Chapter 79 Volume 3, Chapter 6: The Decision to Aid Greece

Strategic Reserve Forces in the Egyptian Delta Time for Decision We have the hope of revoking the proposed Freedom to Form the Balkan Front Admiral Cunningham on the dangers taken by the Navy Talks with the Turks on March 28. My comments on the talks. Yugoslavia is a key point. German troops enter Bulgaria. Troubling developments in Athens. Opinions of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Sir's telegram My ambassador in Athens is distressed Aid Greece or abandon Greece?Mr. Eden's prudent reply. Smuts and the Chiefs of Staff advised us to proceed. Short cabinet meeting on March 7th and final decision. New Zealand's response. Poland's response. I called Mr. Eden on March 14th. Call the President on October 10.

We have hitherto been under no obligation to venture in Greece, apart from the continual large-scale preparations in Egypt and the Athens talks and agreements already discussed.A single order would stop the preparations, and 111 mustering a strategic reserve of four divisions in the Egyptian delta was, in itself, anyway a good thing.Since the Greeks have in many respects violated the terms of the Athenian agreement, we may, if we wish, demand release from this agreement.Dangers loomed from all sides, but, until the beginning of March, I felt perfectly safe and generally at ease, because we had a mobile force at our disposal.

Now it is time to make a clear decision on whether to send the Nile Army to Greece.We must take this major step, not only to aid Greece in danger and suffering, but also to establish a Balkan front including Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey to resist the imminent German offensive, which is also harmful to Soviet Russia. There will be impacts that we cannot estimate.If the Soviet leaders had sensed the impending catastrophe, they must have considered these issues to be extremely important to them.We cannot decide the Balkans by sending troops ourselves.Our limited hope lies in agitating and organizing joint action.If Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey act in unison under our direction, then, in our opinion, Hitler has only two paths: either temporarily put aside the Balkan states; or after a major war with our combined forces Establish a major front in that area.

We did not know at the time that he had made up his mind to launch a massive offensive against Russia.If we knew, we would have a greater certainty of the success of our policies.At the same time we will also see that he will be in danger of losing both ends, and taking an initial move in the Balkans is likely to damage his main move.This was actually the case, but we didn't know it at the time.Some may think we're doing it right; at least, we're doing more than we know.Our purpose is to inspire and unite Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey.What we can do is to help Greece.For all these purposes it is quite appropriate that we have four divisions in the Egyptian Delta.

On March 4, Admiral Cunningham pointed out to us that the transfer of the Nile Army and the Royal Air Force to Greece would inevitably put our navy at considerable risk in the Mediterranean.This movement meant a constant flow of troops, supplies and vehicles for the next two months.Destroyers, in particular, will have to take on extremely difficult tasks, and for some time to come, the defenses of fighter jets and anti-aircraft guns will be weakened.If the Germans launch an air offensive from Bulgaria, our convoys will suffer losses both at sea and in ports of entry.Moreover, we cannot but take into account the actions of the Italian fleet at sea.We could use the battleships at Souda Bay, Crete, against the Italian fleet, but in doing so we would have to weaken the destroyer escort of the convoys and leave the supply lines to Cyrenaica virtually uncovered.All this, in turn, will heighten tensions on the island of Malta.We also have to be very concerned about the vulnerability of ships to magnetic and acoustic mines in the Suez Canal as we begin mass movements of these troops and convoys.Admiral Cunningham said that all offensive plans, including the joint naval and air attack on Rhode Island, must be postponed.His manpower and material resources will be exhausted, but he is convinced that our policies are correct and that these risks should be taken.The suspension of the plan to attack Rhodes is a great disappointment to us.We recognize the critical importance of the island.Rhodes and Scarpanto were key strongholds because of the extremely valuable airfields adjacent to Crete.During the following years we made several plans to attack Rhodes.We have never been able to align this plan with the evolution of other major events.

I was then informed that General Smuts was on his way to Cairo at Mr. Eden's warm invitation, and I sent him the following telegram: February 28, 1941 I am very pleased that you are going to meet Aiden and Dill.We have taken a big and risky decision: to support Greece and try to build a Balkan front.I hope to hear your own opinion on this matter after your meeting.This decision makes it extremely necessary to reinforce Egypt and Libya. I hope you will consult with Wavell and Dill to transfer the Acanthus (the 1st South African Division) to the Mediterranean theater as soon as possible. There are great difficulties in terms of ships. Please contact me propose.Our rapid gains in East Africa contribute to our other missions.Only a few weeks ago they said that they could not march on Kismaayo before May.Now Mogadishu and the whole region are in our hands.

Mr. Eden's report on the status of his talks with the Turks in Ankara was not encouraging.The Turks feel as much about the danger as we do, but they feel as much as the Greeks that the troops we have to offer are of little use in actual combat. Mr Eden to Prime Minister February 28, 1941 This morning the Chief of the Imperial Staff and I had talks with the Chancellor, the Foreign Minister and Field Marshal Chuck Mack on an extremely frank and friendly basis. Our decision to give Greece maximum assistance as early as possible has been welcomed. They reiterated Turkey's determination to fight if attacked by Germany and said they believed Germany's attack on Greece meant Turkey's turn would be next.But, as the Turkish army is not yet capable of attacking, they considered it more in the interest of the common cause not to take part in the war until it had remedied its deficiencies and was able to exert its greatest effect.

The Turks are confident that they will be able to hold off the Germans for a short time if attacked, but expect immediate assistance from us.They claim that they intend to take concerted action with the Yugoslav government. They have contacted the Yugoslav government at our request, but so far they have only received a vague reply.They were worried that if Turkey got involved in a war with Germany, Russia would attack (to them). As a result of the talks, Turkey agreed to participate in the war no matter what at a certain stage.Of course, if it is attacked, it will immediately enter the battle.But if the Germans give it time to re-equip, it will make good use of it, and will fight when it really counts for the common cause.

I called back and said: Prime Minister to Mr Eden (in Athens) March 1, 1941 The Germans' actions were clearly intended to ravage Bulgaria, intimidate Turkey with the threat of air strikes, force Greece out of the war, and then turn to Yugoslavia to force it to obey; Now, your main appeal is to Yugoslavia.The sudden southward advance of Yugoslavia will cause Italy to suffer the greatest disaster, which may have a decisive effect on the entire Balkan situation. If Turkey declares war at the same time, it will be difficult for the enemy to gather enough troops within a few months, and our air force will increase in a few months.I am willing to run great risks if there is a prospect of success (and at any rate there will be a few months of success); all preparations should be made with the utmost speed.However, I would like you to approach matters concerning Greece in this way: if after all considerations (including the possible attack on Rhodes) there is no hope at all, then you have the power to free Greece from all constraints and We are free from any restraining power.Obviously, you and we both have a few days before a final decision can be made.During this period, everything should be carried out according to the original method.

It is time to describe our efforts to warn the Yugoslav Government.The whole defense of Thessaloniki depends on whether Yugoslavia enters the war or not, so we must understand their intentions.On March 2, Mr. Campbell, our ambassador to Belgrade, met with Mr. Eden in Athens.Yugoslavs, he said, were afraid of Germany and internally turbulent by political disputes.Yet there is a possibility that if they knew about our plans to aid Greece, they might be ready to accept it.Mr. Eden and the Greeks feared that the enemy would find out.On the 5th the Foreign Secretary saw off Mr. Campbell, who returned to Belgrade with a secret letter addressed to the Regent.Mr. Eden stated in his secret letter that the fate of Yugoslavia was already in Germany's hands and that Greece and Turkey intended to fight if attacked.In this case, Yugoslavia should join our camp.Eden asked Campbell to verbally convey to the Regent that Britain had decided to assist Greece with a strong army and air force as soon as possible, so if Yugoslavia sent a staff officer to Athens, we would invite him to participate in the talks.Whether Thessaloniki can defend depends on Yugoslavia's attitude.If it capitulates to Germany, the consequences are clear.We advised it to take our side, so that a British army would fight alongside it.We will invest our greatest strength in Greece, and there is a good chance we will hold a front.

On March 1, the German Army began to enter Bulgaria.The Bulgarian Army has mobilized and deployed positions along the Greek border.The German army continued to march southward in all directions, with assistance from all sides in Bulgaria.The next day, Mr. Eden and General Deal returned to Athens from Ankara, where they resumed military talks.As a result of the talks, Mr. Eden sent a telegram stating the seriousness of the situation. Mr Eden and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to the Prime Minister March 5, 1941 When we arrived we found that the situation had changed uncomfortably and the atmosphere was very different from our previous visit. 2. General Papgos had insisted at the last meeting that the only reasonable military solution was to withdraw all the troops stationed in Macedonia to the Aliakmon line.We expect that the retreat to the Aliakmon Line has already begun.Unexpectedly, we found that practically no action had been initiated.Papgos argued that the two sides had agreed that the resolution passed in the last meeting should be subject to the receipt of a reply from Yugoslavia expressing its attitude. 3. Now, Papgos suggested to use four divisions to hold a line of defense near the Macedonian border, but he thought that this line of defense would not last long, and he suggested to keep only the Albanian front.It seemed like an admission of despair, and indeed he admitted it himself. 4. He suggested that after the British troops arrived, they should move to the front on the Macedonian border in batches, although it seemed impossible for the British troops to arrive in time.We of course reject this proposal, as it is completely inconsistent with the conditions under which we agreed to send troops.We have telegraphed the invitation to the Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East to come to Athens for the talks.He arrived on March 3, and the talks have virtually been going on.Owing to the rigidity of Papugos we were obliged to call upon the assistance of the King of Greece, who remained calm, determined, and willing to assist in the difficult discourse that followed. 5. Finally, they were willing to provide three Greek divisions. 6. Therefore, we are faced with the following three choices: (1) Accept Papagos's repeatedly mentioned plan to try to drive our troops sporadically to the Macedonian border. (2) Acceptance of three Greek divisions for the Aliacmon line, which would amount to some sixteen to twenty-three battalions, instead of the thirty which we had expected on our last visit from the prevailing circumstances. Five battalions, and muster our troops in the rear of this army. (3) The proposal to completely cancel our military aid. 7. We agree that the first option is sufficient to cause military uncertainty, and the third option seems to be equally harmful. 8. Therefore, after some hesitation, we agreed to the second option, but on one condition: to authorize General Wilson to take charge of the command and organization of the entire line of Ali Akmon, and to assume responsibility as soon as he can take over the job .This was agreed to by the other party. 9. Our military advisers believe that the situation on this front is dangerous, and the enemy's attack channels are very few. Therefore, it is not hopeless to intercept and resist the advance of the German army on this front.In the worst case, you can always fight and retreat from this front through the mountains and fields that are most suitable for rearguard warfare. 10. We are united in our conviction that we have made the right decision in an extremely difficult situation.Words cannot express the anxiety of these two days, but now that the decision has been taken, the general mood on the Greek side has clearly improved.The harsh fact remains that our forces, including those of our Dominion, will be engaged in a more dangerous campaign than we had estimated a week ago.No doubt it will be up to you to decide whether or not to give notice to the Dominion governments. At this time, in London, our views changed markedly.The Chiefs of Staff noted that various factors were evolving against our Balkan policy, and especially against sending an army to Greece.They first highlighted the main changes in the situation: the demoralization of the Greek Commander-in-Chief; the failure of the Greeks to carry out the obligations they had undertaken twelve days ago and to withdraw their troops to the line we had to hold if Yugoslavia did not enter the war; Thirty-five Greek battalions should have assisted us in holding this line, but now there are at most twenty-three battalions, all new, inexperienced, and short of artillery.Furthermore, we had expected Greece to bring back several divisions from the Albanian front.However, General Papgos now claimed that this could not be done, because they were exhausted and the enemy was outnumbered. Referring to our own difficulties, the Chiefs of Staff pointed out that they had always hoped to take Rhodes before or at the same time as the Greek advance, and that this could not be done until after the march was completed.This meant that not only could we not concentrate our air forces against the advance of the Germans, but, at present, in order to protect our lines of communication to Greece, a considerable air campaign against Rhodes would have to be waged.Finally, by this time the Suez Canal was completely blocked by mines, and it was unlikely to be cleared before March 11th.Half the boats loaded with motorized transport were north of the canal, and all boats loaded with people were south of the canal, and time was running out.The Chiefs of Staff estimated that by March 15 the Germans could muster two divisions along the Aliacmon River and by the 22nd three more divisions.One of these divisions was an armored division.Assuming that the Greeks can only hold them in front of this line for a short time, we can have at most one armored brigade and one New Zealand brigade against the first two German divisions of the invasion. They concluded that the riskiness of the operation had increased considerably.They felt, however, that it was not yet possible to dispute the military opinion of those on the scene, who considered the situation far from hopeless. Alone at Checkers on Sunday evening, I mulled over the report of the Chiefs of Staff and the trends at that morning's War Cabinet discussion.I then sent the following telegram to Mr. Eden, who had by this time left Athens for Cairo.My tone in this telegram is indeed different from before.However, I take full responsibility for the final decision, because I know for sure that I could have stopped the whole program of aiding Greece if I had taken the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff Committee seriously.After all, it is much easier to cancel a plan than to execute one. Prime Minister to Mr. Eden (in Cairo) March 6, 1941 The situation is indeed getting worse.The Committee of the Chiefs of Staff has made a comment explaining the seriousness of the situation, which is attached.The failure of Papgos to carry out the agreement with you on February 22, the apparent difficulty for his troops to disengage from the enemy in Albania; and the other disadvantages cited by the Delayed Delay and Blockade of the Suez Canal) It was difficult for the Cabinet to believe that we now possessed any power sufficient to restore the fortunes of Greece.Things would of course be different if Turkey and/or Yugoslavia were at war, but that seems highly unlikely.We had pushed hard for the Balkans to unite against Germany.We must be careful not to urge Greece, against her own wise judgment, to engage in a hopeless resistance alone, with so few troops which we can transport in time to the Greek field. Committing New Zealand and Australian troops to what you describe as a more dangerous adventure than the previous one is bound to cause serious problems within the empire.We must spread your estimates and those of the Chiefs of Staff to the Dominion governments.It is expected that they will not agree to fight.We don't see any reason for any success, unless of course we take Dill and Wavell's advice very seriously. We must not make the Greeks feel obligated to reject the German ultimatum. If they themselves decide to fight, we should share with them to a certain extent.However, the rapid advance of the Germans may have prevented any powerful British imperial forces from engaging the Germans. So long as Turkey remains faithfully neutral, the loss of Greece and the Balkans is by no means our chief disaster.We could take Rhodes and consider flowing into a plan of operations (attack on Sicily) or a plan to attack Tripoli. We have been advised from many quarters that our ignominious expulsion from Greece would be more injurious to our reputation in Spain and Vichy than the submission of the Balkans to Germany; With our limited armies alone, we have never hoped to be able to prevent them from submitting. Tomorrow's Cabinet meeting may have to pass a resolution if there is no new situation that is very different from the situation we are facing now.I am sending you this telegram to prepare you mentally for the content of the resolution. This telegram is accompanied by the comments of the Chiefs of Staff explaining the serious situation, the summary of which has been included in this telegram. Sir Michael Palerit was greatly distressed when he read in Athens the telegram to which I drew attention.He called the Foreign Secretary, now in Cairo, and said: March 6, 1941 I have just read the prime minister's telegram to you.I need not emphasize the effect of the revocation of the agreement actually signed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Greek Commander-in-Chief, and which General Wilson himself is now carrying out.How can we leave the King alone when the Greek Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff have assured the Greek King of success?I find this unimaginable. The Greeks and the world will laugh at us for breaking our word. 2. The Greeks must not be made to feel obligated to reject the ultimatum. There is no such problem.They have decided to fight against Germany alone if necessary.The question is whether we aid them, or abandon them. On the same day, he called Mr. Eden again and said: The King of Greece told the Air Attaché today that he was very grateful for your visit and expressed his full determination to carry out the agreed plan of action against the German attack. He was sure of the prospect of success, and was satisfied that General Papagos and his government shared that belief.He stressed the vital importance of doing as quickly as possible, especially by sending enough air power here to thwart the air raids that Germany was accustomed to use as the start of an offensive.Germany's initial defeat in the air, more than any other fact, shattered the myth of Germany's invincibility and gave the nation as much faith in success as he did.I haven't seen him in person since you left. Then he said in another telegram: This morning General Wilson had a conversation of great satisfaction with General Papagos.He was very pleased that Papagos's attitude had improved markedly.He found that he was willing to assist and was eager to cooperate in every possible way. Prime Minister to Mr. Eden (in Cairo) March 6, 1941 The War Cabinet is holding off on making any decisions pending your reply. Mr Eden to Prime Minister March 6, 1941 This afternoon, the Chief of the Reich General Staff and I, in our consultations with the three Commanders-in-Chief, re-examined the matter.We agreed that the decision we had taken at Athens was correct, although it undoubtedly entailed great obligations and risks, especially because of our limited naval and air resources.The telegram sent by Palerit to Cairo shows the Greek side's view on this issue. 2. This telegram merely shows you how we ourselves see the matter while awaiting instructions from the Cabinet. He called again and said: Mr Eden to Prime Minister March 6, 1941 Tonight, we had further discussions with General Smuts and the commanders-in-chief, and we will make a more detailed estimate of the telegram tomorrow morning. Prime Minister to Mr. Eden (in Cairo) March 7, 1941 Today I will be presenting your thoughtful reply to Cabinet.During this period, you should proceed with all preparations and troop movements with maximum speed. 2. I am deeply moved that you and your military advisers, Dill, Wavell, and I think Wilson, fully understand the local situation and technical conditions, and consider the memorandum of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Weighed the pros and cons and maintained a firm attitude. 3. The key lies in two points.First, we must never assume the responsibility to: Persuade the Greeks, against their own good judgment, to engage in a hopeless battle in which their country might be swiftly destroyed.But if they are still willing to fight to the death after knowing how limited our forces are at each appointed date, then, as I have said, we should obviously share with them.Do not allow people to say (according to your statement that this is not possible): We have given very little aid and dragged them into the war by forceful persuasion.I see from your manner and from your telegram from Athens that you must be aware of this. 4. Second, the main army responsible for this important task is the New Zealand Division, and after March, there will also be the Australian Army.We must honestly tell the Governments of New Zealand and Australia that we have undertaken this adventure (and they have not dreaded it) not because of any obligation undertaken by a British cabinet minister in Athens, not because of the imperial The Chief of Staff signed the agreement, but because Deal, Wavell, and the other commanders-in-chief were convinced that there was a good chance worth fighting.I take it to be implied in your positive reply to our inquiry telegram. 5. Take your time to bear in mind that, as yet, you have not presented us with any convincing facts or reasons, other than those of noble duty, by which this action should be justified to the two Dominions as Appropriately.Accurate military valuations are essential. 6. You know how our hearts are with you and your excellent officers. On the 7th we received in London the detailed report on the matter originally agreed by Mr. Eden. Mr Eden to Prime Minister March 7, 1941 Here's what your envoys have to say: 1. We have re-examined the entire situation carefully with the Commanders-in-Chief and Smuts.We unanimously feel the significance of this decision, but we cannot see any reason to change our previous judgment. Two. There is simply no question of forcing Greece to go against its sound judgment.When we first met at the Tetoi Palace, the Greek prime minister handed me a written statement at the beginning of the meeting, declaring that Greece was determined to defend itself against Italian or German attack, even alone.The Greek government has maintained such an attitude from beginning to end, but its confidence in the outcome of the war fluctuates from time to time.The Greeks realized that as long as Italy and Germany threatened their frontiers, there was no road to a glorious peace.The Greeks have no choice but to continue to struggle regardless of success or failure, otherwise they can only end up with the same fate as Romania. 3. We have undertaken obligations to Greece.Eight squadrons of the Royal Air Force, ground defense personnel and anti-aircraft artillery had been active there some months earlier. 4. Everyone knows that we have enough troops to mobilize after our victory in Libya.It would be the greatest misfortune if we did not make further efforts to save Greece from collapse by armed intervention on land.Yugoslavia would certainly be lost in the future; and we were not at all sure that even Turkey would remain steadfast if the Germans and Italians gained a foothold in Greece and we did not try to defend it.It would no doubt discredit us if we were ignominiously expelled from Greece, but a defeat in Greece would do us less harm than leaving Greece to the mercy of fate. Under the current situation, we agreed to follow the previously suggested guidelines and provide assistance to Greece. We therefore earnestly hope that no difficulty will arise in sending the Dominion troops as originally planned.At the same time, if we want to make the war have a considerable chance of success, we need to try to make up for the extremely serious gap in our army, especially in the air force. We have emphasized many times since our arrival here that the weakness of the air force is our main concern on this battlefield.Germany was fighting on the inside, building up its attack from Sicily and Tripoli, from the Balkans and the Dodecanese.Our reinforcements to ourselves were not matched by a corresponding increase, and major cuts to the authorized Tomahawks dealt a severe blow.Here the Royal Air Force clashed daily in Albania with the Italian Air Force and in other areas with the growing Luftwaffe. In this battlefield, air combat will be intense.Longmore asked for all possible assistance.If he could keep his air power, most of the dangers and difficulties of this venture would disappear. In the presence of the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services, I raised the issue to a meeting of the War Cabinet for a final decision.The cabinet members knew the ins and outs of the matter.Although we cannot send more planes than are allocated and in transit, there is no sympathy or disagreement among Cabinet members.Personally, I feel that the on-site personnel are all tried and tested.Undoubtedly, their actions have not been influenced in any way by domestic political pressures.With his resourcefulness, Smuts considered the problem from different angles with fresh insights and came to a consensus.Nobody raised the opinion that we have violated the will of Greece and imposed it on others.We didn't try to convince anyone.It is true that we have experts of the highest authority who are completely free to act and who know the people and the situation on the ground.My colleagues, tempered in many successful ventures, can now reach the same conclusions alone.Mr. Menzies has a special burden on his shoulders, but a lot of courage. Everyone is enthusiastic and advocates early action.The cabinet meeting was held for a short time, but the final decision was made. Prime Minister to Mr. Eden (in Cairo) March 7, 1941 This morning the Cabinet studied the plan of action on the basis of your telegrams from Athens and Cairo and mine.The Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services considered that, in view of the firm opinion expressed by the Commanders-in-Chief in the field, the Chiefs of the Reich General Staff, and the commanders of the troops concerned, the matter should proceed immediately.The Cabinet has decided to authorize you to proceed with this plan of action and to take full responsibility for the matter. [1] We shall notify the Australian and New Zealand Governments accordingly. Two days later I again sent the following telegram in a personal tone: Prime Minister to Mr. Eden (in Cairo) March 9, 1941 I completely agree with the way you dealt with the Balkans in your telegram. It seems that Yugoslavia still has the possibility of joining our side, which is more likely than closing the door completely. 2. While you are on site, you should discuss our security requirements openly and honestly with the Egyptian Prime Minister, Farouk and any other relevant personnel.It is intolerable that the Romanian legation should be transformed into a nest of German spies, and that the enemy's agents should be rampant in the Suez Canal zone.I ask you to do something to stop this unkindness towards us from those we have saved. 3. Hee told Smuts that I would be very happy if he was not far from here now, could come here and work in the war cabinet for a month as he did in the past. 4. Do not ignore the part of the instructions given to you concerning the economical use of the troops in the Middle East.I rely on you to solve this problem so that everyone plays a role.Days could be devoted to this work. At this time, New Zealand readily agreed to our request to dispatch a division. Prime Minister to Prime Minister of New Zealand March 12, 1941 Your reply has greatly touched us.Win or lose, it will go down in New Zealand's history and be admired by future generations of free humans everywhere. We will work faithfully and tirelessly to meet your requests and assumptions at the end of your message. Prime Minister to Mr. Eden (in Cairo) March 14, 1941 I have concluded that it is appropriate for you to remain in the Middle East until the initial stages of this crisis are ripe.In my instructions to you, I have pointed out the means of harmonizing the political and military actions of all parties concerned.The attitude of Yugoslavia is still not hopeless, and a situation can arise at any time that makes it possible for you to go to the talks.As events unfold, Turkey needs encouragement and guidance.No one but you has full control over the policy at stake that we have adopted at your insistence.The War Cabinet needs a local representative, and I do wish you would stay there. 2. I met with Sikorski this morning and have asked him to send the Polish brigade.He promised generously, but made a request that this brigade is one of the few remaining symbols of the Polish nation, and it is fortunate that it should not be easily abandoned or left to the mercy of fate.I promise to give it perfect equipment, and never expose it to greater danger than our own flesh and blood. He said: You have millions of troops, we only have this few troops.I want you to understand what we are asking of these brave foreigners, and hope that General Wavell will always keep this in mind. 3. I deeply feel that we have not yet used a British division.I am trying to get the 50th Division to sail with W.S. Eighth on April 22nd.Sending a convoy saves only a week's time, and we can't afford extra escorts. 4. Wavell has not yet informed us whether the Glenn [1] has passed the Suez Canal, but I think the matter is of the utmost urgency.You have received information that Germany is preparing to evacuate Rhode Island in anticipation of the imminent British occupation of the island.You should not lightly agree to an indefinite postponement of the attack on Rhodes.We need to take the island as soon as possible, and then, whether we succeed or not, we need to remove the British 6th Division.We must not be accused of putting other people's armies at risk.You should hurry and expect to capture Rhodes before the end of the month. [1] Refers to the three fast transport ships specially prepared for military operations.See Volume II of this book, page 410.Author (page number of the original book, the same below.) Translator 5. Can you tell me why Papgos did not bring back three or four divisions from Albania to reinforce his right front?It was said that the Italians had suffered recent setbacks, and that the German advance had not yet begun, so that he still had time to withdraw his troops from Albania.In my opinion, the current strategic deployment of the Greek army is the most dangerous. Papagos must have a good reason, if you know, please tell me. 6. Of course, if Yugoslavia joins our fight, it will justify Greece's use of its forces in Albania.However, Yugoslavia's movements are unclear.I suppose you and Dill have carefully studied the possibility of a Yugoslav attack on the Italians in Albania.There they can obtain the greatest victories, and acquire at the same time the great supplies necessary for their independence, which cannot be obtained in time elsewhere. 七‧勿使利姆諾斯島輕易地被德軍佔領用作空軍基地。 八‧似應在克倫取得決定性的勝利後再從那裡撤回空軍中隊。 九‧你的電報（談到朗莫爾不滿的那封電報），忽視了在運輸途中的飛機。 在詳述了空軍方面的這些增援情況以後，我又說： 朗莫爾認為你應取道拉各斯回國，波特爾也贊同這個意見，我所以希望你和迪爾留在現場，主要原因正在於此。因為不然的話，除了我在第一節中談到的重大理由外，你們二人將在關鍵的七天中既不能在倫敦發揮作用，又不能在現場有所作為。此間諸事順利，我們已開始在月夜相當成功地擊落德機。May God bless you all. 我認為應該把我們的計劃電告總統，並就此結束這令人焦灼不安的一章。 former navy personnel to president roosevelt 一九四一年三月十日 我現在應當把我們對希臘作出的決定告訴你。儘管從班加西向的黎波里推進這種嘗試頗能吸引人，而且我們仍有可能將相當數量的軍隊用於這一行動，但是我們卻覺得同希臘人並肩作戰是義不容辭的。他們曾向我們聲明，他們決心抵抗德國侵略者，即使單獨作戰也在所不辭。我們的韋維爾將軍和迪爾將軍曾陪同艾登先生前往開羅。兩位將軍在同我們開誠佈公地磋商後，相信有值得一戰的大好機會。因此，我們正把大部分尼羅河集團軍派往希臘，並盡量增援空軍。史末資正調派南非軍隊前往埃及三角洲。總統先生，你當可估量風險有多麼大。 在這一時刻，南斯拉夫的行動是個關鍵。還沒有一個國家遇到過這樣一個軍事上的大好機會。如果他們在阿爾巴尼亞襲擊意軍的後方，那就難以估量在幾個星期內將發生多麼重大的事件。整個局勢可能改觀，而土耳其的行動也肯定會有利於我方。人們覺得俄國至少可以對土耳其重申其保證：不在高加索對它施加壓力，或在黑海與它對抗，雖然俄國採取這種態度，主要是出於恐懼。你派駐土耳其、俄國、尤其是南斯拉夫的大使所產生的有利的影響在此刻具有莫大的價值，而且確實有扭轉局勢的可能，這一點是無需我多說的。 在這一方面，多諾萬在巴爾幹和中東的長期旅行中做了出色的工作，我應為此向你致謝。他始終具有令人感到鼓舞和溫暖的熱情。