Chapter 31 Chapter 27 They Finally Came

On June 4th, the dawn dawned on the Pacific Ocean, and a soft and gorgeous glow appeared in the sky.Spruance was anxiously awaiting the dawn of light on the tactical horizon.The task force has so far received no word on the exact location of the Nagumo carrier force.Spruance's specific target is these aircraft carriers. He said: My task is to kill these Japanese aircraft carriers and defend Midway Island. [Note: Interview with Spruance, September 5, 1964. 】 The Enterprise received Eddie's telegram at 5:34.This was the first time Spruance had received word of a confirmed sighting of an enemy aircraft carrier.The telegram was enough to alarm the Midway defenders, but it wasn't specific enough to be of much use to Fletcher and Spruance.Fletcher's TF 17 was northeast of Spruance's TF 16, and the two fleets were about ten nautical miles apart. [Note: Enterprise logbook, June 4, 1944. ] At 5:53, the Enterprise received the famous alert from Eddie: a large number of enemy planes were spotted.Spruance later said: Fletcher and I learned from this intelligence that the Japanese had begun to implement that part of their battle plan. [Note: Interview with Spruance, September 5, 1964. 】

The information did not specify the number of aircraft carriers or their exact positions, but it stated that the bearing of the invading enemy aircraft was 320 degrees, 150 nautical miles from Midway Island.After Spruance grasped the situation, he ordered the chief of staff, Colonel Miles S. Browning, to immediately dispatch all aircraft to attack the enemy aircraft carrier as soon as possible. It was only natural for Spruance to make the big decision about deploying all the planes.He has always been a strong advocate of attacking without sparing any effort.He said: If I go to attack the Japanese, I will go all out. [Note: Interview with Spruance, September 5, 1964. 】

Fletcher had come to the same conclusion the night before.He said: There is only one way to deal with the Japanese, and that is to attack them and beat them hard.We must not let this opportunity slip by, we must preemptively attack with lightning speed and force. [Note: Interview with Fletcher, September 17, 1966. 】 Shortly after Spruance's order to Browning was delivered, the task force radio received another report from Midway at 6:03. Two ships and two warships, with a bearing of 320 degrees, a distance of 180 nautical miles, a heading of 135 degrees, and a speed of 25 knots.From this it can be seen that the Japanese were about 200 nautical miles west-southwest of the American fleet. [Note: Analysis of the Battle of Midway, page 121. 】

Fletcher thought quickly in desperation.Like an astute basketball player, he sees teammate Spruance approaching the basket and passes the ball.At 6:07, he sent a signal to Spruance: sail southwest, and attack immediately after finding out the exact position of the enemy ship.He had two solid reasons for keeping Yorktown in reserve.First, he wanted to recover those SBDs that were still on fan patrols in the north.The second reason is that the intercepted telegram stated that there were only two aircraft carriers, while the Naval Intelligence Office believed that there were four or possibly five Japanese aircraft carriers participating in the large-scale military operation on Midway Island.He had suffered in the Coral Sea battle.At that time, he only focused on attacking the Xiangfeng with all his strength, but in the end he was completely exposed to the attack of the Xianghe and Zuihe.Smart people won't be fooled twice after suffering a loss once. [Note: Letter from the captain of USS Enterprise to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet on June 8, 1942, content: Report on the situation of the Midway Naval Battle on June 4-6, 1942.Hereafter referred to as the Enterprise Report; Interview with Fletcher, September 17, 1966; Analysis of the Battle of Midway, p. 125. 】

Spruance had planned to attack at exactly nine o'clock, when he figured the target would be within a hundred miles of him.In the next half hour, he continued to receive reports on the battle situation at Midway Island. Obviously, if he wanted to cause maximum damage to the enemy aircraft carrier, he could not wait another two hours. [Note: "The Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway and Submarine Operations", page 113. 】 In order to make Gao Nanyun a move and outsmart Nanyun, he discussed with Chief of Staff Browning.Browning was the chief of staff of his predecessor, General Halsey, whom Halsey considered remarkable.Browning's temper is like an old turtle.Spruance said bluntly: In the Pacific War, everyone hated him deeply.But Browning was quick-witted, and Spruance didn't run a beauty school after all.The independent admiral was interested in Browning's knowledge of aviation, which he, Spruance, lacked. [Note: Interview with Spruance, September 5, 1964. 】

Browning estimated that the Japanese attack planes would be able to complete their attack missions and return to the aircraft carrier around 9:00.Nagumo will almost certainly not change course until then.If Spruance wanted to attack when the enemy aircraft carrier had finished recovering the aircraft, he had to send the aircraft as soon as possible.We felt it necessary to pre-empt Nagumo's second attack, both to save Midway from further damage and to ensure our own safety. [Note: Letter from the Commander of the Sixteenth Task Force to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet dated June 16, 1942, content: Naval Battle of Midway Island; transfer of various reports.Hereafter referred to as the Spruance report. 】

The decision to attack immediately was one of the most difficult decisions he had to make, since the distance of the attack increased the difficulties of his own aircraft, and it was certain that these were slow, did not fly high, and had a combat range of only one hundred and seventy-five nautical miles. The TBD destroyer type aircraft cannot return to the aircraft carrier. [Note: Analysis of the Battle of Midway, 122 | Page 123. 】Although he doesn't show his emotions on the surface, deep down he loves his subordinates and is proud of having them, no less than Halsey who shows his emotions.But at the juncture when it was necessary to reluctantly part with one another, he made a decision that any good commander knows without hesitation: take the risk of sacrificing the minority to preserve the majority.

Lieutenant Commander John C. Waldron, commander of VT|8 Squadron on the Hornet, was also considering such a grim possibility.Waldron is a burly, hard-edged South Dakota man.In waiting room four the night before, he had distributed a mimeograph to the torpedo pilots who were on standby there.He said nothing, and there was no need to say any more: There are a few words I want to tell you.I think we're all set.Our training time is very short, and we are in the most difficult time.But we did do everything we could.I am convinced that we are the best in the world where we are.I hope we meet a favorable opportunity, this is my greatest wish.If it does not go well, or there is an accident, I ask everyone to do their best to destroy the enemy.If only the last plane is left to make a final impact, I ask that plane to go up and hit the enemy.May God bless us all.I wish everyone success, return safely, and beat the enemy hard! [Note: George Guy's "The Sole Survivor", page 108. 】

Waldron proudly says he is one-eighth Sioux.Whenever he solved a problem intuitively, he credited it to his Native American roots. [Note: "The Sole Survivor", page 95. ] He was one of only a few Naval School graduates in VT|8 Squadron.He spent a lot of time studying naval aviation air combat tactics, especially Japanese naval aviation tactics.He has to give lectures to his subordinates every day, talking about the air combat tactics of Japan and the United States in the form of board demonstrations and dictation.In the waiting room, even during the free discussion time without tasks, when others are talking about the Classic of Mountains and Seas or joking, he is still sitting there, looking at the ceiling, thinking about tactical issues and the Japanese. Wait a moment, and he will let everyone be quiet Come down and speak impromptu for more than an hour.

At this moment, he was giving his final pre-war instructions to his subordinates.He said he did not believe the Japanese would continue their advance on Midway.He believes that once the Japanese learn that there is an American fleet nearby, they will reorganize and retreat a certain distance in order to recover the aircraft.So he asked his subordinates not to worry about the course of the Japanese, just follow him, because he knew where to fly. [Note: Lieutenant George Gay's account of 8th Torpedo Squadron, Midway, Solomon Islands, and Munda Island, October 12, 1942.Hereinafter referred to as Gay's narrative. 】

On Enterprise, Lieutenant James S. Gray, commanding VF|6, had only ten fighters to cover thirty-three dive bombers and fourteen torpedo planes.Dive bombers fly high, while torpedo planes fly low.This raises the question of how to balance the top and bottom.So he and Lieutenant Arthur H. Ely, the operational staff officer for VT|6, agreed on the contact signal.Gray would try to fly at altitudes that afforded protection to both types of bombers.If the torpedo plane was attacked by the Zero, the squadron leader, Lieutenant Commander Eugene E. Lindsay, called to Gray: Jem down!This arrangement seemed reasonable, because it was much easier for Gray's F4F|4 to dive to the altitude of the torpedo plane than to climb to the altitude of the dive bomber. [Note: "Amazing Victory", page 142. 】 Lindsey was not present when Waldron gave his instructions, and Clarence Wade McCluskey, flight chief Officers awarded medals. ] also really think that Lindsay does not have to participate in this battle.As the Enterprise set sail from Pearl Harbor, Lindsay's Saboteur failed to land on the carrier and crashed off the deck.Lindsay was seriously injured, and his nose and face are still bruised, and he can't even put on the flying goggles.But when someone asked him that morning if he could take off, he replied calmly: I was trained to fly to go to the sky. [Note: Bard's interview with (retired) Vice Admiral Clarence Wade McCluskey of the US Navy on June 30, 1966.Hereinafter referred to as Bard's interview with McCluskey. 】 Both aircraft carriers of Task Force Sixteen turned against the wind.The planes on Hornet and Enterprise started to take off at 7:00 and 07:06 respectively.At 7:20, Spruance divided the troops into two formations, spaced a few thousand yards apart.The two formations went into separate battles after 7:20.Grouped with Enterprise are the cruisers Northampton, Vincennes, and Pensacola, as well as the cruisers Balchi, Benham, Irvine, Monaghan, and Phelps destroyer.Mitchell was supported by the three cruisers USS Minneapolis, USS New Orleans, and USS Atlanta, and the destroyers USS Elliott, USS Warden, and USS Conningham. [Note: Analysis of the Battle of Midway, page 123: Spruance's report. 】 At 7:55, the Hornet completed its take-off operation, resumed its original route, and approached the formation of the Enterprise.At 8:15, just as it was approaching, it received a report from the Northampton: an enemy plane was spotted with a bearing of 185 degrees and a distance of 30 nautical miles. The type was a single-engine double-pontoon seaplane. [Note: Letter dated June 11, 1942 from the Commander of the Cruisers of the Sixteenth Task Force to the Commander of the Sixteenth Task Force.Content: Report on the combat situation on June 4, 1942.Hereinafter referred to as the TF16 cruiser commander's report. ] Radar picked up the target, and the observation post confirmed the search aircraft, but the combat patrol aircraft failed to find it in the air. This plane was undoubtedly our old acquaintance, the reconnaissance plane of the Tone.What warships it found each time it sent a message is still a mystery.Due to the excellent visibility, it may have spotted two formations of TF 16, and possibly even TF 17.At this time, Spruance realized for the first time that his fleet had been spotted by the enemy.He was very worried that the advantage of surprise was lost, but his attack planes were already on the way, and now he had to carry out the attack as planned and hope for a good result. [Note: "The Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway and Submarine Operations", page 114. 】 What Spruance envisioned was a coordinated attack by torpedo planes and dive bombers with fighter cover.He dispatched a huge fleet of one hundred and sixteen planes.In addition to the fourteen torpedo planes (VB|8) led by Lindsay and the ten fighters (VS|8) led by Gray, VB|6 and VS| 6's thirty-three SBDs (VS|6's reconnaissance planes were also loaded with bombs for the attack).Hornet supplied thirty-four dive bombers and bomb-carrying scout planes, along with Waldron's fifteen torpedo planes and Lieutenant Commander Samuel G. Mitchell's ten fighters of VF|8, The unification was led by Lieutenant Colonel Stanhope C. Lin, the flight group commander. [Note: Logbook of Enterprise and Hornet dated June 4, 1942, letter from Captain Hornet to Commander of the Pacific Fleet dated June 13, 1942.Content: Report on the battle of June 4th-6th, 1942.Hereafter called the Hornet Report; Analysis of the Battle of Midway, p. 124. ] But Lady Luck hasn't completely abandoned Nagumo after all. At 9:17, the Akagi changed its original course of Midway Island, turned to sail at 70 degrees, and approached the US Special Forces Fleet.In another minute it can recover all the attacking aircraft, [Note: Japanese Narrative, p. 17. ] Incredibly, Spruance was ignorant of the enemy's change in course.In fact, during the period from the interception of the telegram at 6:03 to the actual discovery of the Japanese aircraft carrier force by the U.S. plane, although the enemy fleet was almost always under the nose of the U.S. reconnaissance plane and the land-based bomber at Midway Island, no one reported it to him. Over the enemy's whereabouts. Due to the lack of communication links and no coordination, the United States paid a huge price at Midway Island.Otherwise, the Americans would not have suffered so many casualties, and the Japanese would have been punished much more severely in the end.The problem this time is not the old troublesome problem of non-cooperation among the various services, but the fragmentation within the Navy.Our failure to get enough intelligence from our own land-based forces raised the question of whether we could fully trust our fraternal units.Lieutenant Commander J.G. Foster, Jr., the Hornet's aviation operations staff officer, is understandably resentful. [Note: June 12, 1942 letter from the Air Operations Staff of the USS Hornet to the captain of the ship.Contents; Weaknesses Observed at the Battle of Midway, June 4, 1942.Hereinafter referred to as the Hornet Air Combat Report. ] Captain Murray of the USS Enterprise also had a lot of opinions on this situation.He said: The consequences of not having a supplementary report on the enemy's situation could be disastrous for our army.There was no supplementary report on the enemy's situation, and the land-based aircraft at Midway Island failed to continue to conduct tactical reconnaissance on June 4th and 5th. Perhaps these two things prevented us from completely wiping out the enemy. [Note: Letter from the Captain of the USS Enterprise to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet dated June 13, 1942.Content: Report on the air battle in the Pacific Ocean on June 4th and 6th, 1942, hereinafter referred to as the Supplementary Report of the Enterprise. 】 But this cannot be entirely blamed on the Midway troops.For example, the Nautilus submarine had been secretly following Nagumo since 7:10.After attacking enemy warships, it floats to a depth where it can perform periscope.At 9:00 it found an aircraft carrier at 83 degrees true bearing and continued to approach the aircraft carrier.The Nautilus's logbook records: At 9:10, it was attacked by an enemy cruiser and fired torpedoes at the cruiser. Because the target was evaded and missed, the enemy ship attacked again and dropped six depth charges.What Brockman attacked was not the cruiser, but the destroyer Arashi.At 9:18, he ordered the Nautilus to descend.It had been a full minute since Nagumo had changed course, but the US Task Force had received no reports of the encounter. [Note: Nautilus logbook, June 4, 1942; Nautilus narrative. 】 If Nagumo had changed course ten-fifteen minutes earlier, the encounter with Spruance's plane might not have occurred at all.Even so, when the dive bombers and fighter jets of the Hornet arrived at the predetermined empty space, Nagumo was not in the position originally judged by the Americans. The Hornet originally planned to launch a coordinated attack with dive bombers and torpedo planes, but during the hour when the planes took off and formed, the sky was suddenly covered with thick clouds, and Waldron's VT|8 plane and Lin's Dreadnought plane quickly You can't see each other anymore. [Note: Analysis of the Battle of Midway Island, page 126. 】Lin organized the planes into a reconnaissance formation, and controlled the course and speed by himself.This kind of formation flying was possible at the time, but it was not the best formation.Maintaining a straight formation requires constant adjustment of the throttle, and every time the throttle is adjusted, some gasoline will be wasted. Analysis of the Battle of Midway, 129 | 130. 】Fuel consumption is a big issue related to life and death. After Lin Fei arrived at the interception point, he did not adopt the standard expansion square tactic (that is, the tactic of flying along the four sides of a hollow square and continuously expanding outward). Under the weather conditions of the day, this tactic can make the visibility reach 50 nautical miles or so.He continued on his original course for another fifty nautical miles, brought his fleet closer to Midway, and then returned to the Hornet. At this time the oil pressure gauge reading has been alarmingly low.The attack planes scattered and flew separately, looking for refueling points separately.Lin, the seventeen planes of VS|8, and the three Dreadnoughts of VB|8 landed on the Hornet before they ran out of fuel. [Note: Letter to Bard dated October 18, 1966 from retired U.S. Navy Vice Admiral W. F. Roddy. 】 As far as we know, Lin never publicly explained why he did so, but there must be a reason.Perhaps, as Walter Lord said, Lin estimated that the Japanese had already reached a point somewhere between Midway and the Hornet. [Note: "Amazing Victory", page 151. ] Regardless of his inferences, many blamed him for the disappointment of his troops in failing to find enemy mobile units. [Note: Bard's interview with Captain Edgar E. Stebbins, May 25, 1966.Hereinafter referred to as Bard's interview with Stebbins; November 6, 1966, Bard's interview with U.S. Navy Captain A. J. Brassfield.Hereinafter referred to as Bard's interview with Brassfield. 】 Lieutenant Commander Robert R. Johnson led the remaining thirteen dive bombers to Midway.Not knowing the correct IFF signal, he threw the bombs into the sea, trying to show his identity.But the anti-aircraft artillery on the island was too nervous to see this friendly gesture, so his fleet was forced to dodge the fire of the anti-aircraft artillery for a while. [Note: Voss' letter; Bard's interview with Ramsey. 】 Ensign Troy Girolli ditched a few nautical miles away.Seven and a half hours later, a PBY picked him up and his gunner, and neither suffered much. [Note: Letter to Bard dated April 27, 1967, from retired U.S. Navy Captain T.W. Gilloly. 】One bomber made an emergency landing within ten nautical miles of Midway, and another made an emergency landing in the lagoon. [Note: "Astonishing Victory", page 179; Hornet report. 】 Hornet's dive bombers did not take part in the attack because they could not find the target, and Spruance later reported to Nimitz that if they had participated, they could have attacked the fourth Japanese aircraft carrier, USS Yorktown Later it would also be spared from that enemy aircraft carrier. [Note: Report by Spruance. ] Spruance is not the kind of person who talks about what might have happened, so what he wrote in the report is enough to show how much he was worried about this missed opportunity. There is a passage in the Hornet's operational report that poignantly suggests that this confusion could have been avoided: About an hour after the planes took off, the enemy changed course and began to fall back. We remained in radio silence, Did not report the situation to the aircraft in time. [Note: Hornet report. ] By implication, Task Force Sixteen, (or at least Hornet) knew that the Japanese fleet had changed course.But simply to avoid violating the rule of radio silence, the strike group was not notified of this fact and the entire battle was jeopardized.As readers know, part of the US fleet has long been discovered by a Japanese reconnaissance plane. After the US fleet took off, eliminating the enemy should have been the top priority, so the behavior of not reporting the situation is unforgivable. The above quote is almost certainly from Samuel Elliott Morrison's report on the Battle of Midway.He added: "The officer who wrote the report told me he didn't want to give that impression. [Note: "The Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway Island, and Submarine Operations", Note on page 122. ] It will be very interesting to know what kind of impression the officer wants to make. The Hornet's fighters were more unlucky than the bombers.All of them were forced to land at sea because they ran out of fuel.Mitchell, his operational staff officer, and Lieutenant Richard Gray landed closer together, allowing them to share two life rafts and an emergency ration.It took four days and twenty hours before they were rescued by a PBY machine, starving, blistered, and scared to death by a shark. [Note: Bard's interview with retired U.S. Navy Captain S. E. Rulleau on May 25, 1966. 】 Waldron's situation is different from Lin's.He led the torpedo plane to fly according to the established route, and the position was just right.His intuitive knowledge of the enemy has reached an astonishing degree.At the most opportune time, he turned and flew west-northwest in a small arc.We charged directly at the Japanese fleet, and Waldron seemed to be tied to the enemy fleet by a rope, Captain George H. Gay recalled the scene at that time. [Note: Gay's narrative. 】 The members of VT|8 are typical and representative of American adult males.Pollsters like this representation best.One was a track star at a college in Sheridan, Oregon; another worked for an insurance company in New York State, a worker at a Kansas City meatpacking plant, and a Harvard law student. One was the son of a lumber dealer in Los Angeles, one was directly selected from among the Navy enlisted to serve at the Naval Academy in Annapolis, and several were formal graduates of the Naval Academy in Annapolis. [Note: Alexander R. Griffin, "An Unforgettable Warship: The Hornet Legend", thirty-seventh | thirty-nine pages. 】 Guy was a student at the Agricultural Mechanical Academy before going to the Pensacola Naval Flying School to train.Taking off from the Hornet that morning was the first time in his life that he had carried a torpedo on an airplane, let alone from a warship.And he'd never seen anyone else do it.The other second lieutenants in the squadron had never seen it either.After taking off with his comrades, the twenty-five-year-old had no doubts in his mind.Waldron trained them, gave them lectures, and made them perform difficult and dangerous drills.Guy and his teammates in the squadron have full trust and respect for him.Gay told those who came to interview shortly thereafter: We can almost see what is going on in Captain Waldron's head by looking at the back of his head, because he has never tired of telling us what to do under what circumstances. . [Note: Gay's narrative. 】 At 9:18, the Chikuma spotted these torpedo planes. It was at this time that Tomonaga's last plane landed on the deck, and it was also at this moment that the Nautilus quickly moved to avoid the Arashi's depth charges. dive.The Chikuma built two smoke screens and fired into the air.A destroyer also cast a smoke screen on Tone's port side.Then, Akagi also spotted the incoming enemy plane and began to evade it. [Note: Narration in Japan, page 17. 】From Genda’s point of view, the enemy planes looked like a flock of waterfowls flying over the lake in the distance. They are finally here!Genda said to himself.Since the last land-based aircraft attack, throughout the process of making decisions and recovering the aircraft, the Japanese pilots have been muttering in their hearts; why the enemy carrier-based aircraft has not come yet.But Genda didn't understand why the enemy plane was flying so low, he thought to himself: their way of approaching the enemy is really weird! [Note: Genda's statement. 】 Guy was looking forward to giving the order to attack quickly, while Waldron seized the precious few seconds to telegraph Spruance the position and schedule of the enemy fleet.Unfortunately, due to the distance and the low altitude of the plane, Spruance did not receive this report, nor did anyone else.Apparently, Waldron had intended to attack the Akagi, but being attacked by the Zero's heavy fire, he turned to the center of the three carriers in the ocean below.According to Guy's estimate, there were about thirty-five Zeros attacking them, and the anti-aircraft guns of the ships also fired into the air in unison.Although the Japanese claimed that an American plane had been shot down, Gay was sure that none of the bombers had been damaged by the flak.His plane was the only one that came close to the target and came within range of the enemy's anti-aircraft guns.Most of the rest of the bombers were unlucky and were shot down by the dense Zeros before they could drop their torpedoes. [Note: Narrative by Gay: Memo from R. A. Ofsti to Commander, Pacific Fleet, June 7, 1942.Contents: Combat report dated June 4, 1942, by U.S. Navy Top Lieutenant G. H. Gay. 】 A torpedo plane rushed towards the Akagi, as if it wanted to bring a mine to hit the bridge.Cao Lu recalled: At that time, I thought this game was over.But instead of hitting the bridge, it plunged headlong into the sea.Grass Deer offered a short prayer for this heroic pilot. [Note: Caolu's statement. 】 There is very little material on the tragedy of the last three minutes of this torpedo squadron.Gay was the only survivor, but he had no time to take into account the situation of other teammates. [Note: Gay's narrative. VB|8's Aviation Private Leroy Quillen was on his way to Midway when he heard Waldron's voice on the radio.He was sure it was Waldron's voice because he had heard his voice on the radio several times.This time, he spoke clearly and intermittently: Attack now!Watch out for fighter jets!Look at that overboard!my case?Tell me who did it, I'm very grateful that there are two fighter jets in the water and my two wingman pilots are going overboard [Note: Hornet Report Annex VIII. 】 Guy saw the squadron leader's left fuel tank on fire.As the burning plane passed Guy, he saw Waldron stand up, trying desperately to free himself from the burning cockpit.Of the remaining three TBD machines, two also spun and disappeared.Then the machine gunner and radio operator on Gay's plane also died, and he became the only survivor of VT|8. He pulled up quickly over a destroyer, then rushed towards an aircraft carrier in the sea.This ship was obviously the Soryu, because the other two aircraft carriers he saw were larger than this one.Since the electric mine throwing device failed, he pulled the manual device.The ship turned sharply to starboard and was coming straight at him, so it was impossible for him to miss.He ignored the ship's aimless anti-aircraft fire at all, and aimed at a thumping anti-aircraft gun in the front of the ship.He tried to shoot at it, but the machine gun jammed, and he swerved sharply over the stern and flew away.The aircraft carrier is refueling and reloading the aircraft, and the oil pipes are dragged everywhere.Guy had always wanted a front cannon on the TBD, and this time it was even more so.When he pulled up sharply near the bridge, he saw the little Japanese captain on the bridge jumping up and down, yelling. [Note: Gay's narrative. 】 What Fujita saw from his Type Zero must have been Guy's attack.As far as he knew, only one torpedo plane escaped attack from him and his comrades with the potential to launch a torpedo.After Fujita spotted the torpedo, he banked and turned above Soryu's track, circling crazily to attract the attention of the aircraft carrier. Soryu finally turned a corner, and the torpedo sped past it.Fujita's plane ran out of ammunition and fuel, so he landed on the Soryu.To his surprise, the aircraft carrier did not find the torpedo.Apparently, it was sheer luck that it escaped extinction. [Note: Interview with Fujita, December 29, 1964] As soon as Guy flew away from the Canglong, five Type Zeros rushed towards him in a straight line.A second or third Zero knocked out his plane's rudder controls and ailerons.A wing snapped off and the plane plummeted like a rock, but he jumped out just in time.He grabbed a bag containing a rubber life raft and a black rubber cushion.He didn't know what the mat could be used for, but Waldron had told them not to throw things away because it might be useful in some cases.Guy soon discovered that hiding under the cushions was an effective way to hide from the sight of enemies.It wasn't until the air battle hit his north that he emerged from under the cushions and safely inflated the life raft.He was afloat with minor injuries to his hands and legs.The next day, he was rescued by a PBY machine. [Note: Gay's narrative. 】 Mitchell proposed to ask for credit for the entire squadron and award the Medal of Honor.Although the squadron's heroic combat cannot be overstated, the creditors did exaggerate the results of this operation: the pilots who were not shot down dropped torpedoes at direct range and saw them fly towards the enemy aircraft carrier , exploded on the side of the ship, emitting a dazzling flame.For the task force, for the navy, they crippled Japanese air power from the start of the battle. [Note: Annex III of the Hornet report. 】 Pocket submarines did not contribute to the Japanese victory on December 7, 1941.But after Pearl Harbor, Japanese newspapers seized on the fact that only one of the pocket submariners survived and touted them as heroes.After the Battle of Midway began, the Americans had a similar performance in their treatment of VT|8.This made the survivors in units that fought equally valiantly and suffered heavy losses very dissatisfied. [Note: Bard's interview with Robert E. Laub, May 13, 1966.Hereinafter referred to as Bard's interview with Raub. 】 People speculate that the love for VT|8 is due to Guy, but it has nothing to do with him.Guy is handsome, articulate, personable and humorous.His bravery and resourcefulness have been proven by practice.He is the ideal model for public relations officials. Decades later, it does not detract from the honor of the pilots of VT|8 to admit that others fought and died during the Battle of Midway as extraordinarily heroic.