Chapter 35 2.5 Judgment on the enemy's next battle

In the above-mentioned chapters, such as the judgment on the timing of the U.S. official counterattack against Japan, the judgment on the results of the battle, and the strength and organization of the U.S. aircraft carrier force, I have already talked about some general information, from which we can see how much our intelligence work has achieved.Now let me talk about the US attack on Saipan and Leyte as an example of our judgment on the enemy's next operation. U.S. attack on Saipan On February 17 and 18, 1944, the US Task Force 58 under the command of Commander Mitchell raided the fortress of Truk Island in the central Pacific Ocean.On February 23, the force attacked Saipan and other islands in the Mariana Islands with aircraft carrier planes of two mission groups.

This day, Washington time, is February 22, which is the birthday of George Washington, the first president of the United States.It is a major characteristic of the American people to pay attention to tradition and remember historical facts.Starting from this point of view, the author has been doing statistical research on the enemy’s combat habits, so I strongly feel that today’s Washington’s birthday airstrike on the Marianas is by no means a slack on the way home after the attack on Truk. Maybe it has some special significance ( According to the book "Great War" written by Commander Nimitz, the main purpose of the air raid on Mariana was aerial photographic reconnaissance. For the US military, it is important to photograph the Japanese airport and the coast suitable for landing from the air).

Sure enough, after the air strike, the American radio station broadcast the following news: February 22 was Washington’s birthday, and February 25 was the birthday of Nimitz, the commander of the US Pacific Fleet. birthday gift. We don't think this broadcast by Radio America is just propaganda.Because we immediately think of the U.S. attack on the Marshall Islands on January 30, 1944, which happened to be the day before the birthday of U.S. President Roosevelt.The author's initial impression became more and more profound. Afterwards we paid special attention to monitoring the enemy's movements on the Marianas side.We take into account that the Mariana Islands are a strategic hub in the Western Pacific, and the Japanese mainland, which is 2,160 kilometers away from the Marianas, will be within the bombing circle of B|29 planes at the Marianas base.Because the B｜29 aircraft was officially put into production in the summer of 1943, and the monthly output was quite considerable at the end of the same year (the actual monthly output was about 100), it is estimated that when the aircraft carries two tons of bombs, its activity radius is Seven hundred kilometers, when carrying four tons of bombs, its activity radius is 2,200 kilometers.

Sure enough, on March 24, a large aircraft B|24 flew from the US military base in the Marshall Islands to the high altitude of the Mariana Islands.The author felt suspicious at first, and then thought that this incident might herald the enemy's next combat attempt in the Marianas.This is because the U.S. military has a habit of attacking our military's important places by first surveying and drawing a general map of the island or area it intends to attack through high-altitude photographic reconnaissance, and then lowering the altitude for reconnaissance.According to this situation, if you want to attack Saipan, divide the entire map of the island into several small pieces like a country on a chessboard, and then induce us to launch anti-aircraft artillery fire, and mark the equipment status of our anti-aircraft firearms in In the checkerboard grid, draw a detailed diagram.This is the basic step for the US military to prepare for landing operations.

As expected, in mid-April, the reconnaissance of the lower altitude we had estimated began.Now that the enemy's next combat target is likely to be Saipan. The Fifty-eighth Task Force of the United States launched air strikes on Palau from late March to early April, and launched an attack on Hollandia on the northern coast of New Guinea in mid-April.We believe that the enemy's counter-offensive operation against Japan is a two-pronged approach: one is the MacArthur line from the southwest to the north, and the other is the Nimitz line from the central Pacific to the west.Therefore, we have not changed our original judgment, and still believe that the above-mentioned actions of the 58th Task Force are to support the Hollandia operation of the MacArthur Line. In the Central Pacific, the next target of the US military's operations is still Saipan and other important places in the Mariana Islands.However, most people made the following judgments: the target of the allied forces was the Philippines, and the western Caroline, western New Guinea, and southern Philippines were on the offensive line.In particular, Western Caroline, centered on Palau, is likely to be the earliest target of the enemy.

In May, the number of air strikes by U.S. aircraft on the Mariana side increased, low-altitude reconnaissance became more frequent, and U.S. submarines that had nothing to do with destroying our sea line of communication also gathered near the Mariana.These circumstances make us confident that the US military is about to attack Mariana.Major General Yusuke Nakazawa, then Minister of the First Department of the Military Order (Minister of Operations), recorded in his notes: On May 21, the head of the fifth section of the Military Command (the head of the U.S. intelligence section) judged the enemy's situation:

The enemy attempted to fight the Japanese fleet to the death before summer.The San Francisco conference on May 7th was a purely important conference on naval warfare, and it would be implemented a month later.The enemy attempted a decisive battle between the end of May and the fifteenth of June. The San Francisco meeting mentioned here is a combat meeting of the US Navy.Attending the meeting were US Chief of Naval Operations and Commander of the United States Fleet King, US Pacific Fleet Commander Nimitz and US Third Fleet Commander Halsey.According to the enemy's combat habits according to the author's investigation and statistics, once the combat meeting of the military headquarter reaches an agreement on the next operation, then the new operation will often start one month after the meeting (at the earliest two weeks).Therefore, taking into account those present at the San Francisco meeting, we conclude that the next phase of operations of the United States Pacific Fleet westward from the Central Pacific will take place between late May and mid-June.Sure enough, on June 15, the US military attacked Saipan.

However, as a general judgment of the enemy's situation, most people at that time believed that the Allied forces' attempt was to capture the Philippines as the main operation, and they would fight on the northern coast of New Guinea and the Western Caroline Islands. Relevant personnel of the first department (combat department) of the Military Command Department at that time made the following recollections in the compilation "Mariana Naval Battle": First Minister Yu Nakazawa: At that time, it was estimated that Mariana would definitely be attacked, but I did not expect it to be in June.On the contrary, we think that Western Caroline and New Guinea will be successively attacked successively, and Mariana's turn will come only after the Philippine battle has an outline.

Masao Yamamoto, Head of Lesson 1: We didn't think Mariana would be attacked at all, but we didn't expect it to happen so soon. Genda Minoru: We believe that the enemy's attack direction is western New Guinea and Western Caroline, and the goal is to capture the Philippines. We did not expect that the forces of MacArthur and Nimitz would attack in other directions at the same time. We think that Nimitz's fleet It was to support MacArthur's landing operations. American attack on Leyte In August 1944, the enemy's Mariana Islands operation in Saipan ended. At that time, we estimated that the enemy's attack on the southern Philippines would be in mid-December of the same year.However, the enemy landed on Leyte Island on October 20, two months behind our estimate.

However, the original plan of the US military, as we estimated, was in mid-December.So, why did the combat time advance by two months? From August 31 to September 24, with the support of the U.S. Third Fleet battleships led by Commander Halsey, the high-speed aircraft carrier troops carried out raids on Japanese bases from Mindanao in the south of the Philippines to Luzon in the north. Indiscriminate bombing.Meanwhile, on September 21, while relaxing morning music was being broadcast on Radio Manila, US carrier-based planes carried out a devastating bombing of our ships in Manila Bay.Japanese resistance was incredibly weak.So Halsey filled the sacks of his surprise raid on the Philippines.Halsey reported to Nimitz, commander of the Pacific Fleet, that there was no loss to my ships on the water, and there was nothing on the radar screen except the shadow of our aircraft.

After the U.S. Aircraft Carrier Task Force 38 conducted repeated air strikes on the central Philippines, Halsey saw the astonishing weakness of our defense capabilities in this area.According to his suggestion, Nimitz advanced the combat time by two months.On this point, Nimitz described in his book "The Great War": Commander Halsey found that the central Philippines was nothing more than a shell with weak defenses, poor facilities, and an empty interior, so he sent an urgent telegram to Commander Nimitz, suggesting that the implementation of the plan to capture Yap and Palau should be stopped, and the original plan for the above-mentioned The fighting ground forces were incorporated into MacArthur's forces and attacked Leyte.Commander Nimitz agreed to stop the capture of Yap, but hoped to capture Palau according to the established policy, and reported this opinion to Quebec (the US-UK summit meeting was being held in Quebec, Canada at that time).The Joint Chiefs of Staff consulted General MacArthur, who agreed with Nimitz.Accordingly, U.S. Central Command ordered General MacArthur and Commander Nimitz to suspend plans to land in Yap, the Talau Islands (southern Philippines), and Mindanao The plan was two months ahead of schedule to attack Leyte Island on October 20th. As a result, we did not anticipate this step of the enemy, although we had made an accurate judgment of the enemy's original plan. US comments Immediately after the war with Japan ended, U.S. President Truman ordered the Secretary of the Army and the Navy on August 15, 1945, to submit a report on the Pacific War.Thus, the well-known organization, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), composed of 300 civilians, 350 army and navy officers, and nearly 500 soldiers, was In the second month after that, we set up our headquarters in Tokyo and started working.This agency not only synthesized my country's views on the overall situation of the Pacific War in terms of the war plan and the process of the rise and fall of combat power, and the process of defeat, but also made a thorough analysis and investigation of the reasons for Japan's failure. Among the reports of the investigation team, there is one called "Japanese Army and Navy Intelligence".In this report, seventeen U.S. Army and Navy investigators headed by a lieutenant colonel in the Navy Reserve investigated fifty-two Japanese (twenty-eight naval officers, twenty-three army officers, and one employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). ) and related documents, it studied the intelligence work of the Japanese Army and Navy from the institutions, operations and results of the Ministry of Intelligence on the eve of the war and during the war.In the results of Section 6 of Naval Intelligence in Chapter 4 of this report, the following evaluations were made on the work of the Third Department (Intelligence Department) of the Military Command Department: The intelligence thinking of the Japanese is limited, but the third part has successfully completed its mission.Although there are extremely insufficient personnel, in order to obtain a series of real situations or the best judgment on the enemy's situation; through the arduous process of carefully analyzing a large amount of complicated data, great achievements have been made and accurate information has been obtained.Due to the unfavorable situation of the war, the Third Department of the Military Command has great limitations in terms of the most reliable and accurate sources of intelligence, especially reconnaissance reports, photographic reconnaissance, captured documents and prisoners.The "United States Army and Naval Air Force Organization" compiled by the Department in 1944 captured by the U.S. Army in Saipan is probably the best evidence we have obtained that can confirm the accuracy of the third department's intelligence.This document was translated into English and reported as No. 28-45 of the U.S. Pacific Fleet Command Newsletter. In Chapter 7, the analysis of Japanese intelligence estimates and plans, Section 9, the Battle of Mariana, also wrote: It should be said that in March 1944, the Japanese Military Headquarters had quite a wide range of information on the strength, organization and equipment of the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Forces.In March 1944, the Third Department of the Military Command issued information on these cases, which showed that the Japanese intelligence work was excellent (the piece was later captured by the US military in Saipan). A study of this document reveals that at the time of publication, much of the information was up-to-date, and on some issues, its accuracy was astonishing. Although there were some errors and conjectures, it was far more detailed than expected.It contains intelligence on U.S. air forces on all fronts around the world. There is a list of US aircraft carriers, and the aircraft carriers listed above that are capable of operating and under construction are basically correct.Apparently, Japan had timely and accurate intelligence about the US aircraft carrier. An important point in this document is that it indicates that the aircraft carrier USS Intrepid's air force designation was six in March 1944.Originally, when the ship returned to the Pacific in late December 1943, its air force number was eight.However, the Intrepid's Eighth Air Force was dispatched to land bases and was replaced by the Sixth Air Force before sailing out of Pearl Harbor to participate in the Marshall Operation and raid on Truk.In late February 1944, the ship returned to Pearl Harbor due to injuries requiring repairs. Information about the change of defense of the Pearl Harbor air force was leaked in due course, and it was reported to Tokyo immediately in January or February 1944, or it may have been captured by the Japanese in Marshall or Truk. Obtained there, it seems that the latter is more likely. Similarly, the Third Department of the Military Command also learned that in September 1943, the designation of the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga's air force was changed from three to twelve.The aircraft carriers Enterprise, Essex, Yorktown, Lexington, Ranger, and Bunker Hill are also correct in the list. The eight independent-type cruiser aircraft carriers are also correct, and even the unannounced construction numbers are also clear.Four of the cruiser carriers had the correct air group designations, the other four were incorrect. During the war, we had no intelligence channels in Hawaii.Therefore, just as they speculated, we got the information about the replacement of the Valiant Air Force from the American prisoners. Shortly after the end of the war, in November 1945, the author received an order to visit the Meiji Hotel in Tokyo at the request of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Group.At that time, I was the chief member of the representative agency of the Secretary of the Navy (Lieutenant Admiral Yano Shikazo in charge) specially established in Yokosuka, which was going to discuss the aftermath of the war with Commander Spruance's U.S. Fifth Fleet Command. I came to Meiji Hotel on the appointed date.The investigator, a lieutenant commander in the U.S. Navy who looked like an intelligence expert (it turned out that he had spent two years in Washington as a reserve officer in intelligence work against Japan in Washington), asked me about the intelligence work of the Japanese Navy during the war.I have explained what I have mentioned before, the basic goals of our intelligence operations, such as tide measuring computers, celestial navigation methods, etc., as well as the operating procedures. refining stage) and the fourth stage of work (judgment stage). After hearing this, the major said: I understand all your explanations.However, it is hard to imagine that you can achieve such excellent intelligence results with this alone. He said and put the two documents on the table.It looked familiar to me. It was the "Conjectural Map of the Deployment of the U.S. Ground Forces Against Japan" (as of September 1944) and "The Inner Organization of the U.S. Aircraft Carrier Saratoga" compiled by our intelligence department. surface".He didn't explain how to obtain these two materials, but I think they were seized at the front line. The major seemed to use these two documents as physical evidence, and questioned the author to the bottom of it.It's hard to imagine getting accurate information with the method you mentioned.The Japanese Navy definitely had some kind of special intelligence organization like a secret service. We don't have that kind of organization, so, really, it's hard to make a living without rice.I reiterated our approach to intelligence operations and pointed out that past experience has shown that such results can be achieved with thorough research and continuous effort. However, the major was still not satisfied with my explanation. So he explained his difficulties and begged me: I am going back to Washington before Christmas. I cannot understand your explanation, so I cannot report to Washington.Please tell me the truth. I explained it to him earnestly and in detail, but no matter what I said, he couldn't understand it.I am very impatient with his attitude.Suddenly, I had an idea to make a joke and mock this layman major who had only worked in intelligence for two years and put on the face of an intelligence officer.I said: I completely understand your situation.So, I decided to tell you the truth frankly.However, there are two conditions.First, what I say below cannot be recorded, and the interpreter has to leave the stage; second, don’t get angry at what I say, don’t get angry The major, who had been downcast all this time, suddenly cheered up.Agree to these two conditions you put forward, please be sure to tell the truth. So, I said the following: We also have many reserve officers like you who graduated from private universities.Their intelligence operation ability, using a slide rule as an example, can add and subtract after one year, and multiply and divide after two years.However, this level is not ready for jobs that require more advanced computing skills.I heard that you are a major officer in the reserve service, and you have been engaged in Japanese intelligence work in the Naval Intelligence Office in Washington for two years. The "Prediction Map of the Deployment of U.S. Ground Forces Against Japan" was calculated through advanced calculations. It is not surprising that people with your qualifications do not understand my words.It seems that you concluded that we must have special intelligence-gathering organizations like the Secret Service because you didn't understand it, and you are very, very wrong.Your Colonel McCallum (Chief of the Far East Section of the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence) understands me perfectly.Anyway, you think we have a secret service.This is evidence of your laymanship in intelligence work.You don't understand my words, in the final analysis the problem is here! I said with my finger pointing to my head. You said it's a problem with the brain, what do you mean?The major probably felt that he, a naval officer of the victorious country, had been humiliated in front of me, a man of the defeated country, and suddenly flew into a rage. I fought back against him.I know a lot of U.S. Navy officers. I also met Commander Nimitz and Commander Turner when I was in Washington. I was also familiar with Colonel McCallum and Lieutenant Colonel Creamer in the intelligence service.But this is the first time I've ever met a U.S. Navy officer like you.Didn't you just promise me what to say, and you didn't get angry?Now, I am serving in the Yokosuka Navy Minister's Representative Office, and I am assisting the U.S. Fifth Fleet Command in dealing with important post-war issues. I hope you will stop looking for me in the future. As a result, the major apologized repeatedly, saying that it was my fault, and hurriedly called the interpreter to pour me a cup of coffee. Finally, I said: I made you angry, I'm sorry!However, regardless of the outcome of the war, as far as intelligence work is concerned, to put it bluntly, you are far behind me.It is not surprising, therefore, that you do not understand what is deduced from calculations which you do not understand, At this time, the major's face showed a look of enlightenment. I returned to the Naval Ministry and reported the above.Not long before this incident happened, Rear Admiral Kaoru Takeuchi, who served as the head of the U.S. intelligence section during the war, was also called to the Meiji Hotel to ask him about the intelligence work of the Japanese Navy.Just like what happened to me, the lieutenant commander of the U.S. Navy couldn’t understand, so Takeuchi finally couldn’t hold back his temper: If you were my subordinate, I would never promote you to lieutenant commander! When I told him that in the final analysis it was a matter of brain, the major's sudden outburst was because Takeuchi had insulted him first. When the lieutenant commander was investigating the intelligence work of the Japanese navy, he showed us the "United States Aircraft Carrier USS Saratoga Internal Organization Table" and "The Deployment Map of the US Ground Forces Against Japan".Judging from his intelligence work experience and ability, the selection and evaluation of these two materials does not seem to come from him personally.The former was compiled based on the information provided by the captives, which probably did not differ much from the actual situation.The latter, however, is not based on such straightforward sources, but is the product of our painstaking efforts.Therefore, the accuracy of the two is naturally different. The major described our work as an excellent intelligence effort.This evaluation of his may conceal an attempt to get some kind of answer he expects from us.Therefore, I didn't take all he said.Although his words can be discounted, but thinking that the US highly appreciates our intelligence work, I am afraid it cannot be regarded as self-admired and overconfident. Compared with the actual actions of the U.S. military during the war, and checked with the large amount of information released by the U.S. after the war, it can be said that our intelligence work on the U.S. has basically achieved the expected results and the error is controlled within 20%.