Chapter 65 in conclusion

If we make a general review of the entire process and results of the 1942-1943 South Russian Winter Campaign, we must first admit that the Russian side has achieved great success.The Russians have surrounded and wiped out the German Sixth Army, our strongest field army.In addition, our four Allied armies have all been routed.Many warriors among them were killed on the battlefield, and a considerable number were taken prisoner.The remaining Confederate forces were also routed and sooner or later had to withdraw from the field.Even though the original designations of the divisions of the Sixth Army were restored from the remnants, and the He Lide Army was renamed the Sixth Army in March 1943, the main fighting force of the twenty divisions, plus A considerable number of artillery and engineering units, but it is always a loss that is difficult to make up.The combat effectiveness of the Allied forces was certainly limited, but their loss also left the Germans without replacement forces in relatively peaceful areas.

However, although five complete armies have been lost in the German order of battle, no one can conclude that this alone can have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war. The vast land that had been won in the summer offensive of 1942, together with its natural resources.The seizure of the Caucasus oil fields was originally one of the basic goals of this offensive, but it was finally not achieved. We should also explain here that this economic goal was strongly demanded by Goering, but it has a great effect on the dispersion of offensive forces. decisive influence.When they pursued this economic goal, they completely forgot that the main force of the enemy army had to be defeated before this goal could have any chance of being achieved and maintained.But to sum up, the German army can still hold a part of the Donets Basin, which is necessary for the war to proceed.

Although the Russians have undoubtedly achieved great gains, they have not yet achieved decisive success against the southern flank of the German army. If this southern flank is destroyed, our side will also be devastated.By the end of the winter campaign, the initiative had returned to the Germans, and the Russians had already suffered two defeats.While none of this was decisive, it stabilized the front and gave the German High Command the hope of turning the war in the East into a stalemate.Nevertheless, we should never hope to launch another offensive in the summer of 1943 to change the tide of the war.Our combat losses have been great enough that such a plan is out of the question.

The conclusion that the German High Command should have drawn was that every effort should be made to conclude peace with at least one of its enemies first.At the same time, it should also recognize that the principle of saving troops must be the principle of future war guidance on the Eastern Front. In particular, it should try to avoid Stalingrad-style tragedies (loss of an entire army), and at the same time try to wear down the enemy's offensive capabilities.In order to achieve this goal, we must resolutely get rid of all secondary desires and concentrate our main force on the Eastern Front before the Western enemy can land in France or make serious blows in the Mediterranean region.

If we now return to the winter campaign and its results, the second question we should ask may be why the Russian command, after having achieved such great success in this campaign, failed to deal with the German forces. The decisive annihilation of the entire southern flank succeeded?The Russian army not only had an overwhelming numerical advantage, but also had a combat advantage from the very beginning, so it should have had a chance of complete victory. It is especially worth emphasizing that the Russian command authorities are not lacking in the spirit of courage and enterprising, and in order to achieve their goals, they do not care about the loss of their troops at all.The Russian army can also fight bravely and do not avoid sacrifices.Despite this, the quality of its infantry is still weak, and the artillery lost between 1941 and 1942 has not yet been fully replenished.Russian generals have undoubtedly learned many lessons since the beginning of the war, especially in the organization and use of large armored corps.Although the enemy already possessed a large number of tanks as early as 1941, they had no idea how to organize them into independent units and use them.Now they have also learned how to form a tank army and a mechanized army, and they have also learned the deep breakthrough technology of the German army.But even so, we defeated (destroyed) the Russian armored units every time, even though they had penetrated to a considerable depth in the German advance area, with the exception of November 1942 .Since the encirclement and annihilation of the Sixth Army, the Russian army has never had the same success. Their goal of cutting off the southern flank of the German army has never been achieved.Except in Stalingrad, where Hitler himself created an opportunity for the enemy, the Russian High Command has never conducted a second large encirclement battle, as we did in 1941, when several prisoners were captured. One hundred thousand people.This was despite the fact that in this winter campaign the Russians had a great numerical superiority, and that the circumstances at the beginning and the collapse of the German Allied Army allowed them to enter the German rear without hindrance.On the contrary, what we fought in 1941 was mainly a frontal battle.

Now let's review the top leadership of the Russian army.Judging from the operational situation at the end of the German summer offensive, the strategic objective of encircling the German southern flank was too obvious to be ignored.Breaking through the concept of the Allied Army's front is also a very obvious action.In other words, the Russians really didn't need much military genius when a battle plan was drawn up in the late autumn of 1942. The first blow, the encirclement of the Sixth Army, was undoubtedly correct.If this blow is successful, the German High Command will also do its best to promote its realization, then the most powerful strike force of the German army will be wiped out.

It would seem better if this first blow could be combined with an offensive against the Italian and Hungarian armies. The Russians should have made every effort to attempt a unified large-scale attack from the very beginning of the offensive. To achieve the goal of cutting off the German army in Rostov or the Sea of ​​Azov.Obviously, the artillery it had was not sufficient for this task, and perhaps it was for this reason that the Russian army delayed its breakthrough operation.At the same time, it is also conceivable that the transportation situation of the Russian army cannot allow all its forces to be concentrated and properly supplied at the same time.

However, our allies collapsed unexpectedly and quickly one after another, but they helped the enemy a lot.Therefore, the failure of the Russian army to cut off the entire southern flank of the German army in the lower reaches of the Don River, the Sea of ​​Azov, and the Dnieper River really showed their own incompetence.Judging from the standards of modern warfare, the distance that the Russian attacking forces had to cover was not too great.At the same time, the German army did not have a strong reserve team to invest in, so there was no reason for the Russian army's offensive to stop halfway.

On the contrary, we can say that, with the exception of Stalingrad, the Russian command authorities never coordinated their forces and speed when striking a decisive point. In the first phase of the Winter Campaign, the Russian authorities undoubtedly held back too many troops unnecessarily in order not to let the jackpot of the Sixth Army slip away.Therefore, the opportunity to cut off the supply line of the German southern flank in the lower reaches of the Don was missed.Although the troops attacking the front of the Qier River were very strong, their actions were inconsistent. After breaking through the front of the Italian Army, the Russian High Command still failed to cross the Donets River desperately, in order to go straight to Rostov.Of course, in such an operation, the Russian army itself was in danger of being attacked from the flank, but their subsequent attack on the front of the Hungarian Army could also provide considerable protection.If it is said that this is an inevitable risk, I admit it.But those who dare not take risks will never achieve decisive results.

Even after the successful breakthrough of the Hungarian Army Group, the German front from the Donets River to Voronezh had torn a big gap. The Russian authorities still failed to advance decisively with sufficient speed and strength. (that is, towards the crossing of the Dnieper River) advance.The Russian army did not know to concentrate its powerful forces on one point, but instead dispersed its forces and made a series of uncoordinated attacks.Only in this way can the German army concentrate its stronger forces at the decisive point. Schlieffen once said that in a battle or a battle, the actions of the winner and loser also have a role in the final result.The German High Command was responsible for the loss of the Sixth Army and for the crisis on the entire southern flank, as has been explained above.Now, for the sake of justice, it should also be explained what contribution the German side made to the failure of the Russian army to encircle the German army's southern flank.

There is only one point to be made in this respect: this defeat would have been inevitable had it not been for the almost superhuman efforts of the German troops and their commanders in the face of an enemy many times superior in numbers.Were it not for the fact that our heroic infantry divisions, unlike our Confederate troops, and often lacking proper anti-tank equipment, could stand still in the face of enemy armored forces, and block them immediately when enemy tanks broke through their lines Rise up and annihilate them at last, or the Winter Campaign will be over.Our armored divisions have also worked hard, and they have shown incomparable vitality, running around, which more than doubles their effectiveness.German combat troops believed themselves to be the best soldiers in the world, capable of standing in the most dangerous situations, with a spirit of bravery and self-sacrifice that more than outweighed the enemy's numerical superiority. One thing that should not be forgotten is that the heroic Sixth Army fought to the end, preventing the enemy from annihilating the entire southern flank of the German army in one fell swoop.If it had not held out until the beginning of February, but had given up the struggle as soon as its situation had become hopeless, the enemy's strength at every point would have been doubled at once, and the entire southern flank of the German army would have been encircled and wiped out. will be a foregone conclusion.This is the greatest contribution of the Sixth Army.Although the heroic sacrifice of the Sixth Army does not benefit the overall situation, we must not negate its spiritual value.This group army has fulfilled the greatest responsibility of a soldier for his compatriots, and can still fight to the end in desperate situations.