Chapter 43 Chapter Thirty-Nine: Halfway to the Goal

By nineteen o'clock on June 6th, Spruance had concluded the aerial combat and could once again fully consider his situation.He had to send Maury and Worden to Cimarron to refuel, leaving only four destroyers to cover the two aircraft carriers and six cruisers.His mission was accomplished well beyond the wildest dreams of the most Pollyanna.He wisely told himself that it would be foolish to take a step forward bravely.And he himself had reached this critical point, so he decided to return to the east to join the tanker. [Note: Report by Spruance, June 16, 1942; Interview with Spruance, September 5, 1964. 】

When the people on the Enterprise realized that the battle was over for them, the whole ship was full of joy, as Captain Lindsay said: Many of our good friends died.But when the battle is over, there is a sense of relief in those who fight to find that they are still alive, can do it for a while, and have a few drinks with their mates.The chief military doctor on board must have felt the same way.On the return voyage, he proudly carried four gallons of bourbon to the officers' mess.Lindsey said: "It's a relief to see people put aside the old naval doctrine during the war and put a little human touch on it. [Note: Narrative by Lindsay. 】

The United States has to pay the final price.Emmons wrote to Marshall on June 7th: The first phase of the Battle of Midway was drawing to a close.I call it Phase 1 because I think it's entirely possible for the Japanese to make a comeback For some time I've thought that we should obviously launch an attack on Wake Island.A few days ago, four LB|30 aircraft came from the mainland, so that our warships will have enough range.The planes are now at Midway, and if conditions permit, they will attack Wake before dawn tomorrow morning.We'll telegraph you the result.Also, I'm happy to tell you that General Tinker will be leading the flight himself.Unfortunately, I can't go with you. [Note: Letter from Emmons to Marshall, June 7, 1942, PSF 86, Roosevelt Papers. 】

Tinker's quick heart and Emmons' support only show that they are fighting spirit, not that they are sensible.Tinker's responsibility is far more than just accompanying the four planes in the attack, and it doesn't play much role for him to go out in person.All four Liberators carried drop tanks, each carrying four 500-pound bombs.They didn't find the target at all.Three planes returned, but Tinker's bomber disappeared without a trace. [Note: "The Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway, and the First Submarine Battle", p. 151; "A Surprising Victory", p. 279; see also June 13, 1942 "Chicago Daily Tribune"]

On the morning of June 6, the defeated Japanese fleet had been retreating westward.Leaden sky with low clouds.The mist rising from the sea hovered like a ghost among the masts.The sea itself seemed to reflect the atmosphere of the moment, it was rough and the turbid waves emptied, [Note: Ugaki's diary, June 8, 1942. 】Extremely restless.Yamamoto on the flagship felt dizzy and depressed, [Note: Interview with Watanabe, September 26, 1964. 】 But he will not easily give up hope of inducing Spruance to engage in a surface engagement without a last-ditch effort. After Yamato learned that Mikuma and Mogami were in trouble, Yamamoto ordered Kondo to go to the rescue.As soon as Yamamoto made his decision, Ugaki began to worry about whether the decision was wise.He wrote in his diary: The composition of the enemy fleet seems to be one or two aircraft carriers as the core, plus a group of cruisers.Needless to say, the Mikuma was doomed, and other ships could be doomed as well.Not only that, if the worst happens, the attacking force itself may not be guaranteed to be in danger.

Considering these possibilities, Yamamoto decided to pull the entire main force south to deal with unexpected events, and looked for opportunities to wipe out the enemy within the air cover of Wake Island. Yamamoto and Ugaki never imagined that the U.S. forces that disrupted their grand battle plan were so small.They are convinced that of the five or six enemy aircraft carriers originally assembled in the waters of Midway, two of them have been sunk by them.They also believe that part of this huge fleet is pursuing them closely, and this part of the force includes at least one regular aircraft carrier, two converted aircraft carriers, several destroyers and cruisers.Ugaki wrote anxiously: We believe that this enemy fleet is likely to catch up with the attacking force tomorrow morning after annihilating the other half of the 7th Cruiser Squadron and the 8th Destroyer Squadron, and then retreat eastward temporarily.

Ugaki believes that the best solution for the Japanese is to force the US ships to engage in night battles with the Kondo forces.Otherwise, they will have no choice but to attack the enemy rashly with the main force the next morning, and disperse the incoming enemy planes at any time. The decks of aircraft carriers, blowing up their engines.Of course, if the Americans were within the range of Wake Island, the fighters would be more beneficial to the Japanese.But Ugaki doesn't believe his opponent will get him what he wants. [Note: Ugaki's diary, June 8, 1942. ] He was not wrong at all, because the far-sighted Spruance was determined to avoid the attack circle of Wake Island from the very beginning. [Note: Interview with Spruance, September 1964. 】

Yamamoto decided to take the risk of fighting this last big battle.Ugaki wrote worriedly: This requires a particularly great determination, because if the action goes wrong, the entire combined fleet will be destroyed.All necessary orders were issued at 15:00 on June 6, and the fleet followed suit until the next morning.However, the air search on the morning of the 7th found no trace of the enemy, so the plan to take the risk of a full-scale contest with the main force had to be abandoned. [Note: Ugaki's diary, June 8, 1942. 】 But Yamamoto was unwilling to withdraw from the battle, and decided to make a last-ditch effort to capture the US Special Mixed Fleet.He hastily assembled a containment force.It consisted of the cruisers Haguro and Myoko and nine ships of the 4th Destroyer Squadron, commanded by Takeo Shoki, commander of the 5th Cruiser Division.The unit will send false information by radio to lure the Americans into the waters northeast of Wake Island, putting them under the attack of the island's air force and the submarines lurking there. [Note: Analysis of the Battle of Midway, page 183; Ugaki's Diary, June 8, 1942. 】

Neither Takagi nor his chief of staff, Nagasawa Hiroshi, was optimistic about this plan, because they believed that before the submarines or Wake Island aircraft spotted the US aircraft carrier, the US carrier-based aircraft might find the diversion force and attack it .In fact, Takagi's unit never found the enemy, and it disbanded on June 13th. [Note: Bard's interview with Hiroshi Nagasawa, retired Rear Admiral of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, February 4, 1966. 】 Still, Japan's doom was not over.At midnight on the 7th, when the destroyer Isoha turned 30 degrees twice to turn 60 degrees to starboard, its starboard bow hit the middle of the port side of Uraha, damaging its funnel and causing its boiler to Functionality was affected, but it was still capable of twenty-four knots.But the starboard bow of the Isohama was knocked off a few feet, and her speed dropped to eleven knots.Ugaki was very annoyed, because he had repeatedly warned the destroyer to be careful when making such maneuvers.

One little thing was finally cleared up that day.Ugaki wrote: It is understood that the commander's stomachache was caused by roundworms.The deworming medicine cured him, and we were all happy. [Note: Ugaki's diary, June 9, 1942. 】 However, this joy was mixed with a deep embarrassment.At around 7:00 that morning, when Yamamoto boarded the bridge, the staff members followed him awkwardly and slowly, feeling ashamed and afraid to look him in the face.They were not ashamed of the Admiral, but ashamed of the United Fleet's disgrace. The tense atmosphere lasted for a while, no one spoke, and it was Yamamoto who broke the silence.His dark eyes stared straight at the loyal Kuroshima who was burdened by failure.Black Isle, he said musingly, the submarine search was not done well, it was a big mistake.The mood was tempered by this matter-of-fact comment.His view shows that the Battle of Midway is history, from which many lessons can be learned.Their beloved general returned to normal. [Note: Interview with Watanabe, September 26, 1964. 】

On the 9th, Yamamoto ordered the Nagara to move closer to the Yamato. He wanted to call the main staff of the First Air Fleet to the ship for a meeting.These representatives are Grass Deer, Fleet Secretary Oishi, and of course Genda.The pressing question facing Yamamoto was how to rebuild an aircraft carrier force. [Note: Ugaki's diary, June 9, 1942. 】Before these representatives arrived, Yamamoto called Ugaki, Kuroshima, Watanabe, Sasaki, and Arima together.He knew that the retreat of the Yamato declared the failure of the Battle of Midway.He also knew that the staff had drawn certain conclusions against First Air Fleet and its senior officers.So he instructed these few people not to raise these criticisms.He categorically ordered: Never let outsiders say that the submarine force and the First Air Fleet were responsible for the defeat at Midway.The responsibility is on me. [Note: Interview with Watanabe, October 6, 1964. 】 Kuroshima has always had a very strong opinion on Kuolu, and Yamamoto specifically told this excitable confidant, and said: Don't blame Nagumo and Caolu.The responsibility for failure lies with me. [Note: Interview with Kuroshima, December 5, 1964. 】 The four representatives from the Nagara were still wearing thick winter clothes, and they all looked exhausted after a long and fierce battle.Grass Deer is leaning on a cane, and the clerk's military uniform is in tatters. [Note: The Battle of Tragedy. 】According to Ugaki’s recollection, the first sentence the representatives said mainly meant: I don’t know what to say other than a thorough apology, and he added angrily: Of course, they should do this. The delegates walked into Yamamoto's cabin.Cao Lu made a long speech, talking about his own views on the reasons for this disastrous failure.He made six basic points: (1) radio silence had to be broken before the battle began because of rendezvous difficulties; (2) search aircraft failed to find the enemy before turning back; (4) The bombers were delayed by reloading torpedoes; (5) Waiting for the return of the first wave of fighters caused delays; (6) The over-concentration of aircraft carriers caused many disadvantages. Yu Yuan carefully wrote down these six items in his diary, and under each item was written a lesson that should be learned. [Note: Ugaki's diary, June 10, 1942. 】In fact, these people are too close to the picture to see the whole picture of the painting clearly.Cao Deer's list is limited to the activities of the Nagumo Army, which is the characteristic of him. Ugaki wrote: All in all, we can only draw the conclusion that the main reason for this defeat is that we have become complacent due to past victories, and have not studied what should happen if enemy air forces appear on our flanks when we launch a concentrated attack. What to do I have been very worried about this, and have repeatedly reminded them to pay attention. [Note: Ugaki's diary, June 10, 1942. 】 Caolu reported straightforwardly as before, neither complaining nor looking for excuses.With a sincere heart, he emphasized that the wise way is to tell the truth to the Japanese people.He made a personal request to Yamamoto as one fighter makes another. He said solemnly: Chief Nanyun and I bear great responsibility for this defeat.For this, we will not hesitate to accept any punishment.But I want you to give us a special favor so that we both have the chance to pay off this old debt at the front as we have done before. No one could have spoken more squarely than this.With tears in his eyes, Yamamoto could only say: OK. [Note: Kuolu’s statement; "United Fleet", page 91; Ugaki’s diary, June 10, 1942; interview with Kurojima, December 5, 1964.Cao Deer said in his books and reports that he was only on the Yamato, but Ugaki's diary and other materials all showed that there were other people who went to the Yamato. 】 After a while, Ugaki said to Cao Deer: Our United Fleet Command is aware of our mistakes, and we apologize to the First Air Fleet.But the current setback does not make us pessimistic at all.He went on boldly: We also plan to conduct the Midway operation again, and at the same time conduct the southern operation.The immediate priority was to provide the North with sufficient strength to counter possible enemy activity there in the hope of seeking revenge.He emphasized: How to restore the fleet's air power is a top priority.So I invite you to come and discuss the big plan together. Still grappling with a delicate issue, Kusakaru explained that Nagumo was adamant about the transfer of First Air Fleet Command from the burning Akagi to Nagara.Cao Lu persuaded him that as long as there is one person alive in the First Air Fleet, he, Nagumo, has the responsibility to fight the battle.Despite this, Nagumo was actually dragged off the Akagi by the staff.Cao Lu said: We lost all four aircraft carriers, a team commander, and three captains. After thinking about it, I am also very painful. Yu Yuan listened carefully and comforted him constantly.At about 16:00, he sent the grass deer and his party back to the Nagara, and gave each a small gift to express that they did not hurt their feelings, and he also had 2,000 yen for daily expenses.Ugaki fully understood the true meaning of their little meeting.This can be clearly seen from his diary. He wrote: Everyone is saddened by such a heavy blow.How one treats one's own life is of course a personal matter, especially for those with greater responsibilities.The responsibilities of the chief of staff and those above the chief of staff are quite different from those of ordinary staff officers.I am a combatant on the front line, and I have already made up my mind what to do in this situation.He continued to write a little complacently: I thought about it, and I couldn't help but feel pity for him.There must be no wrong choice between calm and philosophical and the spirit of Takedo. [Note: Yuzhi diary. , June 10, 1942. 】 When the group returned to the Nagara, they were not as depressed as when they left in the morning. [Note: The Battle of Tragedy. ] Genda found Fuchida and told him about the meeting on the Yamato.Genda didn't like to beat around the bush, he told Fuchida that Kusaka had asked Yamamoto: Shouldn't Nagumo commit suicide to atone for his defeat?In this regard, Yamamoto emphasized that no, Nagumo is not to blame, I am fully responsible.If someone had to commit suicide by caesarean section for the defeat at Midway, it would be me. [Note: Interview with Fuchida, February 16, 1964. 】 After Kusaka returned to Nagara, the ship immediately accelerated and surpassed Yamato.It was ordered to sail directly to Kure Port, so that the staff of the First Air Fleet, especially Genda, could immediately begin to formulate a plan to rebuild the force. [Note: The tragic battle; Genda's statement. 】Seeing that they are about to return home, the sailors are in high spirits.But to their great disappointment, they were quarantined when they arrived in Wugang.They were not allowed to go ashore, and they were not allowed to have contact with anyone outside the ship, not even the captain.Only staff officers who are required by work in the headquarters can enter and leave.The sailors had no choice but to stay on the ship, looking at the lights on the shore and sighing.Soon, the Provisional Headquarters of the First Air Fleet was established on Kirishima. [Note: Interview with Fuchida, February 16, 1964; Battle of Tragedy] Admiral Yu Nakazawa, in the Aleutians to the north, found that there was an official policy in place to minimize the losses from the Midway fiasco.On June 10, he received a notice from the Deputy Chief of the Naval Command and the Deputy Secretary of the Navy: It is hereby decided to announce our losses in the Battle of Midway as follows: one aircraft carrier was lost, one aircraft carrier was severely damaged, and one cruiser was severely damaged , thirty-five planes failed to return. [Note: Nakazawa's diary, June 10, 1942. 】Five days later, Ugaki issued a supplementary notice: Except for the information announced by the headquarters, no information about Midway Island and the Aleutian Campaign should be disclosed inside or outside the Navy.It will be announced within the Navy that the Kaga has been lost, and the Soryu and Mikuma have been severely damaged, but the names of these ships will not be announced to the public. [Note: Same as above, June 15, 1942. 】 Cao Lu found that the government did not tell the people the truth about the Battle of Midway as he had advised, and he was very disappointed and disgusted.He understood the need to maintain domestic morale, but he believed that to win a war, the nation had to take it seriously.For this purpose, the people must know the progress of the war, and they can share not only the joy of the army's victory, but also the sorrow of the army.But the official press boasted that the battle had been a major victory.Before all battle reports, the traditional song "March of Battleships" when celebrating victory is played. [Note: Caolu's statement; "United Fleet" page 91. 】 On June 11, the official Japan Times and Advertiser published a strange picture of an American aircraft carrier being attacked by Japanese planes and sinking.The commentary above the picture reads: The Navy once again achieved an epoch-making victory.At the bottom of the screen, there is a paragraph of enthusiastic and unrestrained text, the first few lines are: All hope of the United States attempting to conduct guerrilla warfare against Japan with carrier-based aircraft has come to naught.The powerful Imperial Navy sank two more large American ships.This landmark victory was achieved during the June 4th-7th surprise attack on Dutch Harbor and Midway in the Aleutian Islands.At the beginning of the war, the United States had seven aircraft carriers, now only two remain On June 15, the Imperial Headquarters issued a supplementary battle report, saying: In the previously announced results of the surprise attack on Midway Island, one American San Francisco-class A-class cruiser and one submarine should be added. class aircraft carrier and a destroyer. [Note: "Japan Times and Advertiser", June 15, 1942. 】 It is well known that estimates of the outcome at the time were wildly inaccurate.In contrast, the losses caused to the US military claimed by the Japanese are not too outrageous.As readers know, Nagumo's battle report is only intended for the Japanese, and only for a few Japanese.It can be seen from this that he really believed that the Japanese planes had sunk two US aircraft carriers.It is not too far-fetched to say that the destroyer is a cruiser, plus a submarine. The real falsification is in the reporting of Japan's losses.Of course, the official communique emphasized the victories of the Northern operation and was vague about the defeats.On June 11, a civilian naval expert named Masatoku Ito made a radio address.The next day, Chicago's "Daily Forum" quoted his speech: In view of the brilliant results of the Battle of Midway, we should not be dejected by the loss of two aircraft carriers, because our gains greatly exceed our losses.Except for the combatants and some officers who are in key positions who cannot be ignorant of the situation, the Japanese navy does not know more about the truth than ordinary Japanese people who eagerly read newspapers every day. In an attempt to keep the extent of the casualties a secret, the Japanese government took startlingly extreme measures.The Nagara sailed from Kure Port and arrived at Hashirashima on June 15.Fuchita and about five hundred wounded were transferred to the hospital ship Hikawa Maru.Hikawa Maru sneaked into Yokosuka in the dark, docked at an unobtrusive pier, and then the wounded were secretly sent to the base hospital along a road closely guarded by the marine police.They were divided into two buildings, and no one was allowed to visit them, not even their wives, and they were not allowed to answer the phone or exchange letters.The Japanese Navy has actually stamped them with a top-secret seal and kept them as top-secret documents.Fuchida thought angrily, it was like we were in a detention camp.Under such tight control, morale drops to zero. Under such strict control, Fuchida, who is extroverted, is extremely painful.His injury was painful and slow to heal, but it was localized and he felt fine above the knee.He pays attention to seeking truth from facts.He was very unhappy at the moment.The enemy knows the truth and will be eager to reveal it to the world, so why cover up the truth?The naval base should admit the loss of four aircraft carriers, including aircraft, as proof that the government believes in the courage and determination of the people.Fuchida was very concerned that the Japanese navy was building a wall of distrust between itself and its people. [Note: Interview with Fuchida, February 16, 1964. 】 At the same time, the United States is also facing a crisis of public opinion after this battle. The "Honolulu Star" asked excitedly: They want to know where the US Pacific Fleet is?isn't it?Admiral Nimitz knew the answer, and the Battle of Midway had given it the answer.At 12:45, Nimitz’s Battle Report No. 1 was published under the headlines in big bold letters on the battle at Midway Island and the sinking of the Japanese ship: In the waters of Midway Island, all officers and soldiers of our army are highly skilled and devoted to their duties.A big victory is just around the corner.Citizens can now rejoice. Just half a year ago on a Sunday, the Japanese broke the peace and openly launched a surprise attack on my fleet and army installations on Oahu The revenge of Pearl Harbor has been partially avenged.If the Japanese navy is not completely defeated, this revenge cannot be regarded as complete revenge. We have made significant progress in this regard. Then he added a genteel pun: People might forgive us if we said we were roughly halfway there. [Note: Evening edition of the Honolulu Star, June 6, 1942. 】 It didn't take long, though, for misunderstandings and confusion to arise.The reason lies in Army Aviation.They returned to Oahu first, jubilantly and prematurely announcing their exploits before the Naval Air Forces arrived to make their reports for the record. Rumor has it that the army won the battle of Midway.This is a sentence recorded in the unofficial flight log of VF|6, 【Note: VF|6 unofficial flight log, June 11, 1942. 】It is true that anyone reading the Honolulu newspapers of June 12 will think that the Navy played a mere reconnaissance role in this campaign, but this is also understandable.Colonel Sweeney told reporters: We never needed to look for the enemy, because the exact location of the Japanese Mobile Force had already been spotted by naval aircraft.The meaning of his remark was undoubtedly generous, but it was also a pun.According to reporter Bob Trumbull, the pilots of the Army planes that dropped the bombs personally reported that they hit three aircraft carriers, a cruiser, another large ship (possibly a cruiser or a battleship), A destroyer and a large transport ship.This is not the full report. [Note: "Honolulu Advertiser", June 12, 1942. 】 One of Emmons' staff officers later said: Emmons, like Nimitz, was proud of the Navy and was very angry at the results reported by the Air Force. [Note: Interview with Major General Robert J. Fleming, Jr., June 24, 1977, Fleming was a lieutenant colonel in the Battle of Midway, serving as a battle between Emmons and Nimitz Informal contact. ] In his letter to Marshall, he summed up the results so far, but did not reveal this irritation.He listed the achievements of his pilots as follows: Two torpedoes from B|26 hit the aircraft carrier. The bomb severely damaged an aircraft carrier and possibly injured another. Three battleships were damaged, and one of them was severely damaged. Sink a cruiser. Damaged a heavy cruiser. Severe damage to one destroyer, possibly sunk. Two damaged transport ships (one said to be of the Normandy class) caught fire. Two bombs hit a burning aircraft carrier.Emmons boasted that the troops who participated in the war were laden with honor.He went on to say: In all honesty, I don't think the Navy would risk three carriers against a superior enemy with four or five carriers if it wasn't sure it would be supported by land-based aviation.If the Navy hadn't taken the risk with the aircraft carrier, we might not have achieved such a huge victory, but we might have suffered a defeat. [Note: Letter from Emmons. 】 An editorial in the "New York Times" on June 9 stated that, as far as we know, the main loss of the Japanese fleet in the Battle of Midway was caused by our land-based aircraft.the campaign demonstrated how a highly alert, well-trained, courageous, and adequately manned land-based air force can counter an attack by enemy naval and air forces from the sea Senior leadership in Washington also exaggerated the capabilities of the Army Air Forces.This is not surprising.As early as June 5, Stimson wrote: There is a great battle going on in the Pacific.Apparently, American forces, mainly land-based air forces, launched a surprise attack on the Japanese and were successful. ] Assistant Secretary of State Adolph A. Burleigh said in a memorandum of events at the time: It is true that we have knocked out what is left of the Italian fleet, but the fleet is of little use.Land-based aircraft will work. At the same time, or nearly at the same time, Japan began a major offensive against Midway, possibly also planning westwards against Hawaii.Our land-based aircraft hit the two incoming enemies head-on, and dealt a devastating blow to the enemy.In my opinion, the Pacific Ocean between Hawaii and the Marshall Islands is peaceful. [Note: Memorandum of June 20, 1942; Diary of Adolph A. Burleigh, Jr. 】 On June 6th, Stimson wrote triumphantly, "Things in the Pacific seem to be completely under my control so that we can bring back emergency reinforcements to the West Coast and repatriate the various units drawn from Operation Bolero Bolero Luo is the code name of the operation, which refers to the preparations for the combat plan with France as the main direction of attack.This is the overlord action that later became famous in history.The War Department's willingness to draw troops from Operation Bolero to reinforce the West Coast was a strong demonstration of how serious the War Department was in dealing with the Japanese threat.Stimson added, complacently: My large bombers played a decisive role in the battle.They were skilled in their attacks and damaged many of the enemy's capital ships.This marked a major change in thinking about high-altitude bombing.The Navy puts aircraft carriers into battle.They had a hard time facing a numerically superior enemy aircraft carrier force.But they did what they were supposed to do. Emmons kept sending these big bombers from Hawaii to Midway, and finally drove the enemy back. [Note: Stimson's diary, June 6, 1942. 】 When the Naval Aviation pilots reported to Oahu, the situation created by one-sidedness began to turn around.However, Nimitz strongly advocated friendly cooperation between the army and the navy, and did not overthrow the army's statement, but only made appropriate revisions.Therefore, in the minds of the public, the victory of the Battle of Midway was mainly the victory of the army. It was not until after the war that there were records of interrogation of the Japanese and Japanese files that this impression was changed. [Note: "Nimitz", one hundred and four | one hundred and five pages. 】 The exaggeration of the U.S. record is not intentional falsification, but a mistake.The administration, however, has not been entirely vocal with the public when it comes to American losses.Although the Navy announced on July 15 that the Hanman was lost and the Yorktown was out of combat, [Note: Chicago "Daily Forum", July 15, 1942. ] But it was not until September that the United States publicly admitted that the Yorktown had been lost. [Note: Chicago Daily Tribune, July 15, 1942. 】 Americans have been hearing bad news for so long that they can't seem to believe the good news.As early as June 6th, the West Coast public had a certain premonition; somewhere, something important was happening: Yesterday, strange talk flooded San Francisco, and apparently the rest of the country.These rumors spread and spread in restaurants, restaurants, and companies. You can hear some of the following rumors: 1. Pearl Harbor is being bombed. 2. Washington, D.C. is being bombed. 3. The Puget Sound [J Note: Located off the coast of Seattle] is being bombed. 4. Seattle is being bombed. You can add other place names without limit, as long as the place is three hundred miles from the east and west coastlines.Fear of war spread to Washington.McCormack, D-Massachusetts, said on the House floor that he heard on the radio that Pearl Harbor was being attacked.A Navy spokesman flatly denied it.In San Francisco, the rumor mill also switched to wartime production.At about noon, it was rumored that a bank in the downtown area had learned from a telex from the Seattle branch that Seattle was under an air raid. [Note: "San Francisco Chronicle", June 6, 1942. 】 Not every newspaper rejoiced as the location and nature of the fighting became public. A headline in the "Washington Post" warned: Experts say Japan can still launch a naval offensive.The newspaper said: Experts in Washington believe that this boils down to the fact that although the United States' victory in the Central Pacific has brought the United States a big step forward on the road to final victory, it has not yet secured the final victory. [Note: Same as above, June 8, 1942. 】 The famous military analyst Hanson W. Baldwin wrote cautiously: Although we have won a battle, we have not yet reached Manila Bay or the Strait of Tsushima.He attributes the lack of suddenness of the Japanese attack to radio listening and ground-based reconnaissance planes, and perhaps Army bombers. [Note: The New York Times, June 9, 1942. 】 A report in Chicago's "Daily Tribune" on June 7 did surprise the Navy.The title of this report itself was a fatal blow to the secrecy work: the navy knew about the Japanese naval offensive plan and knew that the attack on Dutch Harbor was a fake attack.The report continued: According to a reliable source in the Navy's intelligence department here tonight, some days before the start of the battle, people in the U.S. Navy had grasped the information of the Japanese troops participating in the battle with the U.S. Navy in a certain waters west of Midway Island, which is believed to be the largest naval battle in this war. Condition. The U.S. Navy allegedly received intelligence shortly after the powerful Japanese force assembled from the base.The Navy, though not very clear about the enemy's intentions, had information so convincing that it could be predicted that the Japanese would attack one American base while actually attacking and occupying another.Some even speculated that Dutch Harbor and Midway could be targets The report went on to list the list of Japanese troops participating in the war, and its accuracy is astonishing. The "Daily Tribune" did not say that the United States had deciphered the Japanese code, but anyone with a little common sense of the navy could see the implication and hear the implication. The reporter who wrote this story, Stanley Johnston, had been with the Lexington in the Coral Sea.On his way back to San Diego on the cruiser USS Chester, a naval officer inadvertently showed him one of Nimitz's papers.The document was an intelligence estimate of the movements of the Japanese army and their composition.The U.S. side investigated the leak, but there was no public trial.It is widely believed that the Japanese are not grasping the circumstances of the leak.They continue to use the JN25 code, with only periodic changes.It may or may not have been a coincidence that they made a major change on August 1, 1942. [Note: "Nimitz", pages 82, 103, and 179. 】 The use of passwords by the Japanese often exceeds the limit of secrecy.This left Yamamoto with less than a year to live.Through radio interception, the Americans had exactly the information that Yamamoto would fly to Rabaul.On April 18, 1943, Yamamoto was shot down over Bougainville. He fulfilled the promise he made to the grass deer.Nagumo and Kusaka went on to serve in the military and made valuable contributions to Japan.Nagumo later died in Saipan, probably by suicide.Grass deer survived for many years after the war.Genda also survived.When forming the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, he donned his military uniform again and was promoted to lieutenant general.After his retirement he was elected to the House of Lords.His friend Fuchida, who served as an important aviation staff officer many times during the war, converted to Christianity a few years later and became an evangelist.During his travels in the United States he met admirals such as Nimitz and Spruance whom he greatly respected. Nimitz is such a person. In order to win the Pacific War, he did his best as an American. After the war, he devoted himself to establishing a bond of friendship between the United States and Japan.He was a major contributor to the return of Admiral Togo Heihachiro's flagship Mikasa.Near the venerable old warship, the Japanese thanked him by planting a Nimitz tree. [Note: Interview with Nimitz, September 4, 1964. 】 Nimitz was a gifted admiral.He used both Spruance and Halsey, two people with very different personalities, and let them take turns as the commander of the same fleet.When Halsey was in command, the fleet was called the Third Fleet, and Spruance was on land planning his next move.When Spruance took over, the fleet was called the Fifth Fleet, and Halsey was ashore analyzing the situation and making plans.This alternates until the war is won. The victory at the Battle of Midway did not bring good luck to everyone. Within three months, Fletcher's two aircraft carriers were severely damaged.八月二十四日，企業號在東所羅門群島受重傷。八月三十一日，薩拉托加號在這一年中第二次中了魚雷，不過好歹還能返回珍珠港進行修理。這次襲擊中，弗萊契受輕傷，此後沒再擔任海上指揮官。是因為他經常運氣不佳，還是因為他不適合作為航空母艦指揮官，這個問題還沒有答案。不過不管答案是什麼，他可以說：在中途島海戰中我是一名指揮官。對於一名海軍軍人來說，這就夠了。