Chapter 119 Volume 4, Chapter 9, Invasion of Myanmar

Japanese Air Raid on Rangoon January 16th They entered Burma from Lolo The 17th British Indian Division was defeated on the Salween River Crossing the Sidang River We withdrew to the Bago River Sad differences with the Australian GovernmentAustralian views Telegram from me to Mr. Curtin on February 20 Telegram to President Roosevelt Telegram from the President to Mr. Curtin who rejected the President's request Reply to me from Mr. Curtin on February 22 I sent the Australian escort Fleet transfer to Yangon Adverse response from the Australian government We agree with their February 23rd request that President Roosevelt's further efforts not to send Australian troops to Burma General Alexander was sent to command he opened the way from Yangon and retreated smoothly to British Columbia The road to India was cut off for the escape of the remnants of our army due to the complexity of command in the theater.

It is generally believed that the Japanese will not launch a large-scale campaign against Burma, at least until the war in Malaya is successfully concluded.But it turned out otherwise.Before the end of December, the Japanese began air raids on Rangoon.At that time, the air force guarded by our side had only one British fighter squadron and one fighter squadron of the US Air Force Volunteer Corps.This volunteer team was formed before the war to aid the Chinese.I ask President Roosevelt to keep this heroic force in Rangoon. prime minister to president roosevelt January 31, 1942 I learned that several fighter squadrons of the U.S. Air Force Volunteer Corps, which is extremely capable in defending Rangoon, may be withdrawn to China by Chiang Kai-shek after January 31.Obviously, the safety of Rangoon is as important to Chiang Kai-shek as it is to us. If these squadrons are withdrawn before the arrival of the Whirlwind fighter jets scheduled to arrive between February 15 and 20, the The consequences will be disastrous.I know that General Magruder has been ordered to raise the matter with the Generalissimo, but I think it is a serious matter and you should know it yourself.

The President granted my request.Despite their meager strength, these forces severely damaged Japanese aircraft conducting air strikes.The bombing caused little military damage, but it caused riots and caused many casualties in the crowded city.Numerous native workers, as well as junior officers, both military and political, had abandoned their posts, and, though not hampering the use of the port, it was seriously affected.During the two months of January and February, the Japanese air raids were thwarted, and each attack had to be paid for. The Japanese invaded Burma from Siam, and since their attack on Dawei on January 16, they have occupied the land without much difficulty, and our few defenders stationed in Myeirao in the south retreated by sea.On January 20, after defeating the resistance of the Indian brigade in Kojali, a division of the Japanese army advanced from the east to Moulmein, and occupied Moulmein a few days later.

Sir Reginald Dorman/Sir Smith, Governor-General of Burma, showed calm and courage during the tense weeks after the Japanese invasion of Burma began. I thought the day after the fall of Singapore was an opportune time to pay him tribute and point out to him the imminent crisis. Prime Minister to the Governor-General of Myanmar February 16, 1942 I have not bothered you with my telegrams, but I want to tell you that I and my colleagues admire you for your fortitude in a situation of increasing difficulty and danger.Now that Singapore has fallen, the Japanese army will definitely increase its strength to attack you.Strong reinforcements, including an armored brigade, plus two squadrons of Tornado fighters, would arrive shortly.We will meet tonight to discuss further possible measures.In my opinion, Burma and the connection with China is the most important link in the whole (Eastern) theater.I wish you happiness.

The three Anglo-Indian brigades comprising the 17th Division were forced to retreat to the Salween Line after two weeks of fighting the superior and increasing Japanese forces, and were outnumbered around Milim on this line. , A fierce battle of offense and counter-offensive was launched.On February 20, the situation became clear, and in order not to annihilate the entire army, they had to continue to retreat towards the Sidang River.There was only one bridge across the great flowing river five hundred yards wide.Before the main force of the 17th Division could reach the bridgehead, the bridgehead was attacked by a powerful Japanese force; at the same time, the marching column which had retreated to the bridge itself was attacked by the fresh arrival of the enemy's division, which was flanked by a new force. Our army engaged in an encounter battle, and the bridgehead commander thought that our three brigades in retreat had been greatly weakened, scattered and hit, and in fact already thrown into the net; under such an impression, after obtaining the approval of the division commander, he ordered Blow up bridges.When the 17th Division opened its way to the river bank, it found that the bridge had been blown up, and there was only rolling water ahead. Even so, 3,300 people managed to get through this natural danger, but with only 1,400 rifles and several machine guns.All other weapons and all equipment were lost.This is a great disaster.

Now the Japanese and Yangon are only separated by the Bago River defense line.The remnants of the 17th Division regrouped here, joined by three British battalions from India and the British 7th Armored Brigade, newly arrived from the Middle East.The armored brigade, originally going to Java, was transferred to Burma by General Wavell, and played an incomparable role in all subsequent fighting.A little further north, the 1st Burmese Division, after being taken over by the Chinese Sixth Army in southern Shan State, moved to the south of Toungoo to guard the road leading north to Mandalay. I cannot fail now to recount a sad episode in our relations with the Australian Government, and their refusal of our requests for aid.I do not wish it to be my account of the facts, but it is necessary to account of the events of the Burmese campaign.In China and in Australia, many people only know about these situations one-sidedly.It is best to have a full discussion of the situation on both sides, so that a fair judgment can be made, and the necessary lessons can be drawn as a guide for the future.

There is bitterness in our military and political circles in London during these very pressing times, but there is unity of opinion between the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff.Don't forget, however, that the Australian government takes a very different view.Their predecessors, under the leadership of Mr. Menzies, established the Royal Australian Army and sent no less than four divisions of troops. These troops were composed of their best men and crossed thousands of mountains and rivers to assist the mother country in the war. war.They are not responsible for the formation of this war and their negligence in preparing for it.From the time of the Battle of Bardia, Australian troops and New Zealand divisions played an important role in the defense of Egypt's desert fighting.They have shown their talents in the prelude to victory, and they have suffered together in many painful defeats.Eight months later, the 9th Australian Division would attack at the Battle of Alamein, what history will call the decisive attack.They risked all the dangers and suffered much in Greece.An Australian division fought well in Johor and was wiped out or captured when it reached Singapore; these circumstances were never explained, and the British operational command was responsible.The failure of the Sidang River seems to have decided the fate of Burma, and the resources and arrangements of the imperial government once again showed serious inadequacies and inappropriateness.No one who knows the situation can doubt that, with superior numbers of forces, total command of the air, command of the sea, and free choice of point of attack, the Japanese onslaught will conquer and hold Wavell within a few days. The entire vast area to which the general's American, British, Dutch, and Australian theaters belong.

All Australian military thinking regards Singapore as the key to the outposts and forward positions in the entire defense system, and Australia depends on it to buy the necessary time for the United States to regain control of the sea in the Pacific Ocean, so that American military aid can reach Australia, so that it can be concentrated And organize the Australian army to defend their homeland.They certainly regarded the Japanese invasion of Australia as a possible and imminent disaster which would subject the people of Australia, men, women and children, to the horror of being conquered by the Japanese.To them, as to us, Burma was but one side of a world war, but the advance of Japan was of little concern to the safety of the British Isles, but a mortal danger to Australia.The Australian Government has lost faith in Britain's ability to command war and our judgment at home, with our fate already in a situation of merciless defeat and ruin.They felt that the time had come when they must muster all possible mustering forces against the dangers which menaced the very existence of their city and people.

On the other hand, we can't help feeling that when we were in the same dire danger that was much closer and more probable in 1940, we were not losing our minds, or even increasing our own risk, for other life-and-death needs. Without hesitation.We therefore feel entitled to ask them to make the same decision as we did in August 1940 when we decided to send half our weak armored forces to defend Egypt in order to preserve the desert.And it's not in vain to do so.The same zealous action by Australia in this emergency might have already paid off. As for myself, I do not believe that after Japan has seized all the rich spoils she has long coveted in the Dutch East Indies, she will send an army of at least 150,000 men, otherwise it will be useless to cross the equator. Four thousand miles south, a war with the Australian people.Australian soldiers have shown they can fight every time they fight.Nevertheless, I was the first to propose the transfer of two divisions of the best Australian troops from the Middle East to Australia; this was announced in Parliament before Australian ministers asked me.Moreover, when I was in Washington in January, President Roosevelt had already received promises from President Roosevelt that he would take responsibility for the use of the United States Fleet for Australia's surface defense, and to send over 90,000 American soldiers there; these measures are being rapidly implemented middle.At present a very tense war crisis has arisen in Burma, and with the enthusiastic support of the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services, I have expressed my opinion to Mr. Curtin.

Prime Minister to Mr Curtin February 20, 1942 1. I think you are fully aware that your advance division is the only force that can reach Rangoon in time to prevent the fall of Rangoon and the cutting off of the communication line with China; Our only Anglo-American ship (the Mount Vernon) sailed south of Colombo to the Dutch East Indies.Around the 26th or 27th, the division can start landing in Rangoon.There is nothing else in the world that can fill that gap. 2. We fully agree that all Australian troops will return home to defend their homeland, and we must do everything possible to assist their transportation work.However, the urgency of the battle of life and death cannot be ignored, and troops on their way to other destinations must be prepared to change direction and join the battle.We will do everything we can to replace the division as soon as possible and send them back to Australia.The United States asked you to send two additional divisions to Burma, and I did not agree.They will return home as soon as possible.However, this division is needed now, and only this division can save the situation.

3. Please re-read your telegram of January 23, in which you said: withdrawing from Singapore would be an unforgivable betrayal, we agree with you, and therefore sent the 18th Division and other important reinforcements to to Singapore instead of sending them to Burma; and we order them to fight to the end.They were defeated in Singapore and did not keep it, otherwise they would have been able to keep it in Rangoon.My colleagues in the National Defense Committee are fully responsible for this decision; however, you are also seriously responsible because of your telegram. 4. In this critical time, you must rely on the greatest support of the United States. They were able to send the necessary Army and Air Force to Australia alone, and it appears they are ready to do so.You also know that the President attaches great importance to the smooth communication of China, otherwise he cannot launch a bombing offensive against Japan; if China is cut off from all aid from the Allies, then the most tragic consequences may happen in Asia. V. I say with certainty that if you refuse to allow your troops to pass through to plug this loophole, if the above-mentioned deterioration of the overall situation of the war occurs, there will be serious consequences on the part of the President and Washington, and they Exactly what you depend on greatly.Note in particular the tendency of the United States to move the majority of its naval forces from Hawaii to Australia and New Zealand. 6. We must have an answer immediately, because the first ships of the fleet are about to sail in the opposite direction, away from Rangoon, and every day is a day lost.I trust, therefore, that it is in the interest of all, and especially of your own, that you will consider very carefully the questions I put to you. I sent a telegram to President Roosevelt. Not only did he pay special attention to the Burma Road, but he also insisted that the Australian side consider it. former navy personnel to president roosevelt February 20, 1942 1. Among the troops, only the Australian advance division can reach Rangoon in time to prevent the enemy from arriving so that other reinforcements can arrive.They can start arriving on the 26th or 27th.We have asked the Australian Government to agree to this deployment for combat purposes, and we have promised to take it as soon as possible.All other Australian troops are about to be shipped home as soon as possible.The Australian government flatly refused.Since it is of the utmost importance to keep the Burma Road open and maintain contact with Chiang Kai-shek, I have appealed to them again. 2. In view of the fact that you provide US troops to assist Australia's defense, and may take naval action, I feel that you have the right to press the Allies to take this action.So please send me a telegram so that I may append it to the strongly worded telegram I have just sent.Our Chiefs of Staff here are extremely determined, and I have no doubt that our Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington feel the same way.You might as well talk to Casey. President Roosevelt immediately sent two telegrams.The reply to me on February 21 was as follows: I hope you can persuade the Australian government to agree to temporarily transfer their Australian advance division to Burma.I think this is extremely important.Please tell them that I am sending additional troops and aircraft to Australia and that the situation there is, in my estimation, very rosy, not bleak. His telegram to Mr. Curtin: President to Prime Minister of Australia February 20, 1942 In the current serious situation, I fully understand the heavy responsibility of your decision to deploy the 1st Australian Division returning from the Middle East. I think you are aware by now that we have decided to send an additional contingent of 27,000 troops to Australia, in addition to the troops on the way.This team is equipped in every way.We must fight to the death for our two wings, one based in Australia and the other in Burma, India and China.Because of our geographic location, we Americans are better able to handle Australian reinforcements and right wing command. I have explained this to you so that you can be confident that we are strengthening your position as quickly as possible.In addition, the US Navy has begun and is planning military operations to protect the coasts of Australia and New Zealand to some extent.On the other hand, the left wing must be held.If Burma falls, it seems to me that our whole situation, including Australia's, will be in serious danger.Your Australian division is the only unit available for immediate reinforcements.They can join the fight at once, and I believe they have the strength to salvage what presently appears to be a very dangerous situation. Of course I know that the Japanese are moving quickly, but from your position, from the condition of the troops that are fighting on or around you, I do not believe that your vital heartland is in any danger. While I know that your soldiers have fought all over the world and are still fighting, and I am well aware of the enormous sacrifices Australia has made, I ask you to reconsider your decision for the sake of our overall war effort in the Far East, And ordered a division that was driving back to Australia at the moment to go to support the British army in Burma at the highest speed. You can firmly believe that we are willing to use all our strength to fight side by side with you until victory. General Wavell, who was in charge of all the defense of the American, British, Dutch, and Australian theaters, and which had been readily accepted by the Curtin government, had made the same request a few days earlier.He did demand that the whole Australian regiment should be mobilized in this way. The reaction this time caused everyone to be surprised. Field Marshal Deal to Prime Minister February 22, 1942 Hopkins just told me that Curtin had rejected the President's request to send the 1st Australian Division to Burma. Australian Prime Minister to Prime Minister February 22, 1942 1. At this too late stage, I have received a rather strongly worded request from you, however, you have long been aware of our desire to deploy the Royal Australian Force in the Pacific theater, and you are addressing the House of Commons It was supported in the report.In addition, on February 15th Page had received a long report on our views. 2. The suggestion of additional military aid to Myanmar was put forward by the top commanders of the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, and Australia.Malaya, Singapore and Timor Island had all been lost, and it was inevitable that the entire Dutch East Indies would be occupied by the Japanese in a short period of time.The enemy, with his superior naval and air forces, began to harass our territory in the north-west and from Rabaul in the north-east.Our government has done its best and made the greatest contribution to the reinforcement of the United States, Britain, Holland, and Australia theaters.It originally sent a division (short of a brigade) and auxiliary troops to Malaya.A battalion of machine guns and strong reinforcements were later sent.The government sent troops to Ambon, Java, Dutch Timor and Portuguese Timor.Six air squadrons have also been deployed to the area, along with two cruisers from the Royal Australian Navy. 3. You have suggested that two divisions of the Australian Army be transferred to the Pacific Theater, and you have since added to this suggestion by stating that you will not obstruct the Royal Australian Forces on their way back to defend the homeland.We agreed to station the divisions in Sumatra and Java, and indicated to Page in a telegram of February 15 that this deployment would provide a route for our troops to withdraw to Australia, provided the situation remained favorable to the Japanese. 4. We are closely related to the theaters of the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, and Australia. The situation in these theaters has deteriorated to such an extent, and the Japanese are advancing southward in the Australia and New Zealand regions. In view of the proposal made by the chief of staff of the three armed forces, our government must maintain the ability to repel the enemy It is extremely difficult to see why we should provide further troops to the furthest reaches of the American, British, Dutch, and Australian theaters of war.Although you express your disapproval of the request to send two additional divisions from the Royal Australian Forces to Burma, our advisers are nonetheless very interested in Wavell's request for the corps and in Dill's report.The destination of the 6th and 9th Australian Divisions has not yet been decided, the report said, as more troops may be desperately needed by the Burmese side.Once a division was engaged it had to be supported, and there were indications that the whole corps would be dragged into this area, or that the experience of the Greek and Malaya campaigns would reappear there.Finally, from the perspective of Japan's superior sea and air power, whether this division can land in Burma is still a doubtful question; as to whether it can be transferred as promised, it is an even more doubtful question.Now that Singapore, Penang, and Madabaan are lost, and Japan's naval and air power in the area cannot but be considered an advantage, the Bay of Bengal is now vulnerable to attack.Therefore, on the basis of past experience, the movement of our troops to this theater cannot be regarded as a well-founded war risk; if the result is not good, the Australian people will suffer the most serious psychological effects.Therefore, the government must stick to its original decision. 5. You said that the transfer of the 18th Division from Burma to Singapore was based on our telegram. Regarding this point, it must be pointed out that the date of this telegram was sent on January 23, and you called on January 14. The Central Committee told me that one brigade of the division was scheduled to arrive on January 13, and the rest of the brigades were scheduled to arrive on January 27. 6. In view of the above, and in view of the exploits of the Royal Australian Forces in the Middle East, we feel entitled to hope that they will be brought back as soon as possible, with sufficient escorts to ensure their safe arrival. 7. If our troops can be transferred to Burma and India without, in the judgment of our advisers, endangering our safety, we will most readily agree to such a transfer; we hereby assure you, and would like you to convey to the President, He is fully aware of how much we have already done to assist the common cause. Section V above is a rebuttal to my paper; I have chosen my words carefully to avoid saying that our judgments have been influenced by Mr. Curtin's protests.In fact, one brigade of the 18th Division had landed before his telegram; however, this was subject to change, and no assignment had yet been made for the other two brigades and other important reinforcements.I have always said that this decision is our responsibility.Mr. Curtin, having participated enthusiastically in the discussion, should not be thought to be irresponsible. In the meantime, I envisage a favorable response, and I have diverted the Australian convoy to Rangoon.Doing so at least gives the Australian government time to consider further. Prime Minister to Prime Minister of Australia February 22, 1942 We did not expect you to refuse our request, and that of the President of the United States, to call in the Australian advance division to save the situation in Burma. We know that if our ships follow their course to Australia, and we await your formal consent, they will either be too late in Rangoon, or will not have enough fuel to make it.Therefore, we have decided that the convoy will temporarily turn to the north.Now they have sailed far north, and some of them need to be refueled before they can reach Australia.Because of these specific circumstances, it is possible to have a few days to observe the development of the situation so that you can investigate the situation, if you wish to do so.Otherwise, according to your wishes, the Australian advance division should be transferred back to Australia as soon as possible. Prime Minister to General Wavell February 22, 1942 The Australian Government has refused to allow their advance division to join the battle at Rangoon, but yesterday we ordered the convoy to sail north, confident that the Australian Government will not fail to meet the critical situation.The transport fleet has sailed far north and must be refueled before sailing to Australia.Why do you do this?This will give three or four days for the Australian government, which came to power with only a one-vote majority, to reconsider the president's repeated demands; it will also allow us to see how the troops under General Hutton are developing on the front line in Burma. Thank you so much for your well wishes.I believe that the national unity is behind me, which is a good thing given the difficulties we face. The Australian government's response has been bad. Australian Prime Minister to Prime Minister February 23, 1942 1. In your telegram of February 20, it is obvious that the convoy will not go north.It appears from your telegram of February 22 that you have dispatched the convoy to Rangoon, and have regarded our consent to this important dispatch as a matter of formality.In so doing, you have created a dangerous situation of increasing the transport fleet, and the consequences of such deployment are entirely your responsibility. 2. We have notified the President of the reasons for our decision.We took into account the terms of his correspondence with me, and we were satisfied with his sympathetic reply that he fully understood and valued the reasons for our decision. 3. Wavell's cable, which was considered by the Pacific War Council on Saturday, showed that Java was in imminent danger of invasion.Australia's perimeter defenses are currently collapsing rapidly, and our fragility is fully exposed. 4. We have managed to send the Royal Australian Forces to save Malaya and Singapore and fall back to defend the Dutch East Indies.All the defenses of the North have collapsed, or are collapsing.Now you want to use the Royal Australian Forces to save Burma.As in Greece, this was all done without proper air support. 5. We feel that the primary responsibility is to save Australia, not only for itself, but to maintain it as a base for the development of the War of Resistance against Japan.Under these circumstances, it is impossible to overturn the resolutions we have taken with the utmost care and reiterated time and time again. 6. Our Chief of the General Staff pointed out that although your telegram of February 20 mentioned only the advance division, the fact is that it is currently impossible to separate the two divisions due to the load of the transport ships, and that all The destination of the transport ships will be determined by the destination of the first transport ships.This fact supports our decision. I answer as follows: Prime Minister to Prime Minister of Australia February 23, 1942 Call on February 23rd. 1. The transport fleet is heading to Colombo to refuel.Then it will be driven to Australia according to your wishes. 2. I have decided that while awaiting your final reply for several hours, it is necessary to turn the convoy northward.Otherwise, even if you can get your assistance, I'm afraid it won't arrive in time. 3. As soon as the transport fleet turned northward, arrangements were made to increase the number of escort ships. These additional escorts are to be maintained during the voyage of the team to Colombo, and after departure from Colombo as long as practicable. 4. I am of course fully responsible for my actions. Everything possible has now been implemented. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister February 23, 1942 1. In view of Curtin's final reply that we do not accept our strong demand, I sent him the following telegram, hoping that we can get a second detachment to assist in the defense of the Burmese front. 2. To Curtin.Received the call on the 20th, thank you.While I cannot fully agree that Australia is desperately in need of the first division to return home, I understand your situation very well.I think the two main bases, Australia and Burma, must be held at all costs, and the main threat today is in Burma, the left wing; and Australia, the right wing, I am sure we can hold it safely.The additional fully equipped American reinforcements are ready to go and are about to leave for you.In the light of all these facts, and of course depending on how the situation develops in the next few weeks, I would like you to consider sending a second returning division to India or Burma to assist in the defense of that front so that it can become a permanent defense zone.In any case, you can count on our full support.Roosevelt. 3. I am working on supplementary plans to strengthen the control of the islands in the ANZ area and further hinder the advance of the Japanese army. Prime Minister to Prime Minister of Australia February 26, 1942 1. The Governor of Myanmar called from Yangon at 18:30 on February 24: There are no major changes, but as long as we can transfer Australians, the situation can be fundamentally improved.It is obviously not easy to transfer them, but I think the risk is worth taking, otherwise the door of Burma will be opened to the Japanese. 2. The Governor of Burma called from Yangon at 23:20 on February 25: We need to know whether the Australian division can come.Please answer now. 3. I have of course informed the Governor of your decision. Prime Minister to the Governor-General of Myanmar February 25, 1942 We have made various appeals, supported by the President, but the Australian Government has firmly rejected them.Continue fighting! Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee February 27, 1942 I would like to make a brief report on which troops we have been able to transfer to the Rangoon front and which troops are on the way.I also wish to make a brief report on the situation of India's existing troops to defend against attacks or invasions.Finally, Tong Xi will inform you of the exact situation of the Ceylon sea, air, and army garrison work, as well as the date of air and land reinforcements. Prime Minister to Brigadier General Hollis, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee February 28, 1942 1. It is a question whether the 2nd Brigade of the 70th Division should go to Ceylon in view of the Rangoon retreat and subsequent restrictions on new lines of communication.How long will it take for the brigade to arrive? 2. Regarding the radar facilities and any suggestions for improvement, I would like to make a report with the date attached. 3. I count on the Admiralty to keep at Trincomalee enough heavy warships to repel the invasion at sea during the tense two or three weeks before we can get reinforcements. 4. In my opinion, it is necessary to relieve the missions of the squadrons of the Dreadnought in Ceylon. 5. Between March, April and May.Please give me a copy of the list and timetable for the reinforcement of the navy and the establishment of our fleet in the Indian Ocean. None of the troops we have can reach Rangoon in time to relieve the siege, but if we can't send a force, we can send one anyway.These correspondents dimmed the pages, but in the meantime it was decided to send General Alexander to the doomed capital.In order to save time, he planned to fly directly to a large area occupied by the enemy.He dined with my wife and I in the new building of the Prime Minister's residence a few hours before he left after he had learned all the facts from the Chiefs of Staff and the War Department.I remember that evening well, for I have never been responsible for sending a general to greater risk.Alexander was, as usual, calm and in good spirits.He said he was happy to go.In the First World War, he participated in the battle as a regiment-level officer in the Guard Division. He was known as an invulnerable person. In the hail of bullets, soldiers were willing to follow him closely.Whether he was a lieutenant or a supreme commander, he was surrounded by confidence.He was the last British commander at Dunkirk.Nothing ever vexed him, or made him anxious; the duty itself was to him a great relief, especially when it appeared dangerous and difficult.But besides that, he had such a lighthearted manner that all who acquainted with him valued the pleasure and the pleasure of his friendship, of whom I was one.For this reason I must confess that I had difficulty imitating his composed manner when we were at dinner together. General Alexander took office on May 5 and was ordered to hold Rangoon as much as possible; if he failed, he would retreat to the north to defend Upper Burma, while maintaining contact with the Chinese army on his left.It soon became clear to him that the fall of Rangoon was doomed.The Japanese were attacking Bago violently and outflanking the northern flank in an attempt to cut off the Rangoon-Pyay road, thus blocking the city's last overland exit.Wavell now serves as the commander-in-chief of the Indian side and has the highest command over the Burmese campaign. General Wavell to Chief of the Imperial General Staff and Prime Minister March 7, 1942 Communications with Burma had been delayed for the past two days; all radio communications had apparently ceased, and I had not heard from Alexandria.From the naval information I received this morning, I conclude that a sudden decision was made around midnight last night to abandon Rangoon, order the convoy underway to return, and carry out sabotage.Immediately called Alexander to inquire about the situation, but has not yet received a reply.As soon as official news is received, we will notify you immediately. In fact, Alexander had ordered the bombing of the great oil refinery at Rangoon, among other things, and ordered his entire army to break out north along the road to Pyay.The Japanese had planned to attack Rangoon from the west.In order to protect the divisions in charge of the encirclement, they sent a powerful force to line up across the road.Our first attempts to break out of the encirclement were thwarted, and it was therefore necessary to muster all available reinforcements.The fierce fighting continued for twenty-four hours, but the Japanese commander was rigid in carrying out orders; when he concluded that the encircling division had reached position and could attack from the west, he considered his blockade mission complete. finished.He thus opened the road to Prome, and continued on his way to join the Japanese general attack on the city.At the same time Alexander advanced with his whole army and escaped from Rangoon in an orderly manner, taking with him his transports and artillery.The Japanese did not put pressure on our troops retreating northward because they had suffered a lot of casualties after this fierce fighting and, after a long march, they needed to be reorganized. The Burmese division fought a cover battle calmly and returned to Taungoo, while the 17th Division and the armored brigade gradually moved to Pyay. Rescuing the Army from Upper Burma required a long and painful struggle.Wavell did not underestimate these difficulties. General Wavell to Prime Minister March 19, 1942 If Japan is determined to attack, I don't think we can expect to stay in Upper Burma for long.Many units were still poorly equipped and shaken by experience in Lower Burma, and it was doubtful that the few remaining Burmese rifle battalions would be of much use.Artillery is running out.At present, it is impossible to get real reinforcements.中國方面的合作，並不容易，他們懷疑我們的戰鬥能力，有退縮的傾向。他們對抗日軍的叢林戰，能否比我們現在打得更成功，尚難肯定。無論怎樣，亞歷山大的善戰是能夠信賴的，日軍的困難一定很大。 有關亞歷山大、蔣介石和美國將軍史迪威之間的指揮問題，困難重重。史迪威將軍已從中國回來，負責指揮中國第五軍和第六軍，這兩個軍由六個師【１】組成，目前正在緬甸。蔣介石大元帥接受了我方的要求，亞歷山大對於實際上在緬甸境內的全部部隊應有最高的指揮權。不過，羅斯福總統認為，亞歷山大和史迪威之間最好能保持雙重指揮權。在這個艱難的時際，我並不爭這一點。 【１】一個中國師相當於一個英國師或印度師的實力的三分之一。 President Roosevelt's Message to Former Navy Personnel March 20, 1942 關於來電所談緬甸指揮問題，最近我已經要求大元帥，繼續增援緬甸前線並允許史迪威按照他早經聯合參謀部批准的命令所規定的方針去安排合作的辦法。史迪威近來幾封電報表明了他同亞歷山大能夠繼續有效地在一起工作，但是迫切需要中國增派部隊。大元帥已派史迪威統率中國第五軍和第六軍，但是不幸的是，在指揮權問題尚未澄清時，他不容許他們全部調到緬甸。史迪威不僅迫切地要求大元帥撤回這個意見，並且在實際上已經命令增派的部隊向南推進，希望大元帥會予以同意，史迪威不管指揮權問題的複雜，提出了保證完全合作的措施，但是如果另有一位中國司令官，還是可以同亞歷山大將軍為難的。史迪威本人不但足智多謀，非常幹練，而且徹底了解中國人民，中國話說得很流利，顯然不是一個自私自利的人。他在最近的電報中說：已同亞歷山大將軍安排合作事宜，指揮權一事並不影響作戰指揮。已請大元帥開始增派三個師到緬甸。在這種情況下，我建議目前應將指揮權問題在此告一段落。我感到亞歷山大將軍和史迪威將軍會合作無間。奇怪的是，他們兩人本來打算按照超體育家計劃（即在法屬北非）會晤，現在卻在眉苗見面了。 仰光的失守意味著緬甸的失守。以後的戰役乃是日本人同即將來臨的雨季展開一場冷酷的競賽。對亞歷山大來說，增援已經沒有希望，因為我方沒有可讓他們登陸的港口。我們少量的空軍，在掩護撤退並追擊數量較多的敵機之後，不得不自仰光的設備良好的基地撤至沒有警報設施的降落場；它們在三月底以前實際上已被消滅了，大部分就是在地面上被擊毀的。印度基地的飛機設法空投軍需品和醫藥品，並且疏散人員八千六百名，其中包括傷員二千六百名。我方其餘的部隊和廣大的非戰鬥人員沒有辦法，只得越過叢林和山嶽，徒步行軍六百哩。 三月二十四日，敵人繼續開展攻勢，向駐守東吁的中國師進攻，經過一星期的激戰後，佔領了該城。四日後他們沿伊洛瓦底江兩岸進逼卑謬。至四月底敵人已推進到曼德勒；同中國軍隊保持聯繫和守住滇緬公路的希望成了泡影。一部分中國軍隊撤入中國境內；其餘則隨史迪威將軍溯伊洛瓦底江而上，爬山越嶺進入印度。亞歷山大率領英軍向西北前進到達加里瓦。只有這樣他們才能守衛印度東部的邊界，這些地帶已經受到一支沿欽敦江北上的日本縱隊的威脅，而在國內又受印度國大黨的騷擾。這裡的道路同叢林中的小徑差不多。途上擁擠著成千上萬的難民，傷的傷，病的病，而人人都餓得慌。由於亞歷山大將軍的陸軍和緬甸民政當局的一項行政措施，總督和總督夫人也參與其間，並且得到來自印度的支援，尤其是阿薩姆邦北部的農場主人們的支持，因而這批人被帶到了安全地點；僅僅在意料中的雨季降臨之後二天，即五月十七日，亞歷山大才能作出報告，說他的軍隊已經順利通過，雖然損失了全部運輸車輛和數輛殘餘的坦克，他們已經在英帕爾集中。這是他第一次獨立指揮的經驗，結果雖然完全失敗了，但是他在這次指揮中表現了將才、鎮定和果斷等優良品質，這些品質後來使他成為盟國第一流的軍事領導人。 通往印度的道路被切斷了。