Chapter 29 what happened when i took over command

On September 17, 1941, I reached the headquarters of the Eleventh Army in Nikolayev and took over its command.The site is a Russian naval base on the mouth of the Bug River. My predecessor, Col‧Gen‧Rilter V‧Schobert, was buried in the city the day before.When he was inspecting the front line, his plane fell by mistake in a minefield laid by the Russian army, and he and his pilot were killed at the same time.The German Army has lost a full-fledged and experienced front-line soldier.His troops are willing to follow him anywhere. The personnel in the Eleventh Army Command were almost without exception the best, and they later organized the core of the Don Army Group headquarters.During the two and a half years of hard war, the help given to me by many excellent officers is worth remembering forever.We get along very well.When I was discharged in 1944, many of them were willing to go with me rather than continue.

My new position is very strange, not only my command has been expanded from an army to an army group.It wasn't until I arrived in Nikolayev that I realized that in addition to the Eleventh Army, I would also be in charge of the Romanian Third Army. For political reasons, the actual command system on this part of the Eastern Front was not easy to arrange.The command of the Axis Allied Forces is under the responsibility of the head of state of Romania, Marshal Antonescu (Marshal Antonescu), who commands the Romanian Third and Fourth Armies and the German Eleventh Army.But at the same time he was under the control of Field Marshal Lundster's Army Group South headquarters.The Eleventh Army Command formed a liaison station between Marshal Antonescu and the Army Group headquarters and advised him on combat matters.

But when I arrived, the reality changed completely.Antonescu's direct command was limited to the Romanian Fourth Army, which was ordered to attack Odyssey.As for the Third Army, it was commanded by the Eleventh Army.And directly accept orders from the headquarters of the Army Group in the South. Under normal circumstances, it would be embarrassing enough for an army command to control, in addition to its own army, another army that is an independent unit. , the difficulty will of course be doubled.To make matters more difficult, not only was there a certain degree of difference in organization, training, and leadership between the two armies, as is customary in Allied armies, but their fighting qualities were also quite different. same.We were therefore compelled to exercise a stricter control over the operations of the Allied forces than was usually applicable to our own forces, and seemed inappropriate from the point of view of maintaining good relations.

Despite these difficulties, we were able to cooperate seamlessly with the Romanian headquarters and combat units without any real friction, mainly because of Gen. Dumitrescu, Commander of the Romanian Third Army. With loyalty.He was later promoted to general.For all Romanian units, up to the division level, we have German liaison teams whose tact and determination also contribute greatly to this cooperation. In this respect, however, it is Marshal Antonescu himself who is worth mentioning.Whatever may be said of him as a politician, Antonescu was a true patriot, a good soldier, and above all our most loyal ally.Once he decided to share his country's fate with Germany, he did everything in his power to mobilize Romania's military strength and war potential for our use.If in fact it is not as good as he imagined, the reason should be found in the internal environment of his country and government.In any case, he was always loyal to his allies, and I have nothing to criticize but thanks for his cooperation.

As for the Romanian army, there is no doubt that it has considerable weaknesses.Although Romanian soldiers who are usually peasants have very low material requirements and can fight bravely; but because the average education level is too low, it is usually very difficult to train them to become soldiers who can think and fight independently. It is difficult, let alone trying to make them a standard non-commissioned officer.Some of these Germanic minorities met the necessary standards, but Romanian ethnic prejudice made it difficult for them to obtain promotion opportunities.As a result, the Romanian soldiers of Germanic ancestry tried to transfer to the German army, and when the latter was ordered not to take them in, they joined the German SS.

As far as the internal stability of the Romanian army is concerned, its greatest weakness is the lack of a non-commissioned officer corps as we know it.I am afraid that the Germans today may have forgotten how great the responsibility of our excellent regular non-commissioned officer corps was in the past. Another very important factor is that among Romania's senior and mid-level officers, a considerable proportion is not up to standard.For the most part, Romanian officers and men lacked the close ties that were taken for granted in the German Army.The people who run them are totally devoid of that Prussian heritage.Because they have no experience in war, Romania's combat training is completely incompatible with the requirements of modern warfare.This again caused unnecessary losses and was also bound to affect morale.Its military leaders have been under the influence of the French since 1918, so their thinking cannot escape the circle of the First World War.Some of the weapons and equipment are outdated and inappropriate.This is especially true for anti-tank units, so they can hardly be expected to hold their positions when they are attacked by Russian tanks.Whether the German army can give them more effective assistance in this respect has become a prerequisite for many other problems.

A final weakness with regard to the use of Romanian troops on the Eastern Front was their awe of the Russians.In difficult situations, this can easily produce the phenomenon of fear.In any war against Russia, if the peoples of southeastern Europe are involved, this must be considered.As far as the Bulgarians and Serbs are concerned, their Slavic ethnic consciousness is more than enough to enhance their inner unease. There is another factor that cannot be completely ignored when making any judgment on the combat effectiveness of the Romanian troops.When we were dealing with the Romanians, Romania had already reached its basic war goal, the recovery of Bessarabia.Even the so-called Transnistria region, that is, the region sandwiched between the Nester and the Bug rivers, although Hitler had persuaded them to accept it, was not in his real desire.So it's understandable, asking them to go deep into Russia, which they've always been so afraid of, is certainly an idea that won't be warmly welcomed by most Romanians.

Despite all the shortcomings and reservations mentioned above, the Romanian troops have done their best.In particular, they were often willing to accept military leadership from the Germans, unlike other Allied powers who always put face before practical needs.There is no doubt that Antonescu's military mind exerted a decisive influence in this respect. All in all, the conclusion I was told by my advisers at the time was that the Third Rumanian Army would be incapable of attack if it suffered any substantial losses, and would only be suitable for defense if strengthened with a German backbone.

The area under my command formed the southernmost flank of the Eastern Front.Broadly speaking, it includes the Crimea and the part of the Dnieper Bend south of Zaporoxhye.It has no direct contact with the main force of the Southern Army Group, which is advancing north of the Dnieper River. As far as the freedom of operations of the Eleventh Army is concerned, this is really a good thing.Having found it very difficult to employ a panzer corps in the forested regions of northern Russia, I now find myself standing on a vast steppe with few natural obstacles, although it offers no masking.It was an ideal country of tanks, but unfortunately, the Eleventh Army had no tanks.

The only changes in the terrain are the small rivers, whose beds dry up completely in summer, forming deep and steep canyons, commonly called Balkas.Even so, the monotony of the prairie endows them with a singular beauty.Everyone may be confused by this infinite scenery for a time. You may drive for several hours just relying on the orientation of the compass. .The distant horizon seems to be a distant mountain, and maybe there is heaven behind it, but the heaven will never be reached.Only the telegraph pole breaks this eternal loneliness.But at sunset, this grassland becomes dazzling and magnificent.To the east of the Nogaisk steppe, around the northeast of Metitopol, we come across villages with German names.Their location is amidst fertile orchards, and their well-built stone houses are a testament to their past prosperity.The residents still speak pure German, but almost all of them are old people, women and children, and all men have been sent by the Russian authorities.

The tasks assigned by the Supreme Command to the Eleventh Army inevitably led it to attack in two different directions.On the one hand, the right wing of the Army Group in the south is advancing, with the intention of continuing to pursue the enemy retreating eastward.For this purpose, the main body of the army should advance along the northern shore of the Sea of ​​Axov, roughly in the direction of Rostov.On the other hand, this army should also take the Crimea and this task should be given special priority.One reason for this was the assumption that the capture of the peninsula would have a favorable effect on Turkish attitudes.There is also a more pressing reason that the enemy's air bases in the Crimea could pose a great threat to the Romanian oil fields, which are of great importance to Germany.After the fall of Crimea, the mountain forces of the Eleventh Army should cross the Kerch Strait and point towards the Caucasus in order to strengthen the offensive beyond Rostov. So at that time, the Supreme Command still had great goals for the 1941 campaign.However, it soon became apparent that the dual tasks assigned to the Eleventh Army were unrealistic. At the beginning of September, the Eleventh Army had crossed the Dnieper River at Berislavl. This was the masterpiece of the 22nd Infantry Division.Nevertheless, it has been shown from this time that the dual mission of this army will inevitably split its axis of advance. When I took command, I found myself in the following situation: The 30th Army under the command of General V‧Salmuth has two infantry divisions, the 72nd and 22nd, and the Führer's Guard Division.The 49th Mountain Army under the command of General Kubler (Gen‧Kubler), under the jurisdiction of the 170th Infantry Division, and the 1st and 4th Mountain Divisions have continued to advance eastward, and the pursuit of the Dnieper River has suffered a disastrous defeat. The enemy was approaching the line of the Dnieper from Melitopol to the south of Chaporozzi. Another corps, the Fifty-Fourth Corps under the command of General Hansen, had already moved towards the gateway to the Crimea, the Isthmus of Perekop.The 50th Infantry Division has been transferred from Greece, part of which is commanded by the Romanian Fourth Army in front of Odyssey, and the other part is participating in the sweeping battle on the Black Sea. The Third Romanian Army, with a mountain corps (1st, 2nd and 4th mountain brigades) and a cavalry corps (5th, 6th and 8th cavalry brigades), remains west of the Dnieper, where it is preparing to take a break.The reason for this may have been to avoid advancing across the river, since crossing the Bug River had already exceeded Romania's political goals. Faced with the dual objective of pursuing the enemy eastward toward Rostov, while taking the Crimea and continuing through Kerch to the Caucasus, the Eleventh Army must now decide whether to undertake both tasks simultaneously, or whether it should What about the order in which they are executed?This decision was originally the responsibility of the Supreme Command, and now it is left to a group army to be responsible. There seems to be no doubt that it is impossible to solve both tasks simultaneously with the forces we have available.To capture Crimea, a much stronger force than the 54th Army is needed.The latter was now facing Perekop.Although our information confirms that only three divisions of the enemy may have fled from the Dnieper into this promontory, in the Crimea itself, it is not clear how large the Russian army is, especially the Russian army. Szap.It was not long before it proved that the enemy had not three but six divisions at his disposal in the fighting on the Cape itself.Later, the Russian army defending Odyssey also transferred reinforcements from the sea. Geographically, however, even a tenacious defense of the enemy's three divisions might have prevented the Fifty-fourth Army from entering the Crimea, or at least would have given it considerable damage in the battle through the Isthmus. Loss. Crimea is separated from the mainland by the so-called Iazy Sea (Zivash Sea), a muddy swamp that infantry can hardly pass through, and because it is too shallow, it is also an absolute threat to assault ships. obstacles.Crimea has only two gateways, the Isthmus of Perikopp to the west and a neck of land west of Genichesk to the east.The latter is so narrow that it can only accommodate a trestle bridge and a train track, both with long bridges in between.So for the target of the attack, it is useless at all. Even Pilicop Headlands was not more than five miles in width, and the attack had to be purely frontal, and over uncovered ground, since a flank attack was quite impossible, as the water was close to each other on either side.Besides, it was already well equipped with strong field defenses, and across the middle of the headland was the Tartars' Ditch, an ancient fortification fifty feet deep. Once the Pilicop Headlands had been breached, there was another bottleneck south of Ishun, where numerous lagoons reduced the actual assault front to a mere two miles in width. Since conditions on the ground are so difficult and the enemy has air superiority, we expect a tough fight.Even if we have succeeded in breaking through at Perekop, it seems doubtful whether this corps will have the strength to fight a second time at Yixiong. In any case, the strength of two or three divisions is by no means sufficient to conquer all of Cree. Mia, including Sevastopol. Therefore, in order to quickly occupy Crimea, this group army must withdraw a strong force from the group army that is now pursuing eastward at all costs.The remaining troops can still be used for pursuit when the enemy continues to retreat, but if he stops to form a new front, or recruits new troops, it will be too weak for such a distant target Rostov up. If the advance to Rostov is considered to be of the utmost importance, then Crimea should be put on hold for the time being.However, under such circumstances, it is difficult to say whether the troops needed to capture the peninsula can be provided.In addition, in the hands of an enemy with command of the sea, Crimea's deep flank to the Eastern Front is enough to pose a serious threat, and its air bases can still continue to threaten Romanian oil fields. If an attempt were made to pursue Rostov with two corps while at the same time leaving one behind in an attempt to take the Crimea, the only result would be that both objectives would be equally ineffective. Should the Eleventh Army decide to give priority to the Crimean side, and in any case, we are determined not to accomplish this task with insufficient forces.Therefore, we allocated all the artillery, engineering and anti-aircraft artillery that could be used in the army group to the 54th Army. In addition, we ordered the 50th Infantry Division to advance from the rear position, and at the latest it must be able to catch up with the 5th Infantry Division. The second stage of the battle is the battle of Cape Yixiong.But this is not enough.In order to be able to quickly conquer the Crimea after the breakthrough, it is necessary to add the strength of the second army. Even in the battle through the Ixon lake area, they are actually not needed.We decided it should be a German mountain army.In its directives the Supreme Command had specified that it should advance through Kerch to the Caucasus.As far as the present is concerned, this force is better used in the mountains south of Crimea than in the steppes. Furthermore, we decided that once we had penetrated the peninsula itself, the fortress of Sevastopol should be taken by surprise with motorized troops.Because of this goal, the SS divisions of the Führer's Guard should be massed in the rear of the Fifteenth Army when it charged forward. Such a deployment will naturally weaken the eastern front of our army considerably.In order to supplement the forces on that side, in addition to drawing from the 22nd Infantry Division, which is responsible for coastal defense tasks in the north of Crimea, only the Romanian Third Army can be used.Despite all the obstacles mentioned above, I had a private conversation with General Dumitris and asked his army to cross the Dnieper quickly. Obviously, the measures taken by the Eleventh Army are quite risky, because the enemy in the east of it may stop retreating and launch an active counterattack again.But that is a price that must be paid if we are to avoid an attempt to attack Crimea with undue force.