Chapter 26 Volume 1 Chapter 22 War

Mr. Chamberlain invites me to the Cabinet Hesitations September 2nd Declaration of War on September 3rd First Air Raid Alert Re-in charge of the Admiralty Admiral Sir Dudley Pound My Knowledge of Naval Affairs 1914 and 1919 Thirty-Nine Years Comparison Naval Strategic Situation Baltic Sea Kiel Canal Italian Attitude Our Mediterranean Strategic Submarine Threat Air Raid Threat Japanese Attitude Singapore Australia and New Zealand Security Organization of War Cabinet Mr. Chamberlain's Initial Choice An Older Generation's The magical effect of characters taking a nap. At dawn on September 1, Germany attacked Poland.That same morning, all our troops were ordered to mobilize.The Prime Minister invited me to visit him in Downing Street in the afternoon.He told me that he believed that the hope of avoiding war with Germany had been lost, and proposed a war cabinet composed of a small number of ministers who were not in charge of the Ministry to direct the war.He mentioned that it was his understanding that Labor was reluctant to take part in a coalition government, but he still hoped the Liberals would.He invited me to be a member of the War Cabinet.I accepted his offer without comment.On this basis, we had a long talk about candidates and measures.

After some reflection, it seems to me that the average age of the cabinet members who make up the highest executive body for directing operations must seem too high.To this end I wrote to Mr. Chamberlain after midnight: September 26, 1939 Haven't we become an old man's team?I found that the total age of the six people you mentioned to me yesterday was 386 years old or an average of over 64 years old!Only one year younger than the age required to receive a pension!However, if you add Sinclair (49) and Eden (42) to the cabinet, the average age drops to 57½. If the Daily Herald's claim that Labor does not intend to enter government is true, we must be in for constant criticism, with the frustrating and unexpected events of war.Therefore, it seems to me all the more important to invite the Liberals, who are in opposition, to join us firmly.Eden has considerable influence over his part of the Conservative Party, as well as moderate Liberals.In my opinion, using this influence is also an extremely necessary way of increasing power.

The Poles have been under heavy attack for thirty hours now.I was deeply disturbed to hear that the Paris side still mentioned the note again.I am sure you will be able to present a joint declaration of war by the time Parliament meets this afternoon at the latest. Unless the Admiralty takes special measures and sends a signal today, the German warship Bremen is about to sail out of the interdiction zone.This is only a minor problem, but it is also likely to cause trouble. I am here for your instructions. 【１】 [1] See Fayling, The Biography of Neville Chamberlain, p. 420. September 2nd was a very tense day, but I was surprised that I didn't hear anything from Mr. Chamberlain all day.I thought maybe he was making a last-minute effort to keep the peace; it turned out to be.When it came time to sit, however, there was a brief but heated debate in which the Prime Minister's ambiguous statements angered the entire House of Commons.As Mr Greenwood rose to speak for the Labor opposition, Mr Amory, in the Conservative bench, yelled at him: Speak for Britain.This remark was greeted with loud applause.The mood in the House of Commons was undoubtedly warlike.I even think it is more resolute and united than the same scene on August 2, 1914, which I personally participated in.A number of important persons from all parties visited me that evening at my flat opposite Westminster Abbey, expressing deep apprehension lest we should fail to fulfill our obligations to Poland.The House of Commons was preparing to reconvene the following afternoon, and that evening I wrote the following letter to the Prime Minister:

September 2, 1939 In our conversation on Friday, I understood that I would be your staff member, and you told me that an announcement would be made shortly.But since then, I haven't heard anything from you.I really don't know what happened on this tense and tumultuous day; although, it seems to me, the prevailing thoughts now are quite different from the thoughts you expressed when you told me that the whole situation was decided.I fully understand that a change of approach may be necessary in order to deal with this very important European situation, but I feel I have a right to ask you to let me know, for public or private reasons, where we stand before the noon debate begins. What position.

It seems to me that if the Labor Party is distant, and as far as I know the Liberals are, it will be difficult to form an effective wartime government of the kind you refer to on such a narrow basis.I think we should make further efforts to get the Liberals in, and that the question of the organization and scope of the War Cabinet, which you have discussed with me, needs to be revisited.There is a feeling in Parliament this evening that the spirit of national unity has been damaged by the apparent weakening of our resolve.I do not underestimate the difficulties you will face in dealing with France, but I am convinced that we will now make up our own minds to set any necessary example to our French friends.In order to do this, we will need the strongest and most complete coalition government possible.I therefore beg you not to announce the names of the War Cabinet until we have another talk.

As I said in my letter to you yesterday morning, I am completely at my disposal and sincerely want to assist you in your difficult task. I later learned that the British ultimatum had been handed over to Germany at 9:30 p.m. on September 1st, followed by a second and final ultimatum at 9:00 a.m. on September 3rd.On the morning broadcast of September 3, it was announced that the Prime Minister would make a radio address at 11:15.As it now seemed certain that England and France would immediately declare war, I prepared a short speech.I think this speech is fitting for this majestic moment in our lives and in our history.

The Prime Minister's radio address tells us that we are already at war.No sooner had he finished speaking than we heard a strange, long-lasting, shrill sound, which has since become habitual.My wife came running into the room, nervous from the urgency of the situation, but she praised the swift and precise action of the Germans.The two of us went up to the roof of the apartment together to see what was going on outside.All around us, in the clear, cool September sun, the rooftops and spires of London in all directions were vividly visible. Already thirty or forty cylindrical balloons rose above these roofs and spires.We are satisfied with this clear sign of preparedness by the government.At the end of a quarter of an hour's preparatory time, which we expected to be expected, we proceeded, equipped with a bottle of brandy and other suitable medicines, to the bomb shelter allotted to us.

Our shelter, about a hundred yards down the street, was really just an open basement without even sandbags.Residents of six nearby houses had already gathered indoors.Everyone has a cheerful and witty attitude.This is the true nature of the British in the face of an uncertain future.As I stood in the doorway and gazed at the empty street and the crowded basement below, this was the image I imagined: scenes of destruction and carnage; a huge explosion that shook the ground; tall buildings collapsing into mounds of rubble The fire brigade and ambulance shuttled back and forth in the thick smoke under the sound of rumbling enemy planes.Haven't we already heard how terrible an air raid would be?The Air Ministry, of course, greatly exaggerated the power of the air strikes in order to emphasize its own importance.The pacifists have tried to exploit this fear of the public, and those of us who have urged the government to actively prepare for a superior air force, while not acknowledging the most dire predictions, have favored it as an irritant to the authorities .I know that the government prepared 25,000 hospital beds for the wounded in the air raids in the first few days of the war.In this respect at least, no underestimation has occurred.Now it's time to look at what actually happened.

After about ten minutes, the shriek sounded again.I myself am not sure whether this time the alarm was repeated, but a man came running along, shouting loudly that the alarm had been lifted.We then dispersed and each went home to do our work.I went to the House of Commons myself.The House of Commons sat duly at noon, proceeded unhurriedly in order, and said a short and solemn prayer.In Parliament, I received a note from the Prime Minister asking me to go to his chambers as soon as the debates were over.After the intense excitement and excitement of the last few days, a particularly strong sense of serenity gripped me as I sat in my seat and listened to the speeches of the MPs.I felt at peace and experienced a sense of detachment above human affairs and personal problems.Peaceful and unprepared as Britain was, she showed a momentary valor at the call of national honor; this glorious tradition of old England thrilled my whole body and mind, and seemed to raise our destiny to one A realm far removed from earthly reality and physical sensations.

When I spoke I tried, to some extent, to convey this sentiment to the House of Commons, and got a good response. Mr. Chamberlain told me that he had considered my letter; he said the Liberals had refused to join the government; Insights about the average age, and can bring it down to under sixty.This, he said, would enable him to invite me to be Secretary of the Admiralty, and to be a member of the War Cabinet.After I heard this, I was very happy, because although I never raised this point, I would certainly like to be in charge of the determined tasks, rather than being superior, making suggestions, and urging others to work.When a minister, however powerful, is not in charge of a department, it often turns out that it is easier to issue orders than to advise, and the power to act, even if limited, is more appropriate than the power to participate in general discussions.If at the outset the Prime Minister had asked me to choose between joining the War Cabinet or running the Admiralty, I would certainly have chosen the Admiralty.And now I have both.

Mr. Chamberlain said nothing about when I should be formally commissioned by the King.In fact, I didn't take up Ruyi until the fifth day.But at the beginning of the war, the Navy may have a relationship of life and death, so I informed the Admiralty and told them that I would take up my post immediately and was going to be in charge of the Ministry at six o'clock.The Admiralty was notified, and promptly and kindly signaled to the fleet that Winston was back.Thus I returned to the very office from which I left it with pain and regret almost exactly twenty-five years ago; twenty-five years ago I was dismissed as Lord Important plans for a forced landing in the Dardanelles were irreparably shattered. 【１】 [1] In 1915, Churchill advocated landing in the Dardanelles and attacking Turkey in order to outflank Germany.The battle lasted eight months, and the British and French troops suffered heavy casualties, and finally had to retreat on their own.In May of that year, Fisher's First Sea Lord resigned, and soon after, Churchill was dismissed from his position as Secretary of the Navy.translator I was sitting on the old old chair, and a few feet behind me was a wooden map box I had set up in 1911. There is still a map of the North Sea in the box, for the convenience of concentration For the most important purpose, I have ordered the Office of Naval Intelligence to mark every day on the map the movements and deployments of the German High Seas Fleet.More than a quarter of a century has passed since 1911, yet we still face the threat of persecution at the hands of the same Germany.Once again we are fighting to defend the rights of a weak nation whose innocents were invaded and devastated.Once again we rise up against all the insane violence of the brave, disciplined, and cruel people of Germany, for life and honor.We need to fight again!That being the case, let's fight! Soon the First Sea Lord came to see me.I had known Dudley Pound during my previous tenure as Lord of the Admiralty, but not very well, except that he was one of Lord Fisher's trusted staff officers.When Italy attacked Albania before, he was the commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean Fleet. At that time, I made a fierce attack on the deployment of the Mediterranean Fleet in Parliament.We now met as colleagues, and the smooth functioning of the entire apparatus of the vast Admiralty depended on our ability to maintain our intimacy and our general agreement of opinion.We viewed each other with a suspicious but friendly eye.But from those first days, our friendship and mutual trust have grown and matured.I have due appreciation and respect for Admiral Pound's professional expertise and personal greatness.In the ever-changing and unpredictable war, we have suffered great shocks together, so we have become more loyal comrades and friends.When he died four years later, in the midst of the general victory of the war against Italy, I mourned with great sorrow all the losses suffered by the Navy and the country. I spent the greater part of the evening of the third day in interviews with the Sea Lords of the Admiralty and the heads of departments, and from the morning of the fourth I dealt with naval affairs.As in 1914, prior to general mobilization, the Navy had taken precautions against surprise attacks.As early as June 15th, a large number of reserve officers and soldiers were conscripted.The reserve fleet, already manned and engaged in maneuvers, was inspected once by the king on the 9th of August; and by the 22nd the reserves of other ranks were called up.On the 24th Parliament passed the National Defense Emergency Authorization Act and at the same time ordered the fleet to move to war points; indeed, the main body of our navy had been at Scapa Flow for some weeks.After the general mobilization of the fleet was ordered, the Admiralty's plan of operations gradually unfolded smoothly; although there were some serious shortcomings, especially in the cruiser and anti-submarine ships, but also, as in 1914, in the face of When challenged, the fleet is fully capable of taking on the major tasks at hand. The reader may understand that I have a great deal of knowledge of the Admiralty and of the Royal Navy.During the four years from 1911 to 1915, during the first ten months of the serious situation, I was in charge of preparing the fleet for operations and presiding over the Admiralty.These four years have left a particularly vivid impression on my life.I have accumulated a great deal of detailed information on fleets and sea operations, and have learned many lessons.During the subsequent period I have done much research and writing on naval issues.I have spoken repeatedly in the House of Commons on these issues.I have been in close contact with the Admiralty, and though I have been their chief critic, I have been covertly involved in many of their secrets during these years.I served for four years on the Air Defense Research Board, which kept me abreast of the latest developments in radar which are now having an important impact on naval affairs.As I mentioned earlier, in June 1938, Lord Chatfield, the First Sea Lord, personally accompanied me to visit the anti-submarine school in Portland Port, and sailed to sea with a destroyer to participate in the detection of submarines with submarine detectors Active drills.I had a close friendship with the late Admiral Henderson, Chief of the Admiralty's Quartermaster until 1928, and the Secretary of the Admiralty encouraged me to discuss new battleship and cruiser designs with Lord Chatfield, so , so that I have a comprehensive understanding of the new construction of the navy.Moreover, I am, of course, familiar with the actual and potential strength, organization, and structure of our fleets, and the like with the navies of Germany, Italy, and Japan, from published accounts. My public speeches, in order to have a critical and provocative effect, must, of course, have emphasized the weaknesses and defects of our navy; My own confidence in it.It would be unfair to the Chamberlain government and its naval advisers to say that the Navy was not adequately prepared to fight Germany, or Germany and Italy.The question of how to effectively defend Australia and India against a simultaneous Japanese attack raises more serious difficulties, but at the moment such an attack is unlikely to occur, and at the same time it will probably certainly throw the United States Involved in the vortex.I felt, therefore, that I had in command, undoubtedly, one of the finest fleets in the naval operations of the world; An unpleasant accident that occurs. The current situation is by no means a repeat of the extraordinary situation in the Navy in 1914.At that time when we entered the war, the ratio of our capital ships to the enemy was 16 to 10, and the ratio of cruisers was 2 to 1.At that time, we mobilized eight combat squadrons, including eight battleships, and each squadron had a cruiser fleet and a small fleet, as well as an important independent cruiser fleet.I happily await a full-fledged engagement with a less powerful, but still more powerful fleet.Now the German navy has just begun to rebuild, and it doesn't even have the strength to form a battle formation.Although we must assume that their two huge battleships, Bismarck and Tirpitz, already violated the limits imposed by the Treaty of Versailles in terms of tonnage, they were still at least a year away from their completion date.Their light battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, which the Germans fraudulently increased from 10,000 tons to 26,000 tons, were completed in 1928.In addition, Germany has three 10,000-ton pocket battleships: Graf Spee, Admiral Scheer, and Deutschland, and two 10,000-ton fast cruisers with eight-foot-caliber guns. Six, plus sixty destroyers and smaller ships.Therefore, the enemy must not challenge our command of the sea with respect to surface ships.In strength and numbers the British navy undoubtedly possesses an overwhelming superiority over Germany, and there is absolutely no reason to think it has any shortcomings in scientific training or technology.In addition to the lack of cruisers and destroyers, the fleet has always maintained its usual high level.The task before it in the future is not how to win the battle with the enemy, but how to shoulder countless heavy tasks. My views on the strategic situation of the Navy were largely formed when I arrived at the Admiralty.It is very important for the enemy to control the Baltic Sea.For supplies from Scandinavia, for Swedish iron ore, and especially to defend the undefended northern coast of Germany (one of which was no more than a hundred miles from Berlin) from Russian attack, the German The Navy must try to control the Baltic Sea.It is my firm belief, therefore, that at this stage of the war Germany must be unwilling to compromise her control of the Baltic.It may therefore harass our shipping with submarines and merchant cruisers, or a pocket battleship, but never at the risk of sacrificing any of the ships necessary for control of the Baltic.According to the development of the German fleet at this time, it must have the control of the Baltic as its main, almost exclusive object.In order to maintain our main object of command of the seas, and to maintain our main naval offensive blockade, it is of course necessary to maintain a superior fleet in the North Sea; naval power. An air attack on the Kiel Canal, the side gate to the Baltic, which would render it unusable, even for a brief period, would significantly enhance British security. A year ago I gave Sir Inskeep an abridged discussion of this particular operation: October 29, 1938 In a war against Germany, the cutting of the Kiel Canal would be an achievement of paramount importance.On this point, I am not going to give a detailed explanation, because I think it is generally accepted by everyone.It is now up to a special technical committee to draw up plans for the attainment of this objective and, if necessary, to work out the details of changes in the plan.The Kiel Canal, because of its few locks and the lack of appreciable difference in sea levels at either end of the canal, could be quickly repaired if damaged by highly explosive bombs, even the heaviest bombs used.But if many medium bombs with timed detonators could be dropped in the canal, some within a day, some within a week, some within a month, since the time and place of their explosion are unpredictable, it would be possible to The canal was blocked, impassable to warships and important vessels, until the entire bottom of the river had been dug anew.In addition, special detonators with magnetic induction should also be considered. In view of the situation we will soon encounter, the term magnetic mine above is very noteworthy.However, no special action was taken at the time. At the outbreak of the war, the British merchant fleet totaled more than 21 million tons, about the same as in 1914.The average size of the ships is larger than before, so there are fewer of them.However, not all of this total tonnage is available for commercial use.The Navy requires auxiliary ships of various types, most of which must be called upon from the largest regular ocean-going merchant liners.All branches of defense need ships for special purposes: the Army and the Royal Air Force need ships to transport troops and equipment overseas; strategic stronghold.The tonnage required to accomplish all these objects amounts to about three million tons, to which must be added the shipping requirements of the overseas empire.By the end of 1939, after balancing gains and losses, the gross tonnage of all commercially available ships in Britain was about 15.5 million tons. Italy did not declare war.It was already evident that Mussolini was waiting for the situation to change.Until the situation is clear and our dispositions are not fully in place, we consider it prudent to divert our shipping around the Cape of Good Hope.But besides the overwhelming superiority of our own naval strength over the combined forces of the German and Italian navies, we have the mighty French fleet to our aid.The French Fleet, owing to the excellence and long administration of Admiral Darlan, has attained the greatest strength and efficiency which the French Navy has never attained since the days of the Empire.If Italy becomes an enemy country, our first battlefield must be the Mediterranean Sea.Except as a temporary expedient, I am entirely opposed to all plans of abandoning the Mediterranean, and merely closing off the two ends of this great inland sea.Our own strength, even without the assistance of the French navy and its fortified ports, is sufficient to drive the Italian ships from the Mediterranean, and to bring the navy into complete control of the Mediterranean in two months, or perhaps in a shorter time. British control of the Mediterranean must have done serious damage to Italy in a hostile position, and it might have dealt a fatal blow to her power to continue fighting.All his armies in Libya and Abyssinia will be like broken flowers in vases.France, and our troops in Egypt, may receive reinforcements at will, while her troops will be overburdened and exhausted, if not starved to death.On the other hand, if the central Mediterranean, Egypt, the Suez Canal, and French possessions are not defended, they will be exposed to the attack of the Italian army hosted by Germany.A rapid succession of major victories on this field within the first few weeks of the war will certainly have the most beneficial and beneficial effect on the main war against Germany.No resistance can stand in the way of these results in our navy and army. Before I was reinstated, I had quite easily accepted the Admiralty's opinion as to how far submarines had been defeated.Although the technical effectiveness of submarine detectors had been demonstrated during many of the first encounters with submarines, our anti-submarine means, after all, were too limited to prevent us from suffering serious losses.I once expressed my opinion at the time: in the open sea, submarines should be under control, but in the Mediterranean, they must be under control.There will inevitably be losses in the future, but it will never affect the evolution of the situation.This opinion is not incorrect.During the first year of submarine warfare, nothing significant happened.The Battle of the Atlantic still awaits in 1941 and 1942. Nor, like the prevailing opinion of the Admiralty before the war, have I underestimated the possible danger of air raids to the British ships of the war, and the consequent thwarting effect on the British ships of the war.In the months leading up to the war I wrote: In my humble opinion (for such matters are difficult to judge), the British warships, with their present armament and protection, would not be prevented by air attack from fully exerting their superior sea power.However, the obstructive effect of the air raids, though exaggerated, soon had a serious effect on the operations of our fleet.Air raids almost immediately proved to be a dire threat, especially in the Mediterranean.The island of Malta, with almost no air defense, became a problem that could not be solved immediately; on the other hand, in the first year, no British battleship was sunk due to air attack. During this period, there was no indication of any hostile actions or attempts on the part of Japan.Japan's greatest concern, of course, is the United States.In my opinion, even if the Americans themselves were not involved in the vortex of the war at this time, it seemed impossible for them to sit passively and watch Japan fully encroach on all the rights and interests of European countries in the Far East.In this case, Japan becoming an enemy, although it will cause us a lot of distress, but if it causes the United States to participate in the war, and if possible, fight only against Japan alone, the comparison of the two is more important to us. , more gain than loss.In any case, regardless of any danger in the Far East, we must not divert attention from the main European goals.We cannot protect our interests and property in the Yellow Sea from Japanese attack.If Japan goes to war, the furthest we can defend is the fortress of Singapore.Singapore must be held until the Mediterranean is secured and the Italian fleet cleared. If the fortress of Singapore is adequately garrisoned, with provisions and ammunition to last at least six months, I have no fear that Japan will send a fleet and army to conquer Singapore when war breaks out.Singapore is as far from Japan as Southampton is from New York.If Japan wants to land and lay siege to Singapore, it will have to send the main force of its fleet to escort a transport ship carrying at least 60,000 people over a distance of 3,000 miles; however, once Japan's sea line of communication is cut off , this siege is bound to end in disastrous defeat.But as soon as Japan occupied Indochina and Siam, and established a powerful army and a very strong air force just three hundred miles across the Gulf of Siam, the above views, of course, no longer apply.However, these events did not occur until a year and a half later. As long as the British navy is not defeated and we defend Singapore, it is generally considered impossible for Japan to attack Australia or New Zealand.We can give Australia a sure guarantee of their protection against the danger of aggression, but we must do so on our own course, in the order of war.It seems that once Japan becomes an enemy country, it is unlikely to send a long march force from the sea to conquer Australia and implement a colonial policy after it has smugly controlled the Yellow Sea.Japan had to maintain a large and well-armed army for a long time before the Australian troops could be feared.Such a plan would necessarily lead to a rash diversion of the Japanese fleet, and a long and slack fight in Australia.At any time, as long as a decisive victory in the Mediterranean is achieved, extremely powerful naval forces can be mobilized to cut off the contact between the invaders and their bases.On the part of the United States, it can easily tell Japan that if Japan sends its fleet and transport ships south of the equator line, it will consider it an act of war.The United States may well be interested in making such a statement; we may now test their opinion on this very remote possibility. As of the evening of September 3, 1939, the strength of the British and German fleets, including ships built and under construction, and the strength of the fleets of the United States, France, Italy, and Japan on the same basis, are given in the appendix ( 6) are listed separately.I am convinced (as the record bears witness to) that there will be no danger to Australia and New Zealand on their home soil during the first year of the World War, and that by the end of the first year we may hope that the sea enemy has been cleared . These ideas, as forecasts for the first year of naval warfare, proved accurate.I will elaborate on the major events that took place in the Far East in 1941 and 1942 at appropriate places in this book. Newspaper opinion, headed by The Times, favored the principle of forming a war cabinet of five or six cabinet members who were not responsible for the ministry.Only in this way, it is said, can a broad and coordinated view be taken of operational policy, especially its larger aspects.In short, the practice of five people only directing the war and ignoring other affairs is considered to be the most ideal. However, this method actually has many defects.Some politicians in a detached position, no matter how high their nominal authority is, are often at an extremely disadvantageous position when dealing with the ministers in charge of important departments with which they have close relations. This is especially true of members of the War Cabinet who cannot bear direct responsibility for the day-to-day conduct of business.They can take important decisions, they can make general comments beforehand, or criticize afterward.But for example, they cannot compete with the ministers of the three ministries of the sea, land and air, because the latter are familiar with the details of the problem, have the assistance of professional colleagues, and are responsible for their actions.The cabinet members of the war cabinet, if they are united, can decide everything, but among them, opinions are often not unified.They discussed and argued endlessly, while at the same time, the war blew forward by leaps and bounds.Of course, the wartime cabinet members themselves were ashamed of the responsible minister who had all the facts and figures in his hands, and dared not criticize him.They can't bear to increase the burden on those ministers who are specifically responsible for execution and command. Therefore, they become more and more theoretical supervisors and commentators; they read a lot of documents every day, but they don't know how to use their knowledge. work smoothly without causing further trouble.When disputes arise between ministries, they can often only arbitrate or seek compromise. For these reasons, the ministers responsible for the foreign and war departments should be organized members of this supreme body.Usually among the Big Five, at least some people are selected not because of their special knowledge and talents in combat, but because of their political influence.Consequently, the size of the War Cabinet began to increase far beyond the limits originally conceived.Of course, if the Prime Minister himself serves as the Minister of Defense, the number can be greatly reduced.Personally, when I preside over the state, I don't like to have cabinet members who are not in charge of the Ministry beside me.I would rather deal with ministers in charge of ministries than with advisers.Everyone should work hard every day and be responsible for some kind of precise task, so as not to cause trouble or grandstanding. The pressure of circumstances forced Mr. Chamberlain's original plans for a war cabinet to be expanded almost immediately to include Lord Halifax the Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hall the Lord Seal, Sir John Simon the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Chatfield, the Defense Coordinating Secretary, and Lord Hankey, the Minister without Ministers.除上述人員外，還增加了海陸空三部的首腦，我是其中之一，還有陸軍大臣霍爾‧貝利沙先生和空軍大臣金斯利‧伍德爵士。此外，殖民地事務大臣艾登先生和內政大臣兼國內安全大臣約翰‧安德森爵士雖非戰時內閣的正式閣員，也必須經常出席。這樣，總數為十一人。關於負責作戰的三個部的大臣加入戰時內閣的決定，大大地影響了查特菲爾德勳爵作為國防協調大臣的權威。他本於慣有的善良本性，接受了這個職位。 除我以外的所有其他閣員，在最近許多年來不是主管我們國家的政務，就是與我們現在所面臨的外交與戰爭局面有所關聯。艾登先生在一九三八年二月曾因外交政策而辭職，而我十一年以來始終不曾擔任公職。因此對於過去的事情，以及現在顯然可見的缺乏準備的情況，不負任何責任；相反地，在過去六七年中，我不斷地預言禍害即將臨頭，現在果然大部分不幸而言中了。因此，雖然現在我掌握了海軍的強大的機構，而在現階段中，唯一負實際作戰責任的，也就是海軍，但我並不感到自己有什麼不利的地方；而且即使我有什麼不利的地方，也必然會由於首相及其他同僚的善意和忠誠的支持而消除。我和所有這些閣員都很熟悉。我們大部分都曾在鮑德溫先生主持內閣期間同事過五年，而且在議會生活中變化無常的局面下，我們當然保持經常的接觸，有時關係融洽，有時則又發生爭執。然而，約翰‧西蒙爵士和我則代表老一代的政治家。在任何其他閣員擔任公職以前，我在英國歷屆政府中任職，斷斷續續的已有十五年的歷史了，而西蒙爵士也有差不多長的經歷。在第一次世界大戰的緊張時期內，我曾擔任過海軍大臣和軍需大臣。就年齡來說，雖然首相比我年長幾歲，但我幾乎是唯一的老一輩的人物。在局勢危急時，人們的普遍心理當然是要求年輕人的活力和新的觀念，而老一輩人物當權，難免會引起指責。因此，我覺得我應該盡最大的努力，以便同現在當權的一代，以及隨時可能出現的年輕而有巨大才能的新人一同工作，而不致相形落伍。在這方面，我依靠自己的知識以及一切可能的熱情和智力。 為了實現這個目標起見，我又使用一九一四年和一九一五年我在海軍部期間被迫採用的一種生活方式，而在我看來，這種方式大大地增加了我日常處理工作的能力。我在每天下午，總是盡早地上床，至少睡眠一小時，充分利用我幾乎能夠立即酣睡的能力，這種能力是一種值得慶幸的天賦。我用這種方法，能夠把一天半的工作壓縮在一天內辦完。大自然的本意，並不要求人們從早上八點鐘開始，一直工作到半夜而不在中間暫時愉快地擺脫一切，稍事休息；這種暫時的休息，哪怕只有二十分鐘也已經足夠使人的精力重新煥發。我對於每天下午都得像兒童一樣上床睡覺，感到遺憾，但我也因此得到了報酬，就是使我能通宵工作，直到第二天兩三點鐘，有時甚至還要晚些，而等到第二天八九點鐘，我又起來重新開始工作。在整個戰爭期間，我都遵守這個日常規矩，而且向別人推薦，如果在遇到需要長期地利用人體中最後的一分精力時，不妨採取這個辦法。第一海務大臣龐德海軍上將知道了我的方法以後，立即加以實行，不過，事實上，他並不上床去睡，而只是坐在扶手椅上打瞌睡。他使用這種辦法，甚至更進一步，往往在內閣會議上也入睡了。不過，只要有人提到海軍一個字，就足以使他霍然而醒，打起全副精神來；他的聽覺非常靈敏，頭腦反應很快，所以什麼事都瞞不了他。