Chapter 51 The Last Battle of the Sixth Army

The story of Sixth Army's death throes, which only began around New Year's Day, is unbelievably poignant.In the helpless environment, these personnel are able to fulfill their duties as if they were dying, which is truly commendable. However, standing in the position of commander-in-chief of the Don Army Group, there is a question that I must answer.Is it reasonable or necessary to ask our soldiers to make such sacrifices?How long should it be?In other words, did Sixth Army's final bitter struggle achieve anything worthwhile?An adequate answer to this question must be based on circumstances and not on the basis of Germany's final defeat.

On December 26, the commander of the Sixth Army sent us the following telegram.We immediately forwarded it to Army Headquarters, and we have always expressed the Army Group's position without any disguise. (From this point on, communication between the encirclement and the outside can only be by radio and personnel flying out. The ultra-short wave electronic typing conversation has been interrupted.) The full text of Admiral Paulus's telegram is as follows: Combat losses, cold, and insufficient supplies have recently decimated the combat effectiveness of divisions.I should report the following points:

1. Our group army can continue to repel small-scale attacks and deal with local crises for a relatively long period of time.Prerequisites are improved supplies and airlifting of replacement personnel as quickly as possible. 2. If the enemy were to mobilize considerable forces from the side of Hoth (Fourth Panzer Army) or otherwise to launch a massive offensive against the Stalingrad fortress, the latter could no longer sustain it for long. 3. Unless a corridor is opened first so that our army can obtain the necessary personnel and supplies, it is absolutely impossible to carry out a breakout operation.

I therefore demand, and please convey to the highest authorities, that rescue operations should be expedited immediately, unless the overall circumstances necessitate the sacrifice of our Army Group.Our army should try our best to hold on until the last minute. I must also report that only seventy tons of supplies were flown in today.Some troops are already running out of food.So urgent measures must be taken now. The content of this report fully demonstrates the absurdity of Paulus' chief of staff, who had said only a week earlier that the Sixth Army could spend Easter at Stalingrad, provided it was properly supplied.

This document also proves that when Army Group ordered the Fourth Panzer Army to break out of the encirclement a week earlier, as it was already approaching the city, it was not only the first but also the last chance for rescue. However, at the end of December and the beginning of January, apart from partial attacks, the front of the Sixth Army was quite calm.There are two reasons for this: on the one hand, the enemy may wish to accumulate ammunition for his artillery in order to launch a large-scale offensive; win. On January 8th, when General Hube (Gen‧Hube) returned to the defense after visiting Hitler, he stopped by the Army Group headquarters to have a meeting with me.Hitler had ordered Hubie to fly from Stalingrad to Lotzen in order to report to him personally on the Sixth Army.Hubie told me that he had told Hitler all the facts about the encirclement without any disguise. (In fact, this is not so different from what is stated in the daily situation report of the army group headquarters, but Hitler is not prepared to believe our report until he has further evidence.)

Even so, it is worth noting that after Hubie's brief stay with Rozen, he was influenced by Hitler to develop confidence, whether real or not.Hitler once declared to him that he would do his best to enable the Sixth Army to obtain supplies for a long time, and also mentioned future rescue plans.Having regained his confidence, Hubie returned to the encirclement, but was soon flown out again on Hitler's orders to direct the airlift from outside the encirclement.However, even he was unable to improve the efficiency of the airlift, since it was not an actual organizational weakness but bad weather and inadequate resources for aircraft.One of Hubie's quotes irritated me most personally, because a rumor was circulating in Sixth Army that I had sent a telegram: Don't let go, I'll get you out of Manstein.Although I used all means to rescue the Sixth Army from Stalingrad, I have never had the habit of making promises to the troops, because I am not absolutely sure whether such promises can be fulfilled, and it is not my responsibility alone. .

General Hubie was such a fearless tough guy that he dared to tell Hitler what a loss to his prestige as Head of State something like the siege of the Sixth Army was.Therefore, he was willing to suggest that Hitler should give his command to a soldier to execute, at least on the Eastern Front.In view of the fact that Hubie had met with us first on his way to Rozen, Hitler would undoubtedly have assumed that Hubie had been prompted by me to fire the cannon.In fact it is by no means so. After the fall of Stalingrad I myself suggested to Hitler the reorganization of the highest military command.Since Hubie had already mentioned similar opinions to him, Hitler flatly refused to consider such questions.Otherwise Hitler might have accepted my opinion, especially at a time when he was somewhat responsible for the loss of the Sixth Army.

On January 9, the enemy surrendered to the Sixth Army.On Hitler's orders, this request was denied.I seldom fully agree with all Hitler's decisions and actions in the military field, but I fully agree with his decision, because no matter how cruel it is from a humane point of view, it was a necessary measure at the time . I do not intend here to discuss the purely military point of view that no army should ever surrender as long as it is capable of fighting.If this spirit is abandoned, the profession of the soldier will disappear.Unless the world progresses to a state where there are no wars and no soldiers, this idea of ​​military honor must be maintained.Even if capitulation could avoid an apparently hopeless battle, that in itself would not be a reason for capitulation.If all the commanders surrendered at once when he thought his situation was hopeless, no one would win the war.Even in absolutely hopeless circumstances, it is often possible to survive.From General Paulus' point of view, however, he should have refused to surrender on the grounds of military duty.There is only one exception, and that is that this army group has no other use, and its continued resistance has no purpose at all.From here it can be explained that Hitler's decision is reasonable.However hopeless the Sixth Army's continued resistance may be from a long-term point of view, it has fulfilled its decisive duty in terms of the overall strategic situation.It must hold as many besiegers as possible for as long as possible.

At the beginning of December, the designations of about sixty large enemy units (i.e., infantry divisions, armored and mechanized brigades, etc.) were found on the encirclement circle around the army. When the Fourth Panzer Army attacked, there was no doubt that , some of the troops must be mobilized temporarily, but new troops will be added.By January 19, it was reported that of the 259 large enemy units facing Army Group Don, 90 were intended to encircle Sixth Army.If the Sixth Army had surrendered on January 9, most of the ninety units would have flooded in, and the situation of the Don Army Group and the entire southern flank would have been unimaginable.

This army group can still fight, even if it is meaningless from its own point of view.But its ability to persevere is decisive for the situation of the entire southern wing.The Sixth Army's ability to contain the enemy for one more day is to make an extra contribution to the entire Eastern Front battlefield.Although some people today think that we have lost in the end, if we can end this war as soon as possible, wouldn't it save us from a lot of suffering.But that's all hindsight.At that time, from a military standpoint, there was no reason to think that Germany would lose.A military stalemate could have the same effect politically, so as long as the southern flank of the German army can be stabilized, the possibility is absolutely there.And its prerequisite is that the Sixth Army should try to contain the enemy until the last minute.This cruel necessity forced the Supreme Commander to demand the final sacrifice of the heroic troops at Stalingrad.As for the self-proclaimed commander-in-chief should be responsible for the demise of the army group, that is another question.

After the Sixth Army refused to surrender on January 9, the Russian army began to attack from all sides, first with heavy artillery ready to shoot, followed by a large number of tank support.The main pressure was on the western salient near Marinovka, where the enemy had penetrated at several points. The situation became more critical on January 11, when the army was unable to recover its lost ground due to lack of ammunition and fuel.With the loss of the Karpovka Valley and especially its settlements, the western defenders lost their shelter from the cold.In addition, weather conditions have also put an end to hopes of airlifts. On January 12, the Sixth Army had a special report that fully explained its predicament, and the Army Group Headquarters immediately forwarded it to the Army Headquarters.The content of the report is as follows: Despite the heroic resistance of the troops, through the fierce fighting in the past few days, the enemy has penetrated into the depths, and the headquarters can only barely plug the breach in the defense line.There is no reserve team, and it can no longer be formed.Heavy weapons have now lost their mobility.Severe losses, insufficient supplies, and severe cold have severely weakened the troops' ability to resist.If the enemy continues to attack with the existing forces, the front of the fortress can only support for a few days at most.Subsequent resistance will be nothing more than partial actions. On January 12, the weather again halted the airlift and also prevented the hard-fought air support of the defenders. At dusk that day, General Pickert, who was in charge of the airlift on the Air Force side, flew out of the encirclement.He painted an astonishing picture of the situation in the city, and believed that the army's ability to continue to resist was limited to two or four days.This estimate proved incorrect due to the heroism and self-sacrifice of the troops.In General Pickert's opinion, even if the airlift situation improved, it would make no difference from now on, because the Army's strength was no longer sufficient to fill the gap created by the enemy. Pickelt also brings us a report by Paulus (now promoted to general) which gives the following account of the tactical situation in the encirclement: On the northwest front, the enemy had already employed ten to twelve divisions in the attack.Parts of the 3rd and 29th Motorized Rifle Divisions had been turned and routed from the north, with the result that it seemed impossible on that side to rebuild the line.Together, these two heroic divisions knocked out a hundred tanks, but the enemy appears to have left fifty intact. South of the encirclement, despite heroic resistance by the 29th Infantry Division, after two days of heavy shelling, the enemy finally broke through.On the one hand, there is no more troops to fill the gap.The Russian army used more than one hundred tanks in the attack in one area, forty of which have been destroyed. The besieged east is still holding, but the enemy is also exerting heavy pressure. On the northeast front, the enemy had also penetrated quite deeply at several points, and the fighting strength of the 16th Panzer Division was exhausted. Paulus added that the army would fight to the last bomb.General Hubie is now suggesting to Hitler to reduce the defensive circle. In fact, this kind of action will only accelerate the collapse, because all the heavy weapons have long been immobile. (Note: When it was necessary to accumulate forces for the purpose of breaking out, Hitler ordered that such operations be prohibited. Since airlifts will never be adequate, there is no hope of improvement now. How long this army can resist completely depends Depends on the strength of the enemy's offensive.) On the same day, the Pitomnik airfield was also lost, after which only one airfield, that is, Gumrak, was available in the Stalingrad encirclement. During the night, however, Paulus reported that the city still had hope of continuing its resistance if a few heavily armed battalions could be airlifted.He had already repeatedly asked for some personnel to be airlifted in to supplement his losses, but the Army Group headquarters could not agree to his request, because it itself had no necessary supplementary troops.And since the rescue operations of the Fourth Armored Army stopped, there was no reason to send reinforcements into the encirclement.It is already a sad thing that many commanders and staff members flew back to the encirclement after the holiday expired.Many of these officers were of famous families. For example, the descendants of Bismarck and Biro insisted on returning to the army. On January 13, Admiral Paulus' adjutant, Capt. Behr, an outstanding young officer who had already won the Knight's Cross, flew out to meet us and brought the war diary of the army group.He told us how the troops fought so valiantly that both men and women could see death as home. Bell brought letters from Paulus and his chief of staff, which fully demonstrated the traditional thinking, courage and integrity of the German soldiers.They also know very well that the Army Group has invested its maximum force in order to rescue the Sixth Army.Conversely, they resented the failure to keep their promise of airlift supplies.All I can say is that neither Admiral Leechedoven nor I have ever made such a promise.The person responsible to them is Goering. On January 16, heavy fighting broke out again on all fronts of this army.For a time it was impossible for any aircraft to land, as enemy ground fire and fighters took unbearable losses on them.So now it mainly relies on night flights or airdrops of supplies.The use of airdrop supplies will inevitably waste a considerable part of the supplies. On the same day, Hitler reassigned Field Marshal Milher to preside over the airlift.On January 17, the Army Group radioed that the Gumenlak airfield was open again, but the Air Force disagreed.Army Group Headquarters, however, insisted that an attempt should be made to land there. On January 19, I had my first conversation with Milher.He was slightly injured when his car collided with a locomotive the day before.I told him that although the Sixth Army's situation was hopeless, there was still a need for an immediate and radical improvement in airlift.Not only because we were supposed to keep our comrades in the Stalingrad pocket supplied until the last hour, but also because this army was undertaking a most important combat task, continuing to hold back ninety large enemy units.Since the rest of Army Group's front and the exposed flank of Army Group B were at stake, any extra day we could get Sixth Army to support would be of great value.Milher allowed the immediate use of all possible resources in Germany, including transport aircraft and maintenance personnel.The latter is especially important at the moment, since both Morosovsky and Tatsinskaya airfields are now lost, and the air force must be based at Novochirkassk and Rostov and even further afield. Judging from what Milch told me, if he had been ordered to take charge of this work a few weeks ago, the situation might have improved considerably, because he could use domestic resources. No power.In other words, Goering was more to blame for not making these resources work at the right time. On January 24, General Zeisler, Chief of the Army General Staff, sent us the following bulletin: The Department has received the following wireless telegrams: The fortress can only hold for a few more days.With no supplies arriving, the troops were exhausted and their weapons could not be moved.If the last airfield is lost, supplies will be completely cut off.There is no stronghold to continue the task of defending Stalingrad.Russian troops were already able to infiltrate many locations, some of which were lost with total casualties.But the bravery of officers and soldiers remained undiminished.In order to make a final blow, the units should be ordered to break out to the southwest in groups.Some personnel may be able to break through and cause chaos behind enemy lines.If no action was taken, it would be tantamount to the death of all men, either captured or starved and cold.I also recommend airlifting a small number of personnel (both officers and enlisted men) to be used as specialists in future operations.Appropriate orders should also be issued immediately, as airport facilities will not last long.Please list names, excluding myself of course. Paulus. The Department has given the following reply: Thank you for your letter.Exactly the same suggestion I myself made four days ago.After my statement again, the Führer has given the following instructions: 1. Regarding the breakout: the head of state reserves the right to make the final decision.Please request again if necessary. 2. With regard to the evacuation of personnel by air: the head of state does not intend to consider it at present.Please send Zitzewitz here to make further representations.I will take him to the Führer. Chaisler. I would like to make the following remarks regarding Admiral Paulus' request to airlift certain members of his army out of the encirclement.From the point of view of purely military interests, it is of course ideal to save as many important professionals as possible, but it should be remembered that the choice has nothing to do with class. Anyone can escape.At the same time, however, issues of military ethics should also be considered: wounded personnel should be flown first (in fact, we have made considerable efforts in this regard.) But the withdrawal of specialized personnel will undoubtedly affect Evacuate the injured.In addition, most of the experts who should fly out must be officers. Due to the difficulty of training, officers are of course much more valuable than soldiers, who seldom have the qualifications of experts.But in a situation like the Sixth Army, German military tradition dictates that when life is threatened, the officer should let the soldiers go first.For these reasons, Army Group did not ask Hitler to accept Paulus' proposal. As for the last-ditch attempt to break into small groups and cross the enemy lines, Hitler's final decision never materialized.Nevertheless, the Army Group did manage to help them survive, such as dropping food at certain points behind enemy lines and sending reconnaissance planes to search for them.But no one could reach the front of the army group, and our pilots didn't find anything. In any case, Paulus's telegram indicated that until the last minute those in the Sixth Army had not lost their will to fight as long as they had strength left.Indeed, we also know that some young officers and soldiers were preparing to break out.This is why we have taken the above measures, even though the result is to achieve nothing. On January 22, the Russians occupied the Gumenlak airfield, and supplies could no longer land.Having reported that he was unable to fill the gap and that food and ammunition were exhausted, Paulus now began to hope that Hitler would allow him to negotiate a surrender with the enemy.On this point I had a lengthy debate with Hitler on the telephone, and I urged him to authorize the surrender, since the Army Group's resistance had grown weaker and had no effect on the situation of the Army Group as a whole, so it was time to end the war. He fought bravely.In this bitter battle, the Sixth Army has exhausted its last strength in order to contain a far more powerful enemy, and has made a decisive contribution to the battle on the entire Eastern Front.The misery of the Sixth Army was no longer able to contain any enemy troops. During a long and heated debate, Hitler rejected the demands made by Paulus and myself and ordered the Army Group to resist to the end.His reason was that if he could resist for one more day, the Russian army in Stalingrad would not be able to be transferred to other areas.In fact, the overall situation is now serious enough that the Russian army has defeated the Hungarian Army on the Don River, and Army Group B is practically non-existent on the map.From Voroshilovgrad on the Donets to Voronezh on the Don, a large gap has been opened through which large numbers of enemy troops can flow, almost as Into no man's land.In these circumstances, the salvation of Army Group Don and Army Group A (now retreating from the Caucasus) seemed to be in serious doubt. Hitler believed that even though the Sixth Army could no longer form a complete front, it could still be divided into several small encirclements and continue to resist for a long time.Finally he declared that there was no way to surrender because the Russians would never keep their promises. The second prediction was correct in principle, despite the fact that the total number of prisoners of war who fell into the hands of the Russians was 90,000, of whom only a few thousand have survived.And it should be emphasized here that the Russians still had a complete railway line to Stalingrad at that time.If they have good intentions, they can feed and evacuate prisoners of war.Although the cold and exhaustion were enough to lose many lives, the death rate was higher than it should be. When Hitler rejected my request not to allow the Sixth Army to surrender, I was naturally faced with the personal question of whether I should resign to express my disagreement.It's not the first time I've had this thought.This question troubled my conscience especially when I failed to persuade Hitler to allow the Sixth Army to break out around Christmas 1942.Over the next few months, I ran into this problem again and again. I think anyone should be able to understand my mood at the time.A man would feel overwhelmed and want to shrug off responsibility if he had to engage in a nervous tug-of-war with his supreme commander before carrying out any emergency military operation.Colonel Bussey, my chief of operations at the time, once said to the engineer commander of the Sixth Army: If I hadn't been for the sake of the troops, I had repeatedly begged him (Manstein) to stay and not go, otherwise he would have already submitted his resignation to Hitler up.Busey is one of my closest colleagues, and his words are very representative of my attitude and position at the time. But it is also necessary for me to comment slightly on the resignation of a senior commander in the field.The first point is that senior commanders, like ordinary soldiers, cannot pack up their bedding and go home at will.Hitler could not be forced to accept his resignation, especially in this case.The position of soldiers on the battlefield is not as free as that of politicians. Politicians can stay together or leave if they don't.Soldiers must obey orders and fight to the end no matter when and where. It is often the case that the senior commander finds that to carry out an order would violate his sense of duty.As Seydlitz said at the Battle of Zorndorf: After the battle the king may do with my head as he pleases, but during the battle he shall allow me to use it own mind.No general, after a defeat in battle, should claim that he was compelled to carry out an order against his own judgment and that this led to his defeat as an unreasonable excuse.In such a situation the only course he should take is disobedience, for he is responsible to his own mind.Success or failure is often enough to determine his right and wrong. This is why I violated Hitler's orders on December 19 and ordered that the Sixth Army should immediately break out to the southwest.In fact, nothing was accomplished simply because the Sixth Army failed to carry out this order.In the future, when necessary, I often violated Hitler's orders.Successfully proved me right, and even Hitler had to put up with such disobedience. (Note: However, it is not allowed to deviate from the line, because it will make the adjacent army group feel at a loss.) However, in addition to the above-mentioned reasons, there is another consideration for resignation.This means that senior commanders should also have a sense of responsibility towards their subordinates.At this time, I have to think about more than the Sixth Army.Our entire army group, including Army Group A, is in danger.If I abdicated my duty at this time, I would be dishonored to those other heroic troops who were fighting to the death outside the Stalingrad pocket, although justified in terms of Hitler's humanitarian motives for refusing to authorize the surrender of the Sixth Army . In fact, the Don Army Group stabilized the most difficult situation in the war.In my own opinion, that was enough to justify my decision not to resign out of pure emotion. It is only necessary to make a concise analysis of the development of the Don, A, and B Army Groups in January 1943 to understand the importance of the Sixth Army's arduous resistance. On December 29, the Army Headquarters finally failed the insistence of Army Group Don and began to order Army Group A to withdraw from the Caucasus, initially starting from the left flank, that is, the 1st Panzer Army to withdraw to the line of the Kuma River. (About one hundred and fifty-five miles southeast of the Salsk River.) The movement was very slow because of the desire to preserve the equipment, and there was no force to twitch for the time being.By January 9, the day the Sixth Army refused to surrender, the First Panzer Army had still not been able to reach the Kuma line. The task of the Fourth Panzer Army was to cover the rear of Army Group A south of the Don and at the same time keep the line of communication through Rostov from being cut off.It had already been forced to retreat westward through Kotnikov after a bitter battle with the overwhelmingly superior enemy forces (three armies in total) on the south bank of the Don.By January 9th it was engaged in a hard defensive battle along the Kuberle between the Sal and the Manych, and we could see that the enemy was encircling it from both sides. intention of.Russia's 3rd Guards Tank Corps, originally near Konstantinovka on the Don, was now turning southeast towards Proletarskeya in the rear of 4th Panzer Army.At the same time, the Russian 28th Army, which came from the Kamik Prairie, also attempted to make a major detour south along the Malikh River. After a hard fight in the great bend of the Don River, Holliday's Army was forced to retreat to the area of ​​the Kagalnik River.Even here the enemy had already broken through to the south of his position, and on January 7 a small force of the enemy had already crossed the Don northeast of Novozirsk, where the headquarters of the Army Group was located.On the army's northern flank, the 7th Panzer Division was using partial assault tactics to try to delay the enemy's advance to the Donets crossing at Vörchstad.The Kamensk crossing can only be covered by some temporary units and a few Romanian troops who have not yet left the battlefield. From this point to the northwest, there is a huge gap left by the collapse of the Italian Army Group.The vulnerable Fretter|Pico Battle Group belonging to Army Group B fought near Mirirov and was at one point almost completely surrounded. On January 24, the Sixth Army was finally divided in Stalingrad and its surrounding areas into three isolated small encirclements, which could no longer contain most of the Russian forces.The rest of the positive situation at that time was as follows: The northern flank of Army Group A was still near Belaya Glina, and even further south, east of Armavir, in other words a hundred miles to a hundred and two miles from Rostov fifteen miles or so.The plan to withdraw the main body of the First Panzer Army from Rostov has now finally been approved by the Army Headquarters. As for the Army Group Don, the Fourth Panzer Army is fighting desperately southeast of Rostov to ensure the passage of the Don River crossing and facilitate the retreat of the First Panzer Army. I hope that this Army Group can be deployed on the left flank of the Army Group , guarding the Donets River defense line from Froshirovgrad above.The Holliday Army is defending the Donets River defense line, from the intersection of the Donets River and the Don River to Volchstad. The Feritpic battle group (with two broken divisions under its jurisdiction) is defending the Donets River on both sides of Kamensk. Since both the Italian and Hungarian armies had been disbanded (the latter had already been routed on the Don), starting from January 19, from Froshirovgrad on the Donets to the As far as Voronezh, there has been a gap two hundred miles wide in the middle.From January 23, the front as far as Starobirk was transferred to the command of Army Group Don.The only actual remaining force in that area was the remnants of the 19th Panzer Division.Facing the three armies of Russia, Starobirsk was finally given up after a hard fight. When the Sixth Army ceased resistance on 1 February, the enemy in the Froshirovgrad area was preparing to cross the Donets with an army of three tank corps, one mechanized corps and one infantry corps attack.In addition, facing the line of the river, from Lissichansk to Zlaciansk, another army group (comprising three or four tank corps and one infantry corps) also seemed to be about to attack. Had it not been for the heroic resistance of the Sixth Army, which held down the huge enemy force at Stalingrad for so long, the development of the situation from January 9th to February 1st and its subsequent evolution would have been unimaginable. Let us now return to this army group and see its final state. On January 24, the front broke and shrunk into three small encirclements, one in the center of Stalingrad and the other two on the north and south perimeters. On January 31, the commander of the group army, who had just been promoted to marshal, and the personnel of his group army department were taken prisoners.On February 1, when the remnants of the Eleventh Army also surrendered in the north of the city, the final battle was finally over. The bitter battle of the Sixth Army is finally over! The German soldiers surrendered only when they were out of ammunition, hungry and cold, and after being captured, they died even more because of mistreatment, hunger and cold.However, thanks to the self-sacrifice of the Air Force personnel, more than 30,000 wounded people were withdrawn from the encirclement. To anyone who wants to ask about responsibility for the Stalingrad tragedy, Hitler's own words should be the answer.On February 5th I was summoned to the High Command, and I urged Hitler himself to go to the front for a personal inspection, or at least to send the Chief of the General Staff or General Jodl, but no word of mouth could move him. In this meeting, Hitler roughly used the following sentence as his opening statement: I am solely responsible for Stalingrad!I might perhaps blame Goering for having made an incorrect estimate of the strength of the Air Force, but he has been designated by me as my successor, so we cannot place the responsibility for Stalingrad on him. This time Hitler was willing to take responsibility, instead of looking for a lamb for atonement, which is always commendable.But what makes us regret is that he did not admit that the failure was mainly due to the mistakes of his leadership. The heroic sacrifice of these soldiers is immortalized in German military history.The full list of numbers is as follows: 1. Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Armies; Fourteenth Armored Army; 2. Forty-fourth, sixty-seventh, seventy-ninth, ninety-fourth, one hundred and thirteenth, two hundred and ninety-fifth, two hundred and ninety-seventh, three hundred and fifth, Three hundred and seventy-first, three hundred and seventy-sixth, three hundred and eighty-fourth, three hundred and eighty-ninth infantry divisions; 3. The 100th Light Infantry Division and the 369th Crotia Regiment; 4. Fourteenth, Sixteenth, and Twenty-fourth Armored Divisions; Five, third, twenty-ninth, and sixtieth motorized divisions; 6. There are also many units directly under the army and army groups, anti-aircraft artillery units and ground units of the air force; 7. Finally, there is the Romanian 1st Cavalry Division and the 20th Infantry Division.