Chapter 18 Chapter 5: The Battle Plan Controversy

It was not until after the war that the planning background that became the basis of our offensive on the Western Front, which replaced the original Yellow Operation Plan issued by Army Headquarters on October 19 and 29, 1939, began. This plan, as is generally known, gave us a swift and decisive victory over the Anglo-French and Belgian forces in one blow.The first person to publicize this new plan was probably Lied Hart, who named it the Manstein project. As I may have been recognized as the instigator of the matter, it now seems appropriate for me to make the attempt myself, from my own records, to explain how the project came to be, especially since it has Having acquired such importance, it is all the more worth trying.At any rate, the idea behind this plan was in my head, and it, like all my memorandums to Army Headquarters that I have drafted, is aimed at making this plan of operations run along our ideal lines. to achieve a decisive victory on the Western Front.In the end it was I who personally had the opportunity to present this idea to Hitler myself, because our army group headquarters had been unable to get the army headquarters to approve the plan. At that time, I had been removed from the post of chief of staff of the army group.Only a few days after my personal audience with Hitler did Army Headquarters issue a new operational order on our recommendation.

At the same time, I must emphasize that my commander-in-chief, Admiral Rundst, and my colleagues, Blumentit and Triskau, have always agreed with me, especially Rundst himself signed Support my suggestion.Without his approval, we would not have been able to repeatedly submit memorandums to Army Headquarters in an attempt to change their original plans. A historian of war, or an officer who studies military history, may be in need of a detailed analysis of the whole controversy over planning of operations.For the purposes of this book, however, I can only briefly outline the plans of the Army Headquarters and explain why I cannot but consider its strategic conception (or, to be more precise, Hitler's strategic conception) The reason for the shortcoming.Next, in contrast to Army Headquarters' plans, I enumerated some of the necessary theories that Army Group Headquarters used as a basis for its strategic considerations.Finally, I will briefly explain how, after long setbacks, the original plan of operations was revised, no doubt at Hitler's orders, to conform to the ideas at the headquarters of our army group up.