Chapter 66 Volume 2 Chapter 24 Dakar

The importance of aid to de Gaulle The plan for the liberation of Dakar The necessity of support for the Free French armies My memorandum of August 8, 1940 Approval of the War Cabinet Intimidation of the war plan Delay and danger of leaks Our news from Jacques The second lead leads to the failure of the French cruisers at Whitehall too late. I advise the War Cabinet to drop the plan. The commanders are eager to attack General de Gaulle. The War Cabinet insists on giving the commanders carte blanche to act cheaply. Telegrams from the General and President Roosevelt to Dakar's attacking warships against the batteries of Vichy France. The loss of our Navy is considerable. The Cabinet and Commanders agree to let it go. Reason Parliament does not ask for an explanation.

During this period, His Majesty's government attached great importance to aid to Charles de Gaulle and the Free France in order to win over France's African possessions and colonies, especially those along the Atlantic coast.We are told that most of the French officers, officials and businessmen in all these areas were not pessimistic.They were appalled by the sudden defeat of the Zulu Thirty-Five, but since they themselves had not yet fallen into the hands of Hitler's army and Pétain's puppet regime, they had no intention of surrendering.In their eyes, de Gaulle is like a shining star in the dark night.Distance gave them time, and time gave them opportunities.

Once I knew that Casablanca was beyond the reach of our troops, I naturally thought of Dakar.The little working committee organized as my personal French advisers was confident and active in the planning of the whole affair.I sent my letter of approval from Checkers on the evening of August 3rd, 1940, for the proposed landing of French troops in West Africa.General de Gaulle, Major General Spears and Major Morton had drawn up the outlines of a plan to raise the banner of Free France in West Africa, occupy Dakar, and thus unite for de Gaulle the colonies of French West Africa and Equatorial Africa, Then fight for the French colonies in North Africa.General Catrouh was scheduled to come to Britain from Indochina to take command of the French North African colony after it was liberated.

On August 4, the Chiefs of Staff pored over the plan detailed by the Joint Planning Committee and drew up a report to the War Cabinet.The proposal of the Chiefs of Staff was based on the following three premises: first, that these troops must be fully equipped and carried by ships so as to be able to land at any French West African port; Secondly, that this expeditionary force should be composed entirely of Free French troops, and not include any British personnel except the ships transporting them and their escorts; thirdly, that the matter should be dealt with as a matter between the The expeditionary force will not encounter effective resistance when it lands.

The strength of the Free French army was about 2,500 men, consisting of two battalions, a tank company, artillery and sapper platoons, a bomber squad and a fighter squad, for which we were to be supplied with Tornados.The army could be ready at Aldershot on 10th August, convoys and supply ships were estimated to sail from Liverpool on 13th August, and troop transports from 19th to 23rd. Departing in between, arriving in Dakar on the 28th, or in other ports such as Conakry and Douala a few days later.The plans were approved by the War Cabinet at its meeting on 5 August. Before long it became clear that de Gaulle was asking for more British aid than the Chiefs of Staff had estimated.Therefore, they told me, this would place us under greater and longer obligations than previously anticipated, and that this expedition would begin to lose its Free French coloration.At this time, our supply of manpower and material resources is already very tight, so we cannot easily accept this kind of additional request.However, on August 6th I held talks with General de Gaulle and on August 7th at 11:00 p.m. a Chiefs of Staff Council was held to discuss the plan.It was agreed that the best place for the Free French troops to land was at Dakar.I declared that the success of this expedition should be adequately supported by the British Army, and I asked them to draw up a larger plan along these lines.The Chiefs of Staff discussed at length the contradiction between our policy of improving relations with Vichy and our interest in directing the French colonies against Germany.De Gaulle's actions, they said, could lead to a war against both the French mainland and the French colonies.Nevertheless, if local Free French spies and our own representatives in the area report that the situation is favourable, they advocate the expedition.Therefore, I issued the following instructions in the early morning of August 8:

Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee August 8, 1940 1. A telegram from the Governor of Nigeria said that with the acquiescence or support of the Vichy government, German influence was in danger of rapidly extending to the French West African colonies.Unless we act swiftly and vigorously, powerful submarine bases supported by the Luftwaffe will be dotted along the coast of West Africa, as inaccessible to us as the west coast of Europe, and accessible only to the Germans. 2. It has now been six weeks since the Cabinet tried to make a move in Casablanca and sent Mr. Duff Cooper and Lord Gort, but without result.The local French were hostile.The Chiefs of Staff was unable to make any positive recommendations, and the situation had clearly deteriorated considerably.

3. The early acquisition of Dakar by General de Gaulle seems to be extremely important to British interests.It would be great if his secret messenger reported that the place could be occupied peacefully.If the contrary was reported, adequate Polish and British forces should be provided, with full naval cover.Once an action has been initiated, it must be carried through to the end.De Gaulle can give the operation a French tinge, and if successful, his government should of course take control of the area, but we must provide the insufficient force required for this operation. 4. The Chiefs of Staff should draw up a plan for the occupation of Dakar.In drawing up their plans, they should regard the following as already in place: (1) de Gaulle's army and all the French warships that could be collected; (3) a fully equipped brigade of the Polish army; (4) a brigade of the Royal Marines, which was originally intended for the Atlantic islands, but can be used to help de Gaulle's army land first, or change to another (5) either by an aircraft carrier, or by aircraft from the British West African colonies, to give appropriate air support.

5. Immediately make a plan and arrange a date for military operations in the Mediterranean. 6. Not intending to garrison Dakar with British troops after the occupation.General de Gaulle's government would be proclaimed and had to sustain itself, with British aid limited to adequate supplies and of course preventing Germanized France from attacking by sea.If de Gaulle cannot withstand the air attack and the airborne troops for a long time, we will take him away after destroying all the facilities in the port.In any case, of course, we will take the French-flagged Richelieu and repair it.The Poles and Belgians could get back their gold, which the French government had shipped to Africa for safety before the armistice was signed.

7. In order to realize this plan, the most important thing is to buy time. We have lost a lot of time.Whenever convenient, British ships were used as transports, but under the French flag.Regarding the raising of the French flag on the British transport ship, there is no need for an order from the Privy Council or a legislative process. 8. The question of the danger of France declaring war and whether it should be co-opted is left to the Cabinet. On August 13th I raised the matter with the War Cabinet, showing that it went beyond the original plan of a purely French expeditionary force.My colleagues had examined the following details: On the assumption that resistance would be encountered, we landed at dawn with six detachments on six beaches near Dakar in order to disperse the defending forces.The War Cabinet approved the plan, subject to the Foreign Secretary being asked to consider the possibility of Vichy France declaring war.Having weighed the situation to the best of my ability, I do not believe this is the case.At this time, I have decided to take this risk.I agree to appoint Vice Admiral John Cunningham and Rear Admiral Owen as Commanders of this expeditionary force.They came to see me at Checkers on the evening of August 12th, and we thoroughly studied every aspect of this uncertain and complicated business.I myself drew up the instructions for them.

I have therefore assumed an extraordinary responsibility for initiating and instigating this expedition to Dakar, code-named Intimidation.Although I don't think we've been able to get everything right, and we've had misfortunes, I've never regretted it.Dakar is a place worth fighting for, and fighting for the French colonial empire is especially significant.It is quite possible that these results could have been achieved without a single strike, and I am deeply confident that Vichy France will not declare war.The tenacious resistance of Britain and the firm attitude of the United States kindled new hope in the hearts of the French.If we win, the Vichy government will just shrug its shoulders and refrain from doing anything.If we are defeated, they will give credit to their German masters for their resistance.The most serious danger is the prolonged fighting.However, in these days, even the most serious danger is used in our daily life.I realized that even though our manpower and material resources have been stretched to the last bit, we can barely cope.When the German invasion of our homeland was approaching and intensifying, we did not hesitate to send half of the tanks to Wavell to defend Egypt.In comparison, this time, it's really not worth mentioning.Our nationally united war cabinet, the Conservatives, Labor and Liberals, were staunch men who increasingly advocated aggressive means of winning.As a result, all relevant orders were issued, and everything was moved forward under the condition that the order must be carried out.

Two of our present dangers are delay and disclosure, with the former aggravating the latter.At this time, the Free French troops in England were a group of heroes in exile engaged in armed opposition to the present government which ruled their country.They willingly opened fire on their own countrymen and agreed to sink French warships with British cannon.Their leaders are under threat of death.It is inevitable that they will be nervous and even act rashly, and who can blame them?What the War Cabinet ordered our troops to do had only to communicate our intentions to a few Commanders and the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and no one else.But General de Gaulle had to persuade his band of bold Frenchmen to join him.So many people will necessarily know everything.Among the French army, Dakar has become a common talking point.At a banquet in a restaurant in Liverpool, French officers chanted Dakar!Our attacking landing craft had to be trailered across England from near Portsmouth to Liverpool with escorts in full tropical gear. We are all in the early stages of war.At this time, the local secrecy work was simply incomparable with the secrecy measures adopted later in the two most important combat operations of the Torch and Bawang. Also, there is the issue of delay.We had hoped to attack on September 8, but it now appears that the main force must first go to Freetown for refueling and final reorganization.The plan had originally been drawn up according to the schedule of the French transports arriving at Dakar in sixteen days at twelve knots an hour.However, it was discovered that the speed of the boat loaded with motor vehicles could only reach eight or nine knots. This situation was not discovered until the time of loading the boat, and it was reported to the higher authorities.In all, ten days were inevitable behind the original date: five days due to an error in estimating the ship's speed, three days due to unexpected difficulties in loading the ship, and two days for refueling at Freetown.Now we have to postpone it until September 18th. I presided over a meeting at 10:30 p.m. on August 20th with the participation of the Chiefs of Staff of the three Armed Forces and General de Gaulle, and, on the record, I summarized the plan as follows: The Anglo-French fleet would arrive in Dakar at dawn, planes would drop banners and leaflets over the city, the British squadron would remain in the distance while the French ships sailed to port.An emissary would sail into the port in a scout boat flying a French flag and a white flag, bearing a letter to the local governor stating that de Gaulle and his Free French troops had arrived.In his letter, General de Gaulle would stress that he had come to rescue Dakar from an imminent German attack and had also brought food and aid to the garrison and the population.If the governor obeyed, all was well; if not, and the coast guards fired, the British squadron approached the port.If the resistance persisted, the British warships fired at the French artillery positions, but suppressed them as much as possible.If there is stubborn resistance, the British army will use all means to smash this resistance.The bottom line: the battle must be over by evening, with de Gaulle in command of Dakar. General de Gaulle agreed. On the 22nd we met again and the Foreign Secretary read to me a letter exposing the leak.As for the impact of this leak in the end, no one knows.The advantage of the navy in offensive warfare is that, once dispatched, no one can be sure where it will attack.The sea is vast, and the ocean is vast and boundless.Using tropical equipment as a clue, it can only be guessed that it is going to Africa.In Liverpool, the wife of a Frenchman, suspected of having a Vichy connection, is said to have believed that the transports assembled on the Mersey were bound for the Mediterranean.Even if the word "Dakar" was spread accidentally, it would still be a mystery that cannot be guessed.This method of secrecy develops to a very sophisticated degree as we grow more experienced and alert.The delay of time worried me and made me feel very embarrassed.As for whether the secret was leaked, no one knows.In any case, the cabinet gave final unanimous approval on August 27th, and action began.Therefore, September 19th was used as the scheduled date. At 6:24 p.m. on September 9, the British Consul General in Tangier telegraphed Admiral North, Commander of the North Atlantic Theater, saying that he had an appointment off the coast of Gibraltar. He also reported the matter again to the Foreign Office: Here is the message from Jacques.The French squadron may have attempted to sail across the Channel, heading west to an unknown destination.This is expected to occur within the next seventy-two hours. The admiral was not behind the plan to attack Dakar, so no special action was taken.A similar telegram was sent from Tangier at the same time to the Foreign Office and was received at 7:50 am on the 10th.At this time we were under almost constant bombing in London.Due to repeated interruptions in work during the air raids, the cipher department had a backlog of undeciphered telegrams.This telegram is not marked as important, so it can only be translated in order.It was not until September 14th that the translation was ready for distribution. At this time, it was finally sent to the Ministry of the Navy. But we also have a second clue.The British Naval Attaché in Madrid was formally notified by the French Admiralty at 6:00 p.m. on September 10 that three French cruisers of the Georges Reig type and three destroyers had left Toulon and were preparing to pass by on the morning of the 11th. Strait of Gibraltar.This was a formal procedure recognized by the Vichy government at that time, and it was also a prudent measure they took at the last minute.The British naval attache immediately reported to the Admiralty and to Admiral North in Gibraltar.The Admiralty received the news at 11:50 p.m. on September 10th.After the telegram was translated, it was sent to the colonel on duty, and he forwarded it to the director of the (Overseas) Operations Department.The importance of the telegram should have been clear to the officer, since he himself was fully aware of the Dakar expedition.But instead of taking immediate action, he sent this telegram along with the First Sea Lord's, in the usual manner.His superiors at the time were very upset with him because of this mistake. However, when the destroyer HMS Vicious was patrolling the Mediterranean Sea, it spotted the French ships at 5:15 a.m. on September 11 within fifty miles east of Gibraltar and immediately reported them to Admiral North. .Admiral Somerville, commander of Fleet H, based in Gibraltar, also received a message from the naval attache in Madrid at 008 midnight on the same morning.At seven o'clock in the morning, he ordered the Prestige to be ready for launch within an hour, awaiting the instructions of the Admiralty.Due to the error of the Director of Operations and the delay in another telegram from the Consul General in Tangier at the Foreign Office, the First Sea Lord did not know that the destroyer Vigor had arrived in France until the chiefs of staff of the three armies met in the cabinet. Report on the whereabouts of warships.He immediately called the Admiralty and ordered the Prestige and its destroyers to be fired.They are ready to go.He then came to the War Cabinet.However, since the two separate telegrams, one from the Consul General in Tangier and the other from the Naval Attaché in Madrid, happened to be delayed and ignored by the various departments, it was too late. .If the Consul General marked the first telegram with the word "important"; or if the two admirals stationed in Gibraltar were not involved, but if one of them was aware of it; or if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been working normally; The director of the department sent the second telegram first, so that the first sea lord could pay attention to it and read it immediately. Then, the Renowned ship should stop the French fleet from negotiating with it, so as to wait for a clear order; the war cabinet must Definite orders will be issued, or by me before a war cabinet meeting is called. As a result, all our arrangements failed, and the three French cruisers and three destroyers sailed through the Strait of Gibraltar at full power (25 knots) at 8:35 am on the 11th, heading south to the coast of Africa.Upon learning of this, the War Cabinet immediately instructed the First Sea Lord to order the Renown to contact the French warships, inquire about their destination, and declare that they were not allowed to proceed to any German-occupied port.If the other party replied that they were heading south, they should be told to go only to Casablanca, and, in that case, to be followed.If they try to drive past Casablanca to Dakar, they should be stopped.But there has been no trace of them.On the 12th and 13th, smog enveloped Casablanca.With a British spy plane shot down and conflicting reports of additional warships sailing into Casablanca harbor, Renown and other destroyers were on watch south of Casablanca, ready to intercept the French squadron.At 4:20 p.m. on the 13th, Renown received a radio report that there were no cruisers in Casablanca.In fact, they have already driven far to the south and are heading towards Dakar at full speed. However, there appears to be an opportunity.Our expeditionary force and its powerful escort fleet are now south of Dakar and are about to reach Freetown.At 12:16 AM on September 14, the Admiralty informed Admiral John Cunningham that the French cruisers had left Casablanca at an unknown time and ordered him to prevent them from entering Dakar.He should use all available ships, including the Cumberland; and when the unavoidable, the Ark Royal should use her aircraft even without destroyer cover.The Devonshire, Australia, and Cumberland, as well as the Ark Royal, therefore turned their bows and headed back at top speed in order to form a patrol line north of Dakar.They did not reach patrolling waters until the evening of 14 September.At this time, the ships of the French detachment had already anchored in the port of Dakar, and opened the cloth tent on the deck. This unexpected incident decided the fate of the French and British expedition to Dakar.I have no hesitation in thinking that this expedition should be abandoned.The whole plan of landing without a single soldier and taking Dakar by General de Gaulle, it seems, since the arrival of this French squadron has failed, they are likely to carry reinforcements, good gunners and the ruthless Vichy government officers, to strengthen the resolve of the local governor, seduce the garrison, and take control of the fort.Fortunately, we can cancel this plan without losing the prestige that is so important to us at present, and practically no one knows about it.This expeditionary force could be transferred to Douala to cover General de Gaulle's military operations against French Cameroon, and then the ships and transports could be demobilized or returned home. Therefore, at the wartime cabinet meeting at noon on September 16, I outlined the whole process of the plan to occupy Dakar from beginning to end, talked about the serious consequences of the postponement from the original date of September 13, and talked about various aspects The leak of intelligence and the unfortunate slip of a French warship through the Strait of Gibraltar, I then declare that the whole situation has changed so that this plan can no longer be carried out.The cabinet adopted my suggestion, and issued the following order to the troops on the expedition to Dakar at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day: His Majesty's Government has decided that the arrival of the French cruisers at Dakar has prevented us from carrying out our plan to occupy Dakar.Alternative plans have been studied here. Given the difficulty of access to Pomaco, the lack of transport for the army, and the possibility of a pre-emptive strike by enemy forces from Dakar, it appeared that the chances of a successful landing at Conakry were low.In addition, with the existing naval power, it is impossible to impose a tight blockade on Dakar from the sea, so even if Charles de Gaulle's army reaches Pomaco, it will not have much impact on the situation in Dakar.The best solution, it seemed, was to land General de Gaulle's army at Douala to consolidate Cameroon, Equatorial Africa and Chad, and to extend de Gaulle's influence into Libreville.British units in the expeditionary force are to remain in Freetown for the time being. Unless General de Gaulle expresses firm opposition to the latter measure, it should be implemented immediately. The expeditionary force reached Freetown on September 17.All the generals strongly opposed the abandonment of the plan to occupy Dakar.Admiral Cunningham and General Owen thought that until it was determined how much the arrival of the Vichy cruisers at Dakar had excited the hearts of the people there, it could not be supposed that their presence there had greatly changed the previous naval situation.It was said that the cruisers had now stretched their decks, and that the position of two of them made it clear that they were incapable of fighting, but good targets for bombing. This was another turning point in the situation.At this stage of the war it is rare to see a commander on the ground bent on bold action.Often the pressure to take risks is domestic.This time the general, General Owen, had carefully written down all his concerns before setting off.So I'm pleasantly surprised by the enthusiasm with which they now want to put this intricate, semi-political battle plan to the test.If the soldiers on the scene think that it is time to do something big and dare to do it, we should of course let them do it, so I sent the following telegram at 11:52 p.m. on September 16: You have full freedom to judge the whole situation for yourself, please consult with de Gaulle, and we will give careful consideration to any suggestions you make. Soon, another strongly worded protest was received from General de Gaulle, who hoped to carry out the original plan.He said: "If the British Government insists on its recent decision to veto a direct attack on Dakar by sea, I demand at least the immediate cooperation of British naval and air forces there to support and cover this attack, which I myself lead and use myself. The army attacked Dakar from the interior. 【１】 [1] Received at 11:55 am on September 17, 1940. At this time, our commander reported: [1] [1] Receipt by the Admiralty at 7:56 am on September 18, 1940. At today's meeting, de Gaulle insisted on the need for an early start on Dakar.He was told that he might well have strong support in Dakar if agents were sent there to deliberate, without delaying too much the action that should be taken, and avoiding too much British overtones in the operation.His agents were ready and instructed at Bathurst.De Gaulle now suggested that the original plan to enter the port of Dakar without resistance should proceed as usual. If it fails, the Free French forces will try to land at Rufisque, supported by the navy and air force if necessary, and then go to Dakar from there. I push forward.The British troops landed only when their support was needed after the bridgehead had been established After careful consideration of all the factors, we decided that the arrival of the three cruisers at Dakar did not add so much to the dangers we were always willing to run that we should abandon the attempt.We therefore propose to accept de Gaulle's new proposal that, should he fail, the British should proceed to land and try to bring him up as previously planned.We believe that increasing the strength of (our) navy is of the utmost importance anyway. The action plan shall be implemented within four days of receipt of the decision of His Majesty's Government. Finally, Major General Owen telegraphed to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff: As you know, in this plan of operations I have taken risks which, from a purely military point of view, should not have been taken lightly. New intelligence suggests that these risks are intensifying, but, in view of the apparent chance of success in the end, I think it is worth the risk.De Gaulle also promised to cooperate with the British army to the end when necessary, and he did not shirk his responsibility to fight among the French. The War Cabinet met again at 9:00 p.m. on the 17th.It was unanimously agreed that it was up to the Commander to act cheaply.The final decision was postponed until noon the next day, knowing that the attack would be almost a week away, so there would be no delay.At the request of the Cabinet, I have drawn up the following telegram to be sent to the Commander of the Forces Expedition to Dakar: We cannot judge here the pros and cons of the various options.We have given you full authority to do whatever is best for you, in order to achieve the original purpose of this expedition.The situation should be reported to us at any time. The telegram was sent at 1:20 p.m. on September 18th. Now just waiting for the result.On the 19th, the First Sea Lord reported that a French squadron, or part thereof, was leaving Dakar and heading south.This incident clearly shows that the fleet transported Vichy-minded troops, technicians and government officials to Dakar.The chances of encountering violent resistance increased with the arrival of newly replenished troops.There is bound to be a fierce battle.My stubborn and adaptable colleagues (as it should be in war) had the same instinct as myself to wait for events to develop naturally, and therefore received reports without expressing any opinions. On the twentieth Admiral Pound informed us that the French cruiser Primog had been intercepted by our Cornwall and Derry, and that she had consented to proceed to Casablanca, where she was being escorted.The three French warships spotted by the Australia turned out to be the cruisers Georges Legge, Monca and Glory.At noon on the 19th, the Cumberland rendezvoused with the Australia and continued to follow the Vichy ship until the evening.At this time, the warships turned to the north and increased their speed from fifteen to thirty-one knots.A chase ensues.We can't keep up with them.At 9:00 p.m., one of the Glory's engines had stalled, and it could not go faster than fifteen knots.Its captain agreed to return to Casablanca under the escort of the Australia.The two warships were expected to pass Dakar at midnight; the captain of the Australia informed the captain of the Glory that if attacked by a submarine he should sink the ship immediately.No doubt the captain of the Glorious informed the Dakar authorities of this, and sailed there safely.The Cumberland, which was tracking the other two Vichyhans, lost contact with the two warships during a heavy rainstorm. Although they were found again later, they did not fire on them and let them escape back to Dakar.The Poitiers scuttled itself when challenged at sea on the 17th. I informed General Smuts of everything. prime minister to general smuts September 22, 1940 You may have seen my telegram about Dakar.I have often thought about what you said in your telegrams that Africa should not be ignored.De Gaulle's campaign to save French colonies was already underway in Equatorial Africa and Cameroon.We cannot allow these actual gains to be destroyed by French warships and Vichy personnel, presumably at the behest of Germany.If Dakar falls into the hands of Germany and becomes a submarine base, the impact on the Cape of Good Hope route will be disastrous.Arrangements have therefore been made for de Gaulle to occupy Dakar, peacefully if possible, and if necessary by force; and the expedition which is now about to attack appears to have the necessary strength. Naturally, the danger of a bloody clash with the French sailors and part of the garrison was no small matter.On the whole, I think they are unlikely to put up a serious resistance, because the French colony is demoralized and in a difficult position, and, because of our control of the sea, they are in danger of ruin and starvation.However, before the fight, no one can be sure of the result.It is said that the danger should not be run when French public opinion has turned to our side, even encouraged by Vichy's fighting against the enemy in England, and that another Oran affair would be very bad for us, The argument has caused us a lot of scruples.Nevertheless, we have come to the unanimous conclusion that this objection may not turn out to be correct, and that in any case it is less dangerous than standing by and allowing the Vichy government to defeat de Gaulle.If the Vichy government had not declared war after the events at Oran or after our blockade of it, I do not think it would have been possible if there had been fighting at Dakar.In addition to the strategic importance of Dakar and the political role of Charles de Gaulle in occupying the port, there were 60 to 70 million ounces of Belgian and Polish gold that had been erroneously stored in the interior of Africa, and which had not been completely destroyed. The destroyed battleship Richelieu will also fall indirectly into our hands.In short, the matter has been decided. We don't plan to get involved in Morocco at the moment, because Germany is putting pressure on Spain and Spanish interests in Morocco.We have great hopes for Syria, where General Catrouh is going next week.There is now a major battle at Port Matruh, and I hope our armored reinforcements will arrive in time. I have no great qualms about the crisis in Kenya, much less if we hold the rear and meet from the railroad, leaving difficult traffic to the enemy.I am trying to get some suitable tanks to this field, and besides, I think there are too many troops stationed there, which are needed for the Sultan and the Egyptian delta. It gives me great pleasure and confidence to walk with you along the path we have followed for many years. I sent the following telegram to President Roosevelt: former navy personnel to president September 23, 1940 I am heartened by the reaction to the news of Dakar transmitted to you by Lord Lothian.It would be to the detriment of our common interest if the Germans established consolidated submarine and air bases there.It looks like there may or may not be a big fight in Dakar.We've given the order to dash, though. We would be very pleased if you sent some American warships to Monrovia and Freetown; I hope that by then we have captured Dakar and welcome your visit.But what is really important at the moment is that you reveal to the French Government that a declaration of war would be to their great disadvantage in all matters concerning the United States.If the Vichy government declares war, it will be the same as Germany, and all the rights and interests of the Vichy government in the Western Hemisphere must also be regarded as the rights and interests of Germany. I am very grateful that you reminded me of the German invasion of my homeland.We are ready to deal with it.I'm glad to hear about the rifle. What happened during the three days of the attack on Dakar I need not dwell on here.它們應當在軍事史上佔有它們的地位，同時，也是一個很能說明運氣不佳的例子。空軍部的氣象學家當然仔細研究過西非沿岸的天氣條件。對長年累月的記錄進行研究的結果表明，在每年這個季節，氣候是很穩定的，天空晴朗，時常有太陽。九月二十三日，當英法艦隊逼近這個要塞時戴高樂和他率領的艦隊在前卻是大霧迷漫。我們原來希望，既然絕大多數的居民，不論法國人還是土著，都站在我們一邊，那麼，英國軍艦隻在遠處接應而由戴高樂率領的軍艦駛入港口，便可決定當地總督的行動。但是，我們很快就發現，維希黨羽已經成為達喀爾的主人；無可懷疑，維希政府的巡洋艦的到來，已使達喀爾參加自由法國運動的任何希望遭到破滅。戴高樂的兩架飛機在當地機場一著陸，駕駛員立即被捕。 其中之一還在身上帶著一張自由法國主要擁護者的名單。戴高樂的代表乘著一隻懸有一面法國國旗和一面白旗的船前往，竟被拒絕，隨後乘坐一艘汽艇進港的其他人員也遭到射擊，其中兩人還受了傷。所有的人都橫下了一條心；這時，英國艦隊在霧中逼近，駛到距岸邊五千碼的水域。上午十時，港內的一座炮台對我側翼的一艘驅逐艦開炮，我方還擊，於是很快就展開了一場大戰。驅逐艦英格菲爾德號和先見號受輕傷，而坎伯蘭號的機艙被擊中，不得不退去。 一艘法國潛艇剛露出潛望鏡就被飛機擊中，還有一艘法國驅逐艦也起了火。 關於軍艦對炮台的問題，曾經長年累月地爭論了很久。納爾遜說過，用一個六門炮的炮台，就足以抵禦一百門炮的一列軍艦。一九一六年，鮑爾弗在達達尼爾視察時說：如果軍艦上的大炮能在炮台射程達不到的地方轟擊炮台，則戰鬥雙方的勢力便未必如此懸殊。這一次，英國艦隊如果正確地部署，在理論上是可以與達喀爾炮台交戰的，而且可以在二萬七千碼的距離外，發射若干發炮彈之後擊毀達喀爾炮台九‧四吋口徑的大炮。但是，這時維希政府的軍隊還有那艘黎歇留號戰艦，它可以用兩門十五吋口徑的大炮同時轟擊。英國海軍上將必須把這一點估計在內。最要命的，是有霧。因此，在上午十一時三十分左右炮戰完全停息，所有英國和自由法國的艦隻都退去了。 下午，戴高樂將軍企圖讓他的部隊在律菲斯克登陸，但是，這時大霧更濃、方向愈難辨明，只得放棄這個計劃。下午四點三十分，各司令官決定撤走軍隊運輸艦，次日再繼續作戰。報導這一消息的電報於下午七時十九分到達倫敦，於是我便在九月二十三日十時十四分以我私人的名義向各司令官發出了以下的電報： 既然已經開始，我們就必須幹到底。不論情況如何，我們均不罷手。 當夜向達喀爾總督遞送了最後通牒，他答覆說，要保衛該港，直到最後一兵一卒。各司令官回答說，他們打算繼續打下去。二十四日的能見度比昨天好些，但仍然模糊。當我們的艦隻逼近時，岸上的炮台向我方開火，同時巴勒姆號和堅決號與黎歇留號在距岸一萬三千六百碼的海域交戰。 不久後，德文郡號和澳大利亞號與一艘巡洋艦和一艘驅逐艦遭遇，結果將那艘驅逐艦擊傷。大約在十時左右轟擊停止，這時黎歇留號已被一枚十五吋的炮彈擊中，曼努耳要塞也中了一枚十五吋的炮彈，另外一艘輕巡洋艦也起了火。此外，有一艘敵方潛艇在企圖阻擾我們前進時被我方投擲的深水炸彈逼上水面，船員宣佈投降。我方沒有一艘軍艦被擊中。下午，又開始轟擊了一會兒。這一次，巴勒姆號被擊中四次，但傷害不大。這一場轟擊毫無結果，只是表明了對方防守牢固，守軍有進行抵抗的決心。 九月二十五日恢復戰鬥。當日天氣晴朗，我方艦隊在離岸兩萬一千碼的海域開炮，這次不但遭到岸上炮台準確的回擊，也受到黎歇留號的兩門十五吋口徑大炮的同時射擊。達喀爾駐軍司令所放的煙幕遮住了我們的目標。剛過九點，堅決號戰艦便被一艘維希潛艇的魚雷擊中。此後，海軍上將鑒於堅決號的情形、敵潛艇繼續進攻的危險以及岸上守軍的射擊既異常準確而且又決心抵抗，便決定撤到海面去。 與此同時，上午十時在我缺席的情況下召開的國防委員會，認為不應向各司令官施加壓力，強要他們採取有背於他們明智判斷的行動。內閣於上午十一時三十分開會，會間，傳來了今晨作戰結果的消息。根據這些消息，似乎可以清楚地看出，就慎思明辨和我方人力、物力所能容許的範圍來說，我們已經盡到了最大的努力。有幾艘優秀的軍艦遭受重創。對方顯然要死守達喀爾。誰也難以斷定，長久打下去的激烈情緒是否會引起法國維希政府宣戰。因此，經過痛苦的討論之後，一致同意不再打下去了。 於是我向各司令官拍發了以下的電報（九月二十五日下午一時二十七分）： 根據所有我們截至目前獲得的消息，包括堅決號的受創，我們決定放棄進攻達喀爾的計劃，因為我們顯然將遇到不幸的後果。除非還發生了什麼我們現在尚未獲悉的情況，使你們打算強行登陸，否則，應就此罷手。請用最急電報通知，你們是否同意這樣做，但是除非情況轉變得完全有利於我方，否則在未接到我們的答覆以前，不應真正開始登陸。 假設放棄這一計劃，我們將盡力用海軍掩護杜阿拉，不過我們不能保護在巴瑟斯特的戴高樂的軍隊（如果他們還在那裡的話）。我們現正考慮向弗里敦調派援軍的問題。一俟接到你們的答覆，我們即發出如何處理其餘的部隊的指示。 各司令官的答覆如下： 同意罷手。 former navy personnel to president roosevelt September 25, 1940 我對我們不得不放棄進佔達喀爾的計劃深感遺憾。維希方面比我們先到一步，並利用其黨羽和幹練的炮手加強了防禦工事。一切同情我們的人都遭到扼殺和鎮壓。我們有幾艘軍艦被擊中，當你想到我們已有的負擔時，當可了解，如堅持強行登陸，將使我們承擔不適當的義務。 在三天的炮擊中，沒有一艘英國軍艦被擊沉，只有堅決號受創，在幾個月內不能參加戰鬥，另外還有兩艘驅逐艦需要在國內船塢大修。維希方面有兩艘潛艇被擊沉。其中有一艘潛艇的船員獲救，兩艘驅逐艦被燒燬和擱淺了，黎歇留號戰艦被一枚十五吋炮彈擊中，並受到兩枚險些把它擊中的二百五十磅炸彈的創傷。在達喀爾當然無法修理這艘龐大的戰艦，它在七月間便一度因受創而不能航行，現在我們肯定可以不再把它作為一個敵對因素來考慮了。 在這次遠征計劃中，談一下戰時內閣和幾位司令官的主張之一變再變，是很有趣味的。幾位司令官起初並不十分熱心，歐文將軍給自己留了退路，他給帝國副總參謀長寫了一篇長長的備忘錄，備述種種理由，強調一切困難。當遠征軍駛過加那利群島以南的時候，法國巡洋艦隊和馳援的維希黨羽，挾法蘭西共和國物質上和精神上的權威，溜過了直布羅陀海峽。從這時起，我便確知形勢已經轉變；戰時內閣根據我的建議，並在參謀長委員會的支持下，一致同意，在為時尚不為晚而且沒有遭受什麼損失的時候，中止這一行動，以免暴露我們的計劃失敗。 這時，在戰地的幾位司令官卻站了出來，強烈要求採取行動，戰時內閣認為，而在我看來也十分正確，應該聽憑各司令官自行判斷，准許他們放手去作。因此，就試行登陸，達喀爾堅強有力的抵抗立即表明，戰時內閣自己的意見和它聽取的意見都是正確的。 達喀爾一戰的劇烈程度，雖然遠遠超過我們的意料，但是，在維希政府不會對英國宣戰這一點上，我們還是沒有判斷錯誤的。他們只是用北非的空軍轟炸直布羅陀作為報復。九月二十四日和二十五日，他們曾對直布羅陀的港口和船塢連續不斷地進行了空襲；第一次，在港口投下了一百五十顆炸彈；第二次，出動飛機約一百架，投彈比第一次多一倍。法國飛行員似乎並不認真，多數炸彈都落到海中。有一點小損失，傷亡不大。我們的高射炮隊擊落敵機三架。達喀爾之戰的結果是維希政府得勝，於是這件事就這麼暗中了結了。 對有關的英國海軍和陸軍司令官並沒有加以任何責備，他們一直供職到戰爭結束，那位海軍上將還得到了最高的榮譽。對敵情估計的錯誤應從輕處理，這是我行事的準則之一。 如果他們根據對當地情況的了解認為可以完成任務，那麼，他們之踴躍一試是十分合乎情理的；他們低估了法國巡洋艦及援兵的到來對維希駐軍所產生的影響，這決不能算作他們的過失。關於戴高樂將軍，我曾在下議院說過，他這次的行為和表現，使我對他比以前更加具有信心。 達喀爾插曲的經過值得認真研究，因為，它在很大程度上不但說明了不可逆料的意外事件對戰爭將產生何種影響，而且，還揭示了軍事力量和政治力量的相互作用，以及聯合作戰的困難，特別是有盟軍參加的時候，尤為困難。在一般的人看來，它似乎是一個估計錯誤，部署混亂、臨事怯懦和糊里糊塗的突出實例。在美國引起了一片強烈的批評，因為達喀爾靠近美洲，美國人對它有特別的興趣。澳大利亞政府也感到憂慮。國內也紛紛抱怨戰爭指揮失當。但是，我決定不作任何辯解，議會也尊重我的意願。 回顧起來，也許應該對這些事情採取一種比較清醒的看法。研究海軍史的人，將十分驚奇地發現，它和將近三百年前發生的一件事情非常相似。一六五五年，克倫威爾曾派遣一支海陸聯合遠征軍去圍攻西印度群島的聖多明各。那次進攻沒有成功，但是遠征軍司令官沒有空手而回，他們接著去奪取了牙買加，從而把失敗變成了勝利。 雖然我們在達喀爾失敗了，但是我們卻得以阻止法國巡洋艦的前進，並且使他們一心想去挑唆法屬赤道非洲駐軍的企圖落了一場空。戴高樂將軍不到兩個星期就拿下了杜阿拉和喀麥隆，使它們成為推動自由法國事業的一個基地。自由法國在這些地區的活動起了一定的作用，不但制止了維希毒素的滲入，而且，由於他們控制了中非，從而使我們後來從塔科拉迪到中東穿越非洲大陸的航空運輸線得到了發展。