Chapter 30 1.5 Judgment on Japan's War Capability

overestimating the power of the war economy In order to analyze and judge our country's ability to conduct wars, the United States has established the following very complete intelligence agencies: Joint Intelligence Committee (subsidiary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) Army Intelligence Far Eastern Section Far East Targeting Section (Army) Naval Intelligence Far Eastern Section Pacific Strategic Intelligence Service (Navy) Army-Navy Joint Intelligence Service strategic intelligence service operational analysis committee Bureau of Economic Warfare foreign economic bureau Enemy Petroleum Council

far east oil committee The size of the U.S. intelligence agencies is far from what our country can compare to the U.S. intelligence agencies.How accurate is the intelligence obtained by the United States through this set of organizations? Generally speaking, despite the integrity of the organization, it cannot be denied that the errors in intelligence results are still quite large.Of course, in estimating the output of specific projects, some have achieved considerable results, as shown in the table below, which can be seen from the estimation of the combat aircraft of the Japanese aircraft industry by the US Army Intelligence Office.

Year: 1941 Army Intelligence estimate: 4,710 Actual (note): 3180 Error (%): 48 Year: 1942 Army Intelligence estimate: 7,308 Actual (Note): 6335 Error (%): 15 Year: 1943 Army Intelligence estimate: 13,794 Actual (Note): 13406 Error (%): 3 Year: 1944 Army Intelligence estimate: 23,918 Actual (Note): 21058 Error (%): 14 Year: 1945 Army Intelligence estimate: 8,980 (Note) Actual (Note): 7128 (Note) Error (%): Nine (Note) The figures for 1944 and 1945 in the estimation table were obtained by the U.S. Army Intelligence Service after studying and analyzing the information provided by the U.S. Army, Navy, and other countries in the United States and Britain.It turned out that in the spring of 1944, according to the agreement between the Military Intelligence Office and the Economic Intelligence Office of the United States and Britain, it was decided that the US Army Intelligence Office in Washington would be responsible for the estimation of Japanese aircraft production.Therefore, it can be said that it is a matter of course that there is such a degree of error in the estimation.

A typical example of overestimation is my country's oil reserves.Many intelligence agencies speculate that our country's reserves at the time of the war were 75 million to 80 million barrels, and it is estimated that this reserve is enough to last for two years (in fact, even if the wartime needs are conservatively estimated, it can barely last for one year. year and a half).Later figures, as shown in the table below, were also overestimated. Period: December 1941 Actual: 41,696,000 barrels Estimated by the Joint Far East Petroleum Committee: 57.43 million barrels Error (%): 34 Enemy Petroleum Council estimate: 75,533,000 barrels

Error (%): Seventy-seven Period: December 1944 Actual: 5,434,000 barrels JFFE estimate: 12,244,000 barrels Error (%): Ninety Enemy Petroleum Council Estimate: 32 million barrels Error (%): three hundred and ninety-seven Period: July 1945 Actual: 2.836 million barrels Estimate of the Joint Far East Petroleum Committee: 5,795,000 barrels Error (%): one hundred and five Enemy Petroleum Council estimate: 27,859,000 barrels Error (%): 882 An estimate that exceeds the actual figure by four to nine times can no longer be called intelligence.What is the reason for this overestimation error? Regarding this point, the report entitled "Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy" written by the General Economic Effects Division of the US Strategic Bombing Survey in December 1946 included the analysis and comparison of US intelligence on the Japanese economy in the first paragraph of the annex. The third item of the is described as follows:

During the war, we had two views of the Japanese economy.One view was that the Japanese economy was fragile and heading towards the apex of poverty, and the other view was that Japan had a large productive capacity and ample reserves; there could still be a considerable surplus at the end of the war.As these two views differ, estimates for special items differ. In general, lower estimates are correct.Because it is based on a more realistic view of the general situation. Many U.S. intelligence agencies overestimated Japan's economic power. This error was mainly due to the inappropriate estimation of the following two factors:

1. Misjudged the overall situation of the Japanese economy.The United States once judged that the various preparations that Japan had made could carry out a minimum war.Few people realize that Japanese industry was severely short of raw materials at the outset of the war. Second, the impact of Japanese industrial and political mismanagement on the wartime economy was not fully considered. For strategic economic intelligence, when conducting statistical analysis, it is necessary to first synthesize a wide range of factors beyond ordinary people’s imagination; it is necessary to collect all factors related to a country, that is, not only including industries and natural resources, but also education levels, social organizations, People's habits, etc.Even if it is still in its infancy, use various methods of social science to analyze.For a certain factor, even if it cannot make a correct judgment on its quantity, it still needs to be paid attention to.

overestimating the power of the war economy The long-term planning work of the United States aimed at overthrowing Japan began as early as August 1942.At that time, a counter-offensive operation against Japan was under way, beginning with the attack on Guaralcanal Island.During the Casablanca talks in January 1943 (the meeting between U.S. President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill), the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff first expressed the following views on this issue: The eventual defeat of Japan would be achieved by an effective method very similar to that of attacking the British mainland from the European continent.The means are blockade (attacking ships and ships), bombing (killing its forces, destroying defenses and munitions industries, and demoralizing) and raiding (attacking from the sea).Our goal in 1943 was to seize territory that could be used to attack Japan with land-based air power.The attack on the Japanese mainland is a matter of the distant future, and such an attack may be unnecessary.

This basic theory, which can be called the idea of ​​overthrowing Japan, focuses on the fact that Japan, an island country, must rely on the necessary materials obtained from overseas to carry out the war.Japan would have to throw up its hands and surrender if its life-and-death sea lines of communication were cut off. Afterwards, serious discussions were held on how to force Japan to surrender as soon as possible and at the lowest cost, and the so-called army theory, navy theory and air force theory were put forward. Army theory believes that to crush Japan's determination to resist the war, attacking the Japanese mainland is an indispensable means.

The history of war bears out this view.Generally speaking, a country will only form an alliance under the city after the center of its territory, especially the area including the capital, has been occupied by the invading army.This theory of the Army was emphasized even more after the Battle of Saipan.Because many Japanese living there would rather die than surrender.This madness convinced many American military officers that the best and shortest way to force Japan to surrender was to actually occupy the Japanese mainland. The naval theory was to force Japan to surrender by means of a blockade.Like Britain, Japan's sea lines of communication are very fragile and cannot withstand attack.If an island country wants to conduct a modern war, its domestic resources are poor and it must rely on imports. Isn't Japan willing to go to war against the United States just to secure important strategic materials from the south?However, if the U.S. recovers the Philippines and deals heavy blows to the Japanese navy and air force, the U.S. military will be able to use the Philippines as a base to conduct operations, cut off Japan’s transportation lines for strategic materials imported from the southern resource belt, and force Japan into a predicament where it cannot wage war.

The air force doctrine was to bombard Japan's cities and industrial belts incessantly, in order to deprive it of the determination and means to continue the war, forcing Japan to surrender.Although bombers based in the Marianas could attack Tokyo, it was necessary to occupy bases closer to Japan in order to maximize the effect of strategic bombing. In the spring of 1944, the Army clarified the basic strategic assumptions for defeating Japan.The Army's proposition is: blockade and aviation attack alone may not be able to defeat Japan, only by attacking its homeland can Japan surrender.This idea was immediately opposed by the Army's direct air force, and the Navy also criticized it. In June of the same year, the Joint War Planning Committee comprehensively studied various options for forcing Japan to surrender, and made recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.This proposal is a compromise based on the opinions of the Army, Navy and Air Force. In September of the same year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, based on the opinion of Army Chief of Staff Marshall, formulated a plan to land in Kyushu first and finally in the Kanto Plain within 1945 as the overall goal of the war against Japan. Of course, the Navy did not approve of this plan, but since the decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff required the unanimous consent of all personnel, and considering that the naval power could defeat Japan before landing, the Navy reluctantly agreed.In addition, the Army believed that the cooperation of the Soviet Union was necessary to achieve final victory in the war against Japan. On May 8, 1945, Germany unconditionally surrendered, and the war in Europe came to an end.This forced the United States to decide on a plan to fight against Japan as soon as possible. Regarding the war plan against Japan, the United States has repeatedly discussed it for several months, but there are still many differences in judgment that have not yet been resolved.The naval and army aviation chiefs believed that a naval blockade and massive air strikes against the homeland alone would be sufficient to force Japan to surrender.However, the army generally advocates that preparations should be made to attack the Japanese mainland and, if necessary, to carry out offensive operations decisively.Nor did the heads of the Navy and Army Air Forces have sufficient confidence to challenge this assertion. In early June 1945, it became clear that the Pacific War was absolutely in the Allies' favor.Germany had surrendered, and the Allies were preparing to transfer troops from Europe to the Pacific front.Manila had been recovered in February, the U.S. military had begun to use Iwo Jima, and the capture of Okinawa was imminent.Moreover, as the Allies strengthened the blockade with submarines and aircraft, they almost cut off the link between the southern resource belt and the Japanese mainland.Strategic bombers taking off from the Mariana base are destroying Japanese cities and munitions industries one by one.The U.S. fleet almost crushed the Japanese fleet and expelled it from the Pacific Ocean. The carrier-based aircraft of the U.S. aircraft carrier force even flew to the inland waters of Japan for activities.Japan was on the verge of defeat militarily. At dawn on June 23, Lieutenant General Ushijima Mitsuru, the supreme commander of the army defending Okinawa, committed suicide by cutting open his stomach after leaving a deadly poem. Five days earlier, on June 18, at a military conference at the White House, President Truman had approved the following plan for operations against Japan: 1. From Okinawa, Iwo Jima, Mariana Islands and various US military bases in the Philippines, continue to carry out strategic bombing and naval blockade of the Japanese mainland. 2. On November 1, 1945, the Kyushu Landing Operation (Olympic Operation) was implemented.In addition, strengthen the naval blockade and air strikes. 3. Attack the industrial center of Japan via the Kanto Plain.The date of attack was roughly set for March 1, 1946. 4. Commanded by General MacArthur and Commander Nimitz. In this way, the plan to overthrow Japan was finally decided. Japan is estimated to surrender eighteen months after Germany's defeat So, how did the allies predict the end time of the war against Japan? It goes without saying that this speculation is based on a comprehensive judgment of Japan's existing and potential combat power. Two days after the U.S. recaptured Kiska in the Aleutian Islands, on August 17, 1943, the Allied forces occupied the Mediterranean hub of Sicily, and the leaders of the U.S. and Britain held the first Quebec talks.Among the consensus reached was the following passage: After Germany's defeat, in order to force Japan to surrender as soon as possible, it is necessary to decide the strategy towards Japan from a comprehensive point of view.This plan should be formulated with the aim of ending the operation within twelve months of Germany's surrender. After that, about a year later, when the second Quebec talks were held in September 1944, the US-British Joint Chiefs of Staff made a proposal to set the date for ending the war against Japan within 18 months after the surrender of the German army. .It may be revised at any time as the situation requires.In addition, it was agreed that once the Axis forces in Europe surrendered, the United States and Britain, in addition to using their existing forces in the Pacific to fight in coordination with the Soviet Union, would devote all their forces in Europe to the war to crush Japan.The proposal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was approved by US President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. On the eve of the Yalta talks (February 4-11, 1945) held by the heads of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union, the United States Joint War Planning Committee made a proposal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff: In order to formulate plans, it is hoped that the war against Japan will be ended. The date was set eighteen months after Germany's defeat, that is, after July 1, 1946. Before the talks between Yalta and the Soviet Union, from January 31 to February 3, 1945, representatives of the United States and Britain held a preparatory meeting in Malta, the British military base in the Mediterranean.The Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States and Britain held a meeting on January 31 in order to reach an agreement in advance on strategic issues between the two countries. Compared with the war in Europe, there is no big problem in fighting against Japan.The two sides approved the plan to attack Iwo Jima and Okinawa, conducted preparatory discussions on attacking the Japanese mainland, liberating Malaya, and cooperation between the US and British navies in the Pacific Ocean, and studied the long-term strategy of the war. When the plan was drawn up, the end date of the war in Europe was expected to be between July 1, 1945 and the end of the same year (Germany surrendered on May 8), and the Japanese surrender was estimated to be within eighteen months of the end of the war in Europe. In other words, it is possible to persist until 1947.Based on this speculation, Roosevelt made a deal with Stalin for the dual purpose of ensuring that the Soviet Union provided military assistance for the war against Japan and political support for the Allies.As the facts have proved, this judgment was wrong.But under the circumstances at that time, it was the latest and most authoritative judgment that could be provided to Roosevelt.Of course, the use of atomic bombs was not taken into account in this judgment. The "Yalta Agreement" was the agreement on the Far East signed by Roosevelt and Stalin through this transaction.According to this agreement, the Soviet Union received generous gifts on the condition that it participated in the war against Japan within two to three months after the end of the European War, ceded Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union, and provided Lushun Port as a naval base to the Soviet Union. Use, open Dalian as a free port, the Soviet Union can lease the Manchuria Railway, etc. None of the major talks of World War II has been so contentious as the Yalta talks.The Yalta talks are blamed for much of the many ailments that have plagued the world in the years following the total defeat of Germany and Japan.Those who make this accusation believe that Roosevelt bowed to Stalin in many ways at the Yalta talks. Major General Deith, who was the head of the US military delegation to the Soviet Union during the war, pointed out that the US military planners became captives of two concepts from the very beginning and acted blindly.These two concepts are: let the Soviet Union participate in the war against Japan; and use the Soviet Union's territory as a base for the war against Japan.Baldwin, a well-known American military critic, expressed regret: this desire, coupled with the overestimation of the Japanese resistance force in early 1945, resulted in a military judgment error during the Yalta talks, and an irreversible political agreement was signed as a result. Ganser accused: If the responsibility for making concessions to Su at the Yalta talks had to be borne by someone, it was the intelligence agencies that provided the Supreme Command with pessimistic judgments.I think the blame should be directed at the Joint Chiefs of Staff.No, perhaps, as the chief of staff of the US President’s entourage, General Lucy, said, the head of the US Army should be pointed at, because it was they who always advocated forcible landing operations on the Japanese mainland and insisted on realizing the Soviet Union’s participation in the war against Japan. The president made up his mind. However, even if the United States holds the attitude that the Soviet Union does not need to participate in the war, will the Soviet Union withdraw from the stage?This is another question.I am afraid that the Soviet Union will not retreat back honestly. The intelligence work of the United States is indeed very good. For example, it detected the imminent war between Germany and the Soviet Union half a year ago.But it was flawed in its strategic intelligence in the second half of World War II, especially in judging the situation in Japan and the Soviet Union at the end of the war. There was a fundamental difference of opinion in the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding tactics to force Japan to surrender.The Navy and Army Air Forces concluded that a heavy bombardment and naval blockade of the Japanese homeland could force Japan to surrender.The army, on the other hand, firmly believes that the only way to force a country, even an island nation, to submit is to rely on a strong army.The Army not only strongly advocated attacking the Japanese homeland, but believed that Soviet assistance was needed to achieve this goal. Roosevelt rejected the navy's opinion and adopted the army's plan, hoping to get the Soviet Union to participate in the war against Japan. For this, he paid a huge price: the United States agreed to give Stalin the Kuril Islands and southern Sakhalin Island.This failure, in the final analysis, is due to the United States' insufficient judgment of Japan's situation, and Roosevelt's wrong evaluation of Stalin, which has led to a tail between Japan and the Soviet Union on the territorial issue. There is another problem associated with this that we cannot ignore. Taking advantage of the chaotic situation that the war was about to end, Stalin made a request to Sorumon: the area where the Japanese army surrendered to the Soviet army should increase the northern half of Hokkaido, that is, the area north of the line from Kushiro on the east bank to Rumoi on the west bank. However, at the Potsdam talks (July 18-August 2, 1945), Truman saw that the Soviet Union did not have the sincerity to seek peace, so he rejected the Soviet Union on the grounds that all of Japan should be surrendered to MacArthur. Army occupation of Hokkaido's request. If Truman's judgment was wrong at that time and the northern half of Hokkaido was occupied by the Soviet army, what would be the situation today?Taking a closer look at the current situation of divided Germany and North Korea, it is indeed not difficult to imagine.