Chapter 91 Volume 3, Chapter 18, Syria

Danger in Syria Repercussions of German Secret Service and Aircraft Arrival in Egypt and Turkey Admiral Darlan's Negotiations with the Germans Our Forces Are Tight Wavell and Free France Misunderstanding between Wavell and the Chiefs of Staff Committee Wavell's preparations and his misgivings Exporter Operations Plan The National Defense Committee approves Wavell's plan I call General de Gaulle June 6th June 7th Presidential March Reinforcements were needed at the outset, and reinforcements came to conquer Damascus, an important result of the Syrian campaign, which was requested by General Dantz on July 12.

Syria was one of the many overseas territories of the French Empire.After the surrender of the French Government, the Territories considered themselves bound by the French Government's surrender agreement, and the Vichy authorities were doing their best to prevent any French troops in the Levant from crossing Palestine to our side.The Polish brigade came, but the French seldom came.In August 1940, the Italian Armistice Commission arose, and the German agents interned at the outbreak of war were released and mobilized.Towards the end of the year, many more Germans came, and with their abundant funds, they engaged in anti-British and anti-Semitic activities among the Arab peoples in the eastern Mediterranean region.By the end of March 1941, the situation in Syria came to our attention.The Luftwaffe has already attacked the Suez Canal from bases in the Dodecanese and is clearly ready to take action against Syria, especially with airborne forces.Once the Germans took control of Syria, Egypt, the important canal area, and the refineries at Abadan would be under constant and immediate threat of air raids.Our overland transportation from Palestine to Iraq will also be jeopardized.Political repercussions are likely in Egypt and our diplomatic position in Turkey and throughout the Middle East will be greatly weakened.

On May 2, Rashid Ali asked Hitler to support his anti-British campaign in Iraq with armed forces.The next day, the German embassy in Paris was instructed to ask the French government to allow the delivery of planes and military supplies to Rashid Ali's army via Syria.On May 5 and 6, Admiral Darlan negotiated a preliminary agreement with Germany, according to which three-quarters of the munitions delivered to Syria and held by the Italian Armistice Commission would be sent to Iraq, The Luftwaffe will also be given the facility to land in Syria.The Vichy High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief, General Denz, had received instructions in this regard, and from May 9th to the end of the month about a hundred German planes and twenty Italian planes landed at Syrian airfields.

At this time, as discussed earlier, Middle East Command's tasks were extremely heavy.The defense of Egypt is the main task; we have withdrawn from Greece; the island of Crete must be defended; the island of Malta is asking for reinforcements; Abyssinia is not yet completely conquered; Now Iraq must be supplied with troops.In order to defend Palestine in the north, the only army that could be called in was the 1st Cavalry Division.This is a fine army, but its artillery and ancillary units have been transferred elsewhere.General de Gaulle strongly advocated the early military action of the Free French forces, without the support of British troops if necessary.But after the experience of the failure at Dakar, neither General Wavell on the ground nor those of us in London found it expedient to use the forces of the Free French alone, even against the German advance through Syria. , however this may be unavoidable.

Even so, we cannot abandon Syria in vain without doing everything within our power.Though we do not want to burden Wavell, we are compelled to urge him to do what he can to help the forces of the Free France.On April 28, he telegraphed that the only army he could deploy was one brigade.I commented on this telegram: It seemed necessary for General Wavell to get that brigade and mobile unit (which he mentioned) as ready as possible, and put them on standby on the Palestine frontier.Therefore, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces instructed General Wavell that assistance should not be guaranteed to General Dentz, but if he resisted the German landing from the sea or from the air, the British would immediately give all possible assistance.General Wavell was also ordered to take immediate air force action against any attack on Germany.

Looking ahead, the danger is extremely dangerous.I submitted a memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces on May 8: Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee The Cabinet will hold a meeting this morning and the Chiefs of Staff of the armed services will be asked to advise me on the Syrian issue.The best effort must be made to prevent Germany from gaining a foothold in Syria with a small army and then using Syria as a springboard to control the airspace of Iraq and Persia.It was useless for General Wavell to be troubled by such a disturbance on his eastern flank.We should aid in various ways without worrying about the reaction of the Vichy government.

I would be very grateful to the chiefs of staff for pointing out the most appropriate measures to take at present. On May 9th, with the consent of the National Defense Committee, I called General Wavell: You must be aware that Syria is in serious danger of being captured by a few thousand airlifted German troops.Our intelligence leads us to believe that Admiral Darlan may have made a deal with the Germans to assist them in entering Syria.You are so short of troops that there is nothing we can do but provide General Catrouh with the necessary transportation to enable him and his Free French forces to do their best when they see fit, while the Royal Air Force deals with the German landings.You are welcome to suggest any better way.

On May 14, the Royal Air Force was ordered to take action against German aircraft in Syria and on French airfields.On the 17th, General Wavell called to say that because of the need to send troops from Palestine to Iraq, the Syrian affairs had to use the Free French army alone or send troops from Egypt.He felt deeply that the Free French army was useless and might make the situation worse.He concluded by saying that he hoped that he would not be held accountable to Syria unless absolutely necessary.The Chiefs of Staff telegraphed back that there was no other option but to improvise a large army without compromising the security of the western desert, and that he should be ready to enter Syria as soon as possible.The composition of that army is at his discretion.

On May 21, just as the Germans were attacking Crete, Wavell ordered the 7th Australian Division (excluding the brigade stationed in Tobruk) to prepare to enter Palestine, and instructed that after returning from Greece earlier this month, the General Maitland Wilson, commander of Palestine and Transjordan, draws up plans for an invasion of Syria. At this point a misunderstanding arose between us at home and General Wavell, who had received the impression from a telegram from the Chiefs of Staff that we trusted the leaders of the Free France and not his own opinion. .He therefore called the Chief of the Reich General Staff to say that in that case he would prefer to be relieved of his command.I hastened to reassure him on this point, but at the same time felt compelled to say that we were determined to take risks in Syria and to take full responsibility for an operation that was ultimately not a military mission.

Prime Minister to General Wavell May 21, 1941 The current affairs of Syria must not interfere with our victory in the Battle of Crete or the Western Desert. We have no objection to your mixing British troops with the Free French troops that are going to Syria.However, as you have clearly stated, you do not have the strength to launch a regular military operation, and as you have been instructed yesterday, all that can be done at present is to prepare the best conditions for carrying out the telegram of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces on the 20th. Armed political invasion of the kind referred to in

You are mistaken if you think that the policy set forth in this telegram is based on the opinion of the leaders of Free France.This is entirely out of the opinion of those who hold the highest command of the war and policy in each theater here.Our take is: if the Germans can get Syria and Iraq with a small air force, tourists, and local mutinies, then we need not be afraid to take the same small military risks or face the potentially more serious consequences of failure. political danger.We are of course fully responsible for this decision. If you find it difficult to carry out, we shall make arrangements in accordance with your possible request for the removal of the Commander-in-Chief. In his reply, Wavell said he was fully aware of the situation.He explained that Free French intelligence on the situation in Syria had proved unreliable, making him reluctant to take military action against Syria when all available forces were needed in Crete, Iraq, and the western desert . General Wavell to Prime Minister May 22, 1941 The situation in Syria is disturbing because the Luftwaffe is already in Syria and they are much closer to the Canal and Suez than from the port of Matruh.It appears that (Vichy) France is now fully in surrender to Germany.After careful discussions with Cunningham, Ted, and Bremey, I am sending reinforcements to Palestine because we feel we must be prepared to act on Syria, and weak action will not do.At present, the entire situation in the Middle East is dominated by air forces and air bases.It will be difficult for us to hold Crete if the enemy has air bases in Greece, and it will be difficult for us to hold Egypt if they have air bases in Cyrenaica, Crete, Cyprus, and Syria.The Nile Army's objective was to force the enemy forces in Cyrenaica to retreat as far west as possible, prevent them from gaining a foothold in Syria, and hold on to Crete and Cyprus.In terms of our strength and the strength of the Air Force, it will not be easy to achieve these goals.I know you understand all this and are doing everything possible to provide what is necessary and we are doing everything we can to secure the Middle East.The months ahead will be difficult, but we will not be discouraged. I called back the next day: Prime Minister to General Wavell May 23, 1941 thanks for your call.These are very difficult times and we must all do our best to help each other. About Syria.We value your opinion, not that of Free France.You'd better keep de Gaulle close to you.I wonder if I can help you get closer to him, please tell me.We cannot fail the Battle of Crete because of Syria.So now I am afraid that we can only take the middle and bottom policy. About Iraq.We hope that Habbani forces will soon enter Baghdad and establish a regency there. As the hope of holding Crete faded, the possible German threat to Syria was increasingly attracting our attention.On May 25th General Wavell cabled him the outlines of the exporters' plan of operations.Exporter was the code name used in the Syrian operational plan at the time.General Wilson was preparing to march north with an army that included the 7th Australian Division, the Free French Army, part of the motorized 1st Cavalry Division, and some other units.Wavell estimates the earliest date for action is the first week of June.Although the danger of Germany setting up an air base on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea may lead to extremely serious consequences, especially the possibility of cooperating with the German army's ground operations through Turkey, it is even more unimaginable without considering the consequences, but we must first try to make it possible. The decisive military success of the Tomahawk campaign in the Western Desert. On the evening of May 27th the Defense Committee of the Cabinet met to study the whole situation in the Middle East, and I summarized the conclusions of the meeting in a telegram to General Wavell. Prime Minister to General Wavell May 28, 1941 Our forthcoming actions in the Middle East will be determined by the following circumstances. (1) After the enemy occupies Crete, they can open a direct line of communication to Cyrenaica via Greece and the west coast of Crete.Unless our air force can gain a foothold in Cyrenaica, we can neither cut off this line of communication nor easily hold the island of Malta and continue to cut off the enemy's line of communication to Tripoli. (2) The enemy's offensive via Turkey and/or Syria will not develop to a level of real force for many weeks. Our first objective must be to achieve a decisive military victory in the western desert and to devote all our efforts to destroying the enemy's armed forces in a single campaign. In the meantime, it is equally important that we establish a foothold in Syria before the German air force, which has been so exhausted by Freiberg's valiant resistance, is restored, and we therefore grant you permission on May 25 The general plan sent in a brief telegram. Therefore, we began preparations for the occupation of Syria amidst the uneasiness of the loss of Crete and the priority of concentrating our forces on the western desert. On June 3rd I called General Wavell: Prime Minister to General Wavell June 3, 1941 Hope to cable you exactly which ground forces and air forces will be used against Syria. How do you use the Polish Brigade?It appears that it is important to use and display a strong air force at the outset, so that even older aircraft can help, as they did in Iraq. 2. The Battle of Crete has caused a storm of criticism, and I am being compelled to explain many issues.You don't have to worry about that now, just work on Syria, especially the Tomahawk program.These two things are the answer to criticism, just or unjust.The air superiority available to the Tomahawk Operations program will far exceed what you could possibly acquire in a few months.As Napoleon said: War will answer.Wish you all the best. Wavell replied on the 5th, telling us how many troops he was going to use.He will try to avoid conflict as much as possible, and the march will start with propaganda, leaflets and displays of might.In case of resistance, use the greatest force possible.He said his estimate of the forces needed to occupy Syria has always been two divisions and an armored division or at least (some) armored brigades.His view, therefore, must have been that success was to say the least questionable and depended on the attitude of the French garrison and the local population. I thought of the difficult and complicated problems facing de Gaulle, and therefore, on the eve of our joint march on Syria, I sent him the following telegram of goodwill: Prime Minister to General de Gaulle June 6, 1941 I wish to extend to you my best wishes for the success of our joint operations in the Levant.I hope you are satisfied that we are doing everything we can to support the armed forces of the Free France.I am sure you will agree that this operation, and indeed our entire future policy in the Middle East, must demonstrate mutual trust and cooperation.Our policy towards the Arabs must be consistent.You know, we don't want to seek special benefits from the French Empire, and we don't intend to use the dire situation in France to our advantage. For that reason, I welcome your decision to allow independence for Syria and Lebanon, and as you know, I think it is important that we provide strong guarantees for that decision.I agree that we must not jeopardize stability in the Middle East while addressing Syria.However, both of us must use all possible means under this premise to satisfy the wishes and emotional requirements of the Arabs.I am sure you have kept in mind the importance of this aspect. Our thoughts are with you and with the soldiers of the Free France at all times.May the loyalty and bravery of the Free French save the honor of France at the height of the vileness of the present Vichy government. I have to ask you, at this critical moment, not to insist on declaring Quatrou as Syrian High Commissioner. As usual, I informed the President of the details. former navy personnel to president roosevelt June 7, 1941 Some of our troops will be entering Syria tomorrow morning to prevent further German infiltration.How successful it is depends mainly on the attitude of the local French army.De Gaulle's Free French Army was an important force, but not a vanguard.He is making a proclamation to the Arabs, in the name of France, granting them full independence, giving them the opportunity to form a free Arab state of three or one (or three in one).The relations of these countries with France will be fixed by a treaty, somewhat like the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, which guarantees vested interests.General Catrouh will be called not the High Commissioner but the French Plenipotentiary. 2. I cannot tell how the Vichy government will react to what might happen.I don't think they could do much worse than what they are doing, but of course they might take revenge against Gibraltar or Freetown.I would appreciate it if you keep up the pressure on them.In Syria, we have no political interest other than to win the war. All that Wavell could muster for this march was: the 7th Australian Division, part of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 5th Indian Infantry Brigade, recently repatriated from Eritrea, including six battalion, artillery squadron and tank company of the Free French Army.Air support was initially limited to about seventy aircraft.The navy and air force must first support the Crete campaign. In order to march to Syria, two cruisers and ten destroyers were dispatched, as well as some small ships.The Vichy army under the command of General Dentz consisted of eighteen battalions of the army, with 120 cannons and 90 tanks, totaling 35,000 men; the air force had 90 aircraft; Two destroyers and three submarines based in Beirut. The allied force was tasked with capturing Damascus, Layak, and Beirut as a first step towards capturing the entire territory.The march began on June 8 and met little resistance at first.No one can tell how far Vichy will fight.Although our attack was not enough to constitute a surprise attack, some people believed that the enemy's attack against us could only provide token resistance.But when the enemy knew how weak our forces were, he rose up and resisted, perhaps only to preserve the honor of their army.The Free French forces were held within ten miles of Damascus, and enemy counterattacks on their eastern flank threatened their lines of communication.The Australian division marching along the coastal road made slow progress due to the difficult terrain.A British battalion was thwarted at Quneitra when it was counterattacked by two enemy battalions assisted by tanks.The navy engaged the Vichy destroyers, but they were faster and fled.On the 9th, there was a brief encounter at sea, and the destroyer Janus was hit critically.On the 15th, two British destroyers were damaged by enemy planes while bombarding Sidon, but one Vichy destroyer was sunk by naval aviation while approaching the coast from the west. After this first week of fighting it became clear to Wavell that reinforcements were necessary.He managed to mobilize transport for a brigade of the now partially formed British Sixth Division and sent another brigade to Syria at the end of June.He also managed to mobilize a brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division (Habaniya troops) that had participated in the attack on Baghdad, and cross the desert from the south to attack Palmyra. attack Aleppo.This method of expanding the war situation has been effective since June 20.Damascus was captured by Australian divisions on the 21st after three days of heavy fighting.Their advance had been aided by the heroic attack of the 11th Commando, which had landed behind enemy lines from the sea.In this heroic blow, the commando lost its commander, Colonel Peder, and four officers, with about one hundred and twenty casualties, more than a quarter of the force's total strength. The fighting of the first week of July brought the collapse of the Vichy army close at hand. General Dontz knew his strength was at its limit.He still has about 24,000 men, but there is no possibility of further resistance.He has barely a fifth of his remaining air force.At 8:30 am on July 12, the Vichy envoy came to request an armistice.We granted their request, an agreement was signed, and Syria was occupied by the Allies.Our casualties were over 4,600; enemy casualties were about 6,500.During this period, an unpleasant incident occurred.British prisoners captured in battle were hastily transported to Vichy France, where they were bound to fall into German hands.When the matter was discovered and the other party did not try to remedy it, General Dontz and other senior officers were taken hostage.This had the desired effect and they repatriated our personnel. The victory in the Syrian campaign has greatly improved our strategic position in the Middle East.This smashed any new attempts by the enemy to infiltrate eastward from the Mediterranean Sea, moved our defense line defending the Suez Canal 250 miles north, and relieved Turkey of any anxiety about its southern frontier.If it is attacked now, it will definitely be aided by a friendly and powerful country.Although it is necessary to separate the wars in Iraq, Crete, Syria, and the western desert for the sake of narrative convenience, it must not be forgotten that they are coherent and affect each other, resulting in critical survival and intricate intertwining. major events together.Nevertheless, it can be asserted that the final result will constitute in fact, not in appearance, an undoubtedly great victory for the British and British Imperial forces in the Middle East.The credit should be divided equally between our responsible authorities in London and Cairo. The Battle of Crete, which cost us so much, destroyed the attacking power of the German Airborne Corps.Iraq's betrayal was finally suppressed.We regained control of that vast area with a small, improvised force. The occupation and subjugation of Syria was a very urgent need, and as all facts show, this action put an end to the German advances into the Persian Gulf and India.Had the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces only played it safe, not treating each stronghold as a victorious one, and imposing their will on all commanders, we would have had nothing but the loss of the Battle of Crete, Instead of getting paid for that hard and honorable battle.If General Wavell, while exhausted, was overwhelmed by the development of events and the extreme tension created by our orders, the whole future of the war and of Turkey might become dire.People often say, don't force yourself to do what you can't do, and also say, do things with certainty.But this principle, like other principles in life and war, has exceptions. One more campaign, that of the Western Desert, which I and the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces regard as the most crucial, has yet to be described.Although the battle was unsuccessful, Rommel was held back for nearly five months.