Chapter 8 Chapter 4 Iron Sleeve Touch

Discussions between the joint fleet and the staff of the First Air Fleet are still going on, and Vice Admiral Kondo Nobutake led his Second Fleet back to the Seto Inland Sea.In the past few days, he has been leading a group of warships to cruise the ocean near Japan, looking for the aircraft carrier that took off the Doolittle bomber group, but found nothing.On May 1, Kondo boarded the Yamato to participate in the preparatory exercise for the Midway Island operation. He immediately expressed doubts about the upcoming Midway Island plan. Land-based aviation was used, but the Japanese could not.In view of this, he hoped not to hit Midway, but to concentrate on cutting off all transportation lines between the United States and Australia.

However, Yamamoto refused to change the plans for the Battle of Midway.He told Kondo that there was no reason Japan could not win again, as long as it could surprise.In this regard, Kondo posed a difficult problem: Even if Midway can be captured and defended, how will the United Fleet plan to guarantee its supply?Ugaki gave a very lame answer: If it is really impossible to guarantee the logistics, it is entirely possible to withdraw after destroying everything that remains. [Note: "The Battle of Midway", page 93 | page 94. 】In short, the staff of the United Fleet did not further consider the actual and crucial logistical issues.

Kondo's suggestion was not adopted.Start drawing exercises that day.The operation throughout the late spring and summer of 1942 would be conducted in four phases, the attack on Midway being only the starting point of the operation: Phase 1: The main force of the Combined Fleet will capture Midway: A mobile force will capture the western part of the Aleutian Islands.After this move lured the US Pacific Fleet, the Japanese army immediately carried out a decisive blow to it.Make it impossible to become a main force in the next few months. The second stage: After completing the Midway Island｜Aleutian Islands combat mission, most of the warships will return to the mainland to stand by. The rest of the troops participating in the Midway Island Operation will gather in Truk and prepare to attack New Caledonia and the Fiji Islands in early July.

The third stage: Nagumo's aircraft carrier force will attack Sydney and other important places in southeastern Australia. The fourth stage: Nanyun Fleet and New Caledonia｜Fiji participating troops rendezvous in Truk to replenish supplies.In early August, the combined fleet would attack Johnston Island and Hawaii with all forces. [Note: "The Battle of Midway Island", page 95. 】 The gigantic exercise on the map is hosted by Yu Yuan. From the beginning to the end, he has been unrealistically optimistic and has a tough attitude.He was convinced that there would never be a situation that the Japanese could not fully control.Therefore, he does not allow any situation that may seriously affect the expected conclusion of the exercise, and he has no scruples to deny the unfavorable rulings made by other exercise referees. [Note: Same as above, page 96. 】

Yamamoto has mobilized more than 200 ships to participate in this large-scale battle, and determined June 7 as N-day [Translator's Note: N-day is the attack day, which is equivalent to D-day for the US military. 】.Choosing this day to attack can give the two fleets of Nagumo and Kondo enough time to conduct a thorough overhaul. At the same time, this day is the last chance to use the full moon for night battles in the next month or so. [Note: "The Battle of Midway", pages seventy-ninth and eighty-four. 】According to the plan, five days before N, that is, on June 2, Vice Admiral Komatsu Teruhisa's advance submarine force will set up a three-part cordon east of Midway Island in order to detect the activities of the enemy fleet.The third submarine team (I｜168, I｜169, I｜171, I｜174, I｜175) will be deployed at latitude 19°30｜23° Thirty minutes, west longitude 167° line; fifth submarine team (I｜156, I｜157, I｜158, I｜159, I｜162, I｜ 165, Yi｜166) will be deployed on the line from 29°30 north latitude, 164°30° west longitude to 26°10° north latitude, 167° west longitude , and finally, the Thirteenth Submarine Squadron (I|121, I|122, I|123) will serve as a supply team to deliver gasoline to Lisianski Island and French|Frigate Atoll and diesel. [Note: Same as above, page 89; interview with Watanabe, September 26, 1964. 】

According to the third-generation plan of the Naval Command, these submarines are also responsible for refueling two Chuanxi-2 seaplanes each weighing 31 tons and with a flight distance of 4,000 nautical miles.The two aircraft were to take off from Watjay Atoll, receive submarine refueling at French|Friget Atoll, and conduct reconnaissance of enemy forces and activities.Because the excellent espionage agency established by Japan on Oahu before the war has been lost.On March 4, two of these seaplanes flew over Pearl Harbor for mock bombing practice and dropped a few bombs, but only to frighten each other. [Note: Ibid., page 88; Bard's interview with the Three Generations, May 6, 1966. 】

Although the underwater advance mission is extremely important, the submarine force commander Komatsu did not personally participate in the exercise.His entire staff, however, took part.There was no mention of the submarine search mission in the official order for the Midway operation plan.The submarine portion of such operational orders was usually drafted by Yamamoto's submarine chief, Lieutenant Admiral Arima Koyasu, but for some reason Kurojima told him he didn't have to. [Note: Interview with Watanabe, September 26 and October 6, 1964. 】 The next force in place was Vice Admiral Yoshiro Hoshikata's Northern Force.They will attack the Aleutian Islands three days before N, on June 4th.This fleet is formidably large.It has three heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, one auxiliary cruiser, twelve destroyers, three minesweepers, one minelayer, three army landing parties with a total of 1,200 people and 1,200 The transport ship of the fifty-man naval landing team, and two aircraft carriers, the Ryujo with 16 fighter jets and 21 torpedo bombers, and the Hayato with 24 fighter jets and 21 dive bombers . [Note: "The Battle of Midway", page 89 | 83. 】

The main direction of attack is Midway Island.Nagumo's First Aircraft Carrier Assault Force will begin operations two days before N (June 5) from about 250 nautical miles northeast of Midway Island.The task is: to clear all enemy surface and air forces within the attack range, and to destroy the coastal installations of Midway Island.According to the original plan, Nagumo will lead the six aircraft carriers that attacked Pearl Harbor, but since the Shokaku and Zuikaku are still fighting in the South Pacific, it is not known whether they can come back, but he can count on the Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu Four aircraft carriers, No. 1 and Soryu, were put into combat at Midway.Akagi and Kaga carried forty-two fighters, forty-two dive bombers, and fifty-one torpedo bombers.Soryu and Hiryu had the same number of fighters and dive bombers, and forty-two torpedo bombers.Nagumo's support ships consisted of battleships Haruna and Kirishima, heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma, light cruiser Nagara, and eleven destroyers. [Note: Ibid, 80 | 81, 85, 106 pages. 】

The plan called for Rear Admiral Yototaro Fujita's seaplane carrier force, consisting of the seaplane carriers Chitose and Kamikawa Maru, a destroyer, and a patrol boat, to capture Cure Island, about sixty nautical miles northwest of Midway, the following day .In this way, twenty-four carrier-based fighter jets and eight reconnaissance planes will use Cure Island as a base to support the main landing. According to the plan in the exercise, the convoy convoy of Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka consisting of twelve transport ships and three fast transport ships departing from Saipan will be slightly southward from the mainland on the same day (June 6). The main force of Kondo's Midway attack force in motion converged. [Note: "The Battle of Midway", page 86 | page 86. 】In order to make the Americans mistakenly believe that the main force of the Japanese army came from the south, Tanaka's fleet must be deliberately discovered by the enemy at this time. [Note: Interview with Watanabe, September 26, 1964. 】This requires accurate calculation of time: the attacking force must be discovered by the enemy, but must not be exposed prematurely.

In the early hours of the Nth, Tanaka will land a force of 5,000 men onboard, and at the same time, Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita's heavy cruisers Kumano, Mikuma, Suzuya, Mogami and two destroyers will provide close support from Guam. .Kondo's main battleships Kongo and Hiei, heavy cruisers Atago, Chokai, Myoko, and Haguro, light cruiser Yura, eight destroyers, and the 12 fighter jets and 12 torpedo bombers The small aircraft carrier Zuiho would remain to cover the flank slightly south-southwest of Midway. [Note: "The Battle of Midway Island", 81 | pp. 82 and 86. 】 How will Yamamoto's main force act?Composed of battleships Hyuga, Ise, Fuso, and Yamashiro, two light cruisers and twelve destroyers, the security force commanded by Vice Admiral Shiro Takasu will provide security for the attack on the Aleutian Islands as planned.Yamamoto will be aboard the Yamato, which is escorted by the battleships Nagato and Mutsu.The light cruiser Sendai, nine destroyers, the small aircraft carrier Hosho carrying eight bombers, and the seaplane carriers Chiyoda and Nisshin carrying pocket submarines used to harass U.S. ships during surface warfare served as supporting forces. [Note: Ibid., pages 80 and 85. 】

Thus, Yamamoto's command position would be six hundred nautical miles northwest of Midway, far from the potential battlefield.Takasu's security forces were five hundred nautical miles north of Yamamoto.As the vanguard of the entire battle, the Nanyun Force will be 300 nautical miles east of Yamamoto.Finally, Rear Admiral Kakuji Kakuda's Second Aircraft Carrier Strike Force, which by this time had returned from the Alaskan waters, would be located three hundred nautical miles east of the security force. [Note: "The Battle of Midway Island", page 86. 】 If all goes according to plan, this massive fleet will be spread out over a thousand nautical miles of water in the northern central Pacific.Each force will be waiting for the US Pacific Fleet to appear on the water antenna sometime after N days. Although the forces are scattered, if something unexpected happens, the troops can still be concentrated in one place to fight against the enemy.Still, no one really believed that was the case.Almost everyone thinks victory is within reach, Watanabe said, with most of the U.S. fleet in the Atlantic.Accordingly, we believe that the Japanese navy has the upper hand in the Pacific.If directed properly, it is impossible not to win. [Note: Interview with Bobian, September 26, 1964. 】This in itself has a big if problem, and, needless to say, this plan is based on the fact that the actions of the Americans are not as expected by the Japanese. The airmen were distressed to see that the Combined Fleet would not be reconfigured in accordance with the methods Yamaguchi proposed at the meeting in late April. [Note: "The Battle of Midway Island", page 99. 】The title of the main force is meaningful.Although Yamamoto talked about sticking to the offensive principle and using the power of naval aviation, he still perhaps subconsciously regarded the battleship as the queen of the fleet.In case the Americans show up early, Nagumo's aircraft carrier will bear all the frontal pressure, and where are these warships at this time?Yamamoto would be three hundred nautical miles west of Nagumo, and Takasu would be nearly a thousand nautical miles north of Nagumo.If there is an emergency, no matter how great your skills are, it won't help. It's better to stay on Zhu Island to save some fuel.However, the vigilance and protection that Nan Yun needed had to be resolved by Nan Yun himself.His two battleships, two heavy cruisers, and one light cruiser could not provide effective cover for four, perhaps six, aircraft carriers. However, the officers of the First Air Fleet, who have tanned their skin and strengthened their bodies in the battles in the southern seas for several months, are very confident.Their personalities respond to these concerns in different ways: some are annoyed, some are disgusted, some are put off, some are mocking and amusing.But no one is vigilant, and no one has a premonition that disaster is imminent.They felt that they could have won the Battle of Midway on their own. During the course of these complex map exercises, some operational commanders noticed that combined fleet staff had grossly underestimated enemy capabilities, and that Ugaki was arbitrarily reversing them in favor of the Japanese when major difficulties arose condition.However, none of them wanted to raise objections, lest Ugaki would be furious.They all thought it would be useless to mention it.Staff and tactical commanders at Combined Fleet Command scrambled to express their confidence. [Note: "The Battle of Midway Island", page 96. 】 During the exercise on the picture, both Ugaki and Kurojima asked a question: when all the fighter jets of the First Air Fleet were dispatched to escort the bombers attacking Midway Island, how would they plan to protect the aircraft carrier from enemy bombers? Looking intently at Genda instead of Nagumo, he waited for his answer. [Note: Interview with Watanabe, September 26, 1964. 】 Since the beginning of the war, whenever Genda dealt the cards, Nagumo always had good luck, but he never asked for a showdown.Nagumo is convinced that he already holds the blue bird that symbolizes happiness, so he relies more and more on this talented aviation consultant.Also, the other staff officers have a certain awe for him (Genda).Outspoken people openly referred to this mobile force as Genda's fleet. [Note: Makishima Teichi: The tragic Midway naval battle.Hereinafter referred to as the Battle of Tragedy. 】 Those less talented than Genda would revel in this kind of unquestioning acceptance.But Genda was a good officer, and he felt uncomfortable, sometimes terribly, in the situation.One of the reasons is that Nagumo has many years of valuable practical experience, but he does not ask sharp questions or express helpful skeptical opinions. In this way, Genda has no opportunity to ponder and clarify his own ideas.It's like trying to sharpen a razor on chiffon instead of a belt.More importantly, Nagumo's attitude shows that he is not thinking seriously, and he is not really absorbing the theory and practical experience of the naval aviation unit. He just blindly believes in Genda's work.Genda, like Nagumo, is full of confidence, but he knows that everyone makes mistakes.When I think that my immature suggestion may affect the future of the country, I can't help but get goosebumps. [Note: "The Battle of Midway Island", page 117 | page 11. 】 This time, after hearing the conversation between Ugaki and Kuroshima, and noticing that everyone was looking at him eagerly, Genda was intoxicated by the victory, forgot the word cautious for a while, and simply replied: One touch of the iron sleeve! [Note: Interview with Watanabe, September 26, 1964. 】He is not playing tricks, what he said is a Japanese poem, in the words of Americans today: We will beat them down! Ugaki had long felt that the young officers of the First Fleet were arrogant.After hearing Genda's answer, he reminded Nagumo that the possibility of the enemy breaking out must be considered.However, Ugaki immediately counteracted the possible good effect of this warning.During the exercise on the map, the situation that Ugaki was worried about appeared: After all the fighter jets of Nagumo flew away from the aircraft carrier to attack Midway Island, the US troops broke through the defense line and bombed Nagumo's aircraft carrier.At this time, the referee of the exercise on the picture, Masaobu Okumiya, Navy Major, ruled that the enemy plane sank the Akagi and Kaga among the nine bombs.But Ugaki doesn't allow his subordinates to commit such crimes.He immediately declared Okumiya's ruling invalid, saying that the enemy plane was only hit by three bombs, which sank the Kaga and slightly injured the Akagi.Thereafter, during the second phase of the on-map maneuver, he nonchalantly revived the Kaga from the bottom of the sea to take part in the attack on New Caledonia and Fiji. [Note: "The Battle of Midway", page 96 | 97; similar deceptions also appeared during the attack on Pearl Harbor, see "Dawn, We Are Still Sleeping", 28 | 20 Nine chapters. 】 In addition, in the exercise on the map, the US fleet did not dispatch for a decisive battle, although this possibility actually exists.Commanding the imaginary enemy is Captain Matsuda.Genda later recalled this matter and thought: Matsuda’s command during the exercise on the map (without the characteristics of the US military) may have given us a wrong impression of the US military’s combat thinking. [Note: Statements by Yuan Tian and Cao Lu. 】 Before the end of the exercise on Midway Island, Yamamoto instructed Nagumo to do his best to conduct reconnaissance on the US Pacific Fleet, especially the US aircraft carrier, and prepare to counterattack with torpedoes.Therefore, he required that half of the attack aircraft of the Nagumo Force must be equipped with torpedoes. Yamamoto's aviation staff officer, Admiral Akira Sasa, was responsible for drafting the Combined Fleet's order to the First Air Fleet.But Kuroshima verbally informed him that Yamamoto's instructions regarding torpedo bombers did not have to be included in the order. [Note: Interview with Watanabe, October 6, 1964. ] Watanabe, who was in charge of collating all the orders drafted by Akira Sasa and discussing the content of the orders with him, did not make excuses for himself and Kuroshima afterwards.However, people can see at a glance that Kuroshima's approach is very reasonable.Nagumo and his staff had heard this instruction with their own ears, especially since Japanese training and actual combat experience had clearly shown that Yamamoto's instructions regarding the ratio of torpedo bombers were correct, so there was no need to write every tactical detail into the command to go. So it was Kuroshima and Watanabe who drafted the joint fleet order together.Issues regarding submarine searches and attacks by torpedo planes of the First Fleet were not explicitly mentioned in the order.Later, when Watanabe recalled this period of history, he insisted: This is our mistake. [Note: Same as above. ] However, it turned out later that the submarine problem was not a question of whether the order was clear, but a question of timing.There is reason to think that tying the hands of a tactical commander a full month before a planned operation begins is not the wisest way to conduct a war. Genda is very worried that the deployment of troops is too scattered, so that the navy may lose sight of the target, which will violate the military principle of concentrating forces.He argued with Kuroshima on this issue at the briefing after the exercise on the map.Genda asserted that the focus of the battle plan should be to destroy the US fleet.For this reason, the troops used to attack the Aleutian Islands should also be deployed in the direction of Midway Island, and all available troops should be used for Midway Island, and even wait until the Fifth Fleet arrives before acting together. The commander of the Combined Fleet could not allow the capital to be harassed, and Black Island replied that he was alluding to Doolittle's air strikes, and that the primary task of the mobile force was to support the capture of Midway. So it is!Genda understood.In the eyes of the staff of the United Fleet, Midway Island is the first goal, and the US fleet is the second.Genda thought about it; he had already said what he meant, and it was useless to hit his head against the south wall. [Note: Genda's statement. 】 The meeting on the Yamato ended on May 4th.After the meeting, Major Murata Shigeharu, who led the torpedo bombers during the attack on Pearl Harbor, said loudly: What the hell is going on!What nonsense!Yamato and other battleships are 300 nautical miles behind our mobile force, what the hell are those cannons doing behind the ass of our aircraft carrier force! Fuchita also said that if those goddamn warships were in front of us, those cannons would still come in handy, and they would also help the maneuvering force.But this is not the case now.I couldn't help but wonder if they really wanted to go to war. Overhearing their conversation, photographer Makishima Sadaichi, who had been aboard the Akagi when it was still in the South Pacific, thought there was something seriously flawed about the upcoming campaign. Our commanding officer is useless at all, he's just a torpedo man, murmured Murata. Perhaps, Lieutenant Commander Takeshiro Miura shrugged, but we'll still win. Murata's good temper returned, and he grinned: This time it's not so fun, the enemy may not come out.As naughty as usual, he told Makishima that he would take him for a ride in a torpedo plane. [Note: The Battle of Tragedy. 】 Seeing such carefree self-confidence, one wonders whether, and how much, the attitude and plans of the Japanese would have changed if they had learned that Nimitz now knew so much.General Nimitz did not believe all of the reports in the haste of Leighton and Rochford.Maybe this is all a trap set by the enemy, and it is false information deliberately leaked by the Japanese intelligence agency?I'll have to think about it, he said, but I believe what I know is true. [Note: Interview with Nimitz, September 4, 1964. ] Nimitz has made up his mind, so he no longer wastes time doubting and hesitating.On May 2, while Yamamoto, Nagumo, and their staff were still considering plans on the Yamato, Nimitz flew to Midway.He spent the day there with Lieutenant Colonel Harold D. Shannon, commander of the 6th Battalion of Marines, and Lieutenant Colonel Cyril T. Semade, commander of Naval Air Station Midway.The two islands on this atoll, Sand Island and East Island, are self-sufficient, but the seaplane hangar is on Sand Island, while other flight facilities are on East Island.At that time, Nimitz did not confide in them, but only asked Shannon what the outpost needed to withstand the large-scale Japanese land and water attack. [Note: Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. McGlashan of the U.S. Marine Corps to the Director of the Information Office on August 12, 1947.Hereinafter referred to as McGlashan's letter. 】 Back at headquarters, Nimitz personally wrote a letter to the two commanders at Midway.He commended them for their excellent work at Midway and informed them that they had each been temporarily promoted. 】For Marine Corps Colonel and Navy Captain.Then, he said that the Japanese were going to attack Midway with all their strength, and the attack time was estimated by the Combat Intelligence Bureau to be on May 28th.He outlined the possible strategies and forces the enemy might employ, and promised to assist them as best he could.Shannon and Saimad were surprised when they read the letter.It is conceivable.But neither of them panicked.Midway Island has long been on alert. Every morning, there are patrol planes on alert over the western sky. The Marines carry rifles and wear helmets at all times, even when eating and swimming. [Note: For McGlashan's letter, see Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Heiner of the US Marine Corps, "The Marine Corps in the Battle of Midway Island", p. 23. 】 But not everyone in the United States agreed with Nimitz's assessment of the situation.Many at the top were reluctant to believe that the real Japanese target was neither Oahu nor the West Coast of the United States. [Note: Samuel Elliott Morrison, The Battle of the Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine Operations, May|September 1942, p. 80.]Hereinafter referred to as "The Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway and Submarine Operations". Not surprisingly, Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons, Commander of Hawaii and Governor of the Territories of Hawaii, feared that the Japanese would attack Oahu first.About the same time that Nimitz took up his new post on Oahu, Emmons succeeded Lieutenant General Walter C. Short.On the whole, he comes across as serious and formidable, but also charming and amiable when he wants to please people. [Note: Interview with Brigadier General James A. Morrison, December 19, 1966.Hereinafter referred to as Morrison. 】When dealing with Nimitz, he always chooses the latter attitude, because they are all loyal to the principle of inter-service cooperation.They got along really well from the beginning.Under the threat of the Japanese, Emmons went to the Pacific Fleet Command almost every day to discuss military affairs with Nimitz. [Note: Interview with Nimitz, September 4, 1964. ] He has been a pilot, understands the power of air combat, but also knows its limitations. On the morning of May 3 (Sunday), Emmons told about 5,000 Civil Defense members and spectators at the Honolulu Stadium: Due to the strategic position and importance of our archipelago, the enemy is likely to come and bomb again, on a large scale.The civilians here must fight alongside the military. We must never be complacent or think we will not be attacked, he cautioned.Our garrison is well-trained, they are always on the alert, and they will strike at the incoming enemy.However, it is unrealistic to expect that we will not suffer losses. [Note: "Honolulu Advertiser", May 4, 1942. 】 Emmons would have been foolish not to have first considered the immediate danger to his sector, given the lessons of Pearl Harbor.But this time, Oahu was not in immediate danger.On May 5, 1942, Admiral Nagano Shoshin, Chief of the Naval Command Department, stated in his instructions to Yamamoto that the commander of the Joint Fleet will cooperate with the Army to attack and occupy strategic points in the western part of the Aleutian Islands and Midway Island. [Note: "The Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway, and Submarine Operations", p. 75. ] Yamamoto always obeys the orders of the military command as long as he knows in advance that these orders are completely consistent with his own wishes.