Chapter 9 Comments on Polish Army Deployment

Unless it is said that its basic idea is to cover everything and never voluntarily give up anything, otherwise it is difficult to decide on the strategic goal of the deployment of the Polish army.Such a policy will usually always bring the weaker side down.A few years later, Hitler also had this similar experience to prove that he did not learn its lessons well for the Polish campaign. Poland's difficulties in the strategic situation are obvious.On the one hand, its strength is at a disadvantage; on the other hand, the shape of its borders allows the German army to attack from two sides at the same time, and even from three sides in the future.When the Polish authorities still refuse to give up their idea of ​​holding everything, it actually proves that psychological and political intentions are extremely difficult to cooperate with hard military facts.

Except for Marshal Pirsudski and a handful of cool-headed Polish politicians, almost no Poles have ever recognized it, because after they forced unreasonable territorial demands on neighboring Russia and Germany, they then puts the country in a more dangerous position.The entire population of Poland is only 35 million, of which there are only 22 million real Poles, and the rest are ethnic minorities such as Germanic, Ukrainian, Belarusian and Jewish, and they are all oppressed to a considerable extent. Apart from relying on their French allies, the people of Poland spent too much time dreaming of opportunities for aggression when Germany and Russia were still militarily weak.Some wanted to raid isolated East Prussia and Upper Silesia; others wanted to take the shortest route straight to Berlin.

When Germany has established fortifications in East Prussia and the Oder-Walta Basin and began to rearm, this dream should also be attributed to disillusionment.However, Polish politicians and soldiers, relying on the French to launch attacks on the Western Front at the same time, still refused to give up this delusion in their hearts.From the initial stage, the above-mentioned deployment certainly represents a kind of defensive thinking, but it can also be judged that their intention is to shift the offensive immediately once the French assistance has taken effect. In addition, the Polish General Staff also lacked its own general tradition, which was formed by long-term experience.On the other hand, the temper of the Poles is like attacking but not defending.We can reasonably assume that the hearts of Polish soldiers still miss their former glory, at least subconsciously.I once saw a portrait of Field Marshal Rydz|Smigly against the background of a Polish cavalry charge.Instead, the newly formed Polish Army was again educated by the French.Since, in fact, since 1918 French military thinking has been based on the experience of static warfare, it was of course difficult to give the Poles the idea of ​​speed and mobility in combat.

Therefore, it is conceivable that apart from the reluctance to give up anything, the deployment plan of the Polish army does not have any clear combat objectives. It is just the aggressive ambitions of the past and the need to make defensive preparations in the face of powerful enemies today. , a compromise between the two.At the same time, the Poles also misunderstood that the Germans would adopt the French style of attack, which would soon degenerate into positional warfare.In this respect, there is one more interesting incident which is also worth mentioning.Just before the war broke out, we received a tip-off concerning Poland's ideal offensive intentions.It came from a reliable source, and it is said that the Polish President or Marshal Liz Migret's cronies all advocated that the deployment of the Polish army should have an offensive character, including the plan to concentrate a strong force in the Poznań province. draw inside.In particular, it is said that this plan was actually suggested, let alone requested, by the British.In this environment, the whole scenario seemed impossible to us.However, it was later discovered that the Poles had indeed assembled quite a strong force in the Poznan province, although in fact, from their own point of view, this was also the direction least likely to encounter a German attack.In the battle on the Bzura River, the Poznań Army finally met its fate.

In fact, there is no shortage of sound proposals on the Polish side.According to Col‧Schneider's report, Gen‧Weygand (Gen‧Weygand) had suggested that the defense line should be set up on the Niemen (Niemen), Ball, La Willow, Vistula, and San (San) rivers. Wait behind the river.From a combat point of view, this is the only appropriate suggestion, because it can cancel the possibility of being surrounded by the German army, and at the same time, using the obstacles of the river can also considerably enhance its defense capabilities against the German tank forces.Moreover, the total length of this line of defense is only about 375 miles, whereas the arc of the Polish frontier from Suvalki to the Calpetia Pass is 1,125 miles long.But if this proposal is accepted, of course the whole of West Poland must be abandoned, which includes the most valuable industrial and agricultural areas of the country, so that any Polish government which takes such a step may itself collapse first tower.At the same time it should be remembered that even such a widespread retreat at the beginning of the war did not necessarily strengthen the French in the west.And it is openly doubtful whether ceding all of western Poland to the Germans would have an encouraging effect on the Russians.They may think that the time is not right, and they will act immediately to secure their possible share of the spoils in the east.

Therefore, Colonel Schleder told us that Gen. Kutrzeba, the principal of the Polish Military Academy, also proposed another solution.In early 1938 he presented a memorandum to Marshal Liz Smegley.He insisted that no consideration should ever be given to abandoning the important strategic region of Poland, which included the industrial areas of Łódź and Upper Silesia, together with valuable cities such as Poznan, Kutno, and Kiels. Agricultural areas are included.So the deployment plan he advocated was to abandon the attempt to defend the Polish corridor or the Poznań province area, substantially similar to what was finally implemented in 1939.To serve as the basis for the defense of Poland, an extensive system of fortifications should be erected, forming a broad arc south of the East Prussian border from Grudziadz to Poznań and along the Silesian border. The border, from Ostrowo, through Cestocava, ends at Cieszyn.At the same time, Kutziba also pointed out that future attacks on East and West Prussia and Silesia should still be prepared.Wanting to build such a huge fortress system is actually completely beyond the limits of Poland's capabilities.Despite this, Kutziba has clearly recognized that Poland is at a military disadvantage to Germany, and at the same time he has a clear understanding of France's support, because he said that even if France gives maximum military assistance, at the beginning For six to eight weeks, Poland will still have to rely on its own resources to tide it over.So he wanted to make a strategic defense along the western perimeter of the above-mentioned important area.Reserves, on the other hand, are concentrated in areas for decisive action at a later date.

I have already said that the disposition adopted by the Polish Army in 1939 was in fact very similar to that proposed by this general.However, what he imagined was to concentrate the main force in the area of ​​Torun｜Bydgoszez｜Gniezno (Torun｜Bydgoszez｜Gniezno), while the deployment in 1939 seemed to have two focuses, one In the area around East Prussia, another faced Silesia. Since the purpose of the deployment of the Polish army in 1939 was to cover everything, including the advancing Poznan province, it was doomed because the German army not only possessed numerical superiority but also had the ability to turn around. to fail.So how should Poland fight to avoid this defeat?

The first problem to be solved is whether the strategic areas pointed out by General Kutziba should be automatically abandoned?Or will it end with the Polish Army as a result of the German encirclement from East Prussia, Silesia, and Slovakia?This was also between 1943 and 1944, whenever Hitler asked me to hold on to the Donetz basin, the Dnieper line, and other parts of Russia, I repeatedly The same question he asked. In my opinion, the answer to Poland's question is quite obvious.From the point of view of its high command, all the results depend on the Polish Army's ability to continue to procrastinate at all costs.The Germans had to wait for an offensive from the West to force the Germans to withdraw most of their troops from Poland.While the loss of the industrial areas will, on the face of it, prevent Poland from fighting for long, there is still hope of winning them back as long as the fighting forces remain.In any case, the Polish Army must not allow itself to be surrounded by the enemy either on the west side of the Vistula or on both banks.

The whole point of the Polish problem is to buy time.It is obvious that no attempt at a decisive defense is possible in any area ahead of the Pol|Laliu|Vistula line, but on the southern flank there may be such a possibility in order to hold the line between the Vistula and the Vistula. In the central industrial zone of Poland between the San Rivers, this front should be advanced to the Dunajec River. The most important thing is to avoid being surrounded by German troops attacking from East Prussia and West Slovakia.The available defenses in the north are the Pol-Raliu line and the Vistula up to the fortresses of Modlin or Wysograd.In any case, this constituted a strong natural obstacle, and the old Russian fortresses, although obsolete, could still provide supplementary support.Moreover, if any German armored forces should emerge from the East Prussian side, they would never seem to be too great.

The problem in the south was to hold the defiles in the Carpetia Mountains to prevent the German army's roundabout movement deep into the Polish rear.Both of these tasks can undoubtedly be accomplished with limited forces.Deploying Polish forces in front of the Pol-Laliu line was just as erroneous as pushing strong forces into the Corridor and Poznań prominence. After the necessary guarantees have been made for the in-depth roundabout operations on both sides of the north and the south, it is possible to carry out a delayed battle in the west of Poland, but we should always keep in mind that the main force of the German attack will definitely come from Sily. West Asia.There are two reasons for this: (1) The railway and road network in this area is relatively convenient for the concentration of powerful forces, while Pomerania or East Prussia are not as far away. (2) If it is a purely frontal attack through Poznan to Warsaw, it will be the least effective in combat, so the German army is also the least likely to take this approach.

The concentration of Polish forces should not be as close to the border as they were in 1939, but should be back, so that the main direction of the German attack can be found.That is to say, in the Polish Corridor and in the Poznań area, only the minimum necessary forces were left in order to be able to concentrate the maximum number of forces against the main attack of the German army from the Silesian side, especially in the hands of the High Command. , should control an appropriate strategic reserve.Had the Poles not drowsy in dreams of aggression for so long, and had concentrated their efforts on improving the old German fortresses on the Vistula between Torun and Grudzicdz, they would have At least it would be possible to delay the rendezvous of the German armies advancing separately from Pomerania and East Prussia. Similarly, if Poznan could be properly fortified, the freedom of movement of the German army in the province could be restricted. Another point worth discussing is the concept of using the position of the inside line to counterattack to the north and south ends of West Poland according to the development of the situation.In practice, this is extremely unlikely.The first point is that there is not enough space for such maneuvers.The second point is that Poland's railway network cannot afford such a transfer.Furthermore, thirdly, any great movement of troops is likely to be stopped before long by the German air and tank forces.Therefore, the only feasible plan is to be able to make a really decisive defense only in the rear of the Pol | Laliu | Wiswa | Fight for time.However, it should be noted at all times that from the beginning, the main force should be aimed at the Silesian side, and at the same time there must be solid protection for the north and south sides. If the Western countries do nothing to save Poland and let her be at the mercy of fate, no measures will be able to save her final defeat.In fact it is true.However, these measures will at least make the Poles less vulnerable to defeat on their frontiers.Because they were quickly routed on the frontier, the Polish high command could not engage in a series of battles in the Vistula, or withdraw their forces behind the river line to take a prepared defense. From day one, Poland could only fight for time.All it can do is try to block the enemy's attack as much as possible, and finally retreat behind the river line to wait for its allies to launch an offensive on the western front, so as to force the German army to retreat automatically.So this seems to be the responsibility of the Polish military leaders. They should frankly tell the government authorities that unless the Western countries can guarantee that once the war breaks out, they will immediately devote all their efforts to launch an offensive on the Western Front, otherwise Poland will There should never be a war with Germany. The then commander of the Polish Army, Field Marshal Liz Smigre, had a decisive influence in the country. Had he been willing to raise such a warning, no Polish government would have taken it lightly.Just for the sake of delaying the war with Germany, the Polish government should also take advantage of the opportunity to reach an agreement with Germany on the Danzig and corridor issues before it is completely ruined. In 1940 our troops in France captured a letter dated September 10, 1939, from Gen. Gamelin to the Polish military attaché in Paris.Apparently it was a reply letter, because the Poles asked when they would get effective military aid.Gan Maling asked the military attache to convey the words to Marshal Liz Smeagley, the content of which is as follows: In the Northeast, more than half of our regular divisions have already started operations.Since we crossed the frontier, the Germans have put up fierce resistance, although we have made some progress.But we are caught in a static war, the enemy is well prepared for defense, and we lack the necessary artillery. From the beginning, there has been warfare in the air coupled with warfare on the ground, and we know that there is A considerable part of the Luftwaffe is against us. So I have fulfilled the promise I made beforehand, and started the offensive with my main body fourteen days after the first day of mobilization in France.I probably do more. From this point of view, in fact, Poland had indeed obtained a guarantee from the French in advance.The only doubt was whether the Polish High Command was satisfied when the French stated that a full fourteen days would be elapsed before the offensive could begin.But in any case, the facts have proved that the meaning of this promise is definitely not equal to the rapid and effective assistance to Poland. Because the Warsaw government had illusions about what its allies were going to do, and because it overestimated the Polish Army's ability to provide long-term resistance, Poland's defeat was an inevitable consequence.