Indian Ocean.Does this matter mean that Japan's main battle line has moved to the Indian Ocean, or does it mean that the Japanese navy will soon return to fight in the Pacific Ocean? Clarifying this issue has a great bearing on the future operations of the United States.

Rocheford made the following four estimates: 1. Japan's operations in the Indian Ocean have ended, and the fleet is returning home; 2. Japan has no intention of attacking Australia; 3. Part of the Japanese forces are planning to fight south of Rabaul; 4. There are indications that Japan intends to fight in the Pacific, but the time and place are unclear. By the end of April, things that were unclear before gradually became clear.The spearhead of Rabaul's southern operations has clearly pointed to Port Moresby.In this regard, the US fleet has moved towards the Coral Sea. Although other operations are still unclear, it seems that the Central Pacific is more likely.

After another week, some fragments of information showing the intention of the Japanese army were obtained, but no definite conclusion could be drawn from the analysis of the communications of the Japanese fleet. Although the Japanese side did not indicate a specific location, there is a name that appears more and more often, sometimes as a destination, sometimes as a location that requires specific equipment. This location always uses the code name AF in the code. For this code name, Rochefort's intelligence officers racked their brains.Among them, one person suddenly remembered that AF was also used in the communication when the Japanese seaplanes failed to attack Pearl Harbor in March.So, everyone carefully searched through the mountains of telegrams received, and finally found what they were looking for.

Sure enough, the Japanese Navy used the code name AF.The seaplane, which had been refueled from the submarine at French Frigate Reef, halfway between Midway and Hawaii, was mentioned in a message passing near AF. This solves the problem for Rocheford that AF must be the name of Midway Island.Since then, he has attached importance to Midway Island as the target of the Japanese attack. However, not everyone sees it so clearly.In particular, some people in Washington estimated that the Japanese army's actual attack target was Alaska or the west coast of the United States. Commander Kim thought it might be Hawaii, while the Army was worried about air strikes on San Francisco.

Therefore, it is necessary for Rocheford to confirm that AF is Midway.Shortly after the Battle of the Coral Sea, on May 10, he went to the Pacific Fleet Headquarters to discuss with Layton, the Intelligence Staff Officer: Can you instruct Lieutenant Colonel Simard, the commander of the Midway Island base, to send a code telegram and say that the fresh water distillation equipment is out of order and cannot be used? Commander Nimitz, who was listening, grinned and agreed: Midway sent a telegram accordingly.Two days later, the Rochefort tactical intelligence personnel who were engrossed in listening to the Japanese communications finally received a telegram from the Japanese Navy reporting that the AF lacked fresh water.

In this way, Rocheford's strategy successfully achieved its goal, and finally solved a mystery: AF is the lingo of Midway Island. standby on lucky point On May 14, Nimitz and General Emmonds, commander of the Army Forces in Hawaii, jointly announced that they had entered a state of combat readiness to resist the invasion of the Japanese fleet.On the 15th, he ordered his ships to assemble.At that time, there were only three aircraft carriers under the command of Nimitz, the Yorktown, the Enterprise, and the Hornet, and they were all operating in the remote South Pacific. On May 24, the submarine force sailed away from Pearl Harbor in order to keep an eye on the waters west of Midway.

The next day, the 25th, Pearl Harbor was boiling with new news. The Tactical Intelligence Unit finally did a great job of deciphering Japanese communications that gave the full picture of the Japanese fleet plan.As a result, all problems such as the Japanese troops, ships, commanders, routes, and attack time were ascertained, and it was learned that the attack time was between June 3rd and 5th. Even Nimitz, who has always been prudent, clearly showed excitement when Rochefort reported on the Japanese Navy's mobile force's combat plan and other issues.Still, Washington remains skeptical.The biggest worry is the fear of falling into the trap of Japan.

In order to conceal its intention to attack Hawaii or the west coast of the United States, Japan may have deliberately sent such a telegram to make Nimitz happy.When the war started, on the eve of the attack on Pearl Harbor, didn't Japan also send out fake telegrams to deceive the United States?This time, it may be playing such a trick. On May 26, Halsey's Task Force Sixteen (with the aircraft carriers Enterprise and Hornet as its backbone) sailed into Pearl Harbor from the Solomon Islands.Major General Spruces was appointed to replace Halsey because of a skin disease. On May 27, another force appeared in the distance. This was Commander Fletcher's Seventeenth Task Force, which was approaching Pearl Harbor.The aircraft carrier USS Yorktown, which was severely damaged in the Battle of the Coral Sea, returned to Pearl Harbor with a stern trail of miles of heavy oil

Before the water in the dock was drained, the repair work on the Yorktown began.Standing under the dock in waist-length boots was none other than Commander Nimitz. The damage to the Yorktown was so severe that a complete repair would in any case take several weeks.However, circumstances did not allow such slow work.Because the Japanese fleet has begun to attack. By all means, it must be fixed within three days? Nimitz spoke to the maintenance crew in a mild tone, but with seriousness in his manner.The maintenance staff couldn't believe their ears when they heard the commander say three days.In the end, the person in charge, Pfeinstager managed to control the hesitation in his heart, and replied firmly: Yes!Commander, we must live up to your expectations.

In this way, whether it was the workers in the navy factory or the crew on board, the entire U.S. Navy at Pearl Harbor mobilized, risking their lives and attacking day and night in order to make the Yorktown catch up with the battle. On the other hand, what was the situation of the Japanese fleet at that time? Just the day before the Yorktown sailed into Pearl Harbor, that is, on May 27, Tokyo time, Lieutenant General Chuichi Nagumo, who was appointed as the vanguard, attacked from the anchorage of Bashirashima in Hiroshima Bay.The light cruiser Nagara took the lead, followed by eleven destroyers, followed by the heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma, the battleships Haruna and Kirishima with tower-like masts, and finally the aircraft carriers Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu. .Just in time for this day to be the 37th anniversary of Admiral Togo Heihachiro's annihilation of the Russian fleet in the Sea of ​​Japan naval battle, people feel that this seems to indicate the luck of this operation. On May 28, the troops attacking Attu Island and Kiska Island in the Aleutian Islands set off from Ominato (Aomori Prefecture), and the troops attacking Midway Island also set off from Saipan Island in the south. May 29th.Lieutenant General Kondo's troops, which indirectly supported the attack on Midway Island, and the main force directly commanded by Chief Yamaki set out from Hiroshima Bay. In this way, there are eleven battleships, eight aircraft carriers, twenty-three cruisers, sixty-five destroyers, plus auxiliary ships, a total of 190 large fleets, starting from Qiandao in the north and ending in Guam in the south. A great arc of eighteen hundred miles, heading east across the Pacific Ocean. At the same time, in the war room of the Admiralty in Washington, which is 7,000 miles away, the combat staff opened the huge Pacific chart and concentrated on conducting the last research on AF and AOB operations. Now, the route for the Japanese army to attack the Aleutian Islands is clear, and a line is drawn with a dark red pencil, with a note beside it: Estimated attack at 8:00 am on May 28. The actions of the troops attacking Midway were also very clear. A red line was drawn from Saipan with a red pencil and marked: Attack on May 28. When studying Commander Nagumo's mobile unit, it seems that he has spent a lot of trouble.I only know that this mobile unit set off on May 27th and drew a diagonal line from the northwest pointing to Hawaii, stating: This line can be denied.A new line was also drawn south of this line, pointing directly to Midway. The Pacific Fleet Command in Pearl Harbor also took pains to judge the enemy's situation. Washington and Pearl Harbor maintained close ties, communicating with each other, exchanging opinions on judging the enemy's situation, and sometimes conducting research on different views.For example, Pearl Harbor believed that Nagumo's forces might take a slightly northerly route, and then approach Midway from the southeast route. But there are various factors that are difficult to determine.For example, no one is sure about the planned movement of the Japanese at 6:00 p.m. on June 2 at a specific point about 650 miles west of Midway.It appears that this location must be a meeting point, but its character is difficult to properly grasp.Even Rochefort's excellent tactical intelligence unit, no matter how painstakingly studied, failed to figure out some of its details. On May 28, Task Force Sixteen, with the aircraft carriers Enterprise and Hornet as the backbone, attacked from Pearl Harbor under the command of Halsey's successor, Spruces. On May 30, Fletcher's Seventeenth Task Force, centered on the aircraft carrier Yorktown, set off.Until one minute before departure, the factory workers were still desperately repairing the ship. After such efforts, the two mission forces met at the assembly point named Lucky Point 300 miles northeast of Midway Island on the afternoon of June 3, making all preparations for attacking the Japanese aircraft carrier from the flank and waiting for the fighter planes to mature. How does the Japanese side judge this kind of movement of the US fleet? Judging from the enemy situation mentioned in the Combined Fleet Order of May 20 is vague.It judges: There are three aircraft carriers USS Enterprise, USS Hornet and USS Yorktown in the Pacific Ocean. It is estimated that these ships are in the southern waters, and one of them may have returned to Hawaii. In addition, the Nagumo troops who grasped the key to the success of this battle judged the enemy's situation as follows: 1. If I start the attack on Midway, the enemy fleet may launch a counterattack; 2. The enemy has not been aware of our intentions; 3. The enemy's mobile forces did not operate in the nearby waters; 4. After the air strike on Midway Island and the destruction of the enemy's base air forces, the enemy's mobile forces can be wiped out. It can be seen that this judgment is full of confidence and subjective assumptions. Pay attention to reconnaissance One of the most important reasons for the US side to win is reconnaissance.Colonel J.V. Highmark, a U.S. naval intelligence expert, commented on this matter as follows: U.S. Navy commanders are determined not to repeat the mistakes of the Coral Sea naval battle.From a few days before the naval battle began, patrol flights were carried out within seven hundred miles of Midway.The best attack aircraft at the time had an attack radius of 200 to 300 miles, so if they patrolled within 700 miles, they could alert the U.S. military twenty-four hours before attacking. Moreover, special duty planes were dispatched every day, one to monitor the take-off point of the Japanese carrier-based planes for dawn attacks, and the other to guard against the rendezvous points that the enemy might use if they escaped the detection of our planes and invaded. Twelve submarines were deployed on patrol west and north of Midway.The main mission of these submarines is to attack the enemy, but they also have a mission to report important information on the presence of enemy forces in the vicinity. In order to complete the above-mentioned reconnaissance tasks, after the aircraft carrier enters the sea area in contact with the enemy, it immediately conducts aerial reconnaissance with the maximum flying distance. Due to the influence of the weather, the approach of the Japanese fleet was not detected, but the day before the carrier battle began, the enemy's attacking force was spotted 700 miles from Midway. On June 4, shortly after sunrise, an airship reported sightings of the Japanese carrier force, and enemy aircraft were approaching Midway.Although the reported enemy positions are somewhat different from the actual ones, and only two of the four Japanese aircraft carriers were found, these two reports are extremely important information.Because for the commander of the Midway Island base, it played an early warning role, and for the commander of the aircraft carrier force, it was of decisive importance.This meant that before the Japanese attack fleet returned to the ship, the aircraft carrier lost its freedom of action; when Commander Spruance wanted to take advantage of the enemy's aircraft carrier, he could calculate the return time of the attack fleet.The most important point is that it shows that the Japanese side does not yet know that the US aircraft carrier force is ambushing in the nearby waters.If the Japanese fleet discovered this situation, it would never attack Midway Island, but would definitely deal with the US aircraft carrier first. Both pieces of intelligence data were used in time, and three Japanese aircraft carriers were sunk.It's like the striker of American football silently crushing the opponent to score for his team. The intelligence obtained by the pilot of this airship made his comrades reverse the situation of the Pacific War in one fell swoop. After attacking the three aircraft carriers, Hornet sent ten scout bombers.After more than three hours of searching, one of the pilots reported that an aircraft carrier, two battleships, three cruisers, and four destroyers were heading north.According to this clear, concise and accurate report, the fourth Japanese aircraft carrier was damaged.If there is no accurate information from this pilot, the Flying Dragon will probably survive, and will surely make a comeback in the future. Indeed, the Battle of Midway Island can be said to be a battle between the discerning United States and the blind Japan.After the naval battle, Nimitz, commander of the Pacific Fleet, said: If the U.S. Navy fails to obtain intelligence information on the actions of the Japanese fleet in the early stage, or is captured by the enemy when the U.S. Navy is dispersing, then the outcome of the Battle of Midway will be different. look. terrified america The best hope for the Midway base is to be the first to spot the Japanese fleet and strike the enemy first.Therefore, twenty-two airships were sent to patrol the 700-mile sea surface of the base. Efforts on June 2 came to nothing.On June 3, patrols began again as usual. At 9:25 this morning, when the airship driven by Ensign Reed reached the sky about 700 miles west of Midway Island, he noticed a black spot ahead.Boat!A lot of boats! Reed thought it was the entire fleet of Japan.So, the radio operator sent a telegram: send to observe the enemy's main force. However, Reid found that the report of the enemy's main force did not have much reference value.Commander Nimitz compared this report with the Japanese plan obtained by Rocheford's tactical intelligence unit, and believed that: Reed mistook the attacking Midway force for the main force.Therefore, a telegram was sent to Commander Fletcher saying: I think the Japanese aircraft carrier force may still attack Midway tomorrow from the northwest. However, would the Japanese fleet really act as the Rocheford intelligence unit got it, and as Nimitz was convinced?The United States still has a lot of doubts in consideration of the eventuality. Therefore, even the United States is closely watching the actions of the Japanese fleet.In any case, the Army could not completely dispel the idea that the Japanese army's real attack target was the west coast of the continental United States. On the night of June 4th, they were very nervous.Soldiers were kept out, radio stations on the West Coast were shut down, and a nine-minute standby siren sounded in the San Francisco area. To give advance warning of enemy attack, the Navy dispatched patrols four hundred miles west of the California coast.On land, the Fourth Army and the Western Defense Force issued a warning to the American people to report any Japanese in American uniform.Because Japanese-Americans have been sent to other areas except for three who wear military uniforms for special missions, they will not be confused with Japanese soldiers. The situation in Hawaii is far more tense than on the West Coast of the United States.Rumors spread everywhere that the Japanese fleet was heading for Hawaii.In order to prepare for the accommodation of the dead and wounded, all inpatients in the Army, except those in special cases, were moved out of the Schofield Army Hospital.The civil defense volunteers are also ready for battle.Army unit commanders asked women and children living in downtown Honolulu to evacuate to safety. At Pearl Harbor, Marines set up machine guns on the concrete gateposts of the Navy Yard.Trucks parked in front of the factory before dark, serving as a fortress to close the factory gates.All anti-aircraft weapons on ships in the port are also fully staffed. As soon as it got dark, a warning alarm was issued.The factory stopped production, some workers waited by the machine guns on the roof of the factory building, and some workers went to prepare fire hoses.The lights of the entire factory were completely extinguished, and entry and exit were prohibited.The workers who stopped working after hearing the alarm waited near the air-raid shelter.Some of them dozed, some smoked, and talked about the enemy's attack that seemed to be imminent. Staff officers at Fleet Headquarters Pacific spent the night in terror in rooms with blackout curtains. The consequences of victory disease The night of cup bow and snake shadow has passed.The fateful day came on June 5th. The Japanese fleet was hit completely unexpectedly. The Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu lost their combat power one after another, and a tragic scene appeared on the ship.Fighting alone, the Hiryu only fired a single shot at the Yorktown.Finally exhausted.All four aircraft carriers disappeared in the waves of the Eastern Pacific Ocean. Why was the Japanese fleet, which was superior in all aspects, defeated? Now let's compare the main forces participating in this naval battle: Japan (including the Aleutian side) Battleships: Eleven Aircraft Carriers: Eight (Light Aircraft Carriers Four) Cruisers: Thirteen Destroyer: sixty-five U.S. Battleship: ○ Aircraft Carriers: 3 Cruisers: 8 Destroyers: 25 In addition to this huge disparity in military strength, the skills and tactics of the pilots of the two sides are also incomparable.Many pilots in our country are veterans since the Japan-China Incident.Since the attack on Pearl Harbor, they have fought successively in the South and the Indian Ocean, making them unrivaled air fighters.Moreover, my Zero fighter was second to none in the world at that time. On the contrary, many aircraft in the United States are old-fashioned, and almost most pilots have no flying experience.Some have just graduated from aviation school, some have not yet flown from an aircraft carrier, and what is more, some machine gun shooters are shooting from an aircraft for the first time. Therefore, it can be said that the United States is not qualified to win and deserves to lose. However, the actual outcome is that the United States, with few troops, poor technology and no qualifications to win, won, while Japan, which should have won, was defeated miserably. Why is this so? The author does not want to analyze the reasons for this failure in detail.However, isn't one of the biggest reasons due to the overconfident victory disease and ignoring the indispensable conditions for defeating the opponent?This condition is a detailed understanding of the other party's situation (intelligence collection) and attempts to conceal oneself (intelligence confidentiality). Always talk about keeping secrets, in fact, it's nothing to leak.If the Americans come out, that's fine.Then you can kill it as easily as an eagle catches a chicken It is probably the inevitable result that this kind of overreaching, dereliction of duty, and being dazzled by the disease of victory will encounter unexpected failures and finally dig their own graves. Indeed, the outcome of the Battle of Midway was an unbelievable defeat for us, from the American side Look, it's an unbelievable victory. Dr. Morrison, author of "A History of American Naval Battles in World War II," said: The victory at the Battle of Midway was a victory of wise use of intelligence. Commander Spruance, the hero of this naval battle, recalled: The main reason for the victory in the naval battle of Midway was first of all to obtain first-class intelligence.Secondly, it should be attributed to the judgment and disposition of Commander Nimitz, who gave full play to his boldness, courage, intelligence and genius according to intelligence. However, Commander Nimitz himself said: The United States deciphered the Japanese coded telegram, so we have complete information about the Japanese army's plan.The information we got was the Japanese army's combat objectives, the general situation of the Japanese fleet's establishment, the direction of approach, and the approximate date of the attack.It was precisely because of such a clear grasp of the enemy's situation that American victory was possible.The U.S. Navy was too far behind to meet the Japanese threat, so this intelligence gave U.S. commanders advance notice of an inevitable disaster. Commenting further on Japan's defeat at Midway, he said: For Japan, this was the first catastrophic defeat since it was defeated by Joseon Yi sun-shin's army at the end of the sixteenth century. This is exactly the case. Taking this fiasco as a turning point, the tide of the Pacific War began to turn sharply in the opposite direction.