Chapter 24 Chapter 21 National Objectives and Military Objectives

In discussing the purpose of war, the distinction between political and military objectives must be clearly drawn.These two purposes are different, but they are closely related to each other, because a country never wages war for the sake of war, but must wage war for the pursuit of some political purpose.Military objectives are merely a means to political ends.Therefore, military goals are determined by political goals.However, there is a basic condition here, that is, politics cannot ask the military to accomplish what it cannot do. It can be seen from this that the study of this issue should not only start from politics, but also end with politics.

The term goal, though widely used, is not a very convenient term to use.The so-called goal has both physical and geographical meanings, so it is easy to cause confusion in thought.Therefore, it is best to make a conscious distinction when using it: when the question concerns the political category, we use the term purpose, and when the question concerns the use of armed forces, we use the term military objective instead. The purpose of the war, although only from one's point of view, is to obtain a relatively peaceful state after the war.Therefore, even when you are at war, always think of the terms of peace you want.This is the same for aggressive states seeking to expand their territory and for peaceful states fighting only for self-defense, but their perceptions of a better state of peace are quite different.

History tells us that a military victory does not in itself mean that a political goal has been achieved.However, those responsible for solving war problems are basically professional soldiers, so there is a natural tendency to forget the basic purpose of the state and only pay attention to military goals.As a result, after each war broke out, political goals were often constrained by military goals.People regard military goals as the ultimate goal, not as a mere means to achieve political goals. And there are worse cases.Military objectives are often misinterpreted and oversimplified by not understanding the correct relationship between political and military objectives, and between politics and strategy.

In order to correctly understand this rather complicated issue, it is necessary to understand the development of military thought in the past two hundred years, understand what viewpoints exist, and how they have changed. For more than a century, the important dogma in military thinking has been to regard the destruction of the enemy's main force on the battlefield as the real purpose of war.This is universally recognized, it is written in all military regulations, and it is taught in all military schools.People regard it as the basic law of military doctrine.Any statesman who ventures to doubt this, fearing that military objectives will not in all cases be adapted to national purposes, is immediately regarded as treasonous.Evidence of this is evident by a careful study of the official archives of the countries at war, and by reading the memoirs of some leading military figures, especially during and after the First World War.

Such an absolute law may have shocked those famous commanders and military scientists before the nineteenth century.They used to believe that the determination of military objectives must be based on the existing forces and current politics, so practical needs and rational requirements must be taken into account. The influence of Clausewitz Destroying the enemy's main force on the battlefield is the true purpose of war. This principle has been turned into dogma, largely due to the influence of Clausewitz.Clausewitz's writings (published posthumously) had a major influence on later Prussian generals, especially Moltke.The Prussian victories of 1866 and 1870 made the armies of all countries accept this principle, and made the Prussian military system their model.Therefore, it is very important to explore Clausewitz's theory.

Clausewitz's disciples took his theory to extreme heights.This is something that Clausewitz himself did not think of during his lifetime, but it is a phenomenon that often occurs in history. It has been the common fate of most prophets and thinkers in all fields of learning that their teachings have always been misunderstood.The pupils of Clausewitz, who departed from their teachers, did not study clearly the purpose of war, and they damaged their original ideas even more than their prejudiced and subjective opponents.It should also be admitted, however, that Clausewitz himself has caused more misunderstandings about his theories than anyone else.As a re-disciple of Kant, he once learned a set of philosophical expression methods, but he is not a real philosopher.His war theory, in terms of expression, is not only too abstract, but also quite boring.Therefore, it is always difficult for ordinary soldiers who are only accustomed to concrete thinking to understand his theories.Thinking along the thread of his argument often turns back suddenly and goes in the exact opposite direction of this thread.Because Clausewitz is quite confused in expression, they can't help being confused. They can only grasp some of his vivid aphorisms and see the superficial meaning of these aphorisms, but they cannot deeply understand the mainstream of his thought. .

Clausewitz's greatest contribution to the theory of war is his special emphasis on the role of psychological factors.He spoke out against the most fashionable geometrical strategies of the age.He made it clear that the human spirit is far more important than those notions of battle lines and battle angles.He analyzed the influence of danger and fatigue on military action in war, and the value of bravery and determination.These are enough to show that he has a deep understanding of this. Unfortunately, however, some of Clausewitz's mistakes also had a rather bad influence on the later course of history.

Clausewitz overemphasized the role of the army, and thus failed to correctly estimate the significance of the navy.He was rather short-sighted, proclaiming his conviction that numerical superiority was still increasingly decisive at a time when the machine age of warfare had opened its doors.Such beliefs increased the instinctive conservatism of ordinary soldiers, making them disbelieve in the possibility of creating new advantages with the invention of machinery.At that time, the widespread implementation of the conscription system made it easy to recruit a large number of troops.It is also a powerful reason for conservative thinking.Due to the neglect of psychological factors, this kind of army established by conscription is more prone to chaos and sudden collapse once it is attacked.And the old ways of the past, though not so often and institutionalized, always tried to form armies with well-trained fighters.

For tactics and strategy, Clausewitz did not offer many novel and progressive ideas.In this regard, he neither created nor promoted, but merely systematized his strategic and tactical thinking.Clausewitz's theory of war lacked that revolutionary impact when compared with the divisional theory produced in the eighteenth century and the use of fast armored forces in the twentieth century. And one thing deserves special attention.When he summed up the experience of the Napoleonic Wars and tried to find a theoretical system for the Napoleonic Wars, he focused on a certain backward form of war. As a result, there was a tendency to turn his back on the revolution, and instead retreated in the direction of national wars. .

Clausewitz's theory of military objectives In defining military objectives, Clausewitz had tended his strategy towards purely formal logic.He writes: To render the enemy powerless is the object of the conduct of war, at least in theory it must be.He went on to say: In order for the enemy to obey our will, it is necessary to make the enemy's situation more disadvantageous than the sacrifice we demand. This disadvantage should not be temporary, at least on the surface, otherwise the enemy will wait for a more favorable situation. The timing didn't give in.Therefore, any change in situation brought about by continued military activity must, at least in theory, be more unfavorable to the enemy.The worst position a combatant can be in is total powerlessness.Therefore, if the enemy is to be compelled to submit to our will by an act of war, it must be rendered either truly powerless, or rendered impotent.From this it follows that the disarming or crushing of the enemy, however it may be called, must always be the object of the conduct of war.

Due to the influence of Kant, Clausewitz's thought has a tendency of dualism.He believed in a perfect (military) ideal, but at the same time realized that in the real world this ideal was never fully attainable.He has a deep understanding of the difference between ideal and reality, and pointed out that military ideals are different from reality.He wrote: In the abstract field of pure concepts, the thinking activity will never stop until it reaches the extreme, because the object of thinking is an extreme thing. If we go from abstraction to reality, then everything is different.In the abstract the object of war is the complete disarmament of the enemy, but in practice this object is not always attainable, nor is it a necessary condition for peace. This extreme attitude of Clausewitz is also clearly reflected in his discussion of combat.He sees combat as a means to an end in war.He emphasized from the very beginning that only struggle is the only means to end the war.He said: There is only one means in war, and that is to fight.To prove this truth, he made extensive arguments.Point out that all military activities are necessarily directly or indirectly related to combat.After a lot of preaching, it seems that most people have accepted his point of view.However, Clausewitz then took a U-turn and declared that the object of war is not always to destroy armies engaged in combat, not to go through actual combat, but to deploy combat and pass through the resulting situation. The purpose of fighting can often be achieved. Furthermore, Clausewitz argued that, all other things being equal, the more we try to destroy the enemy's army, the more we must exhaust our own. The danger of adopting this method is that, precisely because we are trying to achieve greater results, we will in turn suffer greater disadvantages if we fail to do so. Here, Clausewitz himself speaks his prophecy, and it can be said to be very effective for the disciples who followed his principles in the first and second world wars.Because his theories about battles have only been handed down theoretically, not practically.He once argued that other means were employed only to avoid the dangers of battle, thus adding another layer of misunderstanding to his disciples.Because he paid more attention to the explanation of theoretical concepts and focused on abstract explanations, the result was that his disciples had a phenomenon of distorting reality in their minds. For his labyrinth full of philosophical theories, few readers can really grasp his logical line, or go deep into his theoretical realm without getting lost.Of course, there are many readers who can recite his following warning: There is only one means in war, and that is fighting. The attempt to resolve a crisis by bloodshed, that is, to destroy the enemy's army, is the eldest son of war. Only in large-scale battles can major victories and losses be decided. We don't want to hear anything about generals who won without bloodshed. By repeating these words over and over again, Clausewitz has the effect of making his already unclear philosophy even more obscure.His philosophy of war, which became the Prussian Marseillaise, could inspire the blood of men, but it also poisoned their hearts.In this way, Clausewitz's philosophical dogma is only suitable for training sergeants, not generals.According to his doctrine, only combat is a real military activity.Thus, the laurels of strategy were stripped away, and military science became a technique of mass slaughter.Moreover, his philosophy of war encouraged generals to seek battles whenever they had the opportunity, without thinking of first creating conditions favorable to themselves. The following passage of Clausewitz is often quoted, which further proves that he cannot be blamed for the decline of military scholarship.He said: Some good-natured minds may readily think that there must be an ingenious way of disarming or crushing an enemy without inflicting great casualties, and that this is the true direction in which the art of war develops.However beautiful this view may be, it is an erroneous thinking that must be eradicated Obviously, when Clausewitz made this opinion, he did not seriously consider it.It did not occur to him that what he denounced was exactly what all the craftsmen of military science (including Napoleon himself) were after, and that it was the correct goal of military science. Later, when many confused and confused people repeatedly resorted to direct offensive actions and suffered heavy casualties, they often used Clausewitz's remarks to defend themselves, and even felt that they were justified. Clausewitz has always emphasized the decisive role of numerical superiority, and stubbornly adheres to this view.This further enhanced the pernicious influence of his theory.Of course, he also clearly pointed out the great value of suddenness from another aspect.He said: All actions are based more or less on surprise, because without it it is simply inconceivable to gain superiority at decisive points.However, his followers were confused by his habit of emphasizing numerical superiority, always using a large number of troops as the basic means of winning victory. Clausewitz's Theory on the Purpose of War Clausewitz did his best to extol the idea of ​​absolute war.His theoretical elaboration on this issue also had a rather harmful influence on the development of military scholarship.According to his theory, only the unlimited use of power is the way to success.When he began to expound his theory, he pointed out that war is nothing more than the continuation of politics through another means, but later it seemed that there was a little contradiction. He regarded politics as a slave to strategy, and this strategy was still a bad strategy. This idea of ​​his is intensified by the following statement.In his opinion, it would be a big mistake to introduce a factor of limitation and relaxation into the philosophy of war, because war is an act of violence, and there is no limit to the use of violence. Clausewitz's statement is the basis of the blindly exaggerated general war of modernization.The principle of the use of force he proposed is without any restrictions and regardless of any cost, so it is only fully applicable to those mobs whose hatred has reached a crazy level.This is the exact opposite of sensible statecraft and sound strategy, which must serve political ends. If war is the continuation of politics, as Clausewitz said, then when war is waged, post-war interests must also be taken into account.If a country really exhausts its power, its own politics will also go bankrupt. Clausewitz himself had restrictions on his principle of the unlimited use of force.He acknowledged the fact that the political purpose as the initial motivation for war should have a standard (scale) when determining the goals and the weight of the armed forces. There is another situation that makes more sense.Clausewitz articulated an idea about the limits of logic.He has pointed out that when the means lose any connection between it and the end, it is impossible in most cases to achieve the end with the greatest number of forces, because resistance must necessarily arise within it. His classic work "On War" is a work after twelve years of intense thinking.If the author has more time to consider the issue of war, then he may draw a more reasonable and accurate conclusion.With the gradual deepening of research, his thoughts will change.Regrettably.He died of cholera in 1830, leaving his work unfinished.Clausewitz's works were compiled and published by his wife after his death.His manuscripts were found in several tightly sealed packets.Among them, there is also a note that is quite prophetic: If my untimely death interrupts this work, then of course everything that exists can be called a dismal mass of ideas.They will continue to be subject to misunderstanding and arbitrary criticism. If it weren't for that damned cholera, then Clausewitz's book might not have these ills.Because there is already a very meaningful symptom, which shows that Clausewitz's thinking is evolving, and he is almost at the point of abandoning the original concept of absolute war, and is preparing to completely revise his theory on a more reasonable basis.Unfortunately, at this moment, he unfortunately passed away. As a result, the door to misunderstanding is always open, misunderstanding and criticism from all sides, even beyond his own prediction.In general, the civilized world has been seriously damaged by the general adoption of the theory of infinite war.People lack a deep understanding of his theories, so that the causes and characteristics of the First World War were greatly influenced by his theories.In terms of logical development, the consequences of this theory can still be seen in World War II. Military Doctrine After World War I The course and outcome of the First World War.There are good reasons for doubting the validity of Clausewitz's theory, or at least the interpretations given by his successors.On land, countless campaigns and battles were fought, but none of them brought a decisive result.Those responsible leaders, however, are unable to reconcile their goals with changed conditions or to adopt new means with greater power to achieve them.Instead of studying the new problems they faced, they still pinned their hopes on Clausewitz's theory, continued to promote his theory, and tried to win complete victory by means of battles and battles, so that they completely exhausted their strength in the end. light, and complete victory can never be achieved. The final collapse of the belligerents was not so much due to the lack of provisions as a result of the blockade at sea, but to the casualties suffered by the active forces in the course of the campaign.Of course it should be pointed out that the German army lost a lot of blood during the fruitless offensive in 1918, resulting in mental relaxation, and the German high command, already hopeless of victory, hastened their efforts. Crash.It is for this reason that the opposing nations have achieved such a victory, but by the time they have achieved it, they have exhausted themselves to a considerable extent, both psychologically and physically, and are exhausted.Therefore, these seemingly victors did not have the strength to consolidate their positions after the war. It is obvious, then, that this theory is not fully applicable, at least in practical application, no matter in terms of tactics, or in terms of strategy and politics.The heavy losses suffered in striving for the desired goal, and the exhaustion shown by the nominal victors after the war was over, are sufficient to justify the need for a careful examination of the whole question of political and military objectives. In addition to these negative factors, there are also certain positive reasons for renewing interest in military theory.One of them is the decisive role played by the navy.Although no decisive battle was fought at sea, the economic blockade by the navy contributed to the defeat of the Central European powers.This raises the question again: what was Britain's main mistake in this respect?It put aside its own traditional strategy, and did not hesitate to waste a lot of energy and pay a high price to strive for a decisive victory on the mainland. There are two other reasons.Thanks to the increasing development of the air force, we have the possibility of striking the enemy's economic and political center without having to destroy the enemy's main force on the battlefield in advance.Air forces can strike direct targets by indirect means, and avoid enemy resistance without initially overpowering it. At the same time, due to the development of engines using petroleum and propulsion using tracks, the establishment of mechanized troops with a high degree of rapid force has broad prospects.The mechanization of the troops provided another opportunity to destroy the main body of the enemy without engaging in a large-scale battle.The use of mechanized troops to destroy the enemy's supply lines and command system, and the use of tanks to rush into the enemy's deep rear are enough to produce a mental shock that can collapse the enemy's main force without serious combat.The new mechanized land force, like the air force, can still strike directly at the nerve center and heart of an enemy country, although to a lesser degree. If the air force uses a special form of indirect route, that is, the indirect route that flies over the front line, to carry out effective direct strikes on the enemy, then the tank can take the indirect route on the ground, that is, to detour the obstacles of the enemy's army. method to accomplish this blow.We can use the Chinese chess game as an analogy: the air force maneuvers much like a cannon, while the armored tank unit maneuvers like a car.Of course, this analogy does not fully reflect their relative value, because the air force is not only a cannon that can hit the wall, but also has the ability to move in all directions like a car.On the other hand, although a mechanized land force cannot transcend space like a cannon, it has the ability to occupy space. The development of the air force and mechanized forces will inevitably have a wide-ranging and far-reaching impact on military objectives and the selection of targets in future wars. They increase the capabilities of military operations, expand the scope of application to non-military targets, both economic and spiritual, and make operations more effective.At the same time, they have also increased the distance of military operations to military targets, so that they can use the method of paralyzing some important organs of the enemy to win the victory against the enemy in front of them, without having to give the enemy physical damage in difficult battles. The army suffered heavy losses.Eliminating the enemy's resistance by paralyzing the enemy can greatly save troops, because in the past, weakening the enemy's resistance in actual combat often took a long time and cost a lot.The air force has the ability to avoid the enemy's obstruction and attack non-military targets inside the enemy's country. In addition, it also has new capabilities in paralyzing the enemy's armed resistance. Mobility is constantly increasing, both on the ground and in the air.The combination of various effects increases the strength of the armed forces and enhances the status of strategy, giving it greater importance than tactics.In future wars senior commanders will differ from their predecessors in the quicker attainment of decisive results by making more use of movement than of battle. Of course, the meaning of winning the decisive battle will not disappear. Due to the emergence of new and quick tools, the chances of winning the battle will increase, but the form of the battle itself is no longer traditional.It will feel like a natural consequence of a strategic move.Therefore, it is inaccurate and inaccurate to call this concluding combat operation a battle. Regrettably, after the First World War, the military leaders of various countries were insensitive and slow to understand this.They don't know that since the tools of war and combat conditions have undergone new changes, military objectives should also have a new definition. Unfortunately, those who lead the air force are determined to maintain their independent status, so their attention is very narrow, and they only want to hit non-military targets as a limit, regardless of the limited purpose of doing so, or even bring about the opposite. result.For this new branch of the military, they are full of a natural optimism, convinced that the air force's strikes are enough to depress the spirits of the enemy's soldiers and civilians, and their morale collapses, or, like the navy, they can achieve the goal of hanging the enemy by means of economic blockade, and its effectiveness It seems to be coming sooner. The experience of World War II After the war began, the small number of new army units, that is, the mechanized units established before the war, fully proved that they lived up to the expectations placed on them.The use of these forces to carry out assaults on strategic targets far behind the enemy's rear yielded decisive results. The Germans attacked Poland, using only six tank divisions, mainly by means of which the Polish resistance was brought to a complete halt within a few weeks.Before the main force of the army went into battle, the ten tank divisions of the German army had actually decided the outcome of the so-called Battle of France.Then, all the countries of Western Europe, almost invincible, soon collapsed.In just one month, the Germans had completely conquered Western Europe, and at an extremely cheap price.From the point of view of Clausewitz and his like, it was a military operation with little bloodshed, and at the decisive stage the losses were even more insignificant. This was a lightning victory, and although it was the result of combat operations against military objectives, it was primarily strategic maneuvers rather than tactical actions that played a major role. In addition, when advancing to the enemy's rear, on the one hand, it destroys the enemy's communication lines and its command system; are inseparable. So, to put it simply, this is at least partly proof that the effect of taking action on non-military targets is obvious.In April 1941, the German army conquered the Balkans and moved even more rapidly.This once again demonstrates that the paralyzing effect of new tools in warfare on the enemy, and the strategic use of these tools, is effective.In the battle to conquer the Balkans, it can be said that the method of battle has no obvious effect. At that time, the victory was relatively smooth, and basically there was no meaning of destroying the enemy's troops. After the German invasion of Russia began, a different approach was tried.Many German generals, especially Chief of the General Staff Halder, expressed dissatisfaction with Hitler's practice of attacking economic targets first and ignoring military targets.However, an analysis of the operational orders and their own subsequent testimony does not reveal any basis for this accusation.Although Hitler may have been inclined to attack economic targets, thinking that would be more effective, at a critical moment in the war in 1941, he agreed with the German General Staff that there was a need for a decisive battle.In the subsequent combat operations, although the German army won several great victories and caused the Russian army to suffer heavy losses, they did not achieve decisive results. This openly raises the question: Can concentrating forces on economic targets achieve decisive results?Some German generals believed that the chance of defeating Soviet Russia was lost because they were locked into the traditional way of pursuing the goals of the battle.Had they rushed forward as soon as possible then, and taken directly to political and economic centers such as Moscow and Leningrad, they might have been able to win.Guderian, an outstanding representative of the new school of mechanized mobile warfare, insisted on this view.However, when it came to a critical moment, Hitler turned to the orthodox side instead. In a series of lightning offensive campaigns, the Luftwaffe cooperated with the mechanized troops on the ground to deal a mental blow to the enemy army and the people of the enemy country, causing them to become paralyzed.The effectiveness of air operations is astonishing, and it can be said with confidence that they are, in any case, as important as tank forces.There are conditions for the emergence of a new type of blitzkrieg.In analyzing these conditions, the two instruments of warfare can be evaluated, but they should not be compared with each other. In the latter part of the war, the air forces of the United Kingdom and the United States made great contributions to ensuring the victory of the allied land and navy.First of all, it should be said that it was precisely because of the power of the air force that the Allied forces were able to land on the European continent and later carry out a successful offensive.Allied air strikes against German military targets, especially the destruction of its lines of communication, had seriously weakened the strength of the German army, making it impossible to organize effective resistance to the landing Allied forces. However, the Air Force Commands of the Allied countries have never shown any special enthusiasm in cooperating with the ground forces in carrying out air campaigns.On the contrary, they prefer to conduct independent air campaigns against the enemy's non-military targets, that is, against the enemy's industrial centers.Their purpose is to strike directly at the enemy's country, hoping to destroy the enemy's economy and spirit at the same time. They believe that compared with joint operations, compared with attacking the enemy's armed forces, the results will be greater and more gains will be made. decisive outcome. Although all Air Force Commands call this kind of combat operation strategic bombing, in fact this term is imprecise, because this kind of target and action are all within the scope of grand strategy.Strictly speaking, this kind of bombing should be called bombing to achieve grand strategic goals. If this term is too long, it can also be called industrial bombing.In this way, both the spiritual and economic aspects can be included. As to the real effect of these bombings, how much did they contribute to victory?Although many detailed investigations and studies have been carried out, it is still difficult to make an evaluation.In judging the role of these bombings, people tend to vary from person to person, with some approving and others outright negative for some extremely contradictory reasons.In addition to man-made fog curtains, there are so many factors that cannot be estimated, and there are so many factors in aerial bombardment than in any other military operation, that it is almost impossible to correctly estimate these bombardments. impossible. If it is fair to say, it should be pointed out that a careful comparison of the bombing of industrial targets by the strategic air force with the bombing of strategic targets by the general air force within the operational range shows that the former played a decisive role. Still not as big as the latter.A careful study of the various phases of the war shows that the results of the strategic air bombing of industrial centers were always much worse than the targets in the strategic air command's plans. Even more obviously, the bombing of industrial centers had a very deleterious effect on the postwar situation.In addition to the massive physical damage, which is very difficult to repair, there are many serious consequences, both social and spiritual, which are not obvious on the surface but will operate for a long time.Actions of this kind by the air force undoubtedly constitute a great danger to a civilized society with a relatively weak foundation.Today, with the advent of the atomic bomb, this reality is even more dangerous. Here we talk about the basic difference between strategy and grand strategy.Strategy studies the issue of how to ensure military victory, while grand strategy takes a longer view, and its task is how to ensure post-war peace.To make such a statement is not to put the cart before the horse, but just to figure out where to put the cart and the horse. The Air Force's air operations targeting non-military targets should be within the realm of grand strategy.Therefore, it is necessary to judge this kind of behavior from such a perspective.From the nature of the target itself, non-military targets should not be bombed.It is therefore ultimately quite unreasonable to treat these objectives as military objectives, even if their destruction would be decisive.At least not so wise. Further revisions to military doctrine In order to revise a certain theory and make it applicable to new conditions, the first thing to do is to study the source of the theory, and then to modify its conclusion.As far as I know, after the First World War of 1914-1918, the first of the rather broad views of the purpose of war inherited from Clausewitz The one who argues for re-examination is myself.戰後時期，我在許多軍事刊物上發表了大量的文章，嚴肅批評了克勞塞維茨的觀點。一九二五年，我又為此出版了一本專門著作，書名叫做《巴黎，或者是戰爭的將來》。 在這本篇幅不大的書中，我一開始就對正統主義進行了批評，反對了在戰場上消滅敵人的主力這個傳統觀念，而這正是第一次世界大戰中交戰雙方所追求的目標。我曾經指出，這種行動使得交戰雙方相互消耗自己的力量，但卻不能取得決定性的結果。接著，我強調了精神目標的重要性，並且指明了兩點：一、一支裝甲坦克部隊可以對敵軍的阿奚里腳後跟，即構成敵人神經系統的通信樞紐部和高級指揮部，實施決定性的打擊；二、除了在這種戰略性行動中配合陸軍作戰以外，空軍還可以對敵國的神經系統，對其巨大的民用工業中心實施具有決定意義的打擊。 該書出版兩年以後，即一九二七年，英國第一個試驗性的機械化部隊建立起來了。於是，英國陸軍總參謀部下達了指令，把這本書作為軍官們的教學材料。當然，空軍參謀部對於這本書的利用就更為充分一些，因為當時還沒有關於空軍戰略的教科書，而且這本書的觀點，又正好與空軍司令部所期望的發展趨勢相吻合，所以，空軍參謀長便大量採購了這本書，發給各級司令部的下級指揮官們閱讀。 現在我要宣佈，對於這本書中的觀點，確有加以修改的必要。該書還是二十五年以前寫的，經過長期的反覆思考以後，我已經發現了當時所犯的一些錯誤。而且，其中有些矯枉過正的提法，很容易走到另一個極端。早在一九二八年，勞倫斯就曾給我寫信，討論這個問題。He said: 克勞塞維茨觀點的整個體系，是非常合符邏輯的。但是，這個體系卻容易把他的門徒們引入歧途，至少對於那些只願意用手拿武器打仗而不願意用腿跑路的人來說，確是如此的。您現在想獨個地把這種趨勢扭轉過來，而那些以軍事為職業的人對您卻很少有幫助。可是，當您成功以後（這大約會在一九四五年左右），您的追隨者又將越出您所規定的那些界線，並且在新型戰略家的影響之下往後退。我們的運動就是這樣，時而前進，時而後退，走著一條曲折的路線。 在一九二五年，我自己是走得很遠的，對於使用空軍攻擊非軍事目標的利益，強調得未免過分了。不過，我很快就在某種程度上糾正了自己的錯誤，曾經強調指出，對於這樣重要的一項任務，最好採取謹慎的方法來完成。這就是：要使永久性的損害儘量減到最小的限度，因為今天的敵人，也許明天就會成為我們的顧客，而到後天，甚至還會變成我們的盟友。我在那時堅信，採用決定性的空中襲擊，與進行長期戰爭比較起來，可以使敵國少受一些破壞，少耗一些實力，使他們能在戰後較快地恢復起來。 根據後來進一步的研究，我才真正認清，對於工業中心進行空中襲擊，是不可能立即產生決定性結果的。進行這種襲擊，很可能導致一場新的長時間的新型消耗戰。這種戰爭與一千九百一十四至一九一八年的戰爭比較，傷亡數也許可能少一些，但破壞性必將更大。可是，當我指明這一點後，空軍方面卻很不願意接受這種修正意見。他們寧願堅持原來的舊觀念。對於速戰速決的觀念，他們仍然表示著過分樂觀的信念。而當戰爭的經驗逼得他們非放棄舊觀念不可時，他們卻又走向了另一個極端，模仿著第一次世界大戰中陸軍方面的態度，把他們的希望從工業消耗轉移到人力消耗方面。 然而，認識到對非軍事性目標進行轟炸可能導致反面的結果，並不等於要恢復舊有的概念，不是要把會戰當作主要目標。克勞塞維茨的公式，在第一次世界大戰過程中即已有了充分的暴露，說明缺點是不少的。與此相反，第二次世界大戰卻證明，對於軍事目標採取間接路線行動，或者說採取戰略性行動，不僅有著新的可能性，而且也有新的利益。這又充分證明，我們在這方面所作的預測是準確的。甚至在很早的時代，一些偉大的統帥就曾有效地採取過這樣的間接路線，而且，在他們那個時代，進行戰爭的工具是很有限的。而在現時代，由於出現了新的作戰武器，這種間接路線行動就具有了更加重大的意義，雖然進行戰術抵抗的力量也有了增長。軍隊具有了新的，更加高的快速力，因而也就提高了它的靈活性，可以更好地選擇突擊方向和造成對敵威脅，這樣就有可能抵消敵人的戰術性抵抗力。 由於有了最新的經驗和現代化的條件，現在又到了重新審查某些觀點的時候了。例如，關於政治目的和軍事目標這類術語的概念，需要加以修訂。我衷心希望，這項工作應由陸海空三軍聯合組織力量來進行，以求得一個合理的解決。這是因為，當前對於軍事學說的各種觀點，是存在著嚴重的意見分歧的。 經過重新修訂的理論，應使其基本原則適應於現代條件的需要。因此，我希望，在討論這個問題的過程中，應使理論的概念更加充實些。基本思想就是：以戰略性戰役這一術語來代替會戰這個術語，因為會戰是一個古老的概念，現時代已經失去了它原有的意義。在未來的戰爭中，也有可能發生會戰，但它已經不是目的本身了。在這裡，我要重複早先作出來的一個結論，因為它是在第一次世界大戰當中得到了充分肯定的。這就是：戰爭中的真正目標，不在於尋找敵人進行會戰，而在於建立一種有利的戰略態勢。如果說，這種態勢本身還不足以保證取勝，那麼再繼而進行一個會戰，就可以很有把握地保證奪得勝利。