Chapter 45 initial impressions and decisions

On the afternoon of November 24, we continued our journey from Starobirsk to Novochirkassk.Ten years ago, I also traveled to Rostov by the same road to participate in the great Red Army maneuvers in the Caucasus.During that trip, all the impressions were very interesting, but today I have a heavy heart, and my staff and I absolutely have no optimistic illusions about the weight of the task.Although my adjutant, Lt. Stahlberg, tried hard to put us at ease, playing some good music records and chatting about other issues, we still kept thinking about the situation in the Stalingrad siege. Comrades.Since Spicht's death Stalborg has been in his place, introduced by my old friend Trisko, his nephew.Starborg followed me until the end of the war.At this stage he was a most faithful assistant in all my private affairs.

On the morning of November 26, I paused in Rostov to meet with Gen. Hauffe, the head of the German military delegation to Romania, who had originally been designated as the head of the Antonescu Army Group. chief of staff.He paints a very disappointing picture of the situation with the two Romanian armies on the Stalingrad front.He told us that there were a total of twenty-two divisions, nine of which had been completely wiped out, and another nine were disbanded and unable to take part in combat for a while, and now only four divisions can barely fight.However, given a little time, he hopes to reorganize several divisions from the remnants.

Marshal Antonescu has a letter to me, which can also be used as a counter-evidence to Houffe's report.He was critical of the German High Command, which he accused of being indifferent to the threats he had repeatedly warned about at the Klimenskaya bridgehead facing the Romanian Third Army's front. .At the same time, he was extremely dissatisfied with the delays in the project he personally directed. Moreover, the Field Marshal pointed out with great reason that, of all the German allies, only Rumania and himself had made their greatest contribution to the common good.He volunteered twenty-two divisions to join the campaign in 1942, and, unlike Italy and Hungary, he put them under German command without reservation, even though Romania had nothing to do with Germany. bound by treaty obligations.

The outrage of a soldier who sees his troops almost wiped out by the wrong influence of others is certainly to be expected, and his letter is representative of that feeling.From my heart, I really cannot deny that Antonescu's criticism is correct and reasonable. I wrote back to him and said that since I was not there before, I could not express my own opinion on everything he said, so I only forwarded his original letter to Hitler. Of course I know that all the criticisms are aimed at Hitler. of.This was no disadvantage to Hitler, who should have known such frank criticism from his most loyal allies.In addition, this letter also touched on a political issue: that is, the issue of mutual trust among the allies.Antonescu mentions that his sworn enemy, the leader of the Iron Guard, has been taken into custody by Himmler and is now under German protection for future contingencies.The Iron Guard was a radical political group that had attempted coups to overthrow Antonescu's regime in the past, and at one point besieged the Marshal's mansion.Although this kind of rebellion was eventually flattened by Antonescu, the leader of the Iron Guard escaped abroad. Now that Himmler has taken in this person, Antonescu will naturally feel that Germany has been unfaithful to him.This despicable strategy is indeed enough to destroy the unity of the alliance.

The reason why Antonescu wrote to me was to accuse German officers and soldiers of ill-treatment of Romanian soldiers, both public and private, and to slander them maliciously.Although recent setbacks and the fact that many Romanian units were fighting poorly were sufficient excuses, I took immediate action.While the indignation with which the German troops were surrounded by siege after neighboring units had fled, such unfortunate incidents could only harm the common good and nothing else. I have already shown what is and what is not to be expected of the Rumanian troops in various circumstances.But for all that they are still our best allies, and have fought valiantly in many places.

On November 26 we reached our new headquarters in Novochirkassk.The only unit capable of guard duty was a battalion of Volunteer Cossacks, who evidently considered it a special honor to stand guard before our headquarters.By the next night, our main communication network could start working, so we could officially take over the command of Army Group Don on the morning of November 27. The task before us is twofold.The main aspect of it, which is the basis of all other operations, is the rescue of the Sixth Army.In addition to humanitarian reasons, this is also a priority from an operational point of view, because unless the Sixth Army can maintain its strength, the situation on the southern flank of the Eastern Front, or even the entire Eastern Front, will not be able to recover. hope.

Another aspect of this task is the constant anxiety in my heart that the entire southern flank of the German army is already in danger of being completely destroyed.If this happens, it is very likely that the fighting on the Eastern Front will be over from then on, and the result will be that we have lost this war.At present, apart from the so-called Stalingrad Fortress, in the entire combat area between the rear of Army Group A and the still existing front of the Don River, there is only a very weak covering force left at this time.It is mainly composed of the remnants of the Romanian Army, German B-level troops, and emergency units.If the Russian army broke through this thin line of defense, not only the situation of the Sixth Army would be desperate, but the position of Army Group A would also be in dire jeopardy. (Note: The so-called emergency unit is composed of non-combatant personnel, headquarters personnel, air force personnel, and sporadic personnel who are on leave or have not returned to the team. This kind of force lacks unity, experienced officers and weapons, especially anti-tank weapons and Artillery. Most of them lack combat experience and training close to combat. So their combat value is very low. Even so, when they have been fighting for a considerable time, they tend to fight very well.)

We should thank Admiral Hoss, the commander of the Fourth Armored Army, and Col. Menck, the newly appointed Chief of Staff of the Romanian Third Army. Maybe there will be great doubts.We finally built a barrier covering the huge gap between Sixth Army, Army Group A and the Don Line, preventing any Russian expansion in this direction.If at that time, the Russian army used a fast army to go straight to the lower reaches of the Don River in Rostov, and it undoubtedly had this ability, the annihilation of Army Group A and Army Group Six would have been inevitable. But even though this mortal threat to the southern flank was constantly present, the Army Group could not spread the one-man-one-bomb needed to save the Sixth Army among other tasks.Because the hope of success is very slim, the principle of investing power and resources should be maximized.Such an approach must of course accept the greatest risk.

The main cause of our failure to accomplish our mission in the end was that the enemy's forces were too strong, while our own were too weak.In addition, bad weather was also a huge obstacle, which greatly affected the activities of the air force, especially for the supply of the Sixth Army.The transport situation also prevented the reinforcements from moving quickly. Furthermore, we are now also experiencing, for the first time, the containment of the High Command, which in turn has its roots in Hitler's character and opinions.This has been analyzed in the previous chapter.The effect here was that the High Command was unwilling to risk defeat on other fronts by concentrating forces on relief work.Moreover, although the trend of the situation was clear and Hitler was repeatedly reminded by our headquarters, they were always delayed in establishing priorities.

I have already said that when the army group took over the command, there were two tasks before it.Its first mission, the rescue of the Sixth Army, was virtually over by Christmas 1942.By this time it was clearly known that the Fourth Panzer Army could no longer achieve the task of meeting.Because Hitler still refused to give up Stalingrad, the Sixth Army Command violated the instructions of the Army Group, and at this decisive moment, failed to grasp its last possible chance of rescue.When the fate of this army group had been decided, Hitler was still fantasizing about the attempt to bring in an SS Panzer Corps from Kharhov in January for a relief attempt.This is basically a dream.

When the attack of the Fourth Panzer Army was forced to stop, the Sixth Army in the Stalingrad encirclement began to enter a life-and-death struggle.However, since the other task of the army group is to try to prevent the destruction of the entire southern flank, it is only when the bitter battle is really nearing the end, in order to reduce the sacrifice and suffering of the army group, that it can be recommended to surrender. Of course, the battle to save the Sixth Army was closely related to the development of the situation on the entire southern flank of the German army.The reason why I devote a separate chapter to reviewing the latter is to allow greater clarification of the different operational considerations. The order issued by the Army Group on December 1 for the Winter Tempest operation is as follows: At a date yet to be determined (but in any case never before December 8), Fourth Panzer Army is to launch an offensive with its main force east of the Don, starting from the Kotnikov area .After breaking through the enemy's covering force, the task was to attack and sweep through the enemy positions to the south and/or west of the Stalingrad pocket. The 48th Panzer Corps, which belongs to the Holliday Army, should provide a smaller force to advance from the Nizhen Chirskaya bridgehead position at the junction of the Don and Zir rivers and break into the enemy's covering forces. the rear.If, facing the enemy forces of the Fourth Panzer Army to the north of Kotnikov, reinforcements have been received before the attack, or the Romanian Fourth Army is responsible for covering the long flank of the Fourth Panzer Army to the east. After the first reversal, the operation should be changed to the following replacement plan.The armored divisions of the Fourth Panzer Army should move suddenly north along the west bank of the Don River, and then launch their main assault from the Nizentirskaya bridgehead position.In addition, a small elite force should also attack Karach from the bridgehead between the Don and Zir rivers west of the Don, in order to cut off the enemy's line of communication there and open the way for the Sixth Army. Bridge over the Don. As for the Sixth Army, the order stipulates that after the Fourth Panzer Army launched an attack, the army group will decide on a date and order them to break out to the southwest, and its initial direction is to point to Donskaya Tsarytsa (Donskaya Tsarytsa) , whose goal is to join the Fourth Panzer Army and participate in the work of sweeping and encircling the southern and western positions and seizing the Don River crossing. Hitler clearly ordered this army group to continue to hold its existing positions in the encirclement.But obviously, when it broke through to the southwest and joined the Fourth Panzer Army, this order to hold on would actually be impossible to implement, because under the attack of the Russian army, its fronts on the northeastern sides would inevitably retreat gradually. In desperation, he had no choice but to admit the facts, which he often did in the future. (However, it is of course inconvenient to explain our combat order, because Hitler has his personal liaison officer in the headquarters of the Sixth Army. If he gets information from there, he will immediately issue an order to cancel our plan. ) During the first few days after I took command, all was quiet in the area of ​​the Army Group.It was clear that the enemy was preparing a concentric attack on the Sixth Army.On the other hand, the enemy obviously did not want to risk an immediate and deep assault on Rostov with a large armored force, and he did not even want to go straight to the most important crossings of the Donets River for our army group, or at the Railway Junction at Likhakha.The enemy would probably be reluctant to undertake any such ventures, since he already had a superior force in the great bend of the Don, which seemed in any case sufficient to guarantee its success.But having said that, there is no doubt that the enemy has lost an excellent opportunity, because at the end of November and the beginning of December, we had no ability to intercept such an assault at all.