Chapter 41 Chapter Eleven Hitler as Supreme Commander

When I was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Don, I was directly under the command of Hitler for the first time, because he was concurrently serving as Commander-in-Chief and Commander-in-Chief of the Army.Only now have I personally had the opportunity to see how he, in addition to his duties as head of state, tries to carry out the task of being a supreme commander in war, and in the past I have always felt his influence on military decisions, at best only indirectly and distant.Because all events related to combat are subject to strict confidentiality restrictions.So it's hard for me to make any firm judgments myself.

During the Polish campaign we felt no interference from Hitler in the leadership of the Army.When he twice inspected the headquarters of the Army Group of Marshal Lundest, he listened sympathetically to our explanations of the situation, and agreed with our intentions without any intention of interfering. As for the occupation of Norway, the project remained elusive to outsiders, and Hitler's attitude to the Western Front had been discussed at length before.In this case, he completely bypassed the army headquarters, which is certainly shocking and dissatisfied, but his basic concept, that the solution must be offensive, from a military point of view is not at all good, although His original time was wrong.It is true that the outline of the plan he drew up could not lead to a complete solution, for reasons I have already analyzed.At that stage, he probably didn't expect to achieve such a great result.But when the program of Army Group A afforded him the opportunity, he grasped the idea at once and adapted to it himself despite certain restrictions for fear of taking risks.He made a fatal mistake by stopping the advance of the armored forces outside Dunkirk, but at that time, it was difficult for outsiders to recognize this point, because judging from the amount of equipment left on the beach, Enough to make it difficult for anyone to recognize that the British had been so successful in getting their troops across the sea.

However, the lack of proper preparation and timing for the invasion of Britain, in the absence of a war plan, was a failure of the German leadership, in other words, of Hitler himself.On the contrary, it is difficult for anyone who was not physically present to judge whether turning to Russia's decision for political reasons was truly inevitable.The deployment of Russian troops on the borders of Germany, Hungary, and Romania is indeed shocking. Standing in the position of a corps commander and army commander, I knew little about Hitler's influence on the original attack plan and the operational direction of the first phase of the campaign, as well as the planning of the 1942 summer offensive.In any case, Hitler never interfered with the command of the Crimean campaign.When I went to see him in the spring of 1942, he agreed to our intentions without hesitation, and there was no doubt that he had tried to make our Sevastopol as successful as possible.However, I think that after the fall of the fortress, the mobilization of the Eleventh Army is unreasonable. This has been mentioned above and I will not repeat it.

Now, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group, I was directly under the command of Hitler for the first time, which also gave me my first real experience of the execution of his supreme command. When analyzing Hitler's status as a military leader, we must not despise him, saying that he was just a small squad leader in the First World War. There is no doubt that he is very sensitive to operations, as he adopted the plan of Army Group A on the Western Front.In fact, many amateur military strategists often have this genius, otherwise there would not be so many princes who became commanders in the historical record.In addition, Hitler also had an amazing memory and imagination, which enabled him to quickly understand all technical events and armament issues.He is very familiar with the performance of the enemy's latest weapons, and he can recite the whole set of wartime production figures of the enemy and us, like a treasure.In fact, whenever he talks about issues that he doesn't want to hear, he will use this set of magic weapons as a tool to resist the other party.There is no doubt that many achievements in armaments are due to his foresight and extraordinary energy.But his overconfidence in his genius in this field often led to unfortunate results.His interference prevented the smooth development of the air, and the development of rocket propulsion and atomic weapons was also hindered.

Moreover, since Hitler was deeply interested in all technical problems, it turned out that he could not help but overestimate the importance of technical resources.He believed that a few assault guns or the new Tiger tanks would suffice where large numbers of troops were necessary to have any hope of success. In a nutshell, what he lacked was experience-based military ability, which his intuition could not replace. Although Hitler was very sensitive to a tactical opportunity and could seize it quickly, he lacked the ability to determine the prerequisites and actual possibilities of a certain battle plan.He can't understand the goal and final limit of a battle, which must be proportional to the time and force, not to mention the possibility of supply.Nor would he recognize any remote offensive operations, which would require progressively larger forces than were required in the original assault.These weaknesses were evident in the planning and execution of the summer offensive of 1942.Another example is what he told me in the autumn of 1942 that he wanted to use a motorized army group from the Caucasus all the way into the Near East and India.

In politics as well as in military affairs, Hitler had absolutely no sense of what was achievable and what was unattainable.In the autumn of 1939, although he looked down upon the French resistance, he did not at first see that a properly planned German offensive was sufficiently likely to be decisively successful.But when he actually succeeded, because the conditions changed, he missed a better opportunity.In each case, what he lacked was real training in the field of strategy and grand tactics. So his active mind was interested in all the goals that aroused the imagination, and this pursuit of several goals at the same time, often at great distances in the field, exhausted the strength of the German army.He has completely failed to understand the following basic law that the force is never too strong on the point, and that in order to obtain a decisive goal, one should not hesitate to sacrifice the less important aspects, or to accept considerable risks.So in the offensives of 1942 and 1943, he could not devote himself to success.Also unwilling to take any urgent remedial measures when the situation reverses.

As for Hitler's strategic goals (at least as far as the conflict with Russia was concerned), they were largely influenced by political considerations and the needs of Germany's war economy.I have already discussed it in the introduction to the Russian campaign, and I will mention it again when I analyze the defensive battle between 1943 and 1944. In determining strategic goals, political and economic issues are undoubtedly very important, but Hitler's mistake was to overemphasize such achievements, and more importantly, he believed that the preservation of geographical goals was more important than the defeat of the enemy. side's military power.In fact, from the struggle against Russia, it can be seen that when the military victory is pending, it is quite doubtful to obtain economically valuable geographical targets, and it is even more impossible to maintain them for a long time.At that time, it was not yet possible to destroy the enemy's production centers and transportation systems with aircraft or missiles.

Strategy should undoubtedly be a tool in the hands of a political leader, but he should never lose sight of a fundamental fact.In any war, the goal of strategy is still to crush the enemy's military defenses.Political and economic goals can be achieved only after victory is assured. This brings us to another factor, which is Hitler's willpower, which is the most important decisive factor for his leadership character, but he has overestimated this willpower.He believes that this willpower can be implemented in the heart of every soldier, which is enough to make his decisions and orders succeed.

It is clear that the strong will of the Supreme Commander is a necessary prerequisite for victory.At the critical moment, the leader suddenly loses his willpower, and the result is often a failure.But this will to win is not the same as Hitler's will, which was rooted in his confidence that he had a divine mission.Such a belief necessarily leads a man to lose his mind, and to think that his own will is sufficient to overcome reality, regardless of whether the enemy's forces are far superior, regardless of the conditions of time and space, and regardless of whether the enemy's leaders are also strong of will.

Generally speaking, when Hitler made his own calculations, he seldom took into account the possible intentions of the enemy, because he was convinced that his will would definitely win the final victory.Any report, no matter how reliable, as long as it talked about the superiority of the enemy, he would not accept it, even if the latter was several times stronger than him.Hitler would casually refute these reports for no reason, or deliberately exaggerate the weaknesses of the enemy and quote German production figures, so that no one could speak to him. In the face of his will, any situational judgment on which military commanders base their decisions becomes practically meaningless.Hitler was such a disregard for reality.

Hitler was so overestimating his own willpower, and so ignoring the resources and possible intentions of the enemy, that it is strange that the decisiveness of his decisions was not matched by this.Until 1938, Hitler was victorious in politics, but this man had become a political gambler, and he actually dared not take risks in the military field.Perhaps the only decisive military decision made by Hitler himself was the occupation of Norway.Even the original plan was proposed by Admiral Raeder.Especially when the battle situation in Narvik was unfavorable, Hitler almost ordered the withdrawal of the city again, which was tantamount to sacrificing the basic goal of the entire operation to make the iron ore transportation route unimpeded.In the execution of the Western Front campaign, we also said above that Hitler did not dare to take military risks.In the final analysis, the decision to attack Russia was also the inevitable result of not daring to cross the sea to attack Britain.Hitler believed that the invasion of Britain was too dangerous, so he did not dare to try it. In the campaign against Russia, Hitler's fear of risk can also be shown in two ways.One is that he refused to adopt flexible combat methods in the situation after 1943.The only way to meet the crisis at that time is to voluntarily and temporarily relinquish the conquered lands.The second is that he did not dare to abandon the secondary battlefield and deploy as many troops as possible to deal with the main decisive battle, although not doing so may cause great danger. The reasons why Hitler did not dare to take risks in the military field may be divided into three points: First, he may have secretly realized that he lacked the military ability to deal with these crises.Because of this, he even less believed that his generals had this ability.Second, he, like all dictators, fears that any setback would be enough to shake his prestige.In fact, this attitude is just enough to cause military mistakes, and even more enough to lose its prestige.3. Hitler had a greed for power, and he was unwilling to give up anything he had already obtained. When I was the commander-in-chief of the Don Army Group, the Army Chief of Staff General Zeller (Col｜Gen‧Xcitxler) and I spent infinite energy to correct Hitler's wrong thinking, but the result was still in vain. When faced with a decision he was unwilling to face but unavoidable, Hitler stalled for as long as possible.This difficulty is often encountered when we feel the urgency of mobilizing forces immediately to prevent the enemy's success in combat or to halt his expansion.The General Staff had to struggle with Hitler for several days before it could draw any troops from less threatening areas to rescue urgent locations.In most cases, it was always when it was too late that he was willing to give too few troops. The final result was that he spent several times the original number of troops and could not achieve the original goal. .Disputes often lasted for weeks over the relinquishment of an untenable position, such as the Donets region in 1943 and the Dnipro bend in 1944.Sometimes when unimportant prominent lands are given up in order to mobilize some troops, the result is the same and inevitably a dispute.Hitler may have hoped that things would turn out to be his ideals in the end, so that he could avoid making decisions he didn't want to make.Because he is unwilling to adapt his decisions to the actions of the enemy.Since he has great confidence in his own willpower, he is unwilling to accept any risk in mobile warfare, such as a circuitous offensive, the success of which cannot be guaranteed in advance.Nor is he willing to give up anything automatically.As time progressed, these factors became increasingly influential in shaping Hitler's military leadership.The obstinate defense of fighting for every inch of land gradually became a formula, and finally ruined this kind of military leadership.Therefore, after the German army had won such excellent success in the early days of the war by virtue of its operational mobility, Hitler's response to the first crisis on the Moscow front was Stalin's concept of sticking to any position.In 1941, this policy almost brought Russia down, so when the Germans launched their offensive in 1942, they also finally abandoned this concept. Because the heroic resistance of our troops in the winter of 1941 finally repulsed the Russian counter-offensive, Hitler was convinced that his order to prohibit any automatic retreat had saved the German army from the Napoleonic Grande Armée The same fate befell in 1812.His favorites and some of his commanders sang praises for him, enough to boost his confidence.So when, in the autumn of 1942, the German offensive faltered in Stalingrad and the Caucasus, and a new crisis was emerging, Hitler immediately reverted to his old method of holding on to the If you don't let go of what you get, you can ensure success.From then on, there was no way to make him give up this idea. It seems to be accepted by now that of the two forms of combat, the defense is the stronger.However, this is conditional. Only when the defense is effective enough to cause the attacker to bleed profusely and receive a fatal blow when attacking the position can it make sense.On the Eastern Front this theory is inappropriate.The number of German troops was simply not enough to organize such a strong defense.The enemy's forces are several times stronger than ours, and on such a wide front, they can concentrate their forces on any selected point to achieve the purpose of breaking through.As a result, a large number of German troops could hardly avoid being surrounded.Only in mobile operations could the superiority of the German staff and combat forces come into play and perhaps offset the numerical superiority of the Russian army. Hitler's growing tendency to stand still at any cost will be analyzed in more detail later in the description of the Eastern Front in 1943-1944.The reason why he persisted so much may have to be discovered in the depths of his nature.His view of combat was only one of extreme brutality.His mind could only understand standing still and let the enemy touch our lines to bleed to death, but he could not understand that a skilled boxer often takes a step back in order to make a decisive blow.He did not know the art of war, but only brute force, and believed that willpower was sufficient to ensure its success. Because Hitler valued brute force more than soul, he was intoxicated by the production figures of the German munitions industry, even ignoring the fact that the enemy's production figures were even higher.He forgets that training and skill are necessary to bring a new weapon to its full effect, and he is content when the new weapon reaches the front.He paid no attention to whether the troops had learned how to use it, or whether the weapon had passed the test under combat conditions. Likewise, Hitler frequently ordered the creation of new divisions.Although the increase in the number of our troops is extremely ideal, the loss outweighs the gain if there is a lack of supplementary troops for the already formed troops.These old troops have shed almost their last drop of blood.And those newly established units have a particularly high casualty rate due to lack of combat experience. The Air Force Field Division, SS Division and the so-called People's Infantry Division are all obvious examples. Finally, it is worth pointing out that although Hitler appeared to be very heroic and happily pursued the experience gained as a front-line soldier, in fact, he lacked a soldier's character, his thoughts and feelings were not Prussian. traditional. From the reports of the Army Group and the Army Group, Hitler undoubtedly had a clear understanding of the situation on the front line.In addition, he often summoned officers who had just returned from the front.So he was aware not only of what our troops had accomplished, but also of the excesses our troops had endured since the beginning of the Russian campaign.Perhaps this was one of the main reasons why we were never able to persuade Hitler to move closer to the front.It was difficult enough to invite him to inspect our army group headquarters, but it was impossible for him to go any further, probably because he was afraid that what he saw and heard at the front would break his confidence. golden dream. Although Hitler tried his best to emphasize his past as a front-line soldier, I never felt that his heart belonged to the combat troops.For him, the loss of troops is nothing more than a reduction in numbers.He never saw them as human beings. (Note: Some people think that Hitler’s heart is weak, he is overly dominated by emotions, so he is afraid that this weakness will affect his determination, so he dare not go to the front line to take a look. But Hitler is very strange Yes, it is difficult to understand. If he is weak in heart, why does his rule become so barbaric and cruel every day?) But there is one thing, Hitler's concept is completely like a soldier, and that is the award for military exploits.His main goal is to enable the Warriors to be honored. The points I have said above are enough to prove that Hitler is not suitable to be a military leader.However, these shortcomings can be somewhat compensated if he can fully trust an experienced and responsible chief of the general staff.In any case, he also had several qualities which are indispensable to a supreme commander: a strong will, nerves capable of withstanding the gravest crises, an extremely keen mind, a certain genius in the field of war, and the ability to The ability to recognize technological possibilities.Provided he knows how to use the skills of his chief of staff to offset his lack of training and experience in the military sphere (particularly in strategy and grand tactics), he can build an effective military leadership.But this was exactly the way Hitler was unwilling to accept. Just because he believed that the power of his will was invincible, his political successes and early military victories in the war (which he regarded as his personal achievements) were sufficient to induce him to lose all proportion in the estimation of his own abilities. consciousness.According to his thinking, if he accepts the opinion of a powerful chief of staff, it is not a benefit to his own will, but it seems to be surrendering to the will of others.In addition, in fact, because of the influence of tradition and background, he has a fundamental mistrust of military leaders, whose laws of life and ways of thinking are different from his.So he wasn't prepared to have a real responsible military advisor by his side.He wanted to be another Napoleon, and he could only allow his servants to obey him and execute his own will.Unfortunately, he lacked Napoleon's military experience and military genius. In the previous chapter (Chapter VII) I said that no one in the Supreme Command organized by Hitler had the right to advise him on issues of grand strategy. opinion, or draw up a war plan.The Operations Department (Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab) of the Supreme Command should theoretically undertake this task, but in fact it is only a military secretariat.Its only job is to rewrite Hitler's ideas and instructions into official orders in military terms. But worse is the following development.Hitler made Norway a battlefield for the Supreme Command, something that the Army Headquarters had no say in, and that was only the first step in disrupting operations on land.In the future, almost all other battlefields gradually became the private property of the Supreme Command. In the end, only the Eastern Front still belonged to the Army Headquarters, but the Army Commander-in-Chief has been assumed by Hitler himself.So the Chief of the Army's General Staff has pitifully little influence over other matters in the field; likewise the Commanders-in-Chief of the other two services have no influence over matters of grand strategy.The chief of the army's general staff has no say in the overall allocation of army forces, and often does not know which troops and supplies will be sent to other battlefields.In this environment, conflict between the Operations Branch of the Supreme Command and the Army General Staff was inevitable.Hitler seems to have created this conflict on purpose so that he alone could have the say at any one time.Naturally, this bad organization was doomed to the collapse of the entire high military leadership.Another consequence of Hitler's overestimation of his own willpower and military capabilities was that he used individual orders to command subordinate units directly, which was increasingly worse. A feature often emphasized in the German military leadership system is the expectation that commanders at all levels will show initiative and dare to take responsibility.All measures are ideal to take advantage of this characteristic.Therefore, in principle, orders from higher-level headquarters and orders from middle- and lower-level headquarters are limited to designated tasks for the subordinate units.As for how to carry out the assigned tasks, that is the matter of the subordinate commanders themselves, and the superiors should not interfere.The German army was often able to defeat the enemy, and this system of handling orders was one of the main reasons, because the opponent's orders were often very detailed, restricting the actions of all subordinate commanders.Unless it is a last resort, the German army always takes the principle of not infringing on the permission rights of subordinate units as much as possible. Hitler, however, thought that sitting in his office, he had a better understanding of the situation than the commanders on the front lines.He ignores what is marked on his too-detailed map of the situation, and in fact does not keep up with developments.And from that distance, it was impossible for him to judge what actions on the front line were suitable and necessary. He has gradually developed a habit of using warrants to interfere with the actions of army groups, army groups, and lower-level units, which is completely irrelevant to the scope of his concern.Although I have never been interfered with in the sphere of my own command in the past, when I met with Field Marshal Kruger at a railway station on the way from Feiterbsk to Rostov, he once gave me a letter. A forewarned.He said that in terms of Army Group Center, he had to discuss with Hitler in advance any operation with more than one battalion.Although I was not subjected to this intolerable interference in the future, Hitler's meddling had already caused us enough conflicts with the High Command. This kind of Hitler's personal order usually only hinders command and operations. On the contrary, Hitler is extremely unwilling to issue long-term combat instructions.The more he made the principle of sticking to it at all costs the central point of his policy, the less he was willing to issue long-term directives.Since he already distrusted his subordinates, he was afraid that such long-term instructions would give them freedom of movement and do things he did not want to do.The result, however, is that all leadership is lost.After a long time, even an army group could not move without an order from the high command.We often recall our time in Crimea, when we had full freedom of movement. There are many records that Hitler's attitude was very rough, sometimes foaming at the mouth, and sometimes even biting the carpet.It is true that he lost his self-control at times, but I saw him lose his temper only once in my presence, and that was the quarrel with Halder, already mentioned above.It was obvious that Hitler was dismissed by others.As far as my personal experience is concerned, he has always been able to maintain due courtesy.Even if our opinions conflict, we have never blushed. Hitler could be regarded as a psychological expert. He had a way to convince everyone who came to see him and make him accept his point of view.In addition, he certainly knew the motives of anyone who came to see him, and had already prepared a theory of defense.He has a special ability to persuade others to accept his own ideas, whether they are true or not.Especially some officers who have just returned from the front line have no knowledge of him and are more likely to be deceived by him.Under such circumstances, when this person left, he only wanted to tell Hitler the truth on the front line, but when he came back, he was completely convinced by Hitler, and he was even more confident. When I was Commander-in-Chief of an Army Group, I was most impressed with Hitler's incredible tenacity in defending his own views in frequent debates with Hitler about operational issues.Arguments lasted for hours, and sometimes his guests achieved his purpose, but most of them went away empty-handed, and the best consolation was nothing but empty promises.No one I know has as much staying power in such discussions.The maximum time for arguing with a front-line commander is only a few hours at best, but the chief of the general staff, Admiral Zeisler, often argues for several days in order to ask Hitler to take the necessary action.When this kind of debate is going on, we are always used to ask Chaisler how many rounds they have reached. Moreover, the reasons Hitler used to justify his views (and I mean here including purely military ones) are generally not easily refuted.Especially in any discussion of operational intent, few can predict with absolute certainty the consequences of the events in question.In war nothing is ever certain, neither said nor done. When Hitler himself felt that his views on strategy did not make any good impression, he immediately looked for reasons in the field of politics or economics.Because his knowledge of political and economic conditions was unmatched by any front-line commander, his arguments were usually all the more justified at this time.As a last resort we had to insist that if he disagreed with our proposals or our demands, there would be dire military consequences.As a result, political and economic aspects will also be affected badly. On the contrary, despite his reluctance to accept requests, he often showed that he was a good listener, and he was sometimes able to engage in objective discussions. For such a fatalistic dictator, what he thinks about is his political ambition, and he lives in his belief in destiny, so it is naturally difficult to have any intimate relationship with his military generals.Obviously, Hitler was least interested in personal factors.According to him, all human beings are nothing more than a tool used to achieve their political ambitions.He himself had no emotional connection with the German soldiers. The shortcomings of Germany's military leadership became increasingly apparent both because of Hitler's personality on the one hand and the organization of the High Command on the other.So it naturally leads to a further new question, is there any way to improve this situation?As regards the political aspects, I am determined not to analyze them in this book. In order to make the war more rationally directed, I made at least three attempts to induce Hitler to accept some kind of reform in the organization of the High Command.As far as I know, no other person has dared to be as forthright as I, and it would be inappropriate to criticize his military leadership in person. I am, of course, fully aware of the fact that Hitler would never publicly relinquish his supreme command.As a dictator he could not have taken such a step, since it would, in his view, be an intolerable blow to his personal prestige.So my opinion is that I only want to persuade Hitler to retain the status of Supreme Commander in name, but in fact hand over the direction of all military operations to a chief of the general staff with real power. Any Commander in Chief.These attempts of mine were unfortunately unsuccessful, and will be discussed further later when I describe the situation between 1943 and 1944.These efforts were especially difficult for me personally, because Hitler was fully aware that there were many people in the Army who expected me to be the real and powerful chief of the general staff, or commander in chief of the Eastern Front, so I was in a difficult position And subtle. I am not here to discuss the use of violent means to change the leadership of the country, such as the events of July 20, 1944, although perhaps one day I will express my opinion.Within the bounds of this wartime memoir, I will suffice to say only the following few sentences.From my position in charge of commanding an army group, I do not think I have the right to stage a coup d'etat in time of war, which might cause the collapse of the entire front, or even chaos at home.There is also the question of the military oath of allegiance. As I said when I was on trial for war crimes: Any senior military commander who wants his men to die for victory for years will certainly not cause defeat by his own hands. In any case, at that time we all clearly realized that even a coup would not change the Allied demand for unconditional surrender.And while I was still in command of the army, I also felt that we had not yet reached the point where this kind of action was the only way out.