Chapter 48 Volume 2, Chapter 6, Competing to Snatch

The traditional friendship between Britain and Italy Neutrality is in the interests of Italy and Mussolini My letter to Mussolini after I became prime minister His reply in a strong tone May 26 Renault visits London France and Britain ask President Roosevelt to intervene I ask President Roosevelt to intervene Telegram conveying the decision of the Cabinet of May 28. If Italy declares war, it is ready to attack Italy and Yugoslavia. Italy declares war. The French army blocks the attack on the Alpine positions. Letter from President Roosevelt's warning to Italy My telegram to him on June 11 Anglo-Soviet relations Molotov's congratulations on the German victory Sir Stafford Cripps was appointed ambassador to Moscow I 1940 Letter to Stalin on June 25, 1999. Loot from the Soviet Union.

The friendship between the peoples of England and Italy began from the time of Garibaldi and Cavour.Every stage of the emancipation of northern Italy from Austrian rule, every step towards unity and independence in Italy, commanded the sympathy of Victorian liberals.This has fostered an intimate and lasting sympathy.In the original Triple Alliance Treaty between Italy, Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it was agreed that Italy would not be involved in the war against Great Britain under any circumstances.In World War I, Italy's participation in the Allied Powers was most influenced by Britain.The rise of Mussolini and the establishment of Fascism as anti-Bolshevism, in its first stages, divided British public opinion into factions, but did not affect the broad basis of friendship between the two peoples.We have seen that before Mussolini's plans to invade Abyssinia were seriously debated, he joined Britain in opposing Hitlerism and German ambitions.I have spoken in a previous volume of how Baldwin/Chamberlain's policy towards Abyssinia brought the worst out of both our continents; His power; spoke of how much the League of Nations had been damaged by the failure to save Abyssinia.We also see that, during the period of appeasement, Mr. Chamberlain, Sir Samuel Hall and Lord Halifax made sincere and fruitless efforts to reconcile with Mussolini .Finally, Mussolini grew confident that the British sun had set and that Italy's future could be built on the ruins of the British Empire with the help of Germany.The Berlin-Roman Axis followed, and from this it was evident that Italy would be expected to join the war against England and France on the first day of the war.

Mussolini, with a little prudence, must have seen how the war would turn out before committing himself and his country irrevocably.There is absolutely no benefit in adopting the method of waiting.Both sides were fighting for Italy, whose interests were fully respected by the other nations, which made many favorable agreements, and which bought time to improve its armaments.Thus, months of uncertainty passed.Had Italy maintained this policy, its fate is open to speculation.The United States could use its large Italian-American vote to make it clear to Hitler that trying to draw Italy to his side by force would have dire consequences.Peace, prosperity, and growing power can be found in maintaining neutrality.Once Hitler got into trouble with Russia, this happy state of affairs could be extended almost indefinitely, with increasing benefits; whether in peace or in the year when the war was about to end, Mussolini would become the sun-drenched Only the wisest statesman in the history of the peninsula and its industrious and wealthy people.This situation was much better than the actual situation he encountered later.

In the years after 1924, when I was Chancellor of the Exchequer in Baldwin's cabinet, I did my best to preserve the traditional friendship between Italy and Great Britain.The settlement of my debts, which I have agreed upon with Count Volpi, is much more favorable than that which was adopted with France.This leader has expressed to me my most heartfelt thanks, and it was with great difficulty that I declined his highest honor.Besides, no one doubted on which side my sympathies and convictions were on in the conflict between Fascism and Bolshevism.When I met Mussolini twice in 1927, our personal relationship was close and harmonious.On the Abyssinian question, I shall never encourage England to break with him, or the League of Nations against him, unless we finally go to extremes and prepare for war.As for my idea of ​​rearmamenting Britain's armaments, although he was very happy because British public opinion did not support my idea, he, like Hitler, understood and respected this idea very much.

We are now in the midst of a catastrophic defeat in France, and it is obviously my duty, as Prime Minister, to do my best to keep Italy out of the war; and though I have no great illusions, I immediately employ all my resources All means and influence have done so.Six days after I became head of the government, I wrote an appeal letter to Mussolini, at the request of the cabinet; this letter, together with his reply, was published two years later under very different circumstances. . prime minister to mr mussolini May 16, 1940 Now that I am Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, looking back on our meeting in Rome, I wish to express my friendship to you, leader of the Italian nation, across the gulf that seems to be rapidly widening.Is it too late to stop the bloodshed between the British and Italian peoples?A discord between our two nations will surely see us kill each other, hurt both, and cloud the Mediterranean Sea.If you insist on this, it will be so; but I declare that I was never an enemy of the great Italy, nor did I have any intention of opposing the Italian legislators.It is hard to predict the course of the great war now raging in Europe, but I am sure that whatever happens on the Continent, England will hold out to the end as in the past, even if alone, and I am somewhat sure of it, Believe that we will receive increasing assistance from the United States, and indeed from all countries in America.

Believe me, it is not because of weakness or fear that I make this solemn appeal, as will be recorded in history.Above all other demands of the centuries was the cry that the joint heirs of Latin and Christian civilization must not be caught in a life-and-death struggle.Hear this, and I implore you with all honor and respect, before the dire signal is given.We should never send such a signal. The reply was lukewarm.The merit of this letter is at least that it speaks frankly. Mr. Mussolini to the Prime Minister May 18, 1940 I answer your letter in order to tell you that you must be aware of the great historical and accidental reasons which have brought our two countries into hostile camps.Without going back too far, I would like to remind you that your government was the first to propose sanctions against Italy in Geneva in 1935, when Italy was only trying to gain a small space in the African sun, and it did not harm The interests and territories of your country or other countries.I would also like to remind you of the real situation of slavery in Italy in its own territorial waters.If your government declares war on Germany to add honor to your signature, know that whatever happens, the same sense of honor and dignity that we have for the Italian-German Treaty will guide Italy today and tomorrow policy.

From this time on we had no doubts that Mussolini intended to enter the war when it was best for him.In fact, when the defeat of the French army became obvious, he followed suit.He told Ciano on May 13 that he would declare war on France and Great Britain within a month.On May 29 he informed the Italian Chiefs of Staff that he had formally decided to declare war at any time after June 5.At Hitler's request, the date of the declaration of war was extended to June 10. On May 26th, the fate of the northern armies was at stake, and no one was sure which troops would be able to escape; at this time, Raynor flew to England to discuss with us this question that was also on our minds.Italy may declare war at any time, which must be expected.In this way, another front will be ignited in France.A new enemy will come upon it like a wolf from the south.How could Mussolini be induced to change his mind?This is the current problem.I thought there was nothing to be done, and the French Prime Minister thought it would be possible to try, but every argument he gave only convinced me that there was no hope of success.Renault, however, is under great pressure at home, while on our part we would like to take full account of the situation of our ally, whose only weapon of preservation is its army, which is collapsing.Reynaud has published the whole course of his visit to England, especially describing his conversation in detail [1].Lord Halifax, Mr Chamberlain, Mr Attlee and Mr Eden also participated in our talks.Although it is not necessary to enumerate serious facts, M. Reynaud stated in no uncertain terms that it was possible for France to withdraw from the war.He himself wanted to fight, but there was always the possibility that he might soon be replaced by someone with a different character.

[1] Reynolds: "France Saved Europe", Vol. II, p. 200. On the advice of the French government, we jointly requested President Roosevelt's intervention on May 25.In a letter to Roosevelt, Britain and France authorized him to state: We understand that Italy has a grudge against us in the territorial question in the Mediterranean area, and we intend to consider immediately any reasonable demand; the Allies will allow Italy to status to participate in peace conferences; and we will invite the President to oversee the implementation of all agreements now reached.The President complied; but his speech was rejected with extreme rudeness by the Italian dictator.We've already had an answer from the President when we've been talking with Reynolds.The French prime minister has now offered a more explicit proposal.Obviously, if his proposals were used to correct the enslavement of Italy in its own territorial waters, it would certainly affect the position of Gibraltar and Suez.France is prepared to make similar concessions on Tunisia.

We cannot express the slightest sympathy with such opinions.Not because they should not be considered, nor because at this moment the cost of keeping Italy out of the war did not seem worthwhile.My own feeling is that, given our current situation, if we were defeated, Mussolini could have taken everything himself, or Hitler could have given it to him.It's hard to bargain with people when you're dying.Once friendly mediated negotiations begin with the leader, we undermine our ability to continue fighting.I found that my colleagues were very determined and unwavering.Our thinking was more on bombing Milan and Turin as soon as Mussolini declared war and seeing how he reacted.Reynaud had no objection in his mind, and seemed to be persuaded by us, or at least satisfied with what we had to say.The most we can allow him is to bring the question to the Cabinet and give him a definite answer the next day.Renault and I dined alone at the Admiralty.The following cable, much of which is my own wording, embodies the conclusions of the War Cabinet:

Prime Minister to Mr Renault May 28, 1940 1. My colleagues and I have studied with the utmost care and sympathy the proposals you have sent me today for certain definite concessions to Mr. Mussolini, fully aware of the grave situation before us both. 2. Since we last discussed the matter, a new incident has taken place, namely the surrender of the Belgian army, which has greatly worsened our position, since it is clear that the withdrawal of the troops of General Blanchard and General Gott from the Channel ports , has become a big problem.The first effect of such an unfortunate event is that at such a time it is impossible for Germany to offer any acceptable terms, and neither we nor you are willing to sacrifice our independence before the war is over.

3. Lord Halifax, in his proposal last Sunday, suggested that if Mussolini would cooperate with us, all European problems would be resolved, thereby securing our independence and establishing a just and lasting peace for Europe basis, we are ready to discuss its requirements in the Mediterranean.He is now proposing certain special concessions which I do not think will impress Mr. Mussolini, and which, once made, will be very difficult to withdraw and induce him to act as a mediator. human being, and the proposal we discussed last Sunday called for him to fill that role. 4. My colleagues and I believe that Mr. Mussolini has already considered that he will assume this role at the last moment; there is no doubt that he wants to obtain a good deal for Italy in the process of mediation.But we believe that Mussolini's proposal for a conference is unlikely to succeed at this moment, when Hitler is elated with victory and certainly believes that the Allied resistance is about to collapse quickly and completely.I may also remind you that our joint request to the President of the United States has received a completely negative reply, and that Lord Halifax's proposal to the Italian Ambassador to England last Saturday has not received a reply either. 5. Therefore, while we do not exclude the possibility of negotiations with Mussolini at some point, we do not believe that the It would have an extremely dangerous effect on the now steadfast morale of our people.You will be the best judge of the effect on France. 6. You may ask how to improve this situation?My reply is that if we still show strong confidence after losing the support of our two (Northern) armies and our Belgian allies, we can immediately strengthen our negotiating position and win the praise of the United States, May also receive material assistance from the United States.Furthermore, we felt that as long as our two countries stood together, our invincible navy and air force (which destroyed a staggering number of German fighters and bombers every day) could continue to exert pressure on German domestic life for our common good. 7. We have reason to believe that the Germans are also buying time, and that their losses, their difficulties, and the fear of our air raids are weakening their courage.If we rush to admit defeat, we will lose the opportunity to win the glorious outcome of the war in an instant, and thus make a tragedy. 8. As far as I can see, we can save ourselves from the fate of either Denmark or Poland if our two countries hold out to the end.Our success must rest first on our unity and second on our courage and patience. This did not prevent the French government from directly proposing territorial concessions to Italy a few days later, which Mussolini treated with contempt.Ciano told the French ambassador on June 3 that Mussolini was not interested in the proposal to recover any territory from France through peaceful negotiations.He has decided to declare war on France. [1] This is exactly what we expected. [1] Reynolds: "France Saves Europe", Vol. II, p. 209. I am now sending out a series of daily instructions in order to be ready to respond immediately to such a heinous attack from Mussolini. prime minister to general ismay May 28, 1940 1. Please send the following instructions to the Chiefs of Staff Committee: Once Italy entered the war, what did we do to attack the Italian troops in Abyssinia, to support the Abyssinian rebels with muskets and money, and to generally harass the country? I know that General Smuts has sent a South African Union brigade to East Africa.Has the brigade arrived?When can I arrive?Any other arrangements?How strong is the Khartoum garrison, including those in Blue Nile?This was the opportunity for the Abyssinians to liberate themselves with the assistance of the Allies. 2. If, after the declaration of war by Italy, France remains our ally, it would seem very expedient for the combined Anglo-French fleet to launch an active offensive against Italy, operating from both ends of the Mediterranean.It is important to engage the Italian navy and air force simultaneously at the outset of the war in order to see what their capabilities really are and whether they have changed since the last war.The purely defensive strategy contemplated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet should not be accepted.Unless it was found that the fighting strength of Italy was strong, the fleet at Alexandria should charge forward and take some risk, rather than maintain an obvious defensive posture.When the time comes, risky action must be taken on every battlefield. 3. I think that if France declares neutrality, the Admiralty has a plan to deal with it. Prime Minister to General Ismay (and others) May 29, 1940 We must transfer eight battalions back from Palestine as soon as possible.I don't think troop carriers can pass through the Mediterranean.So there is only a choice between the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.One of the two routes (through the desert to the Persian Gulf) can be studied this afternoon, and the Admiralty should be consulted. Please report to me the time required and the security situation.Australian troops may remain in Palestine for the time being, but the High Commissioner, like others, must be subject to the highest needs of the country. It is for the Admiralty to decide whether or not it is possible to transport these soldiers from the Cape of Good Hope at great speed by courier. prime minister to secretary of the navy May 30, 1940 Once Italy declared war, what steps were we taking to seize all her ships?How many Italian ships are there in English ports, and what to do with Italian ships at sea and in foreign ports?Please forward this letter to the relevant departments immediately. At the above-mentioned Supreme Military Conference in Paris on May 31, it was agreed that the Allies should take offensive action against selected targets in Italy as soon as possible, and that the French and British naval and air personnel should consult their plan of. We also agreed that, in the event of an Italian invasion of Greece (as there were signs of it), we should keep Crete out of enemy hands.I went on to make that point in the memo. Prime Minister to Air Secretary and Chief of Air Staff June 2, 1940 In view of the (possible) attacks on Lyon and Marseilles, it is vital that we hit Italy back with our heavy bombers when war is declared.I therefore consider that these heavy bomber squadrons should be flown to airfields in the south of France as soon as French permission is obtained and the logistical forces are ready to receive them. Please bring your proposals to me in tonight's meeting. Prime Minister to Air Secretary and Chief of Air Staff June 6, 1940 It is of the utmost importance that we attack Italy as soon as war breaks out or when an insolent ultimatum is received.Please inform me of the correct location of the logistics unit bound for the airport in the south of France. Ciano was particularly in favor of an earlier Italian plan that limited Italian action in Europe to an attack on Yugoslavia, which would both consolidate Italy's power in Eastern Europe and strengthen her potential economic position.Mussolini himself was momentarily moved by the idea.Graziani writes that the leader told him in late April: We must bring Yugoslavia to its knees; we need raw materials and we must find them in its mines.Therefore, my strategic instructions are: take the defensive in the west (France) and the offensive in the east (Yugoslavia).Be prepared to do research on this question. [1] Graziani said that he had tried his best to advise the Italian army not to repeat the mistakes of the 1915 Battle of Isonzo due to the lack of equipment, especially the lack of artillery.Political arguments were also made against plans to attack Yugoslavia.Germany was trying to avoid disturbing Eastern Europe at this time.They feared prodding Britain into action in the Balkans and possibly inadvertently inducing further Russian activity in Eastern Europe.I was not aware of this aspect of Italian policy at the time. [1] Graziani: "Defense of the Motherland" (Ho Difesola Patria), p. 189. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary June 6, 1940 Previously, I had objected to fighting Yugoslavia because Italy attacked (if it attacked at all), and I wanted to see if this would be a serious blow to Yugoslav independence, or if Italy was simply going to The Cajun seized some naval bases, however the situation has changed.Italy is constantly threatening to fight Britain and France, and not from the back door.Our break with Italy was imminent for reasons which had nothing to do with Yugoslavia, so it seemed that our main course would be best to use this opportunity to mobilize the Balkans.Have you considered this question? Despite the best efforts of the United States (Hull has a touching account of this in his memoirs [1]), they failed to change Mussolini's mind.When the final moment came, we were well prepared to deal with this new attack and dispute.At 4:45 p.m. on June 10, the Italian Foreign Minister informed the British Ambassador that Italy believed it had been at war with the United Kingdom since midnight that day.A similar note was sent to the French government. When Ciano handed the note to the French ambassador François Ponce, Mr. François Ponce walked towards the door and said: You will also find that the Germans are difficult masters.From his balcony in Rome, Mussolini announced to the organized crowd that Italy was at war with France and England.It is said that Ciano later argued that this is a chance that only happens once in five thousand years.Although such opportunities are rare, they are not necessarily good opportunities. [1] Memoirs of Hull, Volume I, Chapter 56 Italy immediately attacked the French army in the Alps, and Great Britain immediately declared war on Italy.The five Italian ships blocked at Gibraltar were captured, and the Navy was ordered to intercept all Italian ships at sea and bring them to ports under our control.On the night of the twelfth our bomber fleet took off from England and dropped their first bombs on Turin and Milan after a long (i.e. light) flight.We expect that when we are able to make use of the airport of Marseilles in France, we will have much heavier bombs at our disposal. It may be convenient here to speak briefly of the Franco-Italian campaign.France can only assemble three divisions and another fortress force equivalent to a little more than three divisions to resist the attacks of the Western Italian Army from the Alps and the Riviera.The army consisted of thirty-two divisions under the command of Prince Umberto.Moreover, the strong German armor, rapidly descending the Rhone Valley, was about to cut across the French rear.Even so, the Italians were resisted, held back even at every point of the new front by the French Alpine forces, and were unable to advance even after Paris had fallen and Lyon had fallen to the Germans.When Hitler and Mussolini met in Munich on June 18, the Italian leader had little to brag about.Accordingly, Italy launched a new offensive on June 20.The French Alpine positions, however, proved invulnerable, and the main Italian attack on Nice stalled on the outskirts of Menton.Although the French army preserved its honor on the southeastern frontier, Germany took its retreat from the south, thus preventing them from fighting, and the armistice with Germany also included France's request to Italy to cease hostilities. Action terms. My account of Italian tragedy may perhaps be concluded with a letter written to me by the unfortunate Ciano shortly before his father-in-law ordered his execution. Mr. Churchill: verona December 23, 1943 You may not be surprised that when I was near my death, I wanted to say a few words to you, because I admired you very much, and regarded you as a crusader, although you once said to me unjust words. I was never an accomplice to Mussolini in crimes against the fatherland and against humanity, in fighting alongside the Germans.On the contrary, if I disappeared in Rome last August it was because the Germans had convinced me that my children were in imminent danger.They promised to send me to Spain, but deported me and my family to Bavaria against my will.I have now been in prison in Verona for almost three months, brutally abused by the SS.My end is near.I was told that my death would be decided in a few days, but it seemed to me that this would just save me from this daily misery.I would rather die than see Italy suffer disgrace and irreparable damage under German pawns. I now atone for my sins: I have witnessed and deeply hate the ruthless and ruthless preparations made by Hitler and the Germans to start this war. I was the only foreigner who saw in the Chamber of Secrets these vicious gangs preparing to plunge the world into a bloody battle.As is the custom of gangsters, they now planned to suppress a dangerous witness.But they were wrong, because I had stored my diary and various documents in a safe place long ago.They testify more than I do to the crimes committed by these men, and to the fact that later Mussolini, a pathetic and base puppet, joined their ranks for his vanity and his disregard for moral worth. I have arranged that these papers (which Sir Percy Lorne knew of when he was in Rome) should be published by the Allied papers as soon as possible after my death. Perhaps I have but little to offer you today, but this is all I have, and my life, to give to the cause of liberty and justice, which I deeply believe will be won. This testimony of mine should be published, let the world know, let the world hate and remember it, and let those who judge the future not overlook this fact: It is not the fault of its people that Italy has suffered misfortune, but the shameful act of one man. your honest ge ciano President Roosevelt delivered a speech on the night of the 10th.I heard this speech with a group of officers in the War Room of the Admiralty, where I was still at the Admiralty, about midnight.He vehemently denounced Italy, saying: On June 10, 1940, a dagger-wielding man thrust his dagger into the back of his neighbor, when there was a cry of satisfaction in the room.I don't know how Italian-Americans voted in the upcoming presidential election, but I do know that Roosevelt was an experienced American party statesman who was never afraid to take risks in order to achieve his resolutions.It was a beautiful speech, full of emotion and with a message of hope.While I was deeply impressed, I wrote to the President to express my thanks before going to bed. former navy personnel to president roosevelt June 11, 1940 We all listened to you last night, and the great vision of your manifesto strengthened our faith. .Your statement that the United States will provide material assistance to struggling allies is a powerful encouragement to allies in dark but not yet desperate times.Everything must be done to keep France fighting and to prevent any notion that the fall of Paris would be an occasion for negotiation.The hope you inspire in them will give them the strength to persevere.They should continue to defend every inch of their territory and use the full fighting strength of their Army.In this way, Hitler, who wants a quick victory, will be frustrated and turn to us. We are now preparing to resist his fierce flames and defend our homeland.With the rescue of the British Expeditionary Force, we have no shortage of troops at home, and the divisions will be sent to France as soon as they are better equipped for the military needs of the Continent. Our intention is to have a strong army fighting in France for the war of 1941.I have cabled you about aircraft, including airships, which are very much needed in the present struggle for the life and death of Great Britain, but destroyers are more urgently needed.The brutality of Italy necessitates destroyers for more submarines which may enter the Atlantic and, perhaps, establish their bases in Spanish ports.The only ships that can deal with submarines are destroyers.The most important thing for us is to get the thirty or forty old destroyers you have reequipped for us.We can quickly fit them with our submarine detectors, which make up for our ships for six months before our wartime new builds are launched.Whenever you need these ships, please notify us six months in advance, and we will definitely return the original ships or ships of equal value to you without delay. The next six months are the most critical.If we were to defend the East Coast from enemy invasion while at the same time dealing with serious new attacks on our merchant shipping by German and Italian submarines, it would be beyond our power, and the oceanic communications on which we depend might be cut off.Not a single day is to be lost.My colleagues and I would like to express our heartfelt thanks for all that you are doing and wanting to do in what we should truly call our common cause. A scramble begins, but Mussolini is not the only hungry wolf vying for food.Partnering with wolves are bears. In a previous volume I had dealt with Anglo-Soviet relations up to the outbreak of the war and the beginning of hostilities, when Soviet-British-French relations were virtually on the verge of breaking down during the Russian invasion of Finland.At this time, Germany and Russia cooperated as closely as their deeply conflicting interests allowed.As totalitarians, Hitler and Stalin had much in common, and their systems of government were similar.On every important occasion, Molotov greeted the German ambassador Count Schulenburg with a smile, boldly and meanly endorsed German policy and praised Hitler's military measures.When Germany attacked Norway, he said (April 7th): The Soviet government understood that Germany was compelled to take such measures; said the British had indeed gone too far; It was completely successful in its defenses. [1] On the morning of May 10, Hitler took pains to inform Stalin of the start of his offensive against France and the neutral Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg.Schulenburg wrote: I visited Molotov.He appreciated the news, adding that he understood that Germany must defend itself against British and French attacks.He has no doubts that we will be successful. 【２】 [1] "Nazi｜Soviet Relations, 1939｜1941", p. 138. [2] Ibid., p. 142. Although the meaning of what they said will of course not be known until the end of the war, we have no illusions about the attitude of Russia.We still followed a policy of patience, trying to re-establish a relationship of mutual trust with Russia, pinning our hopes on the development of events and the fundamental antagonism between Russia and Germany.We thought it wise to make use of the talents of Sir Stafford Cripps as Ambassador to Moscow.He was willing to accept the bleak and hopeless task.At that time we did not fully appreciate that the Communists of the Soviet Union hated politicians of the extreme left more than they hated conservatives or liberals.The closer one was to communism emotionally, the more loathed the Soviets were, unless one joined the party. The Soviet government agreed to accept Cripps as ambassador, explaining the step to their fellow Nazis.On May 29 Schulenburg reported to Berlin that the Soviet Union would like to exchange timber for British rubber and tin.Cripps's mission to the USSR has no cause for uneasiness, since there is no reason to doubt the Soviet Union's loyalty to us, and since the USSR does not change the direction of its policy towards Britain, it is in no way detrimental to Germany or its vital interests .There is nothing here to lead one to believe that recent German successes have aroused consternation or fear of Germany in the Soviet government. 【１】 [1] "Nazi｜Soviet Relations, 1939｜1941", p. 143. 法國的崩潰和法軍的毀滅以及西方一切勢力均衡的破壞，應該會在斯大林的頭腦裡產生某種反應的，但是蘇聯的領袖們似乎對他們自己的危險沒有任何警覺。在六月十八日法國遭到全面失敗時，舒倫堡報告說：莫洛托夫今晚請我到他的辦公室去，代表蘇聯政府對德國武裝力量的偉大成就表示最熱烈的祝賀。 【１】 從這時起，差不多正好在一年之後，同一武裝力量，完全出乎蘇聯政府的意料之外，把瀑布似的炮火和鋼鐵傾瀉在俄國的領土上。我們現在才知道，希特勒在一九四○年擊敗法國僅僅四個月之後，便毅然決定了要對蘇聯進行殲滅戰，那些曾經一度被蘇聯熱烈祝賀過的德軍，向東方開始了路程遙遠、規模龐大、秘密佈置的進軍。蘇聯政府和它的共產黨代理人以及它遍佈世界的夥伴們對他們錯誤的估計和過去的行徑進行回顧之後，不能不高呼開闢第二戰場；曾被他們認為注定要遭受毀滅和奴役的英國，卻在這第二戰場中要扮演主要的角色。 【１】同上，第一百五十四頁。 然而，我們比那些冷酷無情的策劃人更能真實地洞察未來，比他們自己更了解他們的危險和他們的利益。這時我第一次向斯大林寫信。 首相致斯大林先生 一九四○年六月二十五日 當此歐洲面貌時刻都在變化的時候，我願乘你接見英皇陛下的新大使的機會，請他轉交我本人寫給你的一封信。 從地理上看，我們兩國位於歐洲的兩端，再從政治制度來看，可以說我們兩國代表著極不相同的政治思想體系，但是我相信，這些事實不會妨礙我們兩國之間的關係在國際範圍中達成和諧與互利。 必須承認，在過去（誠然是在最近的過去）我們的關係由於互相猜疑而受到危害。去年八月，蘇聯政府決定，為了蘇聯的利益，應該中止與我們的談判而與德國結成密切的關係，因此，德國幾乎是在成為我國的敵人的同時成了貴國的朋友。 但是從那時起便發生了一種新的因素，使我敢於設想，我們兩國都願意重新建立以前的聯繫，以便在必要時，我們能就那些必然與我們雙方都有利害關係的歐洲事務進行商談。 目前擺在全歐洲（我們兩國也包括在內）面前的問題就是歐洲的國家和人民對於德國在大陸建立霸權的形勢將如何反應。 由於我們兩國都不是位於歐洲之中而是位於它的兩端，所以我們擁有一種特殊的地位。其他國家在地理位置上沒有我們幸運，因此我們能夠比它們更好地抵抗德國的霸權；正如你所知道的，英國政府的確想利用其地理位置和龐大資源來達到這一目的。 事實上，大不列顛的政策集中於兩個目的，一個是使英國免遭納粹政府企圖強加在它頭上的日耳曼統治；另一個是把歐洲的其餘部分從德國正在強加給它的統治中解放出來。 德國目前試圖在歐洲建立霸權是否威脅蘇聯的利益，這只有待蘇聯自己來判斷。如果威脅的話，應該用什麼最好的辦法來保衛，也只能由你們自己決定，但是我已感覺到，歐洲（實際是全世界）目前經歷的危機是如此嚴重，因此，我認為應將英國政府所感受到的情況如實地向你坦白陳述。我希望這樣做可以保證：蘇聯政府在與斯‧克里普斯爵士的任何商談中，對英皇陛下政府的政策，或者對英國政府準備就德國目前試圖在歐洲推行分階段征服與吞併的嚴密計劃而引起的廣泛問題與蘇聯政府進行充分磋商的願望，不至有所誤解。 當然沒有答覆，我也並未期待答覆。斯塔福德‧克里普斯爵士平安到達莫斯科，並與斯大林舉行了一次純屬禮儀性的冷淡的會見。 在這個時候，蘇聯政府正忙於攫取擄獲物。在六月十四日，即巴黎陷落那天，莫斯科對立陶宛下了最後通牒，指控它和其他波羅的海國家對蘇聯搞軍事陰謀，要求它徹底改組政府並作軍事上的讓步。六月十五日，紅軍進犯立陶宛，斯梅托納總統逃往東普魯士。拉脫維亞和愛沙尼亞遭到同樣的待遇。必須立即成立親蘇政府並准許蘇軍進駐這些小國。抵抗是談不到的。拉脫維亞的總統被放逐到俄國，維辛斯基先生到來，指定了一個臨時政府，辦理新的選舉。在愛沙尼亞也如法炮製。 六月十九日，日丹諾夫到達塔林，建立了同樣的政權。從八月三日到六日，拿掉了親蘇的友好的和民主的政府的假幌子，克里姆林宮將波羅的海各國並入蘇聯。 俄國對羅馬尼亞的最後通牒於六月二十六日夜十時送交羅馬尼亞駐莫斯科的公使。要求割讓比薩拉比亞和布科維納省北部，並要求於第二天立即答覆。德國雖然被俄國的這種威脅了它在羅馬尼亞的經濟利益的突然行動所激怒，但受到了一九三九年八月的德蘇條約的約束；該條約承認俄國在東南歐這些地區享有獨佔的政治利益，因此，德國政府遂勸羅馬尼亞屈服了。六月二十七日，羅馬尼亞部隊從上述兩個省撤退，羅馬尼亞領土淪入俄國之手。蘇聯武裝部隊現在牢牢駐紮在波羅的海沿岸和多瑙河河口。