Chapter 43 Road to Stalingrad

The reason why the Sixth Army would be completely wiped out at Stalingrad was clearly due to Hitler's refusal to voluntarily give up the city, no doubt primarily for reasons of prestige. But the Sixth Army would not have been in this situation at all had it not been for the prior operational errors (mostly concerning the final phase) made by the Supreme Command in the planning and execution of the offensive in 1942. As a result of these mistakes, the difficulties encountered by the German southern flank in the late autumn of 1942 will be analyzed in the next chapter.What is to be explained now is limited to those points which are sufficient to determine the fate of the Sixth Army.

Since Hitler's strategic goals were in fact mainly influenced by the needs of his war economy, the German offensive in 1942 was divided into two distinct fronts, the Caucasus and Stalingrad.After the advance of the German army suffered a setback, the German army also lacked so many troops to hold this long front.To make things worse, there was no strategic reserve. When the Eleventh Army had just finished its Crimean campaign, it was immediately dismembered by the Supreme Command and sent to all conceivable direction up. Army Group A faces south and is located in the northern part of the Caucasus, sandwiched between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. Army Group B held a front facing east and northeast, starting from the Volga River south of Stalingrad, turning north of the city, reaching the middle of the Don River, and then extending along the river to Voronezh (Voronezh) at a point north of it.The strength of these two army groups is not strong enough to hold such a long front.Especially the enemy's southern flank, which had suffered heavy losses, was saved from destruction, and was not even really defeated.In addition, the enemy maintains very strong strategic reserves in other areas and deep in his rear.Finally, and more importantly, in the Kalmyk Steppes between the two army groups, there is a gap of 190 miles wide, with only one division (16th Motorized Division) Stationed in Yelista, providing a bit of inappropriate cover.

This attempt to hold on to such a long front for so long, which brought the Sixth Army into a desperate situation at the end of November 1942, was indeed the first great mistake. The second, bigger mistake was that Hitler forced Army Group B to plunge its main striking forces, Fourth Panzer Army and Sixth Army, into fighting in and around Stalingrad.The task of protecting the army group's northern flank along the Don River was left to the Romanian Third Army and an Italian and a Hungarian Army. (Note: These group armies are nothing more than superficial, and cannot be regarded as a group army at all).In the Voronezh region, the weak German Second Army is in charge.Hitler should be clear that even if it is located behind the Don River, this patchwork of Allied forces still cannot withstand the powerful attack of the Russian army.The same goes for the Romanian Fourth Army.They were now tasked with protecting the exposed right flank of Fourth Panzer Army.

After the initial assault had been only partially successful, the idea of ​​taking Stalingrad in order to control the Volga could at best be tried for a very short time.But it would be a great mistake to leave the main body of Army Group B at Stalingrad for several weeks without proper protection of its flanks.This is tantamount to voluntarily ceding the initiative of our entire southern flank to the enemy and sending an invitation to encircle the Sixth Army. The third mistake was that the command system on the southern wing of the German army was simply absurd. Army Group A no longer had a commander-in-chief. Hitler assumed this position himself, and he could only spend part of his time managing it at most.

Army Group B commanded no fewer than seven armies, including four Allied armies.The number of armies that any army group headquarters can command should not exceed five at most, especially if most of them are allied units, the difficulty is even more conceivable. There was a good reason Army Group B was headquartered at Starobyelsk, behind the Don River and convenient for monitoring the Allied forces.However, the choice of this location also has its disadvantages, because in this way, the headquarters of the army group is too far away from the right wing of its jurisdiction.Another factor is that Hitler often interfered with the command of operations, so Army Group B's control over Army Group Six was even more reduced.

The Army Headquarters had indeed taken note of these command problems, and planned to establish a new Don Army Group, under the command of Field Marshal Antonescu.However, this new headquarters was never established because Hitler hoped to see Stalingrad fall first.It was a serious mistake not to use the Romanian Marshal.It is true that his command ability has not yet been tested, but it can be said that he is a good soldier.In any case, if he can come forward, our request for a little more troops to protect the Stalingrad flank will definitely receive greater attention.Moreover, he is the head of the Allied Powers, so Hitler also treats him differently, unlike the commander-in-chief of the German Army Group and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group, who can be insulted at will.In addition, Antonescu's personal prestige can also restrain those senior Romanian officers from fleeing, because they respect him no less than they respect the Russians.

When I assumed the command of this army group, Marshal Antonescu wrote to me stating that he had several times warned of the danger in general and with the Third Rumanian Army in particular.However, because he has no command responsibility for the front-line military, these remarks have not received the attention they deserve.At the same time, it is also obvious that the B Army Group and the Sixth Army have also issued warnings in advance of the enemy's preparations to launch a major offensive on both sides of Stalingrad. Finally, it is also worth mentioning the fact that it had equally serious consequences for the position of the Sixth Army and the entire southern flank of the German army.The entire Army Group A, as well as the Fourth Armored Army, the Sixth Army, the Romanian Third and Fourth Armies, and the Italian Army are all based on the only Dnieper River crossing, that is, Dnieper Pitov Sk railway bridge.The railway bridge in Zaporozhye has not been repaired; the route across Ukraine, through Nikolayev and Kherson, into Crimea, and across the Kerch Strait has not yet been opened.So behind the German front, the connection between North and South was also unsatisfactory.Whenever reinforcements were called for from the rear, or when troops were moved quickly from one area to another, the German High Command often felt that they were not as convenient as the enemy, who had more effective means of transport in any direction. for use.

All commanders must take risks if they are to be successful.However, no matter what the risk, in the autumn of 1942, the German High Command should not have kept the most elite main force of Army Group B in Stalingrad for a long time, while on the Don River line, it had only left A little easily destroyed force is used for cover.The only defensible reason is that the German High Command thought that the Allied forces might not collapse so quickly.But Romania has the best troops in the Allies, but our experience in the Crimea suggests that they will run away.As for the fighting ability against the Italians, there should be no illusions from beginning to end.

After the summer offensive had won us only a little more ground, without inflicting a decisive defeat on the Russian southern flank, the German High Command had only to run the risk of returning to the zone between the Caucasus and the middle of the Don. Adopt mobile warfare and take advantage of the geographical advantages of the Dahewan in order to prevent the enemy from regaining the initiative.But the substitution of one risk for another was not acceptable to Hitler's mind.When his offensive failed to produce any concrete results, Hitler was no longer able to take appropriate action, thus paving the way for the Stalingrad tragedy!