Chapter 104 Volume 3 Chapter 31 Japan

Japan and the Nineteenth Century Miracles of Adapting to Time Changes The Old Japan Hidden Unpredictability The System of the Japanese Army The System of the Navy The System of the German and British Merchants Hitler in August 1939｜Stalin The spirit of Japan after the collapse of the non-aggression pact France collapsed Effects of Anglo-American economic sanctions British constant apprehension We are in danger of fighting Japan alone My Memorandum of August 25th and 29th Naval Deployments My Reports to Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa 1941 Duke Konoe resigns in October General Tojo takes power Chiang Kai-shek's appeal November 5th My telegram to President Roosevelt His reply November 9th My telegram to General Smuts November 10th at London Guildhall Speech November 23rd My Memorandum to the Foreign Secretary The President's Statement on His Negotiations The Ten Points Note on the Tentative Treaty Mr. Hull's Decision The Restrictions on British Information Magic My 1941 Telegram of November 30th Dec. 1st matter decided. Memorandum I sent on December 2nd, 1941. Threat of the Isthmus of Carat. An astonishing episode in American history. The unanimous attitude of American leaders. God has delivered them into our hands Come Japan's sins crazy one cheap.

The time has come for one of the scariest adventures in Japan's long and bizarre history.Japan had not taken such a vital step since 1592, when the warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi decided to fight China to the death and use his navy to invade Korea.A solid continuation of traditions and customs has guided these formidable Far Eastern islanders through the centuries.Courage, discipline, and national spirit, never separate from the mystical, had sustained the life force of this hard and savage Asiatic people.Europe first heard of their existence from Marco Polo around AD 1300.The state religion of Japan is a branch of Buddhism.

The subsequent invasion of Christian missionaries, the piety of their followers, and their murderous extermination, had been an episode of which Europeans had scarcely noticed.The brutal massacre of more than 250,000 Christians took 24 years and ended around 1638.After this, Japan fell into a state of strict isolation, and passed through many generations almost in ignorance until the nineteenth century came into the world with its own cacophony of challenges.There was a period of total isolation.The art, culture and beliefs of the Japanese once supported a tight social structure.Science, machines and Western philosophy do not exist for them.

But the steam engine changed the distance on the earth, so about a hundred years ago, ships came from the ocean to Japan and knocked on the closed feudal door of Japan with weapons and ideas.For some time after the unwelcome visit of the American fleet under Commodore Perry in 1853, a British or American gunboat could impose the will of the Japanese state on the British or American government. outward behavior.With the foreign warships came those wonderful arts that the white man had discovered and was ready to teach or sell.The poor and austere culture of the thirteenth century was presented together with the smiling, prosperous and well-armed civilization of the nineteenth century.

Uncle Sam [1] and Britannia [2] are the godparents of New Japan.In less than two generations, the Japanese people, with no background but a long past, progressed from the two-handed sword of the samurai to the ironclad, the rifle cannon, the torpedo, and the Maxim gun; and industrially a similar revolution.Japan's transition from medieval to modern times, under the guidance of Britain and the United States, was rapid and intense.China was overtaken and defeated.In 1905 the people of the world were astonished to see Tsarist Russia not only defeated at sea but also defeated by a remarkable army transported to the mainland that had won several victorious battles in Manchuria.Japan was now among the great powers.The Japanese themselves are amazed to see people respecting them.You despised us and laughed at us when we sent you the beautiful products of our ancient art and culture; civilized country.But all they added was the ornament and armor of practical science.Everything is superficial, and there is still old Japan behind it.I remember how, when I was young, British cartoonists routinely depicted Japan as a bright, neat, uniformed messenger boy.Once, I saw an American cartoon, the style was quite different.An elderly monk-like warrior stood tall, valiant and formidable, with one hand resting on his dagger.

【1】A humorous phrase for the name of the United States.translator 【2】British personified noun (female).translator I don't claim to have studied Japan, whether it is ancient or modern, I just read some of it in newspapers, a few books, and in the official documents of many government departments where I served.I was on its side during the Russo-Japanese War.I welcome the Anglo-Japanese treaties made before this war. When I was in the Admiralty during World War I, I was delighted to read of Japan's participation in the Allies and of Germany's exclusion from the Far East.In 1921 I took part, with regret, in the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance from which we had gained strength and profit.But since we have to choose between Japanese friendship and American friendship, I have no doubt as to which course we should take.

In war and policy, always try to put yourself in the place of what Bismarck called the other.The more a minister is able to do this as far as possible and sympathetically, the greater is his chance of avoiding error.The more he knows about opposing views, the less he will be confused in dealing with them.But imagination without deep and full knowledge is a trap, and few of our specialists have been able to form any thought or real impression of the Japanese.Their thoughts are indeed immeasurable.How the old and the new societies mix and interact with each other at ages apart is beyond the comprehension of foreigners.Indeed, it is doubtful whether Japan knew her own mind, or that there were any forces in her nature which would dictate the moment of decision.

The system of the Japanese Army formed a series of circles united at one center by the Bushido tradition, which encouraged all officers and their men to die for the honor of Japan, and for the honor of each individual's ancestors.But as Japan emerged from long isolation in the vast world that surrounded her, and readily placed in the hands of her warriors weapons of hitherto unimagined power, a calm and slow development also formed the main Control Asia, and perhaps later lead Asia in a plan to conquer the world.It is even rumored that there is a hundred-year plan, even though this is just a background that has a driving force for constantly changing situations and events.

The most powerful check on the Army's power and ambitions in the post-World War II period came from the Navy.In the nineteenth century, Japan's army was trained by German instructors and its navy by British instructors.This leaves a lasting difference in mental state, which in turn is marked by the living conditions of military service.The army officer, who never went much outside the borders except to fight, developed a narrower ego and nationalism than the naval officer who visited foreign ports and thus knew something about the world outside of Japan.Also, the Army felt it could defeat or defend against any army that existed in or could sail to the Far East, while the Navy felt painfully inferior to the British and American navies in terms of fleet strength, especially in Japanese home waters This is even more so in external combat.Therefore, the Navy's view of things is more cautious and stable than that of the Army.

The merchant class did not receive official attention or formal organization like an army or navy, and they never had a common single policy for the various enterprises of finance, industry, and trade upon which they depended.Their influence was exerted partly through the parties in Parliament and partly through their connections with figures at court. On the whole, commercial interests were opposed to major military ventures, but some of them, especially those with investments in China, supported the Army's expansionist policy. Because of the traditional prestige of the Army and the belief that it was the defender of the national interest against the attempts of private capitalists, the Japanese public tended to support the Army in times of crisis rather than the leadership of the liberal bourgeoisie.

According to the Japanese Constitution of 1889, making treaties, declaring war and concluding peace treaties belonged to the Emperor's prerogative and were not controlled by the Diet.The Emperor also has supreme command over the armed forces.But he was supposed to exercise power on the advice of his naval and army chiefs of staff, and to direct foreign policy on the advice of his cabinet. Under Japan's constitution, the cabinet is not accountable to the Diet, although it requires a majority vote in both houses to legislate.The Prime Minister is selected and appointed by the Emperor.According to custom, the Emperor made such selections and appointments on the advice of the elders.At the beginning of this century, there were several elders, but after their death, no one supplemented them. Until 1940, only the Duke of Xiyuan Temple remained.After his death at the end of that year, the nomination of prime ministers was decided by a meeting of all outgoing prime ministers, known as the new elders, who numbered eight in 1941. The land and sea ministers in the cabinet must be a general in the army and a general in the navy, respectively.If a prime minister cannot find an admiral or admiral to fill these offices, he cannot form a cabinet, or maintain it, and the sects are so strong that an admiral or admiral will not Served as land or sea minister in a cabinet whose policies his army strongly disapproved of.The War and Admiralty were thus in a position to exert a constant and sometimes decisive influence on policy by recalling, or threatening to recall, soldiers from ministerial positions. Japan once concluded an anti-communist pact with Germany in 1936. This was originally negotiated between the Japanese Ministry of War and Ribbentrop representing the National Socialist Party behind the backs of the then foreign ministers of both sides.This is not yet an alliance, but it provides the basis for an alliance.In the spring of 1939, the Lu minister in the cabinet with Baron Hiranuma as prime minister attempted to conclude a complete military alliance treaty with Germany.He was unsuccessful because of the opposition of Admiral Minet, Minister of the Sea.During August 1939, Japan was not only engaged in the war against China which had begun in July 1937, but was also embroiled in local conflicts over the border question between the newly formed Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia. hostilities with Russia.Along this smoldering front and its rear, armies were deployed on both sides.When Germany signed a non-aggression pact with Russia on the eve of war in Europe without consulting or notifying its anticommunist partner Japan, the Japanese had reason to feel slighted.They were left behind in their arguments with Russia, and were very indignant with Germany.British support and sympathy for China had alienated us from our former allies, and our relations with Japan were not friendly during the first months of the war in Europe.But there is little or no enthusiasm for Germany in Japan. The Hiranuma Cabinet had to resign because of the loss of face due to the German-Soviet Treaty.The successor cabinet was appointed by General Abe as Prime Minister. Although General Abe was from the army (retired), he was regarded as a moderate figure. He was replaced by Admiral Minai in January 1940. Minai The Admiral opposed the alliance with Germany when he was Minister of the Sea in the Hiranuma Cabinet.Under the governments of Abe and Minai, Japan's policy was to remain neutral towards Europe, combined with Japan's own continued war against China.But before long, extreme unrest rocked the world.With France, Belgium, and Holland falling to Hitler's surprise, and Britain threatened to be invaded and destroyed in the autumn of 1940, brilliant long-lost plans were turned from dream to reality.Would Japan have nothing to gain from the collapse of France, Holland and probably Great Britain, which had large territories in the Far East?Has its historic time come?Deep enthusiasm stirred in the army and among the nationalist politicians.They demanded that Japan begin an immediate southward drive to seize French Indochina, Malaya, and the long-coveted Dutch East Indies.In order to enforce this policy, Admiral Lu Xiang (Hada) withdrew from the Cabinet, thereby forcing Admiral Minet to resign as Prime Minister. There has never been a shortage of sober and prudent elements in Japan, and they are under heavy pressure to maintain control.The senator recommended the Duke of the Guard, a young nobleman, closely connected with the court, but friendly with the leaders of the army, as his successor to Minet.His tenure was from July 1940 to October 1941. He was a very respected and extremely flexible politician, and his approach was to give the Army some token satisfaction without allowing it to drag the country into a major war.During the summer of 1940, the Duke of the Guard managed to restrain the Army from any raids on British and Dutch possessions.On the other hand, he agreed to press Vichy France for air bases in northern Indochina, and in September concluded the Triple Alliance with Germany and Italy.The treaty obligated Japan to fight on the side of the Axis powers when the United States entered a war in Europe on behalf of Britain. Several other major events during this period have become more apparent.By the end of November 1940, the outcome of the Battle of Britain and Hitler's retreat from the big talk of invading Britain were considered top priorities in Japan.The successful British air raid on the Italian fleet at Taranto, which knocked out several modern first-class battleships for several months, gave the Japanese Navy a deep sense of the power of the new air force and its ability to do so. things, especially when used in raids.Japan turned to believe that Britain was not finished.It will undoubtedly continue to fight, and is indeed getting stronger.There was a general feeling that Japan's signing of the Tripartite Treaty was a mistake.There was always a looming fear of a combined British Empire and American action, combining two of the most powerful navies at sea, whose resources, if exploited, would be immeasurable and unrivaled.It seems that danger is getting closer.In the spring of 1941, Konoe obtained the consent of his cabinet to begin negotiations with the United States with a view to resolving outstanding issues between the two countries.It is worth noting that General Lu Prime Minister Tojo supported Konoe's policy this time and opposed Foreign Minister Matsuoka, so some of Matsuoka's statements that such negotiations with the United States violated the Japan-Germany alliance were rejected. In spite of this, the intellectual agitation of the Japanese continued to grow stronger. Beneath their normal course of modern political life, thousands of officers and men in positions of responsibility, albeit of lower rank, seemed to hear the voices of their ancestors prophesying the coming war. Must they feel ashamed of their ancestors who had aggravated vengeance on the thirteenth-century Mongols, whom they believed to be like Tsarist Russia?The great martial arts of the ancestors inspired the descendants to make the most daring attempts.What's more, the whole world is in a precarious state.New powers and new giants have emerged.There will be a new order in Europe. Is this the time to establish a new order in Asia too?In all these outlines there are plans carefully and patiently conceived to accommodate each change in the great upheavals of the world.Army leaders asserted that they should have the authority to choose the moment to signal.They can certainly assert that if Japan were to start a war, the best chance for the collapse of France had been missed by cautious or cowardly politicians. The emperor and the dukes, with the top nobles attached to their left and right, were opposed to launching a war of aggression.They are bound to lose a lot in an age of turmoil.Many of them had traveled abroad and met their equals in foreign courts.They envy life in Europe and fear the mighty power of Europe and the United States.They envied the secure crown of the British monarchy.They continue to rely on their superficial parliamentary system and hope to continue to reign or rule without incident.But who could have guessed what the Army would do?The patriarchal system, the emperor or any dynasty was never able to separate from the army.The Emperor and Dukes wanted peace and prudence, but had no intention of being ruined for such a cause. The decisive implementation of economic sanctions in July 1941 brought the internal crisis of the Japanese political situation to a breaking point.Conservatives were shocked, moderate leaders panicked.This has involved the domestic prestige of the Japanese Army as a constitutive factor in formulating Japanese policy.The navy had exercised its binding power before.But the embargo imposed by the United States, Great Britain, and Holland cut off all supplies of oil on which the Navy, and indeed the entire war power of Japan, depended.The Japanese Navy was immediately obliged to live exclusively on its oil reserves, and had thus consumed four months' supply of eighteen months' supply by the outbreak of the Pacific War.Obviously, this is a constraint, and the choice before them is either to make an agreement with the United States or to go to war for Japan.America's demands limited Japan's withdrawal not only from their new aggression in Indochina, but also from their Chinese homeland, where they had spent so much money and had been waging war there for so long.This is a just but strict requirement.In this case, if an acceptable agreement could not be obtained diplomatically, the naval policy of war was united with the army.The fact that the Navy had by this time developed its air force to a highly offensive capability strengthened their will to take this course of action. Intensive debates in the circles of Japan's ruling figures continued throughout the summer and autumn.We now know that the overarching question of not sacrificing war with the United States was discussed on July 31, immediately following the embargo.It is clear to all Japanese leaders that the time for choice is short.Germany may win in Europe before Japan realizes any of her ambitions.Negotiations between the Japanese and U.S. governments continue.Conservatives in Japanese politics and the court hoped for provisions that would allow them to rein in the domestic militant faction.The State Department shares my belief that Japan may finally be cowering before the overwhelming power of the United States. The reader has seen how our apprehensions about Japan weighed relentlessly on our minds from the first day of the war.Its desires and opportunities are equally evident.We wonder why it did not strike at the collapse of France.We breathed a sigh of relief after this, but we were all the time tense about defending the British Isles from destruction and continuing the Western Desert War.I confess that I feel the threat of the whole of Japan to be in an ominous twilight compared to our other needs.I feel that if Japan attacked us, America would enter the war.We cannot defend the Dutch East Indies, and indeed our own empire in the East, if the United States does not enter the war.On the other hand, if Japan's aggression brought the United States into the war, I'd rather it be.I believe this.The order of our strategic arrangements in 1941 was: first, the defense of the British Isles, including the threat of invasion and submarine warfare; second, the war in the Middle East and the Mediterranean; deliver supplies; and finally, resist the Japanese attack.But it was always taken for granted that if Japan invaded Australia or New Zealand we should sacrifice the Middle East to defend our own kin and kin.We all regard this contingency as remote and improbable, since Malaya, Siam, and above all the Dutch East Indies, would suffice for many easier and more attractive conquests by Japan.If the course of Malaya's fortunes were to change, I am sure we would be able to use all our strength at this point to salvage the situation, even if the Middle East theater were to be routed or supplies to the Soviet Union would be cut off.On the other hand, America's entry into the war outweighs the sum of all evils. It must not be supposed that these generous decisions were made unconsciously or without deep and continuous deliberation by the War Cabinet and their military advisers. As time passed and I realized the enormous effects of the embargo announced by the President on July 26 and involving us and the Netherlands, I became more and more eager to bring the British and American naval fleets Make the largest possible demonstration against Japan in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.The naval fleet is all we can spare.We have carefully examined our resources. On the 25th of August I sent a memorandum to the First Sea Lord concerning the formation of an Eastern Fleet, and stating my opinion as to how it should be constituted.I feel strongly that it should be possible in the near future to place a deterrent fleet in the Indian Ocean, and that this fleet consist of the fewest of the best ships.The First Sea Lord replied that the Admiralty's plan was to have a fleet in Ceylon by early 1942, consisting of the battleships Nelson and Rodney, the battlecruiser Prestigious and the small aircraft carrier HMS Helmiz.Ark Royal will be sent later, but not until April.During this period, the four Royal-class battleships were to be dispatched to the Indian Ocean as escorts for the army convoy.The First Sea Lord detailed in his memorandum the overriding importance of the Atlantic theater of operations, in which he considered keeping all three of our latest HMS King George V-class battleships in the Atlantic for protection against the German ships The possible attack of the Tirpitz is very important. I don't like these arrangements.Escorting old Royal class battleships is effective against cruisers armed with eight-inch guns, but if the enemy were to send a fast modern battleship out for an attack, they and the convoys they escorted would be vulnerable .In their current condition, these old warships will be nothing more than floating coffins.Therefore, it would be necessary to deploy a fast capital ship or two to prevent the Japanese from sending individual heavy raiders. I conclude my letter to the Admiralty with the following words: August 29, 1941 I must add that I don't think Japan is going to stand against the combined forces that the US, UK and Russia are now forming against it while already trapped in China. It is likely that it will negotiate with the United States not to undertake any further acts of aggression or take an active part in the Axis powers for at least three months.Nothing would have made it more hesitant than the presence of the fleet I have mentioned, and especially of a battleship of the King George V class.This may indeed be a decisive method of prevention. 【１】 [1] My correspondence with the First Sea Lord at this time is reproduced in Appendix (XI).For those who wish to study the matter in more detail.For reasons not foreseeable at this time, the battleship sent was Prince of Wales, not Nelson or Rodney. It was decided to send HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, together with four destroyers and as a major component the modern armored aircraft carrier HMS Dreadnought, as the first ships of our Far East Fleet.Unfortunately, the Intrepid suffered an accident and temporarily lost combat effectiveness.We decided to ignore this fact and proceed with the two fast capital ships in the hope of stabilizing Japan and linking up with the American Pacific Fleet.Our general naval strategy is to establish a British Eastern Fleet based in Singapore under the remote cover of the American capital fleet in the Pacific, which will have capital ships of all capacities by the spring of 1942 Seven, one first-class aircraft carrier, ten cruisers and twenty-four destroyers.Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff, whom we had trusted until then, was selected as Commander, and his flag was hoisted on HMS Greenock on 24 October. At the end of October I called the Prime Ministers of Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa to give details of our proposed naval deployment in the Far East. I am still inclined to think that Japan will not rush to war against the United States, Britain, China, and the Netherlands unless (or until) Russia has actually collapsed.Even then they might have to wait for Germany's already promised invasion of the British Isles in the spring.Russian resistance is still strong, especially under Moscow, and winter is approaching. 2. The deployment of the Admiralty used to be to establish a fleet consisting of HMS Rodney, HMS Nelson and four Royal-class battleships near the end of this year, mainly based in Singapore.But that plan has been marred by a recent injury to the Nelson, which will take three or four months to repair. 3. In the interim, in order to further deter Japan, we are sending our newest battleship, Prince of Wales, to the Indian Ocean to join HMS Quench.This was done in spite of the protests of the Commander-in-Chief of our own fleet, and represented a great danger to us.The Prince of Wales will soon arrive in Cape Town.Moreover, the four Royal-class battleships were about to be transferred to Eastern waters as soon as they were ready.In the future, the Quench will be replaced by the Prestige, which has greater endurance. 4. In my opinion, the Prince of Wales will be the best possible deterrent to Japan, so we will make every effort to draw her out permanently.But I must state clearly that, because of the danger of Tirpitz's surprise attack and other operational possibilities before the Duke of York is ready in December, the Prince of Wales must be moved when she reaches Cape Town. Think again. In October, the Duke of the Guards unburdened him.He had asked for a personal meeting in Honolulu with Roosevelt, and he wished to bring his Army and Navy chiefs with him, so that they might be bound in matters that might be settled.But his proposal was rejected by the President, and public opinion on the Army side increased criticism of the wise statesman.He was succeeded by General Tojo, who was simultaneously Prime Minister, Minister of the Mainland, and Minister of Internal Affairs.General Tojo, who was hanged by the victors after the war in accordance with modern custom, said at his trial that he had personally taken over the Ministry of Internal Affairs because he was confronted with a dire tendency that indicated internal chaos if peace was decided instead of war.He resumed diplomatic negotiations with the United States on orders from the emperor, but had a tacit understanding with members of his government that Japan would go to war if the cabinet's advice was rejected.In November 1941, when Tojo and the chief of staff informed the emperor that war might be inevitable, the emperor expressed the hope that further efforts could be made to avoid the disaster of war, but he said to Tojo: If the situation is as you said If there is, there is no other way but to prepare for war. In early November I received an impassioned warning from General Chiang Kai-shek that the Japanese would continue to act in China.He believed that the Japanese had made up their minds to attack from Indochina, capture Kunming and cut off the Burma Road.He appealed to Britain to air aid from Malaya.He concluded by saying: At first glance, you might think that this would involve your country in a war against Japan at a time when your country is fighting so valiantly in Europe and the Middle East.Yu Zhi sees it differently.I don't believe that when China persisted in the War of Resistance, Japan still felt capable of attacking, but once she had no such concerns, she should attack your country at the appropriate time.China has reached the most critical moment of the War of Resistance.Whether or not the overland routes to Singapore and Burma can be defended at present depends first on whether the United Kingdom and the United States are willing to cooperate in the defense of Yunnan.Should the Japanese break the line here, we will be cut off from your country, and your entire machinery for air and naval coordination with the United States and the Dutch East Indies will be severely compromised in a new way and from a new direction. threaten.I wish to do my best to express my belief that it is wise and far-sighted to give China the assistance I have described.There is no other way than to defeat Japan and ensure the victory of the nation now resisting aggression.Looking forward to seeing you again. I can do little more than pass this warning on to the President. former navy personnel to president roosevelt November 5, 1941 I have received appeals from Chiang Kai-shek for airlift assistance for both of us. You know where we are in terms of Singapore's air force strength.Nevertheless, I am prepared to send pilots, and even some aircraft, as long as they arrive in time. 2. What we need now is the most comprehensive and most negligible way to stop Japan.The Japanese have yet to make a final decision, and the Emperor appears to be imposing constraints.When we talked about this in Placencia Bay, you talked about buying time, a policy that has been very successful up until now.But our joint embargo is gradually forcing the Japanese to decide between peace and war. 3. It now appears that they will enter Yunnan and cut off the Burma Road with damaging consequences for Chiang Kai-shek.Should his resistance break down, not only would it be a world tragedy in itself, but it would free up large numbers of Japanese troops to attack north or south. 4. The Chinese have appealed to us to warn the Japanese about their attack on Yunnan, and I believe they have appealed to you as well.I hope you will think it appropriate to remind the Japanese that to attack China like this from a region where we have never recognized their right to station troops would be to disregard what the United States Government has made clear.We are of course prepared to issue a note of the same kind. 5. No single act of our own can stop Japan, since we are so bound elsewhere.But of course, we are willing to stand with you and support you in every possible way, whatever course you choose.I personally think that Japan is more likely to be involved in the war by the situation than to enter the war resolutely.Please tell us your thoughts. The President replied on November 9 that while it would be a great mistake to underestimate the seriousness of the threat, he doubted that the Japanese preparations for an overland attack on Kunming would prove that a Japanese advance was imminent in the near future.He will try to aid China under the Lend-Lease Act and establish a United States Volunteer Air Force in China.He felt that, as was the case in Japan, any new formal verbal warning or exhortation would at least have an equal chance of producing the opposite effect.The whole matter will be subject to our continuous and careful attention, study and effort. I tried to comfort the Generalissimo by repeating the points of this cautious answer. We have no course to pursue but to continue our naval program in the Far East, and leave the United States to try diplomatically to keep Japan calm in the Pacific for as long as possible. I wrote to General Smuts, who had raised larger issues. November 9, 1941 I do not think it would be of any use for me to personally appeal to Roosevelt to enter the war at this time.At the Atlantic Conference, I said to his officials that I would rather the United States declare war now and not get supplies for six months than double the supplies and the United States does not declare war.When it was repeated to him, he took it to be a harsh remark.We must not underestimate his constitutional difficulties.He can act as head of the executive, but only Congress can declare war.He even said to me, I can never declare war, but I can make war happen.If I were to ask Congress to declare war, they might hold debates for three months.The conscription bill passed with a majority of one vote, without which the US Army would have collapsed.He has now carried the de facto repeal of the neutrality statute through the Senate with a slim majority.這如果獲得眾議院的贊同，就一定意味著德國和美國的船艦在大西洋上經常戰鬥。美國輿論最近已經有了進步，但是就國會來說，那完全是一個清點票數的問題。當然，倘若我看出有任何方法可以有助於把這種形勢提高到一個較高的水平，我當然願意這樣做。當此時刻，我們必須具有耐心，並信賴潮流正順著我們的道路，並且向著重大事件發展。 十一月十日，在首相照例出席的倫敦市政廳年度宴會上，我說： 我必須承認，雖然我在將近四十年以前，在一九○二年，曾經投票贊成英日同盟條約，並始終竭力促進同日本這個海島帝國的良好關係，又始終是一個熱情的願望日本人好並且讚賞他們的許多才能和品質的人，但是現在我深切遺憾地看到日本和英語世界之間的衝突正在開始。 美國在遠東的由來已久的利益是眾所周知的。它正在盡力尋求在太平洋上保持和平的道路。我們不知道它的努力會不會成功，但是設若它失敗了而美國捲入對日本的戰爭，那麼，我就得說，英國將在一小時內接著宣戰，這是我的職責。 如果我們盡量冷靜地觀察這個茫茫無際的陰暗局面，就可以看到，對於日本人民來說，十分不必要地投入一次世界戰爭，他們將不難發現自己在太平洋中和人口將近佔人類四分之三的一些國家對抗，這似乎是一個非常危險的冒險行為。 如果鋼是現代戰爭的首要基礎，那麼，對於一個每年鋼產量大約只有七百萬噸的像日本這樣的國家來說，完全無端地引起對現在鋼產量大約為九千萬噸的美國的一次戰爭，這會是相當危險的事；而這還沒有把英國所能作出的重大貢獻計算在內。因此，我希望太平洋上的和平將可按照日本的最明智的政治家所顯示出來的願望來得到保持。但是旨在保衛英國在遠東的利益和保衛現時陷入危境的共同事業的一切準備都已經做好了，並還在繼續進行中。 十一月二十日，日本把它的最後之言送達華盛頓。雖然從這些提議上可以清楚地看出日本實際上不過是企圖不經過戰爭而獲得勝利果實，美國政府覺得不能不作一次最後的外交建議。我們曾經接到關於這項日本照會的通知，並被要求提出我們的意見。十一月二十三日，我在致外交大臣的一項備忘錄中寫道： Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary November 23, 1941 我們主要關心的是：不發生進一步的侵略和戰爭，因為我們已經嘗夠了戰爭的苦頭。美國不會拋棄中國的事業，所以我們可以在問題的這一方面穩妥地追隨它。我們當然不能同意一種使日本可以在西伯利亞自由地對俄國進攻的安排。 我本人懷疑這在目前是否會發生。我記得羅斯福總統在大西洋會議上曾經親自加進了一段話，在北方必須不得再有任何侵略。我想就這點可以（同美國人）達成協議。我認為由日本正式宣佈廢除軸心國條約是不必要的。他們置身戰爭之外這事本身就會使德國人大失所望和受到損害。我們不應當同意對於美國或英國援助中國加以禁止的任何規定，但是美國不致要求我們這樣做。 以上述為條件，在經濟方面對日本放鬆一步而使他們足夠勉強活下去哪怕我們只獲得又三個月的時間，會是值得的，然而這些不過是初步的意見。 我必須說，如果我獲悉美日協定已經訂立，而按照這個協定我們在以後三個月內在遠東的情況不會比現在還壞，那麼，我就感到高興了。 十一月二十五日，總統發給我一封電報，說明談判的情況。日本政府曾經提議在同中國謀取全面解決或全面恢復太平洋地區的和平以前自印度支那南部撤退，而在全面恢復太平洋地區的和平之時，日本將準備從印度支那完全撤退作為回報，美國應以石油供給日本，避免干涉日本在中國恢復和平的努力，協助日本獲得荷屬東印度的產品，並把日美兩國間的商務關係置於正常基礎之上。雙方應同意在東北亞和南太平洋地區不作任何武裝進展。 接著，美國打算提出一個反建議，一般地接受了日本照會中的條件而簡要地提出專門條件，附於日本自印度支那南部撤退的條款之後，而並不提及中國局勢。美國準備接受把原來的凍結命令加以修正的一項有限的經濟協定。例如石油只可以按月供平民的需要而運出。美國的這項建議的有效時期將為三個月，並基於這樣的一種諒解，即在這個期間將討論包括整個太平洋區域在內的全面解決辦法。 當我讀到昔日稱為、而現在仍然稱為暫定條約的這項草擬的覆文時，我認為它是不適當的。荷蘭和澳大利亞政府，尤其是蔣介石都有這個意見，蔣介石曾以一項激烈的抗議送達華盛頓。但是我深深地覺察到當我們就單靠美國去決定行動的一個問題對他們的政策加以評論時，我們所必需遵守的那些限制。我了解到隨著英國人正力圖把我們拉入戰爭的這種想法而來的危險。因此，我就不去觸動這個問題，就是說，把這個問題聽憑總統去處理，於是我只提到中國方面而發給他下列電報： former navy personnel to president roosevelt November 26, 1941 今晚收到你關於日本的電報，也收到了哈利法克斯勳爵關於討論情形和你對日本的反建議的詳細報告。當然，處理這事，全在於你，而且我們的確不需要再多打一場戰爭。只有一點使我們不安。蔣介石怎樣呢？他不是正處於難以維持的境地嗎？我們所焦慮的就是中國。如果他們崩潰，我們的共同危險將會大大增加。我們確信美國對於中國事業的關心將支配你們的行動。我們覺得日本人對他們自己是最沒有信心的。 這封電報當然在標明的日期的當天黎明時到達華盛頓。 赫爾先生在他的回憶錄中說： 夜間，邱吉爾先生致總統對我們的暫定條約加以評論的一封電報送到了。顯然受到蔣介石給他的電報的影響，這位首相疑慮在暫定條約的影響下那位大元帥是不是只能得到非常菲薄的口糧。據他說，中國是使他焦慮不安的原因，而中國的崩潰將會大大增加我們的共同危險。我就這個問題同國務院的遠東問題專家們再次談論以後得到了我們應當取消這個暫定條約的結論。作為代替，我們應當向日本人只提出旨在達到全面解決的那十點建議；原來暫定條約是作為這個建議的前言的。雖然這個暫定條約裡的項目不過包括一些為數微小的棉花、石油和幾種別的商品，其數量與日本所要求的無限制供應相比是非常有限的，但是明顯的是，美國輿論甚至對於以有限數量的石油供應日本也將普遍地反對。中國人激烈地反對，其他有關國家的政府不是不贊同，就是冷淡。 因此，日本會同意這個暫定條約的一點希望，並不足以保證有理由去承擔那些包含在其中的危險，特別是中國士氣和抵抗的崩潰和甚至瓦解的危險。 我們直到此時還沒有聽到過那個十點照會，這個照會不但符合我們和各有關政府的願望，而且實際上超出我們曾經敢於要求的事情之上。就在二十六日那天，赫爾先生在國務院接見了日本的特使們。他甚至連總統於二十三日電告我的那個暫定條約都沒有對他們提到。相反地，他交給他們這個十點照會。其中兩點如下： 日本政府將從中國和印度支那撤退所有的陸軍、海軍、空軍和警察部隊。 美國政府和日本政府將不在軍事、政治和經濟上支持除首都臨時設在重慶的中華民國國民政府以外的在中國的任何政府或政權。 特使們都目瞪口呆，極其狼狽地退出去了。這可能是真誠的。他們之所以被遴選，大都是由於他們以謀求和平和溫和人士而著名，因而可以哄騙美國不加防備，直到一切都決定下來和一切都準備好了為止。他們不大知道他們的政府的全部心意。他們做夢也想不到赫爾先生在這方面所知道的事要比他們多。美國人從一九四○年底起就已經破獲了日本的關係重大的密碼，而一直在譯出大量的他們的軍事和外交電報。 在秘密的美國人圈子裡說到這些電報時稱作魔術。美國人把魔術對我們複述一遍，但是在我們收到以前，有不可避免的稽延有時兩三天。因此，我們在任何特定的時刻並不知道總統或赫爾先生所知道的全部事情。我對此並無怨言。 在那同一個下午，總統以下列電報發給駐菲律賓的高級專員： 準備工作正日益明顯以便在最近作出某種性質的侵略行動，雖然直到目前還沒有清楚的跡象表明這次行動的實力，或者它將指向滇緬公路、馬來半島、荷屬東印度，還是菲律賓群島。向泰國推進，似乎是最可能的。我認為這下一次日本的侵略有引起美日之間爆發敵對行動的可能。 當我們的大使哈利法克斯勳爵在十一月二十九日訪問國務院時，赫爾先生對他說，來自日本的危險就懸在我們頭上了。我們同日本的關係中的外交方面現在實際上已經結束。 目前，問題將由陸軍和海軍的官員們去處理，我已經同他們談過。日本可能在出乎我們意料的時機突然行動。 我認為，日本人認識到他們現在全面地重新開始的無限制征服的方針可能是孤注一擲，因而需要最大的勇氣並做最大的冒險。他又說：當邱吉爾收到蔣關於暫定條約的強烈抗議時，如果他給蔣一封強硬電報使之振作起來，以日本人和美國人正在顯示出來的那樣的熱情去戰鬥，那就會更好一些。他沒有這樣做，而是把這項抗議轉交給我們，而從他那方面並不反對。 我不知道日本的計劃已定，也不知道總統的決心已經達到什麼程度。 former navy personnel to president roosevelt 一九四一年十一月三十日 據我看來，有一種避免日本與我們兩國之間的戰爭的重要方法還沒有使用，這就是秘密或公開地（以你認為哪一種方式最好而定）明白宣佈，日本採取的任何進一步的侵略行動，將立即導致嚴重的後果。我了解你在憲法上的困難，但是如果沒有公平正直地把進一步侵略行動的悲慘性質向日本提示，就讓它因侵略行動而陷入戰禍，那將是可悲的事。我要求你考慮在你認為適當的時候（這個時候也許是很近的），你可否說日本的任何進一步侵略將使你不得不把最嚴重的問題向國會提出，或大意如此的話。我們當然會發表類似的宣言，或參加一個聯合宣言，無論如何我們正在作出與你們同時採取行動的安排。我親愛的朋友，請原諒我冒昧促請你採取這樣的方針，但是我深信這可以使一切改觀，並防止戰爭悲慘地擴大。 但是他和東條都已經遠遠地走在前面了。世界大事也是這樣。 三十日，午後不久（美國時間），赫爾先生訪問總統，總統的桌上放著我在昨夜發出的同日電報。【１】他們認為我關於對日本提出一個聯合警告的建議不會有任何好處。這也不會使我們感到驚奇，這時在他們的面前已經有了一封截獲到的自東京發至柏林，日期也是十一月三十日的電報，這封電報告訴日本駐柏林大使向希特勒和里賓特洛甫作如下的通知： 【１】讀者不必由於這些電報上註明的日期而感到迷惑，只要這些電報的先後次序不亂就行。我經常工作到凌晨兩三點鐘（英國時間），我發出的任何電報需要花費兩三個小時去翻電碼和譯釋。儘管這樣，我在就寢以前擬好的任何電報為了實際的目的幾乎是立即送達總統的這就是說，當他睡醒或在必要時把他喚醒的時候。 非常秘密地對他們說，存在著通過某一場軍事衝突而使盎格魯撒克遜國家和日本之間的戰爭突然爆發的極度危險，並附帶說明這個戰爭爆發的時間可能比任何人夢想到的來得更快。 我於十二月二日收到這類電報的譯文。這不需要英國採取任何特別行動。我們只須等待而已。日本的航空母艦艦隊事實上已經在二十五日載著即將襲擊珍珠港的全部海軍航空隊啟航。當然，這支艦隊是仍然受東京的約束命令的支配的。 十二月一日在東京舉行的一次御前會議，作出了對美國開戰的決定。按照東條在受審時的作證，天皇未發一言。在隨後的一個星期中，太平洋上如死一般地沉寂。可能用外交方式來解決的那些方法都一一試過了。這時，還沒有任何軍事侵略行動發生過。我的最深的憂慮就是日本人會向我們或荷蘭人進攻和憲法上的困難會阻止美國宣戰。經過十二月二日舉行的一次長時間的內閣會議，我給外交大臣一份體現了我們的結論的備忘錄： Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary December 2, 1941 我們的既定政策就是不先於美國去採取行動。除非在日本企圖奪取克拉地峽的情況下，美國直接面臨日本的一次新的侵略行動，還有一些時間。如果美國行動了，我們當立即行動，支持他們。如果美國並不採取行動，我們就必須重新考慮我們的立場。 日本可以隨時襲擊荷蘭屬地。在美日談判之後，這將是對美國的一種直接冒犯。我們應當告訴荷蘭人說，我們不會去阻止這項日本侵略產生的全部影響，日本的這個侵略行動，對美國來說，乃是它與日本之間的一個直接的問題。如果美國對日本宣戰，我們將接著在一小時內宣戰。如果經過相當時期而看出美國即使有我們的直接支持而還不能採取任何斷然行動，那麼，我們縱然獨力支撐，也當與荷蘭人同心協作。 任何對不列顛屬地的襲擊，當然帶來對大不列顛的戰爭。 警惕的英國情報機構和空中偵察，不久就察覺到有些調動和活動表明日本行將進攻暹羅，而且這項進攻將包括海運部隊奪取克拉地峽上的戰略地點的一次遠征。我們把這一情況報告了華盛頓。在我們和我們的遠東總司令之間，以及同澳大利亞和美國政府，都有一系列冗長的電報來往，談論我們應否採取先發制人的行動來保衛克拉地峽。基於軍事和政治上的理由，我們作出了正確的決定，認為我們不應當在一個次要戰區內首先發動攻擊而使事態的發展複雜化。在十二月六日，倫敦和華盛頓都知道了一支大約有三十五艘運輸艦、八艘巡洋艦和二十艘驅逐艦的日本艦隊正從印度支那駛過暹羅灣。另外一些日本艦隊也在海上執行其他任務。 一個龐大的美國國會調查團在一九四六年公佈了它的調查報告，這項報告詳盡地敘述了導致美日戰爭的那些事件，以及未能通過軍事部門給他們無掩蔽的艦隊和守軍發出積極警戒命令的經過。每一個細節，包括譯釋日本的密電和這些密電的本文，共計四十卷都已經公諸於世。美國的力量足夠使它經得起美國憲法的精神所要求的這種嚴格考驗。 我不想在這篇敘述中企圖宣佈對美國歷史上的這個驚人的插曲的判斷。我們知道在總統左右的並為他所信任的那些卓越的美國人士和我一樣敏銳地感覺到日本將在遠東進攻英國或荷蘭的屬地，並將小心地避開美國，以及因而國會將不批准美國宣戰的那種巨大危險。美國領袖人物了解到這可能意味著日本將征服許多廣大地區，如再結合著德國侵俄的勝利和以後英國的被侵入，那將使美國單獨地面對著洋洋得意的侵略者們的勢不可當的聯合力量。那麼，不但那些處於危險中的偉大道德事業將要被拋棄，就是美國和至今才對他們的危險有了一些覺醒的美國人民的生命也可能遭到毀滅。總統和他所信任的朋友們長久以來就認識到在反抗希特勒和希特勒所主張的一切事情的戰爭中美國守中立的嚴重危險性，並且由於國會的掣肘而輾轉不安，這個國會的眾議院就在幾個月以前只以一票的多數通過了必須恢復的強迫兵役制，如果不恢復這個制度，他們的陸軍就已經在世界動亂當中幾乎瓦解了。羅斯福、赫爾、史汀生、諾克斯、馬歇爾將軍、斯塔克海軍上將和作為他們大家的聯繫人物的哈里‧霍普金斯，都是同心同德的。後代的美國人和各地區的自由人民將因他們的先見而感謝上帝。 日本對美國的襲擊，使美國的問題和任務大大地簡單化了。美國對於這次襲擊的實際形式，甚至它的規模，與對於整個美國國家為了它本身的安全而將空前團結在一項正義的事業中這個事實比起來看得非常之不重要，我們怎麼會對此感到驚奇呢？據他們看來，如我所見一樣，日本去襲擊美國，並和它開戰，這無異於自殺。再者，關於敵人全部的和最近的目的，他們比我們在英國知道得更早。我們想起克倫威爾在注視著蘇格蘭軍隊從鄧巴的高崗上往下進撲時怎樣地大聲呼道，上帝已經把他們交到我們手裡來了。 【１】 【１】指一六五○年蘇格蘭軍隊進攻英格蘭一事。translator 我們也一定不可以容許利用外交來往的詳細敘述來把日本描繪成一個受害的無辜者，說它不過是要藉著歐洲戰爭的機會來求得適度的擴張或分潤，而這時遇到美國向它提出了不能期望它的被狂熱地鼓動起來的而且有了充分準備的人民接受的一些建議。多年以來，日本一直以它的惡意侵略和征服在折磨著中國。此時，由於它強佔印度支那而在事實上以及由於簽訂三國協定而在形式上都已經同軸心國家共一命運了。讓它去做它敢於做的事而承擔一切後果吧。 日本竟會同英美開戰，並且可能終於同俄國開戰，因而自取滅亡，這曾經似乎是不可能的。日本宣戰是和理性不相容的。我確信由於這樣的一次冒進，它將遭到毀滅達一個世代之久，而這已經被證明是真實的。但是各國的政府與人民並不總是作出合乎理性的決定的。有時，他們作出瘋狂的決定，或者一派人掌了權而強迫所有別的人服從他們並幫助他們去做愚蠢的事。我曾經毫不遲疑地一再敘述到我不認為日本將做出瘋狂行動的信念。不管我們怎樣誠懇地力圖設身處地為別人著想，我們都不能察看到為理性所無法解釋的人類思維和幻想的過程。 然而，瘋狂是一種災害，它在戰爭時使人去謀求突襲的便宜。