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Chapter 20 Chapter Sixteen High Emotions and Full Confidence

midway miracle 戈登‧W‧普蘭奇 7796Words 2023-02-05
Fog, heavy fog.It's like the beginning of chaos, all kinds of giant reptiles roar loudly in the primitive fog, you call and I respond, one after another.Foghorns whimpered and echoed through the fog. The United Fleet kept in touch with the foghorns as they advanced.The Yamato made a long and deep sound first, indicating that this was the No. 1 ship and its location.Then, the second ship Olu replied with a low and terrible voice, like moaning.Afterwards, Nagato also let out a depressed reply.Watanabe was fascinated by the vague outlines of warships in the distance and the ghostly sound of fog horns.Watching the figures of the battleships of the capital fleet in the thick fog and listening to the sound of fog horns as they question and answer each other is so unforgettable. [Note: Interview with Watanabe, October 6, 1964. 】

During the historic march to Midway, Yamamoto usually started work before five o'clock every day. [Note: The description of one day in Yamamoto’s life during this period is taken from an interview with Watanabe on September 30, 1964. 】The first thing he did when he got up was to check the weather. He was very worried about the weather.The main fleet is getting closer and closer to the destination, and the fog is getting thicker.Sailing in this weather is not only troublesome, but also quite dangerous.After reading the weather report of the day, Yamamoto immediately put on his immaculate military uniform and took the elevator to the combat command room.The war room is on the same floor as the bridge. The room is quite large, with a large table in the middle surrounded by long soft seats.There are various charts scattered on the table, the most important of which is the combat chart.

After Yamamoto said good morning briefly and kindly to the people in the room, he plunged into the pile of telegrams for the day.These messages come from various departments of the fleet, including daily combat reports and reconnaissance reports, and there are usually about a hundred copies.Yamamoto never read ten lines at a glance, but studied each one carefully.He does not waste time discussing the contents of these reports, but never loses sight of any point. After reading the telegram, Yamamoto walked into the bridge around six o'clock, sat down on his hard wooden bench, and prepared to start the main work of the day.Ugaki and Yamato's Captain Takaligi Yoshihachi had their own seats on the bridge, and spent most of their time on the bridge every day except sleeping.

At eight o'clock sharp, Yamamoto returned to the combat command room.On the table, breakfast was already set, and he always had a leisurely meal with the staff while talking to them about the general situation.After the meal was over and the tableware was taken away, everyone continued to talk around the table.Yamamoto always consciously talked to every staff member. He didn't ignore others, but talked endlessly to a certain person. The staff members all appreciated Yamamoto's approach. When talking, Yamamoto is always in high spirits and confident.But when it comes to the U.S. military, he always becomes extremely serious.He listens to news broadcasts in Tokyo every day.Whenever the broadcaster sarcastically ridiculed the enemy and praised the Japanese navy, Yamamoto always attacked the staff.The admiral was born with a distaste for pomposity.The constant flattery on the radio annoyed and embarrassed the decent man.

Another subject of Yamamoto's sarcasm on the broadcast was Tojo.General Yamamoto, who went straight to the point and said nothing, thought that the prime minister was a flashy and conceited cowhide king. As a general and Prime Minister Lu, he talked a lot of empty talk, but the actual results were not much. Ugaki always stayed on the bridge when others were eating.In order to allow the chief of staff to participate in the after-dinner conversation, which was actually a semi-formal staff meeting, Chief of Staff Kuroshima always went to the bridge to replace Ugaki after breakfast.In this way, Kuroshima would not be able to participate in these discussions, but he did not feel regretful.Kuroshima was born to like to be alone, and many colleagues said he was a weirdo.

After breakfast and lunch which started at twelve o'clock sharp, Yamamoto returned to the bridge.He sat all afternoon, watching the fleet's actions with concern, especially anti-submarine warfare.During this time, he has been very sensitive to the activities of the US submarine force. At 18 o'clock, Yamamoto always arrived at the operation command room on time for dinner.Same as breakfast and lunch, everyone still eats and talks, but the dinner party takes a little longer.After the meeting, Yamamoto returned to his cabin and spent half an hour bathing and shaving his face; no matter on the ship or on the shore, or in peacetime or wartime, Yamamoto always did these things at night instead of in the morning thing.In this way, on the one hand, the brain can be rested and awake, and on the other hand, it can be put into work immediately after getting up in the morning.

Around 20:00, Yamamoto took the elevator to the bridge again, not to work, but to play chess, usually with Watanabe.He regards Watanabe as his junior and likes him very much.Yamamoto tried his best to show no preference for all the staff members, but he was a human being after all. How could Yamamoto not particularly favor Watanabe, a big, good-tempered young man who clearly regarded him as the greatest man in the world? Woolen cloth? Watanabe sees playing chess with the Commander as one of his missions.In his opinion, this kind of long-standing competition is not only a general's hobby, but also keeps him alert in commanding operations.From 20 o'clock to bedtime, everyone on the ship did not know where Yamamoto was, but Yamamoto authorized his staff to immediately deal with emergencies that occurred while he was playing chess.No matter what Yamamoto does, he does his best.When working, he concentrates; when playing chess, he also concentrates.Like many active minds, he sleeps less than average, and finds a different kind of mental activity more refreshing than eight hours in bed.He never went to bed before twenty-three o'clock, and often undressed and went to bed at midnight or even two o'clock in the middle of the night.

Even so, he couldn't get a good night's sleep.Occasionally, an emergency report came, and Watanabe or other staff officers on duty had to wake him up.At this time, he would get up to read, sign his name, thank whoever came, and then lie down and go to sleep Nimitz, however, was not so serene.He admitted that I was often worried and anxious when the Japanese fleet sailed towards Midway.Before and during the Midway naval battle, Nimitz slept very little. He had too many issues to consider, and it was impossible to dispel all kinds of worries.Add to that the fact that he wasn't there to see the progress for himself, and those worries were compounded. [Note: Interview with Nimitz, September 4, 1964. 】Although he didn't know exactly which troops his opponents were, he deeply felt that Yamamoto would never make a fuss, and would definitely invest in a much larger fleet than he could mobilize.He had accepted Naval Intelligence's estimate of the situation at Midway, and made a judgment that contrasted with that of Washington's dignitaries. In this way, he tied his career closely to the outcome of the Battle of Midway.But far more important than that: the fate of all men and ships depended on him, and he was responsible for them and for them.

In the early morning of June 2, Japan time, Yamamoto's air search force found the missing oil tanker Naruto at a distance of 60 degrees from the main fleet and 20 nautical miles away. Ugaki then ordered the destroyer team to refuel.However, due to poor visibility and poor signaling technology, it took a lot of time for the order to pass.Ugaki wrote.Whenever Ugaki talks about destroyers, he always loves and annoys him like a father treats a lovable and troublesome child.At 11:30, Toei Maru and two other oil tankers were also found.These hungry kid destroyers are finally fueled up.These destroyers are like children, they need to be taken care of.Ugaki said dotingly in his diary. [Note: Ugaki's diary, June 2, 1942. 】

When the destroyer was refueling, the ships of the main fleet reduced their speed to twelve knots and sailed parallel to the refueling fleet in a 70-degree direction.It was drizzling and the visibility was only a few kilometers.Such weather has both advantages and disadvantages: it helps to conceal the fleet, but it prevents search aircraft from taking off.The fog is getting bigger and bigger.By late afternoon, the fog had gotten too thick to continue refueling.Ugaki had no choice but to send the light cruiser Oi to convey the order to suspend refueling to the oil fleet. [Note: Ugaki's diary and Sanhe's diary, June 2, 1942. 】

In addition to the problem of refueling, Ugaki was also worried about the fate of his beloved pocket submarine that day.An unidentified Australian radio station said the three pocket submarines that entered Sydney Harbor were only attacking ships used in the harbour.One pocket submarine was sunk by depth charges and one by ordinary bombs.Ugaki was very sad when he heard the news. This attack was different from the Hawaiian operation, and the crews participating in the battle were all well-trained.It is sad that such people cannot return safely.Is the bright moonlight beneficial to defending the enemy?It seems that the bright moon is beneficial to our side, and it is also beneficial to the enemy?This issue deserves serious study and consideration.Especially since it is believed that pocket submarines will still be very important in future wars, this issue deserves more attention. [Note: Ugaki's diary, June 2, 1942. ] Even in that unrefutable diary, Ugaki was reluctant to admit that the whole concept of pocket submarine warfare was outdated, arguing that it had nothing to do with whether moonlight was beneficial to the enemy or not. Nagumo's situation is the same. Not only is he in the thick fog, but his thoughts are also like falling into the clouds.He managed to get all the ships refueled that day even though the visibility was dropping from around 1,000 or so. [Note: Narration in Japan, p. 6. 】The information he got was as chaotic as the weather.The original plan stipulated that the Japanese submarine should establish a forward cordon on this day and send Yamamoto and Nagumo the latest information on the activities of the US military in the area at that time.However, the submarines of the Fifth Submarine Squadron failed to reach the designated location and establish a second cordon.At the same time, due to the tragic failure of Operation K, the submarines of the Third Submarine Squadron also failed to establish a cordon. However, Yi|168 sent back sporadic information from the Midway waters.The submarine reported that no enemy submarines were seen in the south of Sand Island except for a warning submarine. A large aircraft group is conducting intensive patrols in the airspace within 600 nautical miles southwest of the island; Aircraft patrolled day and night; many cranes appeared on Midway Island, indicating that the United States was expanding its defense facilities on the island.Although these reports from Yi|168 were fragmentary and few, they were the only valuable reconnaissance information sent by Japanese submarines before the Midway naval battle and during the naval battle. [Note: "The Battle of Midway Island", page 123] At the time, the Akagi was far ahead of Yamamoto's main force, but it also knew little about the activities and intentions of the American forces.In fact, Nagumo was more in the dark than Yamamoto.Nagumo's radio receiver on the aircraft carrier was less powerful than Yamamoto's, and the radio had to be silent. Therefore, the intelligence that Ugaki and Sanwa had noticed clearly indicated that the US Pacific Fleet had picked up a little wind, but Nagumo didn't know it. Nagumo's chief of staff Kusaka was worried from the very beginning that this situation would prevent him from exchanging information with Yamamoto. Even before departure, he repeatedly urged Yamamoto to forward all the information received by the Joint Fleet Command to the Akagi. [Note: Ibid., page 123 | page 124. 】However, which intelligence is important and which is not is obviously not explained.Only focusing on surface warfare, the main fleet centered on battleships considers little or even worthless intelligence, but it may be a treasure that is hard to buy for the aviation of Nagumo's aircraft carrier fleet. In addition to different understandings of the value of intelligence, the scale of Japan's sea expedition has also caused some confusion.For example, at about this time, the Naval Command radioed Yamato that the U.S. aircraft carrier fleet in the waters east of Midway was probably on the move, perhaps preparing an ambush.This telegram included the First Air Fleet as the receiving unit.Yamamoto read the telegram and said to Kuroshima: I think it is best to forward this telegram to Nagumo in the name of Yamamoto or the United Fleet.But Kuroshima said: Since the First Air Fleet is also the receiving unit, there is no need for the United Fleet to forward it to Nagumo.Besides, the radio silence is still maintained.We still shouldn't break it. [Note: Interview with Hei Dao, November 28, 1964. 】 The Americans also have communication problems.Spruance's radio operators reported that they heard the Coastal Patrol off Oahu talking to Pearl Harbor.This is a disturbing situation, indicating that the TBS system is not immune to eavesdropping. The TBS system is a short-distance linear propagation system, and it was originally estimated that its radio waves would not exceed the horizon.There may be an atmospheric or mechanical anomaly in the transmission of this call to the Sixteenth Special Stick Fleet.The anomaly might not recur for weeks or years, but Spruance didn't want to take any chances.He used visual signals to order the entire task force: unless the situation is extremely urgent, the TBS system must not be used at night, and only visual signals are allowed to be used during the day.Spruance was determined not to lose the surprise of the fight, nor to give away his position.Therefore, while ordering the prohibition of radio use, he informed all pilots that in the upcoming battle, the aircraft should return to the aircraft carrier on their own, and the aircraft carrier could no longer be expected to use radio navigation. [Note: Interview with Spruance, September 5, 1965; Spruance, p. 39. 】 On this day, June 1st, Hawaii time, Japanese newspapers had long said that the sunk USS Saratoga left San Diego at full speed, hoping to arrive in time to join the battle in the Midway area.The result failed, and the day it arrived at Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Midway was over.As for the troops participating in the war, Fletcher's 17th Task Force received the last refueling from the Cimarron and Platt before the battle. At the same time, the Hornet sent a plane to fly 150 nautical miles to search, but No enemies were found. [Note: Analysis of the Battle of Midway, page 63; "Battle of the Coral Sea, Battle of Midway, and Submarine Operations", 156 | 157; Hornet and Enterprise Logbook, June 1, 1942. 】 It was cold and wet, so it was likely that the radars at Midway were the first to send word about the Japanese.In the flight log of VF | 6 said, [Note: VF | 6 unofficial flight log, June 2, 1942. 】The next day was still covered with dense clouds and waves, and the advance of the US and Japanese fleets were hindered.Nagumo's ships turned a blind eye to each other beyond six hundred yards.To avoid collisions and maintain formation, Nagumo approved the use of searchlights.It was a risky move, but the thick fog was like a thick wall, and the powerful beam of light diffused almost before leaving the lamp socket, making it impossible to penetrate.The dense fog prevented Nagumo from dispatching anti-submarine patrol aircraft, but it did not work against U.S. submarines equipped with radar.Therefore, Nanyun ordered the fleet to be on high alert, and sent two additional sentries to strengthen the observation and vigilance of enemy submarines. [Note: "The Battle of Midway", page 123 | page 124. 】 Nagumo and his staff gathered on the right side of the Akagi bridge, silently watching ahead.On the left side of the bridge, Captain Aoki and Navigator Miura Admiralty Commander focused on commanding the warship to maintain formation and course under the difficult situation of almost zero visibility.According to the original plan, the aircraft carrier mobile force should change the direction of the ship at 10:30. This is a big problem for Nagumo. He must notify all the ships to change the course according to the original plan.But the dense fog made it useless to communicate by flag, and the searchlights could not effectively convey orders.The only way is to use the radio, but that would be tantamount to informing the US of the location of the Mobile Force. [Note: "The Battle of Midway Island", page 126; Japanese narrative, page 6. 】 Nagumo didn't like to use these methods.He himself is extremely brave, and his successive victories make him arrogant and ambitious.However, he always likes to fight in accordance with the regulations of his superiors, but lacks the flexibility to make quick decisions when the situation changes.At this time, however, he was in a predicament he had not caused.The two missions entrusted to him by the Midway operation contradicted each other.They each require him to act in fundamentally different ways, as in a football game, where he protects the dribbler from an opponent and dribbles the ball himself.One of his tasks was that the aircraft carrier mobile force must arrive at Midway Island before Kondo's fleet, carry out a fire attack on the island, and pave the way for the landing.This task requires that Nagumo must be in a certain place at a certain time, that is, between the goal (Midway) and the player with the ball (Kondo).Neither Midway nor Kondo will move locations for Nagumo's convenience.In this way, Nagumo must maintain the established course.His second mission, however, was autonomous: If the U.S. Pacific Fleet came to meet it, Nagumo would assist in the attack and destroy it.This mission requires a high degree of tactical maneuvering and the secrecy of whereabouts.These two tasks can only be unified under one premise, that is, Nimitz acted in accordance with the Japanese plan to the letter, and only ordered the fleet to dispatch when he heard that Midway was under attack. Nagumo's staff had been apprehensive about this dual mission from the start, fearing that the two missions would conflict in the course of their execution.But now, in the words of the Bible, what they were most worried about fell upon them.Nagumo’s chief officer, Oishi Yasushi, was at a loss. He summed up the difficult situation at that time and said: The combat order of the United Fleet stipulated that my first task was to destroy the enemy, but the same order specifically required us to attack Midway Island on June 5. If we do not suppress the enemy's shore-based air force on Midway as planned, our landing operation will encounter fierce resistance two days later, and the entire offensive operation schedule will be disrupted. To this Nagumo posed the final and most difficult question: but where was the enemy fleet? Oishi admitted that no one knew, but he also said that if the enemy fleet was at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Mobile Force would have time to deal with it after the air raid on Midway was completed.Even if the enemy fleet has been dispatched, they will not be too far from the anchorage to be near the Japanese aircraft carrier.Therefore, he thought it necessary to take the risk of sailing on the original course and complete the task of bombing Midway Island first. [Note: "The Battle of Midway Island", page 127. 】 Akagi's intelligence staff could not say what actions the enemy fleet might take.The aircraft carrier did not intercept anything, and Yamato gave him no information.With the weather so bad and with no other options, the intelligence officer suggested using short-range internal fleet radios to send orders to change course to the ships. [Note: "The Battle of Midway Island", page 127 | 128; Japanese narrative, page 6. 】 The strongest argument in favor of this approach is the instructions given by Ugaki during the combat exercises.At the time, Ugaki had imagined that the situation Nagumo was currently facing might arise.Ugaki's order is: Once this happens, the fleet must still maintain the original planned formation, and radio silence can be broken as a last resort. [Note: See Chapter 8 of this book. 】Therefore, Nagumo adopted the suggestion of the intelligence staff of the Akagi.Later, in his post-war report, Nagumo blamed himself for taking this action, which he feared had exposed his position.In fact, although the Yamato received its radio signal 600 nautical miles behind it, it is still believed to this day to be the only Japanese radio contact that American interceptors failed to intercept.God can play tricks on people, just as the Akagi sent out this controversial telegram, the dense fog dissipated and visual signals could be used. [Note: Japanese narrative, pages 6 and 42; "The Battle of Midway", note on page 128. 】 The dense fog worried the commander on the bridge of the Akagi, and also made it impossible for the aviation of the maneuver force to fly.These flight personnel gathered in the officer's lounge to play cards for entertainment. Everyone was talking and laughing, and it was very lively. [Note: The Battle of Tragedy. 】 The fog on the side of the main force is also a little lighter, and the destroyers have refueled.At this time, it was discovered that the flagship of the third submarine team, the Chuanchi, and a destroyer were missing. [Translator's note: According to the order of operations and context, the Sawauchi should be the flagship of the third destroyer team. 】Therefore, a plane on the Fengxiang took off to search, and found them about 43 nautical miles ahead at 13:15.The two warships turned around immediately and returned to the team before 16:00. [Note: Ugaki's diary, June 3, 1942. 】 On this day, Ugaki was obviously very sad.He thought again of the pocket submarine crews lost in Australia.Although they said our submarine attack was unsuccessful, they must have been greatly shaken.Even if these submarines fail to deliver a major blow to the enemy as planned, the souls of the crews can rest in peace. [Note: Same as above. 】These young sailors who failed to achieve anything but were brave and tenacious in combat and full of sacrifice spirit exchanged their precious lives for only scaring the walkers in the waterfront area of ​​Sydney Harbor. The love for these sailors only sees the bright side of things. In the afternoon, Yamamoto's main fleet resumed its serpentine movement. When it saw a merchant ship that looked like a two-masted single-chimney in the distance to the north, it changed its course and accelerated.Fengxiang sent a plane to reconnaissance.Two hours later, the plane reported that it was Patrol Boat Nankai Maru No. 7.Thirty-two kilometers away, a small patrol boat of only 87 tons was actually regarded as a large merchant ship of thousands of tons. This should be said to be a typical false report of military information.Ugaki, who was extremely disgusted with this matter, wrote sternly.Later, he calmed down: Nevertheless, the spirit with which such a small boat has weathered the storms and traveled such distances to perform patrol duties is rare and highly commendable. If we had known this then, we would not have sailed from her, Should drive towards it.In this way, their spirits will be more lifted when they see our main fleet marching eastward in mighty strength.We didn't do that, and I feel sorry for them. [Note: Ugaki's diary, June 3, 1942. 】 Spruance, however, had neither the time nor the inclination to make such a gesture.On June 2, Hawaii time, he sent a signal to all ships in his fleet: The enemy is expected to launch an attack on me to take Midway.Its strike force may consist of a variety of combat ships including four or five aircraft carriers, troop carriers and supply ships.If the position of Task Forces 16 and 17 remained unobserved, I should be able to conduct a surprise attack on the enemy aircraft carriers from the flank northeast of Midway.Subsequent operations would depend on the results of these attacks, casualties inflicted on the enemy by the Midway forces, and intelligence on enemy movements.Winning the battle that is about to begin is vital to our nation.In case the aircraft carriers are divided by the enemy's air force during the battle, they must also strive to keep within the visible distance of each other. [Note: "The Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway, and Submarine Operations", page 98. 】 It's really literary.Spruance, like the document, presents the facts without emotion, with unpretentious language, and analyzes developments with clarity, without panic or conceit. At sixteen, Spruance rendezvoused with Fletcher's Task Force 17 at what Nimitz called the Luck Point.There is no protection from the shore-based air force of Midway Island here, and it can only rely on itself.From here, the two task forces officially merged into one combat force, under the unified command of the senior Fletcher.But in actual combat, the two fleets still fought independently. [Note: Analysis of the Battle of Midway Island, 62 | 63 pages. ] In the face of a strong enemy, the small fleet, which is already at a disadvantage in terms of numbers, has to be divided into two groups?Yes!Fletcher was outnumbered and could not rely on concentrated forces.He has to stay mobile.To use a common saying, it is: you can't put all your eggs in one basket.
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