Chapter 41 Chapter Thirty-seven I am deeply saddened and shudder

On June 6, Yamamoto aboard the Yamato woke up early.He realized that the battle of Midway had been lost, and he felt very bad.In the past few days, he had a stomach attack and neurasthenia, and the treatment did not improve.As painful as the commander's illness was to himself, it worried his loyal staff, who knew that, despite Yamamoto's best efforts to conceal his true feelings, the defeat had pierced his heart. [Note: Interview with Watanabe, September 26, 1964; Ugaki's diary, June 8, 1942. 】To be honest, even a hard-hearted person will be sad when he sees this situation. N day, that is, June 7 (Japanese time), finally arrived. Ugaki wrote that in April and May, comprehensive planning and preparations were carried out with this day as the goal.However, before that day came, the situation took a turn for the worse.Right now, we are being forced to brace ourselves for the worst.Then he added a brilliant sentence: War is unpredictable, and this should be firmly remembered as a lesson. [Note: Ugaki's diary, June 8, 1942. 】

In this darkness, a faint light flickered in the north.While these dramas were being discovered to the south, the Aleutian front to the north was not idle.On the afternoon of June 4, Kakuda dispatched an elite force of eleven dive bombers, six level bombers, and fifteen fighters to attack Dutch Harbor.The pilot encountered good weather again over the target.This time they blew up four oil tanks, the barracks ship Northwest, a hangar under construction, and a wing of the hospital.On the way to the rendezvous point, the aircraft of the aircraft carrier Hayato encountered eight P|40 aircraft over Cape Ott Airport, and an air battle broke out.The Japanese lost one fighter, two bombers, and two bombers too damaged to fly back to the carrier and crashed at sea.At the same time as the Japanese were attacking Dutch Harbor, a group of B|26 and B|17 aircraft attacked Kakuda's warship. As a result, one of the two types of aircraft was lost, but the Japanese side did not suffer any losses. [Note: "The Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway Island, and Submarine Operations", pp. 177-178; Analysis of the Battle of Midway Island, pp. 190 | 191; "Midway Island Sea Battle", on page 218, Fuchida said there were nine bombers. 】

On the afternoon of the 4th, Yamamoto sent intermittent telegrams to Xixuan, and there was no further fighting that day.Xixuan's chief of staff, Yu Nakazawa, concluded that something must have gone wrong, although no special ingenuity was required to make this inference.Based on the information obtained, the impression I got was that the First Mobile Unit had suffered unexpected heavy losses, and I couldn't help but feel extremely worried. [Note: The diary of Admiral Yu Nakazawa on June 5, 1942 provided by Chihaya.Hereinafter referred to as Nakazawa Diary. 】 The next morning, after learning that all Nagumo's aircraft carriers had been destroyed, Xixuan suggested to Yamamoto at 8 o'clock that the Aleutian operation should be suspended at this time.He also said that apparently the United States and the Soviet Union had only discovered the Second Air Fleet, not the Northern Forces.A few hours later, the northern troops received a telegram from Ugaki saying that they would add a few warships to the northern troops and ask for our opinions on the implementation of the offensive.In this way, the intention of the United Fleet became clear, so Xixuan replied: After we get reinforcements, the offensive operation can be carried out. [Note: Same as above, June 6, 1942. 】

At the same time, Xixuan ordered the offensive force of Rear Admiral Sentaro Omori, about 225 nautical miles southwest of Adak Island, to go back to capture Attu Island.Yamamoto decided to capture Kiska Island and Attu Island. At 12:59, he telegraphed the relevant troops: the Second Mobile Force should be returned to the Northern Forces. [Note: "The Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway Island, and Submarine Operations", page 180 | 181; Japanese narrative, page 39. 】 Ugaki wrote: They seemed to be encouraged by our decision, and decided shortly after noon to launch the Aleutian 5 operation on the day after N-day in spite of everything.The circumstances under which they made this decision can only be speculated, but an explanation should eventually be given.Yamamoto predicted that with the cancellation of Operation Midway, the Americans would intensify their efforts to defend and retake the Aleutian Islands.Therefore, at 23:20, he transferred the battleships Kongo and Hiei, the heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma, the light aircraft carrier Zuiho, the seaplane carrier Kamikawa Maru, and fourteen submarines to Xixuan.These warships will sail north immediately after refueling.In Ugaki's words, the staff officers of the United Fleet hope to have the opportunity to avenge Midway Island. [Note: Ugaki's diary, June 8, 1942. 】

Let me explain in advance here that the landings on Attu Island and Kiska Island were realized as planned, but this is not surprising because there are no troops stationed on these two islands. [Note: Analysis of the Battle of Midway Island, page 193 | 194 pages; "Battle of the Coral Sea, Battle of Midway Island, and Submarine Operations", pages 181 and 182. 】Since the key link of Midway Island is still under the control of the Stars and Stripes, these two islands have no strategic value to Japan.Trading four aircraft carriers for two palm-sized islands shrouded in mist and swamps is not worth the candle.Of course, Nakazawa did not imagine that his troops could do enough to make up for Japan's loss at Midway.He said sadly: For the Japanese Empire, June 5th is the most unlucky day, which is unforgettable.As wars become protracted, our efforts should be more extraordinary than ever.Japan should thoroughly review all combat strategies and operational guidelines and the navy should formulate contingency policies as soon as possible. [Note: Nakazawa's diary dated June 7, 1942. 】

On the afternoon of June 5, the destroyers escorting Nagumo's aircraft carrier caught up with the retreating large force.According to the original plan, the survivors should be transferred immediately to the larger ship, so that the wounded could be cared for as best as possible, but this was not possible at the time.Ugaki planned to transfer them to the battleships after arriving at the refueling point outside the 600 nautical mile radius circle centered on Midway Island on the 6th.However, due to the long night and bad weather, reports of enemy planes found nearby were disturbing, so the refueling point was changed again, and it took a day to continue sailing westward before arriving.The evacuation of the wounded then began rapidly. [Note: Ugaki's diary, June 8, 1942. 】

Shifting jobs is like a nightmare.The sky was starless, the ship was blacked out, and the waves were pounding the destroyers violently, threatening to knock them into the battleship.In the end, the fleet had to stop to give the boats enough time to complete this merciful mission.Many of the wounded were badly burned and bloody. [Note: "The Battle of Midway Island", page 225. 】Almost all the survivors scattered from the aircraft carrier felt inexplicable pain in their knees and wrists.The doctor's final diagnosis said that it was caused by the impact of the blast wave. [Note: Tiangu's reply; the battle of tragedy. 】Watanabe did not let any wounded on the Yamato, in order not to let Yamamoto see their tragic situation and affect their fighting spirit. [Note: Interview with Watanabe, November 25, 1964. 】

By dawn on June 6, General Yamamoto's troubles were not over.He really needs the staff to cheer him up and cheer him up.At 6:30, he received a telegram from the Mikuma: Two enemy carrier-based aircraft were found. [Note: Ugaki's diary, June 8, 1942. ] They were two of the eighteen SBDs that took off from the Enterprise at 5:02, each carrying a 500-pound bomb.One of them was undoubtedly the 8|B|2 on the Hornet, whose pilot, Ensign William D. Carter, spent the night on the Enterprise.At 6:45 he had reported sightings of an aircraft carrier and five destroyers. [Note: Spruance's report, June 16, 1942; VB|8 Operational Diary, June 1942; Enterprise report, June 13, 1942. 】

After hearing this report, Spruance laughed and said: We are looking for it!But he was only happy for a while.Carter directed radio operators to report a battleship, a heavy cruiser, and three destroyers.The problem was either with the operator, or with the radio center, who, due to a sound error, heard BB (battleship) as CH (aircraft carrier).The Hornet notified the Enterprise by airdropping information that the information was wrong. [Note: Interview with Spruance; Hornet Report, June 13, 1942. 】 Before the mistake could be corrected, Spruance had ordered the Hornet to attack.At 7:59, the Hornet dispatched twenty-six Dreadnoughts and eight Wildcats.Going together in wildcat pose is out of caution.In order to prevent the resistance of the enemy plane that was not found before. [Note: Hornet report, June 13, 1942. 】

At the same time, another 8|B|8 of the Hornet reported at 7:30 that it had spotted two heavy cruisers and three destroyers. [Note: Enterprise Report, June 8, 1942. ] After discovering the enemy situation twice on the map, it can be seen that the distance between the two is fifty-two nautical miles.This was enough to convince Spruance that he had two enemies to deal with.The strange thing is that the air battle that day and the reconnaissance planes sent by the cruiser did not clarify the situation. Of course, there are only a group of Japanese ships in this sea area, namely the injured Mikuma and Mogami and the escorting Arashio and Asashio . [Note: Analysis of the Battle of Midway Island, page 174. 】

It is easy to mistake the ship type when observing from the air.This was only the first in a series of misunderstandings that occurred on June 6, 1942, and the day thus became the typical material for the study of such misunderstandings. Less than two hours after takeoff, Hornet's dive bombers spotted and attacked the target.All the pilots who participated in the flight agreed that their main target must not be a cruiser, but a battleship (perhaps the Kirishima class).However, the indistinguishable distinction between the Kirishima-class battleship (displacement slightly greater than 31,000 tons) and the highest-class heavy cruiser (displacement of about 12,000 tons) did not have much impact on the pilots attacking the target. [Note: Hornet Report, June 13, 1942; "Imperial Japanese Navy", pp. 47 and 155. 】 The Hornet claimed that they had two 1,000-pound and one 500-pound bombs that hit an enemy ship, probably the Mikuma.They also said two bombs hit the second target, the Mogami, and a 500-pound bomb hit a destroyer. [Note: Hornet report, June 13, 1942; Nimitz report, June 28, 1942. 】 There is no record of damage to the Mogami and Mikuma in Japan's existing archives of aircraft carrier combat records and damage statistics on June 4.Therefore, it is difficult to say exactly what happened to these cruisers.However, according to survivors, Mogami was indeed shot in two places.One of the bombs killed everyone on the No. 5 turret.Another bomb hit amidships, damaging the torpedo tubes and causing a fire in the bilge. [Note: Analysis of the Battle of Midway Island, page 169. ] Fortunately, Yuandu had the foresight to launch the torpedo the night before, so no serious fire and explosion occurred. [Note: Ape Du's reply. ] The Mikuma was hit by two or three bullets, and the Arashio was wounded in the tail, but continued to fight.The hit situation sounds good, but the consequences are relatively insignificant.Hornet lost a Dreadnought in the attack. [Note: Analysis of the Battle of Midway, p. 169; Hornet Report, June 13, 1942. 】 Then, Enterprise tried its luck.Under the unified leadership of the battle-tested Short, its thirty-one dive bombers and two fighters took off at 10:45.Shortly after lift-off, they received orders to hunt down a warship they said was believed to be about forty miles in front of the target they were supposed to attack. [Note: Supplementary Report of the Enterprise Number, June 13, 1942. 】 The Enterprise was going to send three torpedo planes, which had taken a lot of effort to repair and were ready for combat, to support them in their operations.Before setting off, Spruance specifically instructed Raub not to attack if there was resistance.He considered that these TBDs would be used against potentially more aggressive targets.Sure enough, the anti-air fire on the destroyer serving as the guard was very accurate, so Laub readily carried out Spruance's order. [Note: Bard's interview with Lausch, May 13, 1966, Shumway's VB|3 report. 】 Following the instructions of their superiors, the fleet flew over the cruiser and destroyer to find and destroy the non-existent battleship; after a period of searching was fruitless, the fighters and a bomber squadron turned around and attacked the cruiser.They accurately identified one as the top class and the other as the Atago class.Not a bad estimate, since the Atago heavy cruiser displaces only about a thousand tons less than the Mogami. [Note: Supplementary Report of the Enterprise, June 13, 1942; Shumway's VB|3 Report; "Imperial Japanese Navy", pp. 151 and 155. 】 Laub said he had never seen such an accurate dive-bombing site before. [Note: Bard interview with Raub, May 13, 1966. ] Short said the operation was relatively simple. [Note: Bard interview with Short, June 5, 1966. 】This is true, because the Americans don't have to deal with the powerful Zero machine, so they can do whatever they want. The bridges of Hornet and Enterprise listened to the combat calls.Mitchell said calmly that the monitoring showed that the attack was effective. [Note: Hornet report, June 13, 1942. ] Spruance listened with interest to the conversation between the pilots.He said: This kind of call is rare, and most of the words are difficult to be elegant. [Note: Interview with Spruance, September 5, 1964. 】 Look at that shit is on fire!Beat that son of a bitch again!Knock 'em all down and your bomb did hit its stern.Great job man!Let's do it with a destroyer or two. Hitting these devils is easy. Then, the speaker's tone was slightly sad: Oh, it would be nice to have another bomb!The other attack plane obviously did not encounter the threat of anti-aircraft fire. Its pilot said contemptuously: Little Japan can't hit you with a slingshot.Then he yelled: Tojo, you bastard, send out the others too, I will clean them up as usual! Spruance was so overjoyed that he sent Nimitz a copy of the speech.He knew how pleased the Commander in Chief would be. [Note: Personal letter from Spruance to Nimitz on June 8, 1942 (with attachments). 】 It is clear from all the transcripts that the dive bombers on Enterprise mistook the last of the Japanese formation for a battleship. [Note: Attachment to Spruance's letter. ] This ship must be the Mikuma, because the planes mainly launched an onslaught on it.Throughout the Battle of Midway, all Americans had the awareness of taking the initiative to attack, which is very lucky for the United States.This time, Lieutenant E.M. Eisaman of VB|3 took the initiative to offer this Atago-class heavy cruiser [Note: Mogami and Mikuma are sister ships of the same class. The reason why Americans repeatedly mistake cruisers for battleships is still is a mystery. ] swooped down and found that it was not injured at all; and risked the heavy fire fired on him alone to drop the bomb, which hit the stern of the ship. 【Note: Shumwei's VB|3 report. He must have hit Mogami, although some survivors say the ship was hit by only two bombs, one amidships and one just forward of the bridge. [Note: Analysis of the Midway Battle, p. 169; Ugaki’s Diary; June 8, 1942; Sakamoto’s material. 】 Saruto said the only thing that really caused serious damage was the bomb that blew through the deck of the seaplane.It fell into the cabin, causing a fire.It turned the ward into a hell, with medical officers and assistants dying and wounded, and patients who didn't die on the spot left unattended.Despite the efforts of Yuandu's damage control personnel to pour water on the fire, the fire is still in danger of getting out of control.In the end, Saruto had to order the entire damaged cabin to be sealed, and was prepared to take terrible responsibility for it.He was worried that there were still people alive inside, but, in order to save the warship, he had to take this obviously cruel step. Later, after the fire was brought under control, the crew opened the hatch, and Yuandu found that a group of officers and soldiers were sealed inside and died. He felt very sad.In fact, he also saw an engineer second lieutenant committing seppuku.He said: I am deeply saddened by their death and shudder. [Note: Saruto's reply: Sakamoto's material. 】 The hapless Mikuma wobbled after being hit by five bombs on its forecastle, midsection and bridge area.The last one triggered the anti-aircraft shells that were placed on the deck for firing, and the bridge was blown up.The bombs that landed in the midsection decoyed several torpedoes, and the bombs that landed on the foredeck destroyed the front guns. [Note: Letter from the Commander of the Pacific Fleet to the Director of Naval Intelligence on June 21, 1942, the content is the interrogation of Japanese soldiers captured in the Battle of Midway Island on June 9, 1942. ] Lieutenant Taketoshi Kawaguchi, the engineer officer of the Mikuma, gave a vivid description of the incident near the bridge: When the No. 3 turret forward of the bridge was hit by a bomb (estimated to have been hit by a second attack around 09:30) (12:30 local time), many on the bridge were killed by fragments of the blast .At that time, Sakiyama (Shifu) was commanding the warship with his head sticking out of a manhole on the top of the bridge. His head and face were injured, and he fell into a coma immediately.At this time many officers were killed. Vice Captain Takashima (Hideo) Navy Lieutenant Commander took over the command.Then, the starboard front wheel engine room and the port rear wheel engine room were shot, and the warship stopped as a result.According to the order of the vice-captain, the maintenance personnel under my command set up the raft with timbers at the bow.Mr. Sakiyama and the wounded boarded the No. 1 raft and were released into the sea.On the No. 2 raft are quartermasters and flight commanders, who carry important documents and materials with them. [Note: Materials from Sakamoto.It is difficult to give an accurate account of the events of June 6, and the fate of Admiral Sakiyama is another example.According to Fuchita, Admiral Sakiyama was wounded in the third attack of the day, but he had been in command of the Mikuma until it sank, and was thrown far from the sinking ship before being killed. A destroyer was rescued.Afterwards, the heroic commander died on June 13 in the sick cabin of the Suzuya. ("Battle of Midway Island", p. 229) Lord said: The bridge of the ship was destroyed when it was attacked for the first time, and Captain Sakiyama was mortally wounded, but the deputy captain Takashima took over the command and continued to fight. ("Amazing Victory" page 273)] The Mikuma, despite being heavily damaged, assisted the two destroyers in rescuing the approximately 300 people who jumped into the sea from the Mogami or were thrown into the sea by the explosion.However, due to heavy enemy air raids, they were forced to interrupt the rescue work, and watched about 100-150 people adrift at sea. [Note: Materials from Sakamoto. 】 At about the same time, a rare comic episode appeared in the battle, which enlivened the atmosphere of the battle.Midway had of course received the morning's erroneous report that two lines of enemy ships had been spotted.Semade believed that Task Force 16 would deal with the targets in the north, so at 10:45 he dispatched all twenty-six B|17s that could be dispatched to search for the few targets sailing southwest. cruiser.Midway Island also hoped that these ships would join the Japanese transport fleet, so that they would become lucrative targets. B|17 did not find the target.On the way back, a team of six aircraft spotted a warship.Thinking it was an enemy ship, they dropped twenty 1,000-pound and 1,100-pound bombs and reported hitting a cruiser, which sank within fifteen seconds. [Note: NAS Diary; Contact Report; Ramsey's Report; Nimitz's Report, June 28, 1942] It was an anecdote that a cruiser sank in fifteen seconds.If the pilots lingered for a while, they might have seen an even more peculiar sight: the cruiser could not sink.The American submarine Grayling broke through the waves and surfaced again.The captain, Lieutenant Commander Elliott Olsen, was furious and sent a report to headquarters.He wanted to know why the U.S. Army Air Forces dropped bombs on the U.S. submarine, forcing it to make an emergency dive. [Note: Nimitz's report, June 28, 1942; "Turning Point", p. 146. 】 Enterprise was unscathed in attacking the cruisers.Apparently, its planes made one of the most successful attacks.But Spruance never does things halfway, and he still has a worthy target in mind.About an hour before Enterprise recovered the aircraft, Hornet's attack group of twenty-three dive bombers was also dispatched. [Note: Twenty-four planes took off, and one flew back to the Hornet for some reason. ] At 14:45, under the leadership of Lin, the aircraft group launched an attack on the already battered enemy.Among the enemy ships Hayashi recognized a heavy cruiser (probably the Kinugasa class) [Note: According to "Imperial Japanese Navy", p. ], the other is a heavy cruiser or light cruiser, and two destroyers.This naval battle may be the closest in this strange sea battle between the American and Japanese warships, because the pilot of the Hornet can see both the Sixteenth Task Force behind him and the enemy ahead. [Note: Hornet Report, June 13, 1942; Analysis of the Battle of Midway, p. 176. 】 Lin's fleet returned to the Hornet intact.He claimed that one bomb hit a light cruiser, six bombs hit a heavy cruiser or light cruiser, one bomb hit a destroyer, and a violent explosion could be seen on the heavy cruiser before it was finally destroyed by fire. It was burned into an empty shell, and the people on the ship abandoned the ship one after another to escape. [Note: Hornet report, June 13, 1942. ] The above report appears to be the most accurate one hoped for, although there is some evidence that Mogami was spared this time around.The Japanese destroyer reported that the Mikuma was damaged again and caught fire.But the report did not mention Mogami.Apparently, it avoided repeated air strikes during the third and final attack by the US plane. The Mikuma caught fire after being intensively bombed by the Hornet aircraft. The fire was so violent that it seemed that it was exhausted.Its vice-captain ordered the ship to be abandoned, but he himself stayed on board and died with the ship. [Note: Materials from Sakamoto. After receiving the order to abandon the ship, the short, round-faced navy captain, Masao Koyama, asked one of his senior non-commissioned officers to watch him commit suicide by cutting open his stomach.Koyama was the commander of the main battery fire center.It is not difficult to imagine that the fate of the Mikuma is not in any case the responsibility of someone like him. [Note: Statement by Yoshioka. ] In this way, Koyama became a national hero in Japan.But this also helped the Americans. Only a few more Americans would be happy if a young and promising officer like him died! Lin hit the destroyer Arashio.The bomb hit the third turret.This was miserable for the Japanese, as the stern was crowded with the large numbers of men evacuated from the Mikuma.Many people were blown into the sea by the explosion, and a group of people were killed. Commander of the Eighth Destroyer Squadron Ogawa Yu (Yan) Xi was seriously injured.The structure of the Arashio was damaged, but the tenacious little destroyer was still able to sail by manpower. [Note: Sakamoto material; USSBS No. 295, interrogation of the navigator of the Suzuya. 】 This time, the U.S. Navy saw the end of the Mikuma with its own eyes just as it had witnessed the sinking of the Hiryu.On June 9, the submarine USS Trout captured two Japanese soldiers from life rafts and sent them to Pearl Harbor.One of the Japanese was Katsuichi Yoshida, a radio chief.He suffered comminuted rib fractures and was taken to a naval hospital.The other is Kenichi Ishikawa, a third-class marine engineer.He was breezy during his trial.He was only twenty-one years old, and he felt indifferent and satisfied with his fate as a prisoner of war in the United States.He knew that his relatives and friends would never forgive him because he had not been killed in battle, but had been taken lightly as a prisoner.He has not specifically expressed a desire to return home.In fact, when asked where he was going, he said frankly that he would like to stay in the United States. Ishikawa not only told the scene of the sinking of the Mikuma he saw with his own eyes, but also explained to the interrogators many circumstances of the ship's departure for Midway Island.He also talked freely about the situation of the Japanese ships he saw.He explained that during the battle, there were more than 20 people who climbed onto a life raft from the side of the Mikuma, and only he and Yoshida survived.They had not had their teeth stained for three days when they were captured by the Trout. [Note: Letter from the Commander of the Pacific Fleet to the Director of Naval Intelligence, June 21, 1942. 】 After the last strike crew returned to TF Sixteen, Spruance still had no idea what type of enemy ship the pilots were attacking.In order to solve this mystery, he sent two reconnaissance planes to conduct photographic reconnaissance. [Note: Interview with Spruance, September 5, 1964. ] Ensign Edwin J. Brogg of VB|6's plane took Mr. A. D. Brick of Fox Film News, who was going to make a movie.Ensign Cleo J. Dobson, who flew the second plane, was the Enterprise assisted in the landing and was a veteran of many aerial reconnaissance missions.His plane took the veteran photographer of the Enterprise and was ordered to go to shoot the results of the scene. [Note: VB|6 Operation Report, June 10, 1942; Bard's interview with Dobson, May 12, 1966. 】 During the flight, Dobson felt a sense of murder in his heart.He was an affectionate man, very fond of his friends and fellow shipmates.Whenever misfortune happened to any of them, he was very sad.He thought that if he saw any Japs who had drowned alive, he would fight them back like the Japanese had shot American sailors in similar circumstances.There were about 400 to 500 Japanese sailors who fell into the water around the ship.My heart softened as I flew over these poor fellows, and it was impossible to shoot them.He saw many dead bodies lying on the deck of the Mikuma, and five life rafts floating on the sea about 300 yards from the ship, but there was no one on them.About thirty nautical miles to the west, a cruiser and two destroyers were trying to get away.Spotting planes flew over them to take pictures, but they were unable to get close as the fleeing warship opened fire on them.After that, the plane with the mission of photography turned around and returned, but Dobson was still thinking about the Japanese who were sure to die on the way back. He wrote in his diary: Man, of course I don't want to fall into the sea like they did.I don't have to feel sorry for them too much, because I might be in the same situation myself someday.Then, with some humor, he added: When I no longer have the ambition to go out and fight, I will be relieved to sit by the fire and read these diaries. [Note: Dobson's diary, June 6, 1942. 】 In order to find out the type of enemy ship, Spruance personally asked the four men.But he was annoyed when Dobson replied, "Sir, I don't know, but he's a big warship."One of the four insisted that one of them was a top-tier heavy cruiser.The news was astonishing.Spruance reported to Nimitz: "Never during the whole day did we suspect a battleship among the enemy ships.The photos were taken with great success.After flushing them out the next morning, Spruance checked for himself and found that the observant officer was right.Filled with remorse, he said: "I was blushing because I had reported to Admiral Nimitz on the afternoon of the attack that we had bombed a battleship. [Note: Interview with Spruance, September 5, 1964; Budd interview with Dobson, May 12, 1966; Spruance's report, June 16, 1942. 】 Had the photo-reconnaissance been delayed a little longer, they might have been certain that the Mikuma was dead, since she sank shortly after sunset. [Note: Materials from Sakamoto. ] Curiously, those who saw the two leading Japanese ships insisted that Mikuma must have been larger than the light cruiser or destroyer that accompanied it.The last position of the smaller warship was fifteen nautical miles away, with a long trail of oil trailing behind it. [Note: Report by Spruance, June 16, 1942. 】 One of the reasons for this observation error may be the damage to the bow of Mogami.When it was sailing, the bow of the ship was heavily tilted forward, which caused a large wave at the bow. Therefore, the Japanese later estimated that the Americans might have mistaken its sailing speed because of this.In fact, its speed is only about fourteen knots.It was still steerable, but for strange reasons it wasn't discovered until it sailed to the Truk Islands.It turned out that when the collision occurred on June 5th, its anchor chains all slipped, as Yamada explained: Although its bow was injured, it was able to hold the direction, which seemed to be dragging with it. Anchor chain navigation has a lot to do with it.Relying on its own power, the Mogami staggered to the Truk Islands.It was out of combat for nearly a year thereafter. [Note: Sakamoto’s material; Yamada’s reply. 】 If one individual could be credited with saving a particular warship, it would be Saruto, the highest-ranked damage control officer.When the warship was hit and it was extremely dangerous, he decisively threw away the torpedo. (Material by Sakamoto)] Then when the warship was attacked, he bravely made the most difficult decision to sacrifice the few and preserve the majority.