Chapter 22 Chapter 19 The Theory of Strategy

Through the analysis of history, we have reached our own conclusions.It now appears beneficial to build a new edifice of strategic thinking on this new foundation. First, let’s explain what strategy is.Clausewitz once gave a definition of strategy in his theoretical masterpiece "On War".He said: Strategy is the use of battle for the purpose of war.Therefore, he believes that strategy must provide an objective for the entire military operation to adapt to the purpose of the war. The first shortcoming of this definition is that it intrudes into the realm of politics, or rather, it invades the realm of supreme leadership in war, which is the responsibility of the government and not the concern of military leaders.The task of military leaders is to carry out the mission assigned by the government, that is, to lead military operations.The second shortcoming is that the concept of strategy is too narrowly limited to the simple use of battles, thus giving rise to a misunderstanding that only battles are the only means to achieve strategic goals.Therefore, some unsophisticated followers of Clausewitz often rashly confuse the ends with the means, and thus come to the conclusion that in war, only the decisive battle is the main goal, and everything else It is nothing more than ancillary to this main goal.

The relationship between strategy and politics If the executive power of strategy and politics is concentrated in the hands of one person, as Frederick the Great and Napoleon I were in the past, then the distinction between strategy and politics is really meaningless.However, today, such a dictatorial ruler who is the head of the government and the military commander is rarely seen. Throughout the nineteenth century, this phenomenon can be said to have temporarily disappeared.Hence, there is much potential harm in failing to draw a clear line between strategy and politics.Because that might lead military leaders to make absurd claims that politics should be subordinated to their war plans, and those politicians in power, especially in democracies, might seek to expand their powers, even as military Workers also intervene when they use the tools in their hands within the scope of their duties.

Moltke's definition of strategy is clearer and more precise.He sees strategy as the actual use by a general of the instruments at his disposal in order to achieve the ends assigned to him. This definition clearly states the responsibility of a military commander to the government because he is employed by the government.It is the business of the military commander to employ in the field of forces entrusted to his control, that is, to employ them most effectively in the interest of the highest military policy.If the military commander considers that the forces assigned to his command are insufficient to fulfill the tasks assigned to him, he has the right to argue; if the government disagrees with him, he may refuse to assume command duties, or retire to idle positions; However, a military commander cannot compel the government to allocate to his command a certain amount of troops. To do so would be to exceed the reasonable limits of his power.

On the other hand, since the government has the sole power to determine military policy, it must adapt its policy to the constantly changing conditions of war.In the course of the war, the situation is changing rapidly.Therefore, military policy must not become rigid and lose flexibility.The government has the power to intervene in the strategic direction of each campaign, not only to replace distrusted commanders but to revise their objectives and adjust their missions to suit the needs of military policy.Of course, the government should only clearly set tasks for military commanders, but it is not appropriate to interfere with how they command the army to fight and how to use their own tools.Therefore, strategy does not necessarily have a single goal of destroying the enemy's military power.When a government sees an enemy's overall military superiority, or military superiority within a theater of operations, it can pursue a limited-scale strategy.

As far as the government is concerned, sometimes it is necessary to wait until the allies enter the war or transfer new forces from other battlefields before the situation can change.Sometimes it is not only necessary to wait, but also to limit military operations on land, and to use other methods, or to put economic pressure on the enemy, or to take naval operations to finally solve the problem.Sometimes, the government can estimate before the war that it is simply unable to eliminate the received military power, or that it is not worth the effort to expend power for this purpose. Therefore, the military policy at this time can take the capture of some of the enemy's territory as the goal.That way, when it comes to peace negotiations, it can use the occupied territories as bargaining chips, or try to occupy them permanently.

From the perspective of historical experience, there are many examples of this military policy.However, orthodox military figures do not appreciate this much.Some service members who worship violence see it as a policy of weakness.Not really, this policy runs like a red thread throughout the history of the British Empire, and it has saved Britain's allies many times, and it has often saved the Empire itself by adopting this policy.Therefore, we have sufficient grounds to ask: Is this conservative military policy not qualified to occupy a place in the theory of war guidance? The general reason for adopting a limited-purpose strategy is to wait for a change in the balance of forces.And this kind of change can often take the method of small-scale acupuncture, that is, to gradually consume the enemy's troops, without risking a powerful surprise attack.Of course, the consumption of the enemy's troops must be greatly exceeded his own consumption, and the following methods can be adopted for this purpose: attacking the enemy's supply bases; Inflict heavy damage; induce the enemy to attack under unfavorable conditions; take certain measures to force the enemy to spread his forces on an overly wide front; try to consume the enemy's energy and physical strength.

The question has been raised before: Does a military commander have absolute freedom in executing his strategy in his area of ​​operation?Moltke's clearer definition above seems to provide a suggestive answer to this question.For example, if the government has decided to pursue a limited end, or in other words, insists only on a Fabian grand strategy, then the military commander, even within the sphere of his strategic activities, can only weaken the enemy If we try to destroy the enemy's military strength at this time, the result may be more harmful than beneficial to our government's military policy.Generally speaking, a military policy pursuing limited ends can only produce a strategy of limited ends; military commanders can pursue decisive ends only after obtaining the approval of the government, and only the government has the right to determine which ends is worth pursuing.

We can now formulate a more succinct definition of strategy: Strategy is the art of allocating and employing military tools to achieve political ends.The study of strategy is not limited to the mobilization of troops. The general definition only pays attention to this point, and the effect of mobilization of troops must also be taken into account.As for the use of military power in battle, that is, the combat deployment of these forces and the command of direct action, they already belong to the category of tactics.For these two nouns, although a boundary line has been drawn for the convenience of explanation, it is actually difficult to separate them, because they not only influence each other, but are fundamentally inseparable.

grand strategy or advanced strategy Tactics are the application of strategy at a lower stage.Similarly, strategy, that is, the use of grand strategy in the lower stages.In fact, grand strategy and the military policy that guides the conduct of war are completely consistent.However, there are some differences between them, that is, grand strategy is different from basic policy.Basic policy, or national policy, determines the purpose of military policy; the term grand strategy signifies policy in execution.The so-called grand strategy, or high-level strategy, has the task of regulating and directing all the resources of a country or several countries in order to achieve the political goal of war; and this goal is precisely determined by the basic policy, that is, the national policy .

Grand strategy must clarify the economic and human resources of a country or several countries, and effectively mobilize these resources to support the combat operations of the armed forces.At the same time, it must fully take into account the spiritual strength of the country, because educating the people to have a high spiritual quality is always important, and its importance is no less important than material means of struggle.Grand strategy must also be responsible for the distribution of forces and weapons between the land, sea, and air force, and for the adjustment of the entire armed forces and industry.Furthermore, military power is only one of the various means at the disposal of grand strategy.In order to achieve the purpose of weakening the enemy's will to resist, the grand strategy should pay more attention to and use all its forces, namely, financial pressure, diplomatic pressure, commercial pressure, and the last item in terms of importance. ideological and moral pressure.A good reason, such as a famous teacher, is a sharp sword and a shield at the same time.Therefore, heroic behavior in war can be regarded as one of the most effective weapons. On the one hand, it can weaken the enemy's will to resist, and on the other hand, it can increase one's own spiritual strength.

If it is said that military strategy is limited to the study of various issues related to war, then what grand strategy studies is not only issues related to war, but also issues related to post-war peace.Therefore, a grand strategy must not only combine the use of various tools of war, but also ensure their use to avoid damage to future peace, that is, to ensure that peace can be guaranteed and developed.After most wars, both sides suffer losses. The reason for this can be explained by the fact that, unlike strategy, grand strategy still has a largely mysterious and virgin territory waiting to be explored and studied. purely military strategy After clearing the field, we can establish the concept of strategy on an appropriate plane and on the basis of the original plan. This is to more specifically determine the concept of strategy as the art of command. Whether the strategy can be successful depends mainly on whether the purpose and means (tools) can be accurately calculated, and whether they can be used in combination correctly. The purpose must be compatible with all existing means and used to achieve each goal. The means of an intermediate end must also be commensurate with the importance and needs of that intermediate end, and it does not matter what kind of end is pursued: whether it is to directly seize an end or to strive for other achievements.The means must not be too much, because too much is too much. The right harmony of ends and means requires the most reasonable economy of force, and in its profound sense, for this military term is often used, but its meaning is understood differently .However, the uncertainty of war, which has its own characteristics, and the lack of scientific study of its problems, adds color to this uncertainty, so that even the greatest military genius cannot It is difficult to reconcile ends and means quite correctly; however, the more perfect the matter is, the greater the chance of success. This relativity is necessary because, however rich our knowledge of military science may be, military success depends on the art of applying it in practice.Art not only brings ends and means into better harmony, but also makes the means more valuable, because the means are effectively used and the ends are more magnified. The above situation greatly complicates the estimation of various factors.This is because it is impossible for any one person to accurately determine the power of human intelligence, nor to correctly estimate the power of human will. factors and conditions Compared with strategy and tactics, its calculation is simpler, and it is easier to approach the truth.In war, the most difficult factor to calculate is the will of the people.This is most clearly shown in resistance, but that is a matter of tactics.Strategy does not deal specifically with the problem of overcoming resistance, with the exception, of course, of dealing with natural obstacles.The purpose of strategy is to minimize the possibility of resistance; for this it makes use of such factors as movement and surprise. Movement is a problem in the field of physics, and the conditions it needs to consider are time, terrain and transportation capacity.The so-called transportation capability includes all the tools and methods that can be used to transport and support troop operations at present. Suddenness is a problem in the psychological field. It needs to consider a variety of conditions, and it is something that can affect the enemy's will in every specific situation.Therefore, the problems it faces are much more complicated than those in the physical realm. Strategy can be weighted more on the use of movement and less on surprise, or it can be reversed, more on the use of surprise and less on movement.However, these two factors are complementary and can be mutually causal.Movement can create suddenness, and suddenness can act as a stimulus to movement.If the movement is rapid, exceeds the usual speed, or changes direction, there can be no doubt that the movement may have some degree of suddenness even if no precautions are taken to conceal it.At the same time, suddenness can impel the movement to continue, thus forcing the enemy to be unable to counter-maneuver and take other counter-measures. As for the interrelationship between strategy and tactics, it can be said that there is no clear boundary between the two at the time of execution, so it is difficult to determine where the strategic operations of the troops end and where the tactical operations end start.However, these two concepts are distinct from each other: Tactics permeates the entire field of battle (combat); strategy is different, it does not stop at this boundary, but in order to achieve its own goals, it needs to take the actual combat Actions are reduced to a minimum. strategic purpose This subject may give rise to many controversies.Some believe that the only proper purpose of war is to destroy the armed forces of the enemy; others believe that the only purpose of strategy is to fight; still others insist on defending Clausewitz that blood is often the price of victory .People may disagree with the above statement, but regardless of their respective views, the above statement still exists and will not be shaken. In fact, even if the decisive battle (battle) is regarded as the main purpose of war, and the strategic The purpose is still to make this battle (battle) go on under the most favorable conditions.However, the more favorable the conditions, the less elements there will be for fighting. Therefore, the most perfect strategy, that is, the kind of strategy that can achieve the goal without going through serious battles.We can see that there are many examples in history where, due to unfavorable conditions, strategy actually guaranteed the above-mentioned good results.Caesar's Battle of Illelda, Cromwell's Battle of Preston, Napoleon's Battle of Ulm, Moltke's Siege of McMahon's Army at Sedan in 1870, Allen Bay The siege of the Turkish army in the hills of Samaria (in central Israel) in 918 is an example of this.The most shocking and tragic examples in modern times are the few campaigns carried out by the Germans in 1940.At that time, Guderian's tank troops were in the center of the Western Front, that is, near Sedan, suddenly broke through the opponent's defense, cut off and encircled the left wing of the Allied forces in Belgium, and caused the Allied forces on the European continent to panic. Total breakdown. The battle examples cited above show that the goal of destroying the enemy's armed forces can be achieved by disarming the enemy after it has surrendered.And such annihilation is not necessarily necessary for the achievement of the purpose of the war.Sometimes, a country just wants to maintain its own security and does not want to invade other countries. Then, as long as the threat to security is removed, that is to say, the enemy has been forced to give up his aggressive purpose, the purpose of this country will be It can be regarded as achieved. After the Persians had long since given up their attempt to invade Syria, Belisarius, in order to satisfy the desire of his troops to win a decisive victory, suffered a serious defeat near the city of Sur.This is a striking example of the useless expenditure of strength and risk taking.On the contrary, when Belisarius repelled the Persians and drove them back from Syria, his last act is a shining example of a decisive victory in history.In other words, this time, he purely used strategy to achieve national goals.At that time, the psychological factor had a great effect, causing the enemy to give up his intention without much physical pressure. Although such a bloodless victory is an extremely rare phenomenon, its significance is not rapidly diminishing, but continuously increasing.The value of this victory is that it demonstrates the great potential of strategy and grand strategy.Although human beings have thousands of years of war experience, our use of psychological warfare capabilities is still just entering the stage of exploration. After an in-depth study of war experience, Clausewitz came to the conclusion that tact is the basis of all military operations.In all military action there is tact and its effects.However, in actual wars, both sides are often driven by emotion, forgetting the role of reason, and unable to deeply understand the profound meaning of Clausewitz's conclusion.They are often unwilling to use their brains, so that they often hit a wall. According to the general law, the national government should not only be responsible for determining the purpose of grand strategy in war, but also solve the problem of the role of strategy. Is it used to achieve decisive military victory?Or is there another purpose?A surgeon's operating box can contain many different instruments.In order to achieve the goals of grand strategy, the military tool is only one of many tools.Similarly, battle (combat) is only one of many means to achieve strategic goals.If conditions are favorable, the use of military means can often achieve rapid results.If conditions are unfavorable, it may be foolish to use military means. It can be assumed that a certain strategist is empowered by the government to make a military decision.In this way, his task is to strive to achieve his goals under the most favorable conditions, and strive to obtain the best results.It can be seen from this that his real purpose is not only to find opportunities to conduct battles (battles), but also to create the most favorable strategic situation.Of course, this situation by itself cannot produce a decisive result, but it can certainly be obtained if it is followed by a battle.In other words, the purpose of strategy is to destabilize the enemy, to throw the enemy into chaos.As a result, the enemy either collapsed automatically or was easily defeated in battle.In order to automatically collapse the enemy, some combat actions may be taken, but in essence, this is different from conducting a battle. strategic action How does strategy destabilize the enemy?In the physical sphere, the following actions may have this result: 1. Disruption of the enemy's disposition, thereby forcing them to change fronts suddenly, causing confusion in the organization and disposition of their forces; ) their strength; 3. to threaten and destroy the enemy's supply systems; 4. to threaten their lines of communication so that they cannot, if necessary, retreat along these lines of communication and re-fortify and hold in intermediate areas or strategic rears. Destabilizing the enemy can be achieved by any of the above four methods, but more often a combination of several methods is used.In fact, it is difficult to separate these methods, because even a move towards the enemy's rear is a combination of the above methods.However, the interrelationships and roles among several methods are constantly changing.And, as historical experience demonstrates, it depends on the size of the army and the complexity of its organization.For the army that takes food locally, the line of communication is really of little use to them, because they can obtain supplies by robbery or conscription.Even when military organization is already highly developed, the smaller an army is, the less dependent it is on lines of communication for supplies.The larger and more complex an army is, the greater is the effect of threatening its lines of communication. If the army is not so dependent on the lines of communication, the use of strategy will of course be subject to certain restrictions, thereby giving tactics a more important place in battle.Still, some talented strategists can make a difference in this situation.They can create a decisive advantage by threatening the enemy's retreat, cutting off his supply bases, and disrupting the deployment of troops long before the battle, and then use the battle to complete his work. In order to obtain the desired effect, this threat must be carried out as early as possible in time and as close as possible to the enemy's combat forces in space, rather than mainly threatening their lines of communication.Therefore, in ancient warfare, it is difficult for people to distinguish between strategic maneuver and tactical maneuver. The destabilization of the enemy is psychologically the result of the effects of the various methods described above on the enemy commander.If the enemy suddenly feels that he is in a disadvantaged position and thus unable to resist, then the influence or effect of the above methods will be particularly strong. The enemy will feel that he has fallen into a trap in his mind, which is psychologically destabilizing the enemy. the main reason. Because of this, physical pressure on the enemy's rear can often have psychological effects.An army, like a man, cannot stop an attack from behind without turning around and turning its arms in a new direction.When performing this turn, that is, when adjusting the deployment of troops in a new direction, the combat effectiveness of the army will inevitably be temporarily weakened.This is also the same as when a person loses protection when turning around.Moreover, the time it takes for an army to perform this turn is bound to be much longer than for an individual, so the time for its combat effectiveness to be temporarily weakened is also much longer.So, any army, especially its minds (commanders), are always very sensitive to threats from the rear. On the contrary, a direct attack on the enemy, whether physically or psychologically, not only does not destroy the enemy's resistance, but may actually increase their stability, that is, increase their resistance.Even when the enemy retreats under the pressure of a frontal attack, it is gradually approaching its reserves, supply bases, and reinforcements by which they can recover their strength.Carrying out this kind of frontal attack can only make the enemy very nervous at best, but it is difficult to make it panic. Therefore, the purpose of moving back to the enemy from the flank, or going forward to the enemy's rear, is not only to avoid the enemy's resistance, but also to obtain a favorable outcome of the battle.In other words, such a maneuver is to take the line of least resistance.From a psychological point of view, it is the route with the least expectation of the enemy.This seems to be two sides of a coin. After understanding this truth, the understanding of strategy will be further advanced.But we must know that when we choose the route of least resistance, we can't do it simply, and we can't be too obvious, because we know the enemy and we know it, and the enemy will naturally pay attention to it.In that case, the route may no longer be the route of least resistance. When we study the physical factors, we should never forget the spiritual factors.Only by taking into account the combination of these two factors can a strategy be called a true strategy of the indirect line and have any real hope of destabilizing the enemy. Merely making an indirect march towards the enemy and then advancing to the enemy's rear is not a strategic indirect route.The art of strategy is not that simple.Sometimes the initial movement may be of indirect significance as far as the enemy's front is concerned, but as the situation develops the enemy will guess that you are going forward to his rear and will preemptively change the disposition.In this way, the actions to be taken in the future will no longer have indirect significance to the enemy's new front, but will be transformed into a purely direct attack. Since the enemy has this possibility of preemptively changing his deployment to change the front, one or several general maneuvers in secondary directions are usually carried out before taking the action directly behind the enemy in order to distract the enemy , to contain their forces.In other words, find a way to deprive the enemy of their freedom of movement.Only in this way can it be possible to guarantee good results both physically and spiritually.From a physical point of view, the action of attracting the enemy's attention is to disperse the enemy's forces, or to make them use their forces in secondary directions, so that they cannot carry out effective resistance in the decisive direction and cannot withstand our forces. Fang's attack.Psychologically, to be effective, it is necessary to try to deceive the enemy commanders, to paralyze their will, to confuse and frighten them.For this strategic approach, Stonewall Jackson had such a famous saying: first make the enemy feel mysterious, lure them into the wrong path, and then catch them by surprise.The first two sentences are the basic method to distract the enemy's attention and troops, while the latter sentence, that is, surprise attack, is an important condition for destroying the enemy's stability.The enemy commander must be distracted before their forces can be distracted.The loss of freedom of action is the consequence of the loss of freedom of thought. Psychological factors run through the realm of physicality and can have a decisive influence on it.If we can have a deep understanding of this, then this understanding will have indirect value.Because it can prompt us to avoid wrong estimates and superficial analysis, that is, it tells us not to use mathematical methods to analyze and study strategic theories.According to the mathematical method, it seems that only the concentration of superior forces at a selected point is enough to determine the outcome of the battle.In fact, this kind of strategic thinking that emphasizes quantitative superiority is just as incorrect as the past approach to strategy based on the geometry of lines and angles. General military textbooks have such an erroneous tendency to regard the main body of war as the concentration of superior forces.This kind of view is far from the truth, and the result of developing according to this view is often a dead end. For the principle of saving troops, Foch once made a famous definition.He said: "It's the art of using all the resources and all the power skillfully at a certain time and a certain place.That is to say, it is necessary to make correct arrangements for the use of all forces as far as possible, to keep the various departments in constant and fixed contact, not to separate them, and not to make all the forces of each department fixed on a permanent and unchanging task.Once the result is obtained, this art must be reflected in another point, that is, the deployment can be changed quickly, so that all forces can be quickly concentrated and take coordinated joint actions to deal with new targets. We may instead use a more precise and clearer expression: to dispose the army to such an extent that the various scattered units can often support each other and can be concentrated on a certain point within the shortest possible time limit; Concentrate more troops on one point in order to win the victory, and distribute the troops to other places as long as there are the most necessary numbers. It is a very unrealistic idea to concentrate all the troops in one place. Even if it is shouted as a slogan, it is dangerous to a certain extent.Moreover, judging from the actual situation, the sum of many of the most necessary quantities will certainly exceed the so-called maximum possible concentration in the proportion of the total force.Or, to put it more accurately, the more forces that are effectively employed here and there to contain and distract the enemy, the more chances will be given to winning victory when the rest of the forces are concentrated at one point to attack the enemy.Contrary to this, even if a large number of troops are concentrated to attack the enemy's heavily defended target, it does not necessarily mean that there will be a greater chance of victory. Even if a superior force can be concentrated at a decisive and anticipated point, it will still be difficult to achieve victory if the enemy cannot be prevented from mobilizing reinforcements there in time.If the enemy is only at a disadvantage in numbers at this point, but has not been shocked spiritually, then relying on the superiority of troops cannot guarantee victory.On several occasions Napoleon suffered disastrous defeats by neglecting this guarantee.The importance of this division of forces has become all the more evident since the power of weapons to retard the enemy has increased. Basis of Strategy In war, every question and every principle, like a coin, has two sides.Foch and other disciples of Clausewitz did not fully understand this rather profound truth.Therefore, in order to adapt the two aspects to each other, a compromise must be taken well.This is a corollary, since war is waged by opposing sides, each of which may attack but also defend.According to this principle, if you want to carry out an effective attack, you must first deprive the enemy of its self-defense ability, and attack the enemy by surprise.Only after the enemy has dispersed his forces can he effectively concentrate his forces.Under normal circumstances, in order to achieve this goal, the attacker must first disperse its forces.In this way, we can observe an apparently contradictory phenomenon: the real concentration of forces is the result of the first dispersion of forces. Another result of this mutual influence between the two sides is that in order to ensure the capture of a certain target, several targets of the other side must be threatened at the same time.It is at this point that we can see that there is an important difference between modern military doctrine and that of Foch and his disciples in the nineteenth century, because they pursued only one goal.This is also the difference between practice and theory.If the enemy has accurately determined the direction of your assault, then they have the best chance to take defensive measures to weaken your assault force.From another perspective, if you can threaten several targets at once, then you can distract the enemy and force them to spread their forces too.This method of distracting the enemy is the most economical method, as it enables you to concentrate the greater part of your forces in the main direction of the assault.In this way, you can meet the requirements of the maximum concentration of forces, while taking into account the need to disperse forces. There is no battle plan, which contradicts the essence of war.The Frenchman Borset put forward a wise conclusion in the eighteenth century. He said it very clearly: any war plan must contain several combat plans, and people need to think carefully. There is one that guarantees victory.The young Napoleon was Borsetter's successor, and he continued to do so afterwards.Napoleon also said that there should be two options in the battle plan.Seventy years later, Sherman, learning from experience, restated in similar conclusions, quoting his famous maxim: Keep your enemy constantly in a bind.In any case, as long as the enemy is present, several courses of action are to be envisaged.Whether in wartime or in peacetime, one principle must be followed: only adapt to survive!War, which is nothing else, is a form of concentrated human struggle, a struggle of man against his surroundings. In order for the plan to be carried out, the enemy's ability to resist must be taken into account in formulating the plan.The best way to overcome enemy resistance is to adapt the plan to changing conditions and to change it at any time.In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to make the plan flexible while maintaining the initiative. Therefore, making the operational direction capable of threatening several targets at any time is the most important means.如能做到這一點，就有可能迫使敵人處於左右為難的困境，而使自己至少奪得一個防衛比較薄弱的目標，甚至還能達到一箭雙雕的目的。 在戰術領域內，敵人的部署往往是根據地形的性質而決定，所以，選擇目標要比在戰略領域內困難一些。因為在戰略領域內，敵人不得不分出兵力去防衛一些重要的工業中心和鐵路樞紐。當然，即使在戰術領域內，如果能利用敵人的任何一個弱點，特別是根據敵人的抵抗程度來選擇戰線，那麼仍有可能取得某種類似戰略領域中所能獲得的那種利益。計畫也像果樹一樣，一棵果樹如果不分枝丫，當然不可能指望它結出果子。計畫如果只有一個方案，只有一個目標，那它就像一根不能結果的光桿木頭。 切斷交通線 打擊敵人的交通線，可以有兩種方法：或者從側翼進行迂迴，或者從正面實施突破。但在制訂這種計畫時，比較難解決的問題還是選擇最為有利的打擊地點是指向敵人的淺近後方呢？還是指向其深遠後方？ 當我開始研究這個問題的時候，試驗性的機械化部隊還剛剛建立起來，他們的戰略使用還在考慮當中，因此，我試圖以過去戰爭中的騎兵襲擊戰法，特別是自從鐵路出現以後的騎兵襲擊戰法，作為分析研究的根據。我想，儘管騎兵襲擊的能力與機械化部隊進行深遠戰略突破的能力相比較可能要小得多，但這種差別並不會減小，而且將提高襲擊所具有的意義和作用。經過一些必要的修正以後，就可以得出下述結論： 一般說來，破壞敵人的交通線時，離敵人的距離越近，其效果也越迅速；從另一角度來說，離敵人的基地越近，其效果也越巨大。無論採取哪一種方式，如果在敵人處於運動中，或正在執行任務，則破壞其交通線所產生的效果，總比在敵人停駐時的效果更加巨大而且迅速。 在確定快速部隊的突擊方向時，最主要的根據是戰略態勢和敵人的補給狀況。必須考慮到：他們現在有幾條補給線，利用其他補給線的可能性，儲備品的數量，這些補給品在前線附近前進倉庫中的集中情況。考慮過所有這些因素以後，還應研究達成各個目標的可能性：即考慮距離、天然障礙物和敵人可能進行的抵抗等因素。一般說來，所要經過的距離越長，則途中遇到的天然障礙物也會越多，但來自敵人的抵抗力卻可能相對地減少。 所以，如果天然障礙物並不特別嚴重，而且敵人也不十分依賴其補給基地，則只有在敵人深遠後方切斷其交通線才能有希望獲得較大的效果，並取得勝利。 另外還有一種見解：當打擊指向敵人的淺近後方時，對其部隊的精神震撼作用比較大；當打擊指向敵人的深遠後方時，對其指揮官的心理影響比較大。 在過去，騎兵的襲擊由於不注意隨後的破壞工作，往往難以獲得應有的效果。因此，對於使用騎兵襲擊敵人交通線的重要性問題，不免估計過低。必須指出，要破壞敵人的補給，不僅要對其前送道路進行破壞，而且要攔截或威脅其輜重隊。機械化部隊出現後，由於它具有高度的快速力和越野能力，破壞敵人交通線的可能性大大提高了。 上述這些結論，已為第二次世界大戰的經驗所證實。特別值得一提的例證是古德里安的裝甲部隊，當時，他跑在德軍主力的前頭，在亞眠和阿布維爾等地越過松姆河防線，進入盟軍的深遠後方，切斷了盟軍的交通線，從而使盟軍在物理上和心理上都陷入癱瘓狀態。 前進的方法 直到十八世紀末葉，軍隊的移動，不論是戰略性的（開向戰場），還是戰術性的（在戰場上），照例都是以物理性的大量集中前進為原則。拿破崙崛起後，繼承了包爾色特的思想，採用了新的師的編制，創造了在戰略上分開前進的方法，這就是說，軍隊分成獨立的單位向前運動。不過，他在戰術方面仍然採用著集中開進的方法。 到了十九世紀末葉，由於火器的發展，為了減少火力的殺傷，戰術性的前進運動也開始採用分散的方法了。可是，這時的戰略性前進運動，反而又回到了集中的方式。其原因一方面是由於鐵路的發達和軍隊數量的增長，另一方面則是由於對拿破侖的方法有一種不正確的理解。 為了使戰略的藝術和效力得以復活，首先要使分散性的戰略前進方式復活起來。新的鬥爭工具如飛機坦克的出現，又促進了這種分散性戰略前進方式的發展，空中襲擊的危險性，麻痹欺騙敵人的必要性，充分利用機械化部隊快速力的迫切性，都說明一個道理：向前運動的部隊，不僅應該儘量分佈在寬廣的正面上（以不損害行動統一為原則），而且應該儘量採取分開前進的方式（以不損害部隊的整體為原則）。在使用原子武器的條件下，這一點將是特別重要的。無線電通信聯絡的發展，更為這種分開前進的方式提供了方便，同時也為不間斷的指揮提供了保障。 為了代替那種以集中兵力進行集中打擊的單一思想，我們提出三種方案，可以根據情況任選一種：一、使兵力分開前進，但是都指向一個目標。二、使兵力分開前進，但是依次指向幾個目標。（這時，在每一個行動之前都要採取預備性的措施，以分散敵人的注意力和兵力。如果我們有同時威脅幾個目標的可能性，足以大大分散敵人的注意力，因而使他感到困惑，這樣就不必採取預備措施了。）三、使兵力分開前進，但是同時指向幾個目標。（在新的戰爭條件下，在幾個方向上奪得局部性的勝利，或者甚至只是同時威脅幾個目標，其積累起來的效果，與在一個地點取得完全勝利的效果，可能要大得多。） 軍隊行動的效果，取決於新方法的發展程度。這些方法的目的：一是要使部隊越過敵人戰線而滲透進去，控制敵人的一定地盤，但不是去奪占防禦地區；二是在實際上促使敵人的行動癱瘓，而不是在理論上談擊毀敵人的兵力。所以，部隊的流動有可能保障取勝，而把兵力集中起來，則可能帶來嚴重的危險。