Chapter 49 life and death race

Between us and the enemy, a life-and-death contest begins now.Our own goal was to save the Sixth Army, but for this purpose we did not hesitate to gamble with Army Group Don and Army Group A. The contest was to decide whether reinforcements from the Fourth Panzer Army could join the Sixth Army on the east bank of the Don before the enemy forced us to stop this operation?The enemy can break through our weak line on the Zill, or the left flank of our army group (more likely, the right flank of army group B), so that they can stay behind everything that can cut off army group Don and army group A position on the traffic line.

On the one hand, it wants to launch and maintain an offensive operation on the east bank of the Don River, but on the other hand, the above-mentioned dangers are increasing day by day, so it is taking unprecedented risks now.I can't believe that Hitler has fully recognized the seriousness of the situation at this time, otherwise he should have taken more decisive measures, at least he should try to strengthen the Fourth Panzer Army to speed up the rescue of Stalingrad.But in fact, as Chaisler said, he had nothing to achieve except being hindered by troubles.We can take the following examples: he held the 17th Armored Division at the wrong point, keeping it out of action during the most urgent phase; he held the 16th Motorized Division until it was too late. Ken let go.Hitler often criticized the generals and the officers of the General Staff for calculating and not taking risks.But the fact this time is a very powerful rebuttal to his personal statement.Hitler did not enthusiastically support Army Group Don's reckless command of Fourth Panzer Army to attack Stalingrad when its entire southern flank was in danger of being wiped out.

This race to the death began on December 12, when Fourth Panzer Army attacked Stalingrad.Only a general description can be given here, because the situation at that time was changing rapidly, and the enemy continued to invest new forces, especially tanks. At this stage, the excellent qualities of our armored vehicles and tank personnel are fully demonstrated, as well as the bravery of our armored troops and the skill of our anti-tank units.The Sixth Armored Division is an experienced old armored division. The division commander, General Rauss (Gen‧Rauss) and the tank expert, Colonel Hulerdorf (Col‧V‧Hunersdorff) are both worthy of admiration (the latter unfortunately died in battle), The division's tanks and assault guns are also complete.On the contrary, the fate of the 23rd Armored Division happened to be in sharp contrast. It had only twenty tanks available!The division commander, Gen. V. Vormann, was my colleague at Army Headquarters and was wounded five times during the First World War.

For now at least we outline the important episodes of this battle, all of which have an important bearing on its outcome. After the concentration of the Fifty-seventh Army near Kotnikov east of the Don, since December 10 strong enemy forces have once again attacked our front on the Lower Zill.It is now clear that the idea of ​​drawing the 48th Panzer Corps from this side to protrude from the bridgehead between the Zill and the Don in cooperation with the 57th Panzer Corps is no longer possible. Therefore, the Fifty-seventh Panzer Corps needed to act quickly.While the corps was disembarking from the train and making its final concentration, the enemy had already attempted to attack, and having thwarted this attempt, the corps was able to cross the starting position on December 12.On its side, the Volga River is on the east, covered by the Romanian Seventh Army, and the Don River is on the west, covered by the Romanian Sixth Army.The attack apparently surprised the enemy, as they did not seem to have expected to come so quickly, so the corps's initial progress went fairly well.However, the enemy did not adopt defensive tactics this time. He hastily dispatched fresh troops from the Stalingrad area, counterattacked repeatedly to regain the positions occupied by our tanks, and attempted to encircle our small units with his superior armored forces.Although it repeatedly destroyed powerful enemies, until December 17th, the Fifty-seventh Panzer Army still failed to achieve any decisive results.On this day, the 17th Armored Division was finally able to participate in the battle on the east bank of the Don River.After repeated requests from the Army Group Headquarters, the Army Headquarters finally delegated the control of this division.However, this division was located in the rear of the left flank of the army group, so it had to go through a long march and cross the Don River on the bridge of Potemkinskaya (Potemkinskaya) before it could participate in the battle on the east bank.

While the Fifty-seventh Panzer Corps was trying to secure a decisive victory on the east bank of the Don, the enemy intensified his efforts on the west bank so that the German defense line on the Zill would collapse.In particular, we have fully understood the importance of our bridgehead position (including the Don River bridge) at the intersection of the Zir River and the Don River. The target of the aggressive attack.On December 14th we were forced to abandon and blast the bridge.By December 15th it became clear that the frontal fighting on the lower Zill had only a few days to go. But at the same time, in the great bend of the Don, a new danger arose.On December 15 there were clear indications that the enemy was trying to attack the left flank of Army Group Don and the right flank of Army Group B.The next day the enemy launched a partial attack.In the beginning, we still can't fully understand the enemy's intentions, because he may be like the old way in the past, first test around, and then make a breakthrough, or it may just prevent us from drawing troops from this area to reinforce the battlefield on the east bank of the Don River .Not long after, however, our radio taps revealed the designation of a new army (Third Guards Army), which hinted at the enemy's intention to make a deep breakthrough (possibly directly into Rostov).

Our army group is fighting to rescue the Sixth Army on the east bank of the Don River, so of course no further decisive battles can be fought on the left flank.So just procrastinate as long as possible.Therefore, the He Lide Group Army in charge of that direction was ordered to use the necessary reserves to delay the enemy. The Army Group headquarters allowed it to shorten the front line backwards, but it should always pay attention to maintaining a continuous relationship with the right wing of Army Group B. December 18 was a first-class crisis day. East of the Don River, although the Seventeenth Armored Division had caught up, the Fifty-seventh Armored Army was still unable to quickly rush to the vicinity of Stalingrad, forming conditions that facilitated the Sixth Army's breakout.On the contrary, the army may be forced to take a defensive position, because the enemy is constantly drawing troops from the encirclement to counterattack it.

On the lower reaches of the Zill River.The bitter battle is still going on, although the enemy has not yet penetrated our defenses.On the left flank of Army Group, the most serious crisis was in the making. The enemy had already launched a large-scale attack on Holliday's Army and the Italian Army, which formed the right wing of Army Group B. As far as Holliday's army was concerned, the two Romanian armies proved unable to stop such a fight, and if the Allied forces retreated across the board, it would be difficult for only a few German divisions to stand firm.What's worse is that the enemy defeated the Italian Army after the first assault, and as a result, the flank of the Don Army Group was completely exposed.

On the same day, the Army Group Headquarters requested the Army Headquarters to take immediate steps to allow the Sixth Army to break out to the Fourth Panzer Army.When the 17th Armored Division fully exerted its power, the 57th Armored Army still had the opportunity to take a step further in the direction of the encirclement.In other words, there is still hope for a turnaround in the fighting on the east bank of the Don.But it would have been more favorable had the 17th Armored Division and the 16th Motorized Division (the latter still tied up at Irista) had been able to take part in the rescue operation when Fourth Panzer Army first launched it. !

Although we firmly believe that it is necessary to allow the Sixth Army to rush out of Stalingrad immediately, Hitler still refuses to authorize it and his Chief of Staff tells us that due to the collapse of the Italian Army, all the troops in motion have been ordered in the direction of Army Group B. reinforce.At this time, it is necessary to study whether Stalingrad can continue to hold on, which is enough to prove that the High Command has not or is not prepared to realize the seriousness of the situation. Hitler, at this stage, still refused to let the Sixth Army withdraw from Stalingrad, but he could not prevent the Army Group headquarters from making at least such preparations.On December 18th, I sent my chief of intelligence, Maj. Eismann, to fly into the encirclement to inform the Sixth Army of our opinion on the breakout operation, which in the immediate future will undoubtedly will become necessary.

Here's the gist of what he had to say: The emergency situation on the Zill front, and more critically the situation on the left flank of Army Group, showed that Fourth Panzer Army's operation to rescue Sixth Army east of the Don could only last for a very limited time.Furthermore, it is doubtful whether this Panzer Army will be able to push all the way to the actual encirclement circle, since the enemy is constantly throwing in new forces to stop them.But for the same reason, the Sixth Army's chances of breaking out now are a little better than at any time in the past.Whether the Fourth Panzer Army and the Sixth Army can meet depends on whether the latter can actively participate in this battle in the future.When it first broke out to the southwest, the enemy could no longer draw its encirclement forces, so the Fourth Panzer Army could continue to advance towards the encirclement.

In the winter storm operation order mentioned by the Sixth Army on December 1, the task assigned to the army was as follows: prepare to break out westwards, as far as Donskaya Sharitsha, in order to cooperate with the Fourth Panzer The Army Group made contact.Now this task may be more extended.The Sixth Army was supposed to push as far southwest as possible until it actually joined the Fourth Panzer Army.The Winter Storm order also ostensibly stipulated that the Sixth Army should still hold Stalingrad in accordance with Hitler's orders. Now this new plan implies that it should retreat in sections in order to continue to break out to the southwest. Major Eisman also pointed out that despite the best efforts of the Army Group Headquarters, it did not believe that the airlift situation would improve so that the Sixth Army could hold on to Stalingrad for a long time. Major Eisman's mission was to reconcile the views between the two commands, but the results were not satisfactory.Paulus himself was not unimpressed by what Eisman told him, but he emphasized the difficulties and risks of his task.The Chief of Operations and the Chief of Quartermaster of the Army Group also emphasized this difficulty to Major Eismann, but both declared that in this case, it was not only necessary to break out of the encirclement as soon as possible, but it was also possible to break through. However, it was the opinion of its chief of staff, Major General Maj｜Gen‧Sohmidt, that ultimately determined the attitude of the Sixth Army.He believed that the army group could not break out of the encirclement at this time, and said that such an approach would be tantamount to suicidal.He told Eisman that the Sixth Army will spend Easter here, and your task is how to get it better supplies.Himid apparently decided that it was entirely up to the High Command or the Army Group Headquarters to get the Army out of the current situation, because it was not their own fault that they were trapped in this situation, and the main problem at present was to ensure their proper supplies.This view is understandable, and as a matter of theory he has a right to uphold it.Unfortunately circumstances are more dominant forces.Eisman pointed out that although the army group headquarters had done its best to maintain supplies, it was not guilty of bad weather stopping the airlift, and it could not conjure transport planes from inside the hat.But although he is good at rhetoric, for Himmid, it is tantamount to playing the piano with a cow.Even Eisman tried to point out that the breakthrough of the Sixth Army was necessary for overall operational interests, and the chief of staff did not budge. Although the Army Commander may have been a better-trained tactician and clearer mind, his Chief of Staff had a tougher personality than he.As a result, Paulus himself, under his influence, declared that a breakout was impossible and pointed out that the abandonment of Stalingrad was forbidden by order of the Führer! (Note: In this case, Himmid's stubbornness was the main cause of the disaster, but this character made him very heroic after being captured. As a result, he was sentenced to twenty-five years by the enemy. Years of forced labor. In the interest of justice, we should still respect his actions.) Although Eisman had made the Sixth Army headquarters fully aware of the current situation and the intentions of the army group, he still failed to reach an agreement on the tasks of the Sixth Army.How can we hope that an army command can carry out such a difficult operation when both the army commander and his chief of staff doubt the feasibility of such an operation? At any other time a difference of opinion like this would have been justification for a change in the command of an army group, but in the present emergency such action was not considered.Any succeeding commander or chief of staff would need time to get into the situation, and at this time there was no time at all.Also, we couldn't get Hitler's approval because he believed this man would be able to hold Stalingrad for him. Despite this, the Don Army Group Headquarters decided not to give up this last chance to rescue the Sixth Army regardless of any difficulties and dangers.It was prepared to issue a formal order absolving the Army Commander of all responsibility for risking a breakout and abandoning Stalingrad.After much deliberation, we intend to take this step. As for why the Sixth Army did not carry out this order in the end, I will analyze it later. Paulus and the chiefs of staff of both sides have used the newly established ultra-short wave radio telephone to have numerous conversations on this issue, and our headquarters and The same is true among the high command. The next day, December 19, again gave us the hope that things would improve on the east bank of the Don and that the two armies might soon cooperate to rescue the Sixth Army from Stalingrad. The Fifty-seventh Panzer Corps achieved an admirable success that day.It actually crossed the Aksai River, advanced northward to the Mishkova River, and its spearhead was actually within thirty miles of the southern encirclement!The approach of reinforcements gave the Sixth Army a chance to break out of the encirclement.If the Sixth Army were to attack now while the Fourth Panzer Army continued northward, or at least to attract the enemy's forces and face a two-pronged attack, it would at least be hopeful that enough contact would be established for the Sixth Army to Get the fuel, ammunition and food it needs to continue its breakout.For this purpose, the Army Group Headquarters has concentrated a transport column loaded with 3,000 tons of supplies to follow the Fourth Panzer Army, and has also added tractors to tow and rescue the mobile part of the Sixth Army artillery .As long as the tanks have opened up a road, even temporarily, this transport column is ready to take the risk of rushing straight to the besieged army. The situation of the Army Group west of the Don River, as far as December 19 is concerned, can barely last until the Sixth Army has a chance to break out to the southwest. For the time being, there will be no decisive developments that force us to stop Battle East of the River. At the same time, our defenses on the lower reaches of the Zill are still being held.Although the group army found that it was necessary to use the He Lide group army to stabilize the situation on that side, it could basically withstand it as planned.However, there is still a threat to the exposed side of the army. On both sides of the Don River, the race with death has entered the final decisive stage!Can the Army Group stabilize the situation in the Great Bend of the Don River for a few more days, so that the Sixth Army will not miss this last chance?This goal is only possible if you don't waste another hour! Therefore, at noon on December 19, the Army Group sent an urgent appeal to the High Command with an electric typewriter, requesting permission for the Sixth Army to withdraw from Stalingrad and immediately break out to the southwest to join the Fourth Panzer Army (see appendix three). When this request failed to obtain an immediate response, at 18:00, I directly ordered the Sixth Army to project to the southwest immediately (see Appendix 4).The first phase of this operation remained the same as the Winter Storm attack ordered on 1 December.But if necessary, it should continue to advance beyond the Donskaya Sharitsha in order to gain contact with the Fourth Panzer Army and allow the passage of the supply columns. At the same time, the order stipulated that, if necessary, a second phase of operations should follow the attack of the winter storm.After receiving the code word order from Thunderclap, the Sixth Army should immediately continue to advance to the Fourth Panzer Army, and at the same time the divisions should gradually withdraw from the Stalingrad area.The reason for temporarily retaining the issuance of this code word order is to make the actions of the two armies and the passage of the transport column perfectly coordinated in time.More importantly, the headquarters of the army group had to try to persuade Hitler to withdraw his order to stick to Stalingrad, because after the thundering order was issued, of course all the responsibilities should be borne by the commander-in-chief of the army group and had nothing to do with the commander-in-chief of the army group. Hitler's order still exists, and the commander of the army group will feel scruples and dare not act.