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Chapter 62 Volume II, Chapter XX, American Destroyers and Bases in the West Indies

Memoirs of the Second World War 邱吉爾 12488Words 2023-02-05
I demand the role of fifty American destroyers Lord Lothian My telegram to the President on July 31 We are willing to lease bases in the West Indies with the United States I am opposed to haggling over the fleet August 15th Telegram to the President President's Statement My Speech to Parliament on August 22 Telegram to the President on August 22 Telegram to the President on August 27 Telegram to the President on August 27 Our Final Proposals for the United Kingdom The Fleet offered assurances to Parliament on 5 September. As mentioned earlier, in my first telegram to President Roosevelt on May 15th after I became Prime Minister, I requested the borrowing of forty or fifty of your older destroyers to make up for the loss of our existing ships and our losses from the war. The gap before the large number of new ships that were built at the beginning came into service.By this time next year, we will have enough ships.But if, during this gap, Italy joins in and attacks us with a hundred submarines, we may be on the verge of collapse.I revisited the matter in my telegram of June 11, after Italy had declared war on us.For us, the most important thing is to get your thirty or forty old destroyers that have been reequipped.We can quickly equip them with our submarine detectors.The next six months are the most critical.By the end of July we were alone and engaged in a fateful air battle, and in view of the immediate possibility of an enemy invasion after the air battle, I resubmitted my request.I am fully aware of the President's good intentions and his difficulties, so I try to explain to him, in candid terms in every telegram, that if Britain collapses and Hitler dominates Europe and controls all the shipyards and navies in Europe, Then the United States will be in a dangerous situation.

During the discussions on the matter, it became apparent that my telegrams in June were popular among senior American officials by emphasizing the serious consequences for the United States if the enemy landed and conquered England. played a considerable role.Washington demands assurances from us that we will never surrender the British fleet to Germany under any circumstances.We are, of course, prepared to offer that pledge in the most solemn manner.Now that we are ready to sacrifice, we are not afraid to make a pledge.However, on the eve of the imminent landing of the enemy and the height of the air combat, I would not have encouraged the Germans to know that we had conceived such an eventuality.What's more, by the end of August, our situation had greatly improved.The entire regular army has been reorganized and re-equipped on a considerable scale.The National Guard was actively engaged in activities.We have inflicted severe losses on the Luftwaffe, and our capabilities have far outstripped our ability to defend ourselves.The arguments which had given me confidence in the defense of the enemy's invasion during June and July were doubly convincing by September.

At this time we had a distinguished and influential ambassador in Washington.I have known Philip Kerr since 1919, when Lloyd George was in power, and even before that, and he has now inherited the title as Marquess of Lothian.From Versailles to Munich, and more recently, we tend to disagree on many issues.As the situation became increasingly tense, Losian not only had a broad understanding of the situation, but also a far-reaching vision.When France collapsed, the Marquess of Lothian had carefully considered the serious implications of my telegrams to the President concerning the possible fate of the British fleet if England had been invaded and conquered by the enemy.He urged the heads of state in Washington to take the matter to heart, and they were shaken, sympathetic not only to Britain and its cause, but above all, of course, to the survival and security of the United States.

Lothian was troubled by the last paragraph of my speech in the House of Commons on the 4th of June, when I said: We shall never surrender, not even if our island, or a great part of it, were subjugated and starved. Never believed this to happen Our imperial subjects overseas, armed and protected by the British fleet, will also continue to fight until the new world, in God's due time, brings forth all its might to save and liberate this old world.He thought these words would encourage those who believed that even if England were conquered, her fleet would sail across the Atlantic to them.Readers know that the phraseology I use behind the scenes is quite different.At that time, I explained our position to the foreign secretary and the ambassador.

Prime Minister to Lord Lothian June 9, 1940 The last paragraph of my speech is, of course, mainly addressed to Germany and Italy, for whom the thought of a war between two continents and a protracted war is at present very unpleasant; it is also addressed to the Dominions, We are their trustees.Nevertheless, I have always taken your words to heart and have mentioned your views in several cables to the President and MacKenzie King.If Great Britain fell, a German-friendly government could obtain far more lenient terms from Germany by surrendering the British fleet, making Germany and Japan the masters of the new world.His Majesty's present advisers would never do such a cowardly thing, but if a Quisling-style puppet government is established, they will certainly do it, and perhaps they can only do it. The President should know this.You should convey this to the President, so as to dissuade the United States from thinking that according to their current policy, they can pick up the remnants of the British Empire.On the contrary, they ran a dire risk that their naval power would be completely overwhelmed by the enemy's navy.Moreover, the islands and naval bases that make the United States feared by the enemy will also be taken by the Nazis.If we fail, Hitler will have a great opportunity to conquer the world.

I hope the above points will help you in your conversations with people. A month later, still no results.Then the ambassador sent an encouraging telegram.He said (July 56) that American visionaries are at last beginning to feel that if the war goes against me and they remain neutral, they are in danger of losing the British fleet altogether, however, unless guaranteed, once the United States enters the war , the British Fleet, or what remains of it, would have sailed across the Atlantic in the event of Great Britain's defeat, otherwise it would be extremely difficult to get American public opinion to consider us acquiring American destroyers.

At the end of July, I was under increasing pressure in many ways at the same time, so I brought this matter up again. former navy personnel to president roosevelt July 31, 1940 It's been a while since I last took the liberty of sending you a personal telegram, and a lot has happened, good and bad.Now is the time of utmost urgency, please let us acquire the destroyers, launches and airships which we have previously requested.The Germans have occupied the entire coast of France, from where they can send submarines and dive bombers to attack our merchant ships and food transport ships. In addition, our navy has to be constantly prepared to repel possible attacks from the English Channel, and to deal with the attack from Norway. Attacks in Ireland, Iceland, Shetland and the Faroe Islands.Besides this we shall control the outlets of the Mediterranean, and if possible the whole of this inland sea, so as to prevent the conflagration from spreading seriously to Africa.

We are already building a large number of destroyers and submersibles, but we will simply not have enough ships for the next three or four months, as I told you in my last telegram.Recent enemy air raids have caused important losses to our ships. In the last ten days we have sunk the following destroyers: Brazen, Codrinton, Dewright, Wren, and have been wounded: Hound, Schooner, Radiant , Griffin, Montrose, Walpole, Whiteside, a total of eleven ships.All this happened before the enemy attempted to land!Destroyers are vulnerable to bombing by enemy aircraft, but they must cruise in areas under air attack to prevent attacks from the sea.We cannot long sustain such losses as we are present, and if we do not receive strong reinforcements the war will be defeated by this secondary and easily compensated factor.

I have told you frankly our present situation, and I am sure that, now that you have seen our situation, you will do everything in your power to send us at once fifty or sixty of your oldest destroyers.We were able to equip them very quickly with submarine detectors for use against submarines in the Western Passage, thus enabling us to deploy newer and better gunned ships in the English Channel against enemy invasion.Mr. President, it is with all respect that I say to you that in the long history of the world, this is the present imperative.We will build a large number of ships in 1941, but the crisis will come long before 1941.I know you will use your powers to the fullest, but I feel qualified and obliged to present to you the gravity and urgency of the situation.

If destroyers are given, please also give us very useful motorboats and airships. I began to feel that if we could get through the next three or four months, the future of the war was very promising.Air combat is going well.We have defeated the enemy's air raids and bombed Germany, dealing a heavy blow to Hitler.However, the loss of our destroyers to enemy air raids was so great that we were unable to protect the transatlantic food shipments and merchant shipping routes. Tonight the latest convoy of rifles, cannon and ammunition is about to arrive. Special vehicles were waiting to deliver the weapons to the troops and the National Guard, who would never lay down the weapons without killing the enemy a lot.I have no doubt that, since you know the sea well enough, you will not make it difficult for us to survive the war without these destroyers.

Three days later, I called our ambassador: August 3, 1940 The second option, which is to (ced) some bases (owned by Britain) to the United States, can be agreed, but we would rather lease indefinitely than sell.It goes without saying that this will give us immediate access to destroyers and airships.You should let Colonel Knox and others know that we agree with such a request. As you said, what matters is a quick resolution.Now is the time when we desperately need destroyers.Once in our hands, it takes about ten days to fit them with submarine detectors and everything is ready to go.We should also prepare some submarine detectors and give them to the US Navy to help them install and explain how to operate them.Hope is to proceed quickly in accordance with these principles. After intensive and anxious negotiations in Washington, the first week of August, the United States, through Lord Lothian, offered us an exchange of fifty repaired old destroyers in various naval yards on the eastern coast. We have a series of bases in the West Indies, plus another base in Bermuda.Of course, these ships are old and ineffective, and the strategic security that the United States derives from enjoying the use of these island bases is permanent, so the real value between the two is of course difficult to compare, but the invasion The threat of the threat and the need for a large number of ships in the English Channel make it urgent for us to acquire American destroyers.Besides, these islands are only of strategic value to the United States.Once upon a time, they were the springboard for an attack on America from Europe or from England.Now, because of the prowess of air forces, they are even more important to the security of the United States and must therefore be in the hands of friendly nations or themselves.But in the desperate war now beginning to be waged for Britain's existence, the islands are unlikely to be held by friendly nations.As I have always believed that the survival of the United Kingdom is inseparable from the survival of the United States, it seems to me and my colleagues that there is actually a great advantage in placing these bases in American hands.So I'm not looking at the issue with any British narrow-mindedness. There is another reason, more significant than our need for destroyers or America's need for bases.The transfer of fifty destroyers by the United States to Britain certainly constituted an act of non-neutrality.By all historical standards, the German government was justified in declaring war on the United States.There is no danger, in the President's judgment, of Germany's solution to its difficulties in such a simple way, and I do not think the Germans would do it at all.It was in Hitler's interest to deal with his opponents by breaking them down one by one.The last thing he wanted was to be involved in a war against the United States before ending the war against Britain.However, the surrender of destroyers to Britain in August 1940, which in itself was sure to bring the United States closer to Britain, and at the same time closer to war, was part of a growing series of non-neutral actions in the Atlantic The first non-neutral act, which is extremely beneficial to us.It marked the transition of the United States from neutral to non-belligerent.Although Hitler dared not speak out, as we shall see, the whole world understood the significance of this move. For all these reasons, the War Cabinet and Parliament approved our policy of leasing bases for destroyers, provided we could persuade the concerned governments of the West Indies to accept, for the sake of the Empire, what a great sacrifice and annoyance to their lives things will do.On August 6 Lothian telegraphed that the President was eager for an immediate answer on the future fate of the British fleet.He wanted assurances that, should Britain be occupied, the British fleet would continue to fight for the Empire abroad, never surrender or scuttle.It is said that this is the most convincing argument to the United States Congress on the destroyer issue.He believes that the hope of completing the legislative process is growing steadily. I expressed my personal feelings to the Foreign Secretary: August 7, 1940 I think the situation is very clear.We have no intention of capitulating or scuttling the British fleet.Indeed, such a fate was more likely to befall the German fleet or its remnants.Our country does not tolerate any discussion of what we would do if our homeland were occupied.On the eve of the invasion, discussions of this kind might be detrimental to the current high mood of the masses.Furthermore, we must not be put in a position where the United States government can then say: In accordance with the understanding or agreement reached when we gave you the destroyers, we believe that the time has come for you to bring your fleet to this side of the Atlantic . We should refuse to make any statement as they propose, and limit the transaction to the lease of the colonies only. At this time, I sent a telegram to Losian: August 7, 1940 We urgently need those fifty or sixty destroyers and hope to get them.In no other way will the United States help us so effectively in the next three or four months.As you know, we are quite willing to lease to the United States the naval and air base facilities of the West Indies for an indefinite period, on the basis of this gratuitous lease, the necessary common interest of both the Navy and Army of Great Britain and the United States.Therefore, should Colonel Knox make a proposal of this or similar nature, followed by the immediate delivery of the aforementioned destroyers to us, we shall gladly accept it.However, the matter has nothing to do with any negotiations or statements concerning the future fate of the British Fleet.Obviously, it is impossible for us to make any statement on this issue, nor do we agree with any statement they made.In my secret telegrams to you and to the President, I have repeatedly reminded that if the enemy's invasion of Great Britain succeeds, a government of the British Quisling type is established, and the best conditions possible for the remaining inhabitants after the war, What kind of danger will the United States encounter.I am glad that I have found that people have recognized that the danger is serious and that you must not minimize the seriousness. The anxiety of the United States on this issue is justified, and we have no intention of alleviating their anxiety.Moreover, it is our position that we do not wish to make the collapse of Great Britain a subject of practical discussion.I told you some weeks ago that there was no legitimate reason to discuss any question of the transfer of the British fleet to the shores of the United States or Canada.I don't even allow any of the staff to talk about this issue, let alone make any technical preparations, even to make a plan. It is especially important that you realize that we must never agree to make such a statement in order to obtain a destroyer or something like a destroyer.Please make this clear at once: We will never agree to the slightest concession of our total freedom of action, nor will we tolerate any such defeatist statements, because the consequences of doing so will be extremely harmful. Although I thought in my June 4th speech that it would be best for the Germans to realize the prospect of an indefinite naval war, we cannot allow any neutral friend to speak of the matter.Of course, if the United States entered the war as an ally, we would fight with them, and at all times would offer and consult with them on the best dispositions in a war that would ultimately defeat the enemy.You foresaw this in your first conversation with the President, when you said, You dare to assert that we will never send any part of the British Fleet across the Atlantic unless the United States actually becomes an ally in war. I sent the following telegram to the President: August 15, 1940 I need not tell you how relieved I was when I received your telegram, how grateful you are for your tireless efforts to give us all possible assistance.I am sure that you will send us everything you can, because you know that the value of every destroyer you can bring to us is incalculable.But we also need the motorized torpedo boats you mentioned, and as many airships and rifles as possible.We have a million people waiting for a rifle. The moral value of these new aids from your government and people to us in this critical time is immense, and we are infinitely grateful. We can do whatever you think will help your mediation with Congress and other interested parties, but I am convinced that we will only do so if I say that we must be assured of getting our ships and airships without delay. , you will not misunderstand me.On the question of pledges concerning the British Fleet, I am of course prepared to repeat to you what I said in Parliament on June 4th.We will fight to the bitter end with our fleet, and none of us intends to buy peace with the capitulation or scuttling of our fleet.Remember, when you quote my repeated assurances, that it would be harmful from our point of view to give the impression that the conquest of the British Isles and their naval bases is not impossible. It may also be harmful from your point of view.The spirits of our people are high.They showed unprecedented firmness.Last week's fierce air battle also of course greatly strengthened their confidence in the war.With regard to the sea and air bases, I readily agree with your proposal of a ninety-nine-year lease, which is more acceptable to us than a purchase.I am sure that, once we have agreed upon matters of principle, we can proceed leisurely to the finer points of adjustment.We have to consult with the governments of Newfoundland and Canada about bases in Newfoundland, where Canada also has an interest.We will immediately seek their consent. Mr. President, allow me to thank you once again for your help and encouragement, which is very important to us. Losian thought the wording of the reply was just right, saying there was an opportunity for the president to release the fifty destroyers without going through the legislative process.That was not certain, but he thought we should immediately send the British destroyer crews to Halifax and Bermuda.It would create a very bad impression in the United States if the American destroyers were ready to stand without British sailors taking them across the Atlantic.And, when our sailors were already waiting, the fact itself helped to make Congress feel the urgency. On August 16, the President issued a statement at a press conference, saying: The United States government is negotiating with the British Empire government on the issue of obtaining naval and air bases for the defense of the Western Hemisphere, especially the Panama Canal.In addition, the US government is still negotiating with the Canadian government on the defense of the Western Hemisphere. The president went on to claim that the United States would give Great Britain something in exchange, though he did not yet know what those things were.He has emphasized more than once that the negotiations on the air base have nothing to do with the question of destroyers.The destroyer is not included in future arrangements, he said. Since the President has to fully consider the views of the U.S. Congress and the Navy authorities, of course he has to try his best to explain to his countrymen that this deal is very beneficial: the United States can exchange a few old destroyer fleets for unlimited security in this critical moment.That's true, but it doesn't seem quite right to me.The very idea of ​​leasing out any part of these long-established territories must have caused great outrage in Parliament and the Government; and if it were said to the British that it was a mere deal: British territories for fifty destroyers, There will certainly be fierce opposition.I therefore try to place this transaction at the highest level, and indeed it should, because it embodies and preserves the permanent common interest of the English-speaking world. With the consent of the President, I brought this matter to Parliament on August 20th, and what I said then, perhaps will not lose its meaning with the passage of time: Not long ago, we learned that the United States is also concerned about the sea and air defense of their Atlantic coast. Recently, President Roosevelt has made it clear that he is willing to discuss with us and the Dominion of Canada and Newfoundland about the development of the United States Navy in Newfoundland and the West Indies and Air Force facilities.There is, of course, no question of any transfer of sovereignty which was never raised and no action was taken without the consent or will of the colonies concerned, but, on our part, His Majesty's Government sincerely Willing to hand over the defenses to the United States on a ninety-nine-year lease, we are sure it will be in our interest no less than theirs, and in the interests of the colonies themselves, as well as Canada and Newfoundland.These measures are important.No doubt this measure meant that the two great democracies of the English-speaking world, the British Empire and the United States, joined together in some of their affairs for the common good of each other.Personally, I don't see such measures as anything to worry about going forward.I can't stop it even if I want to, no one can stop it.Like the Mississippi, it will roll on and on.Let it run!Let this irresistible torrent of warmth flow onward to wider fields and better days. former navy personnel to president August 22, 1940 1. I am so grateful for everything you have done for us.Between us, I never thought about such things as contracts, bargaining or selling.It is a fact that we decided in a cabinet meeting to provide you with naval and air installations on the Atlantic coast, absolutely not conditional on your destroyers and other assistance.In our opinion, we are two friends in need, and we should do everything we can to help each other.Therefore, we are willing to provide the above facilities at no cost, and if you find it difficult to hand over the destroyers, etc. tomorrow, our proposal is still valid, because I think it is something that is beneficial to both of us. 2. In our correspondence, it is inappropriate and even dangerous to mention or admit in any way that the arms you delivered to us are used to pay for the above-mentioned naval and air force facilities.Once this concept is accepted, people on both sides will weigh what is given versus what is taken.They will calculate the value of these munitions on a monetary basis, comparing them with the value of these military installations, which some may consider worthwhile and others may not. 3. Also, Mr. President, as you know, every island and every location is different.For example, if there is only one port or stronghold, how should it be divided and how should its benefits be shared?On this occasion, we are willing to put forward to you what we think is the best proposal for both parties, without haggling over every detail and arguing about gains and losses. 4. What we want is this: We are going to make you feel safe across the Atlantic with all the facilities we have to make you safe; of course, if you invest money in developing it on a large scale, you have to get the actual security of a long-term lease. For the present, therefore, I prefer to rest on the general statement I made yesterday in Parliament, both on this matter and on the future of the Fleet.In this way, if you enumerate in more detail what you want, we will immediately tell you what you can achieve, and then our experts will make the necessary technical and legal arrangements.On the other hand, we are entirely at your discretion and the opinion of the American people as to what arms aid, etc., you think you may give us.This is entirely a matter for the United States to decide on its own in light of their views on this world war, the relationship between their own vital interests and this war, and the cause that this war will defend. 5. Although the airstrikes have decreased these days and our strength has grown in many ways, I don't think the gangster has fully stretched his fist yet.In the Northwest Passage, our only regular route to the seas now, large numbers of merchant ships have suffered losses, so the immediate arrival of your fifty destroyers would be a great help. At this point Losian called to say that Mr. Summer Wells had told him that, because of the position the President held in the Constitution, he could never have sent the destroyers as a voluntary gift, but had to send them As an exchange to Britain.Under current law, neither the Chief of Naval Staff nor the Headquarters of the Navy can certify that the ships are not essential to national defense without such certification, unless they are addressed by a specific measure that they can demonstrate will contribute to the security of the United States. In exchange, it cannot be legally transferred.The president tried to find another way, but there was no other way. former navy personnel to president August 25, 1940 1. I fully understand that, because of your legal and constitutional difficulties, you wish to enter into a formal contract embodied in writing, but I take the liberty of stating to you what I anticipate the procedure will encounter. difficulties, and even dangers.In order to obtain our desperately needed instruments on the list we have expressly proposed, we have received your request that all the islands and territories from Newfoundland to British Guiana at the judgment of the United States be placed without restriction. For US use.If we fail to grant everything your specialists demand, shall we not be accused of breaking a contract for which we have already paid?Your obligations are limited, ours are unlimited.Although we need these destroyers very much, we are not willing to risk misunderstandings with the United States, or enter into serious disputes with the United States, in order to obtain them.If this matter is to be stated in the contract, the obligations of both parties must be clearly defined, and our obligations must be more clearly stipulated than before. However, this will take some time. As I pointed out hierarchically, the reason we need these destroyers is mainly to make up for the shortfall between now and the arrival of our new ships in England, which I started building at the beginning of the war.The number of our newly built ships is quite large. For example, by the end of February, we will have received twenty destroyers and new medium destroyers, sixty light destroyers suitable for chasing submarines in the navy, thirty-seven motorized torpedo boats, Twenty-five motorized anti-submarine boats, one hundred and four Fermat wooden anti-submarine patrol boats, and twenty-nine seventy-two-foot motorboats.Over the next six months, a larger batch of ships will be completed.It is during this period, from September to the end of February, when this new batch of ships is being built and about to be launched, that your fifty destroyers are invaluable.With these destroyers in hand, we can reduce the loss of ships on the Northwest Passage, and we can also take a tougher approach to Mussolini in the Mediterranean, so time is very important.But in such a case it would be impracticable to draw a blank cheque for the free use of all our possessions in the Atlantic simply to get through this period of shortage of ships; There are more dangers and catastrophes, which we wish to figure out for ourselves anyway.Our difficulties have been described here with such frankness that I think you will understand. 2. Is the following procedure feasible?Immediately I propose certain fairly demarcated facilities, in order to indicate the extent of our intention to concede, experts from both sides may negotiate on these facilities or other facilities which may be added or subtracted, and we reserve the facilities which we can consign Final decision.We do all this completely, and it is up to the generosity and goodwill of the American people whether they will help us or not.It is, however, the stated policy of His Majesty's Government to provide you with reliable and efficient facilities for the protection of your Atlantic coast, and to put them in your hands when you need them.I have directed the Departments of the Navy and the Air Force to make a preliminary sketch of the facilities we intend to provide, and to leave your specialists open to alternatives.I propose to send you our preliminary opinion within three or two days and make it public in due course.Then there will be no quarrels, and the American people will be more warm to us, for they will see that we are fighting for what is right for the whole world, and that their safety and interests are of utmost concern. 3. If, by your laws, or by the requirements of the Navy, the aid you intend to give me must be in exchange for England, I see no reason why the British Government should be compelled to do so.Can't you say that unless the United States repays in some way, causing the Navy to link the two things taken from and given to England, you think it inconvenient to accept this beautiful gift from us? 4. Knowing that you have always been our friend, I am very grateful for your tireless efforts; I am deeply sorry for the increased burden on you. former navy personnel to president August 27, 1940 1. Lord Lothian has telegraphed the facilities you want.Our naval and air force experts have come to basically the same conclusion after studying this issue from your point of view. They also believe that Antigua can be used as an airship base.We also welcome you to Antigua.It is our stated policy to keep the United States safe on its Atlantic coast, as infallible as you may remember. 【1】 【1】President Wilson said in 1917. 2. We are ready to make a positive proposal to you immediately on this line.This, of course, should be negotiated immediately on the details, but for the reasons I stated in my previous telegram, we do not like to settle disputes by arbitration, because, as donors, we must The General Scope reserves the final say on the content of the gift, always on the understanding that we will do our best to meet the wishes of the United States. 3. I fully agree with the two letters to the Secretary of State drafted by Lord Lothian.The only reason why we disagree with the publication of the second letter is because I think it is more likely that the German government will surrender the fleet in the future, or scuttle the fleet or the remaining ships themselves.As you know, they already have experience in this area.You will recall that I mentioned in a private telegram to you some months ago that we believed that such things were done by cowards, and each of us felt so. 4. After we have provided you with facilities, if you think you can give us the previously mentioned tools [1] or other things you think are appropriate, this matter can be interpreted as: not compensation or care for us, but acknowledgment We did everything we could to keep America safe. [1] Also said by Wilson. 5. Mr. President, this matter is especially urgent in view of Mussolini's recent threats to Greece.If we had acted with great vision and noble goodwill, we could still save this small ancient country from invasion and conquest by its enemies.Even the next forty-eight hours are important. prime minister to general ismay August 27, 1940 如果以我們的名義將洛西恩勳爵轉達的羅斯福總統的要求向公眾公佈,現在就必須用第一人稱。比如:英皇陛下政府對美國總統提出了如下的擬議:我們懷著友誼和善意準備立刻會見你們的代表,研究在下列島嶼上提供有效的海、空軍基地問題。etc. 請根據這種精神給我擬一份草稿,以便我能口授一封電報。務必在今天上午將草稿送來。 接著,就擬定電報如下: 英皇陛下政府向美國總統提出了下列擬議: 我們懷著友誼和善意,準備立刻會見你們的代表,商討在下列各地建立租期九十九年的海、空軍基地問題。這些地方是: 紐芬蘭安提瓜 百慕大聖盧西亞 巴哈馬群島特立尼達 牙買加英屬圭亞那 細節問題,以後商定 同時,我建議發表時用下述電文美國總統為了要我提出他所希望的保證而拍給我的電報原文。 據悉,大不列顛首相曾於一九四○年六月四日正式向議會宣稱,在這場由大不列顛和大英帝國殖民地參加的戰爭中,如果英國戰艦不能守住英倫三島周圍的水域,英國艦隊決不投降或自行鑿沉,而將開往海外,保衛帝國的其他地方。 美國政府鄭重詢問,上述聲明是否代表英國政府的既定方針。 總統採用了這篇電文,於是我向他發出了以下事先經過雙方同意的答覆。 總統先生,你詢問,我在一九四○年六月四日向議會發表的關於英國艦隊決不投降或自行鑿沉的聲明是否代表英皇陛下政府的既定方針。of course.不過,我認為這種假設的意外事情,似乎更可能落到德國艦隊或其殘餘艦隻的頭上,而不會落到我們艦隊的頭上。 這樣,一切問題便令人愉快地迎刃而解了,九月五日,我用謹慎的措辭正式通知下院,並且獲得了他們的默認實際上是全體同意: 當我上次在議會講話時,即已料到英美兩國之間將進行一樁重大的事情,現在此事已經完成。在我看來,這件事情的完成,使英、美兩國的人民都普遍感到滿意,也使我們全世界的朋友感到鼓舞。試圖深入玩味來往的官方照會,以致於超過文件字面上的含意,那是錯誤的。我們進行的這種交換純粹是兩個友好國家之間本著信任、同情和好意的精神互相支援的措施。這些措施結合而成為一個正式的協議。必須完全按照這些措施所體現的這種意義來理解。只有非常愚昧無知的人才會認為,美國把驅逐艦交給英國,起碼是違反了國際法,或者起碼是影響了美國的非交戰狀態。 我相信,希特勒先生不會喜歡這次驅逐艦的讓與,而且我也相信,他一旦抓住機會,就會向美國發洩怨氣,所以我很高興看到美國的海、陸、空軍前線已經沿一條寬闊的弧線伸展到大西洋,使他們可以在遠離其本土幾百哩以外的地方扼制危險。海軍部也曾對我們表示,他們切盼獲得這五十艘驅逐艦,使他們可以極其順利地渡過這艦隻缺少的時期,我過去曾在本院講過,在我們的戰時計劃中的大批新造艦隻可供使用之前,是不可避免地有這麼一段艦隻缺少的時期的。 我想議會已認識到,我們明年在海上的力量將比現在強大得多,即便是現在,我們也有足夠的力量應付目前的任務。 應當毫不遲延地把美國的驅逐艦編入現役艦隊;實際上,英國水兵已經在各移交港口等待。你們可以稱之為有準備的巧合。目前,我對整個這件事情實在想不出還有什麼要說的了。 現在不是玩弄辭令的時候,但是,請允許我鄭重向本議會進一忠言:當你得到你所需要的東西時,就最好聽其自然,不再究問。 我們就這樣得到了五十艘美國驅逐艦。我們把在西印度群島和紐芬蘭劃定的海、空軍基地租借給美國,為期九十九年。第三,我以向總統提出保證的形式重申我關於英國艦隊決不鑿沉或投降的諾言。我把這一切看作是平行的授受,是根據它們的功用而不是根據它們的價格進行的善意行為。總統覺得,把它們作為一個有聯繫的整體提到國會,比較容易得到批准。我們彼此都不矛盾,兩個國家都感覺滿意。此事在歐洲發生的影響至為深遠。
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