Chapter 45 Chapter 41 Analysis of the US side: Commanding wisely and luckily

Like many Americans who commented on Pearl Harbor, many Japanese who commented on the Battle of Midway mistakenly believed that Japan failed because its own country should have done some things and did some things but did wrong.The United States after Pearl Harbor, and Japan after Midway, failed to admit that they were not then in control of their own destiny.It is just as wrong to think that the Americans at Midway passively benefited from the enemy's mistakes as it is to think that the Japanese victory at Pearl Harbor was solely at the fault of the Americans.The Americans did win the Battle of Midway, not just avoid defeat.

For the United States, deciphering the JN25 code is a very commendable thing.Genda and his colleagues had already estimated that the Navy code would be deciphered one day, but they never expected that the Americans had already deciphered this code, and had deciphered the telegram encrypted with this code as completely as they themselves. .Genda cites the tireless efforts of the Americans to obtain as much information on the Japanese as possible as one reason for the American victory [Note: Statement by Genda. 】.Ugaki thought the Americans had managed to learn about the Japanese operational plans long before they spotted the Japanese attacking forces, but it never occurred to him that the codes would be broken, at least not in his diary. [Note: Ugaki's diary, June 8, 1942. 】On the contrary, some low-level military officers are more sensitive. They all agree that the Americans must have deciphered their naval codes, otherwise they would never be able to use three aircraft carriers to launch a concentrated attack on our fleet from the flanks. [Note: The Battle of Tragedy. 】

Hypo's achievement is a paean to the skill and dedication of Rochford and his colleagues.Although Rochford seems to regard the method of inducing the Japanese to confirm that AF is Midway Island as a trick [Note: See Chapter 5 of this book. ], we think, however, that he should be highly appreciated for coming up with such an ingenious idea. Ironically, when Nimitz introduced Rochford's outstanding contributions to Admiral King and proposed to award him an honor, King refused.His reasoning was that no one should be highlighted for doing a good job of intelligence at Midway. [Note: Interview with Nimitz, September 4, 1964. 】If this logic goes on, then no one person can win the award, because human achievements are largely the product of collective efforts.One has to conclude that, in King's view, intelligence work is important to winning battles, but intelligence personnel don't deserve all that respect.

Of course, if Nimitz didn't accept Rochford's assessment of the situation and act on it, Hypo's intelligence was useless.It is also the hallmark of a true leader who trusts and relies on staff and uses experts effectively.Nimitz has long since escaped the shackles of the old museum psychology.This state of mind has led many intelligence experts to a dead end.They store information for its own sake and do not put it to use.Nimitz's conception of intelligence is dynamic: facts are high-grade ore, to be carefully sifted, then refined into high-purity metals (accurate intelligence), forged into weapons to defeat the enemy.

Haibo's breakthrough guaranteed the success of the US strategy.After Nimitz learned that the Japanese were headed towards Midway Island with Nagumo's aircraft carrier fleet as the lead, he not only knew where and when the battle would start, but also how the battle should be fought.It was going to be an air battle, so he kept the ships on the west coast so they wouldn't disrupt the operation.He had to use every available aircraft carrier, and he demanded that every effort be made to repair Yorktown so that it could go to war.The speedy restoration of Yorktown was a colossal achievement, a dramatic initial victory.In contrast, the Japanese procrastinated on the issue of repairing the Xianghe and supplementing the Zuihe, thinking that without these two warships that participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor, they could also eat up the US Pacific Fleet.

But knowing when, where and how the enemy will attack is not the same as winning.Enemy forecasts by themselves cannot produce warships, nor can they increase trained pilots and aircraft.None of these will miraculously appear like the bread and fish in the Bible.The victory at Midway came from military and government intelligence work, and from the intelligent use of the intelligence gained. Nimitz was not intimidated by the large enemy fleet that was heading towards him.If he had looked at the comparison table of the strengths of the two sides and acquiesced that the situation was irretrievable, it was understandable. He could have decided to temporarily withdraw from Midway and transfer his precious aircraft carriers and cruisers to the West Coast, or let them stay in the United States. In or around Pearl Harbor.However, he did not do so.On the contrary, he acted immediately and boldly.He deliberately throws his smaller forces against a much stronger enemy.Conscious of his own inability to engage the enemy head-on, and aware that saving Midway would require his troops to engage enemy air strikes early on from a favorable strategic position, he ordered Fletcher and Spruance to The special stick fleet is deployed on the flank of the Nanyun First Air Fleet.In the naval battle of Midway Island, the United States had two commanders, Fletcher and Spruance, who had the will and courage to go all out to preempt the enemy. This is not only the luck of the Americans, but also the knowledge of Nimitz. The result of good deeds.

Throughout his campaign report, Nagumo bemoaned the lack of time to prepare for the battle at Midway.Yet the best minds in the Japanese navy had been planning this campaign for months.Still, they almost all regretted their haste.But what about Fletcher and Spruance?They had only a few days to prepare for this daunting challenge from the enemy.Fletcher did not begin preparations for the Battle of Midway until he entered Pearl Harbor on the afternoon of May 27 with the heavily damaged Yorktown.Spruance also arrived at Pearl Harbor only a day earlier than Fletcher, and when he arrived, he unexpectedly learned that the Japanese were heading for Midway, and that he himself had been newly appointed Commander of Task Force Sixteen. .After a few hasty meetings with Nimitz and Fletcher, Spruance put to sea on the morning of May 28.Two days later, Fletcher was ready to sail; his aircraft carriers were operational, and a strategy had been agreed upon with Spruance.

Fletcher's decision to split the task force in two after rendezvous with Spruance was truly a flash of inspiration.A good tactical commander not only knows the principles of warfare but also knows when and how to apply them.Fletcher's splitting of a numerically inferior fleet in the face of a formidable foe is a prime example of this talent.If these three U.S. aircraft carriers are still assembled together, the tragedy of the Yorktown is likely to befall the other two aircraft carriers.No one doubted the skill and guts of Nagumo's pilots; once they flew over a target, that target was sure to die.The carriers of the First Air Fleet were in close proximity, and this chain reaction of destruction befell them.

Later, Fletcher made another big decision.He knew very well at that time: the general who led the US fleet to the first naval victory in World War II would become a hero that everyone expected, and his name would go down in history and last forever.However, when he realized that he was no longer likely to command the air strike force most effectively, he turned the command over to Spruance.It was a selfless, sincere, patriotic act.Both Nimitz and Spruance are now more famous than Fletcher, yet Fletcher is the link between them both, a man of brains and personality who brings a genius to its full potential talent.

Among the decisions made by Nimitz in command of the Battle of Midway, the most important and far-reaching was the selection of Spruance as commander of Task Force Sixteen.Spruance is little known outside the narrow circle of senior U.S. Navy officers.Also, he had never been a pilot.But Halsey recommended him, and Nimitz readily agreed."It's a choice I never regret, and Spruance has excellent judgment," Nimitz said.A commander like him always conducts a thorough investigation and understanding of various situations first, and then conducts careful and careful consideration. Once he decides to fight, he will fight hard.Spruance, like General Grant, was good at taking the war to the enemy.He emphasized that I desperately need such a commander.In addition, Spruance was also very bold, but never reckless, he was also more cautious, and he had a gift for fighting. [Note: Interview with Nimitz, September 4, 1964. 】

What Nimitz thought of Spruance was what a mentor would say about his protégé, what one American admiral would value another, and one friend a measure of the merits of another friend.As the saying goes, the best compliments are those from your enemies.Watanabe's evaluation of him is: Spruance has excellent qualities, and has the best character required by a naval aircraft carrier fleet. Strong will, well-organized considerations, and his mind never fluctuates hot and cold, and his mood never fluctuates. Suddenly low.He aimed at the main goal and moved forward bravely, never giving up halfway.That's what a good admiral should be. [Note: Interview with Watanabe, November 24, 1964. 】 Spruance displayed these qualities throughout the Battle of Midway.As soon as he knew where the target was, he mobilized all the aircraft he could mobilize to attack.He leads his fleet with certainty, and with cunning timing.He led his troops eastward on the night of June 4th, avoiding the night attack of the Japanese.This is exactly the right move.Likewise, his westward march on June 5 was the right decision, which terrified the Japanese.Spruance displayed an almost uncanny insight into the psychology of his enemies.On the whole front, he made the enemy guess and lose their minds. Spruance knows not only when to attack, but also when to stop.Fleet commanders in his position are seldom able to resist the temptation to pursue and flee the enemy.Spruance knows well how far beyond bravery is sheer stupidity.Besides, he knew he was tasked with protecting Midway, so he stuck to his post despite the alluring ghosts to the west.He also knew that his second mission was to save the aircraft carrier for another battle.Therefore, he was not fooled by the enemy, and he did not drive within the attack range of the shore-based bombers on Wake Island, nor did he go beyond his own communication range. Naval historian Samuel Elliott Morrison aptly praised Spruance: Fletcher played well, but Spruance did a great job.He is composed, decisive, and a good listener.He always kept in mind the disparity in strength between the two sides but boldly seized every available opportunity.Raymond A. Spruance stood out in this battle and became one of the greatest generals in the history of the US Navy. [Note: Six minutes, page 103. 】 At the grassroots level, America's combatants are terrific.In the Pacific War, when American junior officers demonstrated their bravery and resourcefulness again and again, Reid decided to go beyond the search range to conduct reconnaissance, and found the Japanese attacking force before the Japanese planned. Eighteen chapters. 】.This discovery in itself did not give the USG task force time to enter the theater, but it allowed the island guards to stand by.Although intelligence agencies on Oahu had provided information, Reed's observations were gratifying confirmation of the correctness of Rochford's information.Eddie's discovery of Nagumo's force, while not significantly affecting the Japanese air attack on Midway, did point Fletcher and Spruance to the exact location of the enemy. [Note: See Chapter 21 of this book. ] Since then, Waldron has gained a lot from studying Japanese tactics. He exerted his pioneering spirit and discovered the enemy aircraft carrier, while others were rigid in thinking and completely missed the fighter. [Note: See Chapter 27 of this book. 】Most importantly, McCluskey used unique search methods to discover the First Air Fleet, allowing the dive bombers to attack and turning the tables. [Note: See Chapter 29 of this book. 】 Time and time again, U.S. military combatants have demonstrated their fearlessness.When attacking the enemy aircraft carrier, they faced Zero aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and watched their companions fall on fire, but they still went forward indomitably.Later, Genda expressed to his American counterpart the heartfelt respect one warrior has for other warriors.He said the U.S. victory should also be attributed to the spirit of their fighters who persisted in the offensive despite the fact that losses were heavy. [Note: Genda's statement. ] Two Japanese analysts also generously said that no one could have foreseen the power of their heroic attack.Their tenacity brought the Japanese army to a tragic end in the Battle of Midway. [Note: "The Magical Zero Machine", page 114. 】 Okumiya said: Since ancient times, people have always believed that the process of fighting is the process of constantly making mistakes.The side that makes fewer mistakes wins. [Note: "The Battle of Midway". ] This somewhat sarcastic comment does make sense.It is futile to deny that the United States made mistakes in the Battle of Midway.The U.S. erred so badly that the Japanese, who erred, almost won.Spruance said bluntly, we turned in luck. [Note: Interview with Spruance, September 14, 1964. ] It seems that these words are not too modest. Genda considered the Americans' worst weakness to be poor torpedo launch technology. [Note: Genda's statement. 】Caolu justly criticized that these attacks were sporadic and scattered, not concentrated. [Note: Caolu's statement. 】 Americans pride themselves on their advanced craftsmanship.However, there are many instances where the quality of their equipment was poor.Five-hundred-pound and thousand-pound bombs could not disable the enemy's armored ships, but smashed targets to pieces with far more bombs than needed. [Note: Spruance's report of June 16, 1942. 】US aircraft carriers have not yet managed to put armored flight decks on them, so they are extremely prone to fire. [Note: Interview with Spruance, September 5, 1964. 】If the Americans must lose an aircraft carrier in this battle, then the Japanese concentrated their attacks on the USS Yorktown, which had already been beaten to pieces.Americans are indeed very lucky. The reports submitted by the pilots of the B｜17 aircraft repeatedly mentioned that the devices on the aircraft often malfunctioned, which affected the battle, and sometimes they could not exert their power as they should. After takeoff, my No. 1 engine row The air pipe ruptured; the bomb rack failed and only three bombs were dropped; the walkie-talkie failed and no bombs were dropped. [Note: On June 5, 1942, Captain O. H. Wrigley Jr., Lieutenant H. S. Grundman, and Lieutenant Paul I. Williams submitted reports on engagements with the enemy, respectively. 】 Communications between the various fighting units were also far from ideal.The captain of the USS Enterprise commented on this problem unceremoniously: Numerous contact reports from the Midway forces came to a negative conclusion.It may have been a disaster for our troops to have no follow-up report following the initial contact report.Nine times out of ten we failed to wipe out the enemy force because they had no supplementary contact reports, and the Midway-based aircraft did not provide consistent tactical reconnaissance on June 4th and 5th. [Note: The report of the enterprise account. 】 The Hornet's air battle report put it even more pointedly: We have not received sufficient intelligence from shore-based forces.This raises the question of whether other troops can be fully trusted.The conclusion of the report was that the tactical situation was in our favour, but mistakes on our side prevented us from achieving a more memorable victory. [Note: The air battle report of the Hornet. 】 Kems had his own complaint on behalf of his shore-based forces: We had no idea what was going on with nearby forces, nor what our surface forces were doing.Looks like there's something wrong with the communications plan. [Note: Kems’ official talk. 】 Certain types of aircraft did not work well or for what they were designed to do, especially the B|17 bomber.America may build bigger, faster, more destructive planes than the Flying Fortress, but none will be more endearing than the B|17.This aircraft has a beautiful appearance, firm structure, and responsive response. It can be regarded as the most ideal aircraft in the United States in the era of the Air Force.It seems inconceivable that such a legendary aircraft should not be omnipotent. The Battle of Midway provided a good opportunity to prove once and for all that high-flying shore-based bombers could sink or severely damage maneuvering surface ships.But neither the B|17 nor the B|26 made any achievements.Later, some advocates of aviation insisted that the operation could not be considered a fair test because the number of aircraft over each target was too small. [Note: "Army Aviation in World War II", 459th | 460th page. 】Of course, if Emmons can send a large number of B|17 bombers to launch an overwhelming attack and drop a large number of bombs, one or two of them may hit the target, but this would seriously violate the principle of saving troops.However, the three Dreadnought dive bombers, using their strengths, beat up the Akagi so much that the Japanese had to scuttle it. One thing that still baffles us today is that Nimitz directed that the defense of Midway be left to the island's anti-aircraft artillery force, and that the island's fighter jets be concentrated against enemy aircraft carriers. 】; But why didn't the defenders of Midway Island follow suit.Admittedly, these fighters were worn out by the carrier force and handed over to the Marine Corps, and it turned out that they were no match for the Zero.But if they could join the bombers and torpedo planes on the island against the 1st Air Fleet, these fighters might be effective in distracting the escorting Japanese fighters, saving the lives of some American pilots, and maybe even hitting a ship or two .However, they did not do so.Near Midway, the fighters suffered heavy losses and achieved little real success. That anti-aircraft guns were held in great contempt by many fighter pilots may be one answer to the above puzzle.In peacetime, fighter jets put their main tactical focus on how to avoid enemy anti-aircraft artillery fire.But in combat, they soon discovered that the enemy fighters were much more dangerous.In an official interview, Saatchi said: My battles were roughly two-thirds under our own flak and one-third against the enemy's.I don't think AA fire is of much value in stopping a determined attacking enemy.The anti-aircraft guns might have knocked out a few planes, but the Japanese and our attacking pilots ignored it. [Note: Official interview with Lieutenant Commander John S. Thach at the Bureau of Aviation, August 26, 1942. 】 However, although the United States made many mistakes and the confusion was serious; however, the Japanese side made more and more serious mistakes and confusion.In the end, Nimitz, Fletcher, and Spruance emerged victorious, and military historians have come to regard Midway as one of the few decisive battles in the world.