Chapter 125 Volume 4 Chapter 15 Arctic Escort Transport Fleet

1942 The Northern Sea Route to Russia Tirpitz in Trondheim Supplies Pile Up Pressure from the President My Response to Stalin's Request on May 2 My Reply on May 9 P‧Q‧Seventeenth The Tragedy of the HMS Convoy The First Sea Lord's Announcement of the Retreat of the Cruisers and Destroyers The Tragedy of the Convoy on the German Side We Have Decided to Stop the Arctic Convoy at the End of Daylight in the Polar Regions Telegram with a detailed explanation of the alternative route to Persia I asked Russia to call the Polish division The President agreed to my telegram Stalin's brusque and angry reply I decided to silently accept Raeder's statement to the Führer The September convoy opened itself The extent of British efforts to aid Russia in the course of 1941 and 1942 was a successful convoy and its consequences a major crisis in German naval policy.

When Soviet Russia was attacked by Hitler, the only way America and we could help them was by sending weapons and supplies.These things are to a large extent the products of the United States and Britain, and some are munitions supplied by the United States to Britain.Consequently, the equipment of our desperately needed troops was seriously affected, and all effective preparations for an imminent Japanese attack were virtually impossible.The Beaverbrook/Harriman Anglo-American delegation who visited Moscow in October 1941 agreed to give Russia a large amount of supplies, and their proposals were basically approved by their own governments.A direct route for these supplies to the Russian army was by sea, round the North Cape, via the Arctic sea route, to Murmansk and on to Arkhangelsk.According to the agreement, the Soviet government was responsible for receiving the supplies in British or American ports on their own ships and shipping them back to Russia.However, they did not have enough ships to carry the large quantities of supplies we were willing to provide, and British and American ships immediately took up three-quarters of the traffic.For the first four or five months, all went well, with only one ship lost; by March 1942, German aircraft from northern Norway, as well as German submarines, began to seriously disrupt the convoy.

We have seen how Hitler directed the German Navy to concentrate its forces on Norway during the winter, not only to prevent British attacks but to prevent supplies and munitions from entering Russia.He also kept a portion of his submarines from attacking Atlantic and transatlantic shipping for the defense of Norway.I have long pointed out that these decisions were wrong on Hitler's part.We and our American allies are very pleased that the enormous attacking power of German fast warships was not used to increase the tension of submarine warfare in this critical period.Nevertheless, as attacks on our Arctic convoys increased, so did the burden on the Admiralty.

In January, Tirpitz sailed to Trondheim.Shortly there, Scheer rejoined her, and in March the cruiser Hipper rejoined.Among this group of surface ships, there are also the battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, which had already come from Brest, and the Prinz Eugen, who escaped with them.However, both Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were torpedoed by us and were out of action for several months. Both warships suffered heavy air attacks while they were being repaired.On the night of February 27, the Gneisenau was bombed in Kiel's dock. Although we did not know the situation at the time, it must have been seriously damaged, so that the warship was never seen again. Appeared in naval battles.Only the Prinz Eugen remained, which was sent to join the ranks of the Tirpitz at the same time as the Scheer.The warship was torpedoed by the British submarine HMS Trident and managed to make it to Trondheim.After temporary repairs, she finally sailed back to Germany and could not take part in combat until October.Although the naval power at Trondheim was only about half of what Hitler had planned to deploy, it also attracted our attention.

The P‧Q‧12th convoy left Iceland on March 1, and the Tirpitz was ordered to intercept it.A British submarine reported its whereabouts.Admiral Tovey, who led the HMS King George V and the aircraft carrier HMS Victory to protect the transport fleet, immediately turned to intercept.German reconnaissance planes could not find the convoy, and the Tirpitz went back.Admiral Tovey missed it on its way home.On March 9, the aircraft aboard the Victory spotted it.So, let the torpedo plane take off immediately.Tirpitz still managed to evade all torpedoes and found cover in Sievert Harbor again.In this way, the transport fleet P‧Q‧No. 12 arrived at its destination safely.During April, convoy P.Q. XIII was heavily attacked by German planes and destroyers, losing five of its nineteen ships.A German destroyer was sunk, and our cruiser Trinidad was torpedoed and finally sank.During April, the arrival of the American Special Forces at Scapa Flow, which included the new battleship USS Washington, the aircraft carrier USS Wasp, two heavy cruisers and six destroyers, thus gratifyingly strengthened our forces and made it possible to attack Madagascar .However, the difficulties and dangers of the transport fleet are increasing day by day.In April and May, three more convoys sailed to the north of Russia. The first convoy sailed into the great pack of drift ice north of Iceland. Of the 23 ships, only 14 turned back.Of the remaining ships, one sank and only eight reached their destination.The second and third convoys, under increasing attack, lost a total of ten ships.Fifty ships passed safely, but in the process we lost the cruiser Edinburgh, sunk by a submarine.

By the end of March, 1942, the United States and Great Britain had delivered far more supplies than we could afford to ship.As a result, freight and supplies are jammed; both Washington and Moscow are making urgent demands that we do more.Hopkins telegraphed me about it. Prime Minister to Mr Harry Hopkins April 26, 1942 Thank you for your personal telegram regarding the accumulation of goods destined for Russia. We have given this question very careful consideration in the light of the serious condition of the transport fleet.Harriman received today ample information on the number of convoys we may dispatch on the northern sea lanes, the number of ships in each convoy, and our proposals for dealing with the backlog of freight.I hope you can agree.

We are asking the Russians to do more to help protect the convoy. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister April 27, 1942 On the issue of shipments to Russia.Your telegram to Harry disturbed me greatly, for I was concerned not only about political influence on Russia but, more importantly, that our supplies would not reach them in time.I think that we have made such an enormous effort in moving supplies that it would be a grave mistake to allow them to pile up except for compelling reasons.I learned from talking to Pound and my personal naval advisers this morning that the situation is extremely difficult.I really hope that you will study again how large the transport fleet should be sent immediately, so that the supplies now piled up in Iceland can be transported.I can and am willing to make timely adjustments for this.

However, in view of the imminent attack on the Russian army, I would prefer that we do not at this time seek a new agreement with Russia on the quantity of our supplies. It seems to me that to make any claim to Stalin for any reason at this time, that our supplies will be stopped, would have the most unfortunate results. President Roosevelt's Message to Former Navy Personnel April 30, 1942 Admiral King exchanged views today with Pound on the urgent matter of sending another convoy in May to clear up the standstill of shipments loaded or loading to Russia.I urgently hope that these ships will not be unloaded or reloaded in England, as I believe this will leave an intolerable and disturbing impression in Russia.Our problem is to get the 107 loaded and loading ships currently in England and America out by June 1st.I hope you can agree with Kim's comments.Because of the trade-offs, I think it's the most important we'll ever use our transport fleet.

We will be mindful of the loads out of Iceland so that the agreed figures for departures from Iceland after June 1 do not exceed the possible loads of our transport system.I know this is a difficult thing to do, but I think it is very important, so I hope you will study King's proposal carefully with Pound. As much as we would like to do so, it is impossible to meet these requirements. former navy personnel to president roosevelt May 2, 1942 1. My sincerest respect.Your suggestion is beyond my ability.Admiral King has expressed his opinion that our transatlantic convoy is already too thin.The proposed curtailment would throw the shipping fleet's systems into disarray within eight weeks.During this period, if the enemy attacked from the east coast to the center of the ocean, our main lifeline would be met with disastrous results.

2. Moreover, the difficulties encountered by the Russian transport fleet cannot be overcome by anti-submarine ships alone.Enemy heavy ships and destroyers may attack at any time.Even this convoy of our present convoy has been attacked by enemy destroyers.While repelling enemy ships, one of our ships was damaged.Our best six-inch cruiser, the Edinburgh, badly wounded by a submarine, is being towed to Murmansk; while the Trinidad, whose convoy was destroyed last time, is still at anchor.I just received a report that the HMS King George V collided with our destroyer HMS Punjab.The Punjab was sinking when the depth charges on board exploded, damaging the HMS King George V.The lack of anti-submarine ships in the Russian fleet is therefore at least as difficult as the lack of combat-capable surface ships.We made a desperate attack on the Tirpitz at Trondheim, but alas, although close to the target, no damage was done.

3. I beg you, do not force us to make decisions beyond our judgment in this act.We have made a very careful study of this.With regard to this work, however, we cannot yet estimate the full extent of its tension.Mr. President, I can assure you that we have done our best, and I cannot push the Department of the Navy any further. 4. Six ships from Iceland have arrived at Port Clyde and they must be reloaded immediately.As a rule of thumb, the most we can dispatch is three convoys of thirty-five or twenty-five ships every two months.Pound had another telegram to Admiral King. President's message to former Navy personnel May 3, 1942 At present on the question of the Russian convoys we have to agree with you, but I still hope that you will keep the strength of the convoys at thirty-five ships.I propose to insist that the Russians reduce their necessities to a minimum, on the grounds that all available munitions and ships will need to be mobilized in order to prepare the Polileu operation plan. [1] The code name for the preparations for the main battle against France, which later became the basis of the Overlord plan. Prime Minister Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill May 6, 1942 I have a request for you.About ninety ships carrying all kinds of important war material destined for the Soviet Union are currently stuck in Iceland or at the entrance to Iceland from the United States.Owing to the difficulty of the British naval power in organizing convoy escorts, I understand that the voyage of these ships is in danger of being greatly delayed. I am fully aware of the difficulties and the sacrifices Britain has made in this regard.However, I feel it is my duty to ask you to take all possible measures to ensure that the above-mentioned supplies reach the Soviet Union in May, because this is what our frontlines desperately need. Please accept my heartfelt regards and best wishes for success. Prime Minister to Premier Stalin May 9, 1942 Received the call on May 6th, thank you for your notice and greetings.We have decided to open up the channel and transport the war materials to you in the maximum amount.Due to the activities of Tirpitz and other enemy surface ships at Trondheim, each convoy voyage had become a serious fleet operation.We will continue to do our best. No doubt your naval advisers have pointed out to you the dangers of attacking convoys by surface vessels, submarines, and aircraft from various bases under enemy control, on either side of the convoy's line of voyage.We have devoted all available energy to solving this problem.To this end, the convoys of our Atlantic convoys have been severely weakened, and, as you are of course aware, our losses have been great. I trust you will not mind my frank and emphatic reference to the need for assistance in strengthening the Soviet Navy and Air Force to enable the safe passage of these convoys. Marshal Stalin to Prime Minister May 13, 1942 Call received.You promised to arrange the maximum possible shipment of war materials to the Soviet Union, and I am writing this letter to express my gratitude.We know very well that the UK is overcoming these difficulties, and that you are suffering heavy losses at sea in the fulfillment of this enormous task. As for the proposal for more effective measures to be taken by the Soviet Air Force and Navy to protect transport ships in the area you have mentioned, you may rest assured that all possible measures will be taken immediately on our side.However, it must also be understood that our naval power is limited, and the vast majority of our air force is already engaged in front-line combat. Please accept my heartfelt regards. Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee May 17, 1942 Not only Premier Stalin, but also President Roosevelt strongly opposed our cessation of convoys at the present time.The Russians are in the middle of a fierce battle, and they want us to share in the danger and do our part.The American ships were lined up and waiting.My own feelings, mingled with anxiety, held that the convoy must start on the 18th.As long as half of them pass, the operation is considered to have worked.Failure to succeed in our attempts in this regard will reduce our influence over our two principal allies.Weather and luck, which are often unpredictable, may also help us.I share your concerns, but I think it's a matter of liability. When our efforts came to a head, there was at last an interlude concerning the fate of the P.Q. Seventeenth convoy.The convoy, consisting of thirty-four merchant ships, sailed from Iceland to Archangelsk on June 27.Its escort consisted of six destroyers, two anti-aircraft ships, two submarines and eleven smaller ships.In emergency support were two British cruisers commanded by Rear Admiral Hamilton, two American cruisers, and three destroyers.Nine British and two Russian submarines were stationed along Norway's northern coast to attack Tirpitz and the German cruiser if necessary, or at least to warn them not to approach.Finally, in the west, the commander-in-chief of the navy, Tovey, led our main covering forces, the battleships Duke of York and Washington, the aircraft carrier USS Victory, three cruisers and a small group of destroyers to patrol and guard. The convoy passed the northern part of Bear Island, about 300 miles from the German air base, when it was blocked by drift ice.The Admiralty ordered General Hamilton not to sail the cruisers east of Bear Island unless the convoy was threatened by an enemy surface fleet against which he could fight.This obviously meant that he would not be sent to attack the Tirpitz.At the same time, the naval commander led the heavy ships to stay in the area 150 miles northwest of Bear Island, ready to attack the Tirpitz as soon as it appeared, first by sending the aircraft on the Victory aircraft carrier to attack.The transport convoy was discovered by the enemy on July 1, and has been followed by the enemy's air force since then, and has often been attacked.The first ship was sunk on the morning of the Fourth of July; three more ships were torpedoed by enemy aircraft that night, while the convoy was a hundred and fifty miles from Bear Island.Rear Admiral Hamilton, using his discretion, remained with the convoy.According to reports, Tirpitz had left Trondheim sometime before noon on the 3rd, but no information was available on the exact movements of her and the other German heavy ships. The Admiralty watched the progress of the convoy with deep anxiety.In view of the enemy's pursuit, the situation had to be studied in light of the information then known to the Admiralty.On the 4th of July, there is every reason to believe that Tirpitz and her companions, after refueling at Alta, had probably gone to intercept the convoy.This overwhelming and colossal attack was more dangerous than any attack by air or submarine.General Hamilton's cruisers were of little use against the forces employed by the Germans, and the only hope of maintaining a portion of the convoy seemed to be to disperse the ships as much as possible before the enemy arrived.The enemy ship may reach the place within ten hours of leaving the port, while the speed of the merchant ship is only seven or eight knots.Even if a decentralized approach is effective, time is of the essence.That same evening, the First Sea Lord, who believed the attack was imminent, sent an urgent notice directly and personally to General Hamilton as follows: nine eleven p.m. The cruiser should only retreat westward at maximum speed. nine twenty-three p.m. In view of the threat of enemy surface ships, the transport fleet should be dispersed and headed for the Russian port. nine thirty-six p.m. The transport fleet should be dispersed. 【１】 [1] Dispersed orders are to be used only when directly threatened by surface ships.The rules for the actions of each ship in the convoy upon receiving orders are detailed in the signal manual. Once this decision had been issued, the commander in command of the cruiser was left with no choice.His orders are clear and absolute.Though he was distressed at having to abandon the unfortunate transport, there was nothing he could do.Our fleet could not reach the accident site in time.The destroyers covering the convoy also unfortunately withdrew, and, though this decision was correct in the circumstances, their function was later to help gather the scattered ships into small groups, and for the remainder of the long and dangerous Provides some protection against air and submarine attacks during voyages. If only our British ships were concerned, Admiral Pound might not have issued such a firm order.But the apprehension aroused in him to make these astonishing decisions was that such a first large-scale combined Anglo-American operation under British command would involve the destruction of two American cruisers as well as our own battleships. .This is just speculation based on what I know of my friend, as I have not discussed these matters with him.In fact, these orders, issued under the authority of the First Sea Lord and approved by the Admiralty, were so kept in such extreme secrecy that I did not know what happened until after the war. The Confederate cruisers had passed the appointed point.Unless new orders from the Admiralty were received, the cruisers would in any case withdraw within an hour or so in accordance with the original orders.Their initial actions do not actually affect the tactical situation.The decision to disperse the ships was, as it became known, rash.If General Hamilton could stay in the vicinity until the convoy had dispersed before leaving, the panic caused by the convoy watching the cruiser leave could be avoided.However, based on the signals he received, he could only assume that the Tirpitz might appear on the surface of the ocean at any moment. Let us now turn to the situation on the German side.The enemy fleet consisting of Tirpitz, Scheer, and Hipper, as well as the accompanying destroyers, gathered in Arta and did not leave the port until noon on the 5th.By this time they learned from aerial reconnaissance that the convoy had dispersed and that the British cruisers had retreated.Soon, the German ships were first spotted by a Russian submarine.The submarine attacked Tirpitz and incorrectly boasted of two hits.Later, a British submarine also spotted Tirpitz and reported that it was heading northeast at high speed.Although the German admiral knew that he had been detected, feared the attack of the British Air Force, and believed that he must be within the range of the air attack, he still planned to continue the mission.However, the German High Command took a different view on the matter and, remembering the fate of the Bismarck a year earlier, decided to withdraw the fleet.They also estimated, more or less correctly, that aircraft and submarines might be more effective against dispersed convoys.German heavy ships were ordered back to port that night.The potential threat they posed caused the convoys to disperse.Thus, the Germans immediately achieved a great success for themselves by merely appearing on these routes. The consequences for us are painful.Scattered and unprotected convoys were now prey to intercepted planes and submarines.The misery of each ship, or each squadron of merchant ships, and some of them accompanied by one or more smaller escorts, is a legend in itself.Some took refuge along the frozen coast of Xindi Island.Of the thirty-four ships that left Iceland, twenty-three sank, their crews either dying on the frozen seas or suffering unbearable pain and maiming from frostbite. [1] Two British, six American, one Panamanian, and two Russian merchant ships arrived at the port of Arkhangelsk and unloaded 70,000 tons of the 200,000 tons shipped from Iceland.In all, fourteen American merchant ships were sunk.It was one of the saddest naval episodes of the entire war. [1] In addition, three rescue ships set off with the convoy.One of them sank. On July 15th I wrote to the Lord Admiralty and the First Sea Lord by memorandum: I did not know until this morning that it was Hamilton, Commander of the Cruiser Fleet, who ordered the destroyer to leave the convoy.How did you feel about that decision?What do you think now?I await the results of the investigation into the conduct of those involved. It took quite a while, and, as a result, no one was punished.With all the telegrams sent under the order of the First Sea Lord, how can punishment be imposed? Of the many incidents that have befallen me, including my trips to Cairo and Moscow, which are to be described in later chapters, I have left aside for the moment some incidents which have concerned me, but only now do I have to relate them.If Tirpitz and her wingmen approached the escorting cruisers and convoys, it would be right to order the cruisers to retreat; for otherwise there would be unnecessary sacrifices, and the best hope of the merchant ships was to disperse.The departure of the destroyer raises another question.General Hamilton referred to the fuel situation in his report, noting that the dispersion of the convoys made it impossible for them to find a tanker to replenish their limited supplies. He also dwells at length on contingencies in the operations of the convoy, in which case destroyers were much needed by the convoy.However, the dispersion of the transport fleet made the destroyer unable to play a role in resisting the attack from the superior sea.The retreat of the destroyers was of course a mistake.In order to protect merchant ships, all risks should be taken. Since the war, American writers have criticized this unfortunate event, and it immediately aroused a burst of blame and abuse from the Soviet government.However, we have learned a lesson from our misfortune. In view of the tragedy of the P‧Q‧No. 17 transport fleet, the Admiralty suggested that the transportation of the Arctic transport fleet should be started at least before the northern drift ice melted and after the white night in the polar region had passed.I think this is a very big decision, and, on the principle of never giving up, I think that instead of weakening the bet, it should be increased. Prime Minister to Admiralty and First Sea Lord July 15, 1942 Please do your research on the following points: From the 18th of this month, the voyage of the P‧Q‧18th transport fleet will be suspended according to the current opinions.Learn about our combat operations in Malta. If all goes well, Dreadnought, Victory, Argonaut, and Eagle will be transferred to the north of Scapa Flow, and at least five auxiliary aircraft carriers will be mobilized, together with all available Dido-type ships and at least twenty-five destroyer.Let the two battleships with sixteen-inch guns sail directly to the south under the shield of air umbrellas and destroyers, do not approach the ice floes, and only choose the clearest weather to attack the enemy.If our transport fleet can operate under the umbrella of at least a hundred fighters, we will be able to reopen the passage, and it will be better if we can complete a fleet voyage. However, I could not persuade my Admiralty friends to adopt this course.Such an approach would necessarily hold back some of our desperately needed ships, which in actual military importance surpass the Arctic transport fleet.I then sent the following telegram to Stalin.Regarding this telegram, I have obtained the prior consent of the President. Prime Minister to Premier Stalin July 17, 1942 From August 1941 we sent a convoy of small convoys to northern Russia, and until December the Germans took no steps to obstruct them.After February 1942, the organization of the transport fleet expanded, and the Germans then transferred a very powerful submarine fleet and a large number of aircraft to northern Norway to launch a resolute attack on the transport fleet.Given the escort of the strongest possible destroyers and anti-submarine ships, the transport convoy will always be spared considerable, if not all, loss.Apparently, the Germans were not satisfied with what they had achieved with planes and submarines alone, as they began using surface ships to attack convoys.Fortunately, however, in the beginning they used the heavy ships to the west of Bear Island and the submarines to the east.In this way, our home fleet will be able to prevent the attack of enemy surface ships.Before the departure of the transport convoy in May, the Admiralty reminded us that if, as expected, the Germans engaged their surface fleet east of Bear Island, the losses would be severe.However, we have decided to let the transport fleet go.A single attack by the enemy's surface ships did not materialize, and our convoy lost a sixth of its ships mainly due to air strikes.In the case of Convoy P.Q. 17, the Germans are finally using their power in the way we have always feared.They concentrated the submarines on the west side of Bear Island and kept the surface ships in preparation for attacking the east side of Bear Island. The final fate of P‧Q‧Convoy No. 17 is unclear at this time.So far, only four ships have reached Arkhangelsk, and another six ships are in the port of Novaya Zemlya, but these six ships may be attacked by air at any time.Therefore, at most only a third can be saved. I must explain the dangers and difficulties of the operation of these convoys when the bearing of the enemy's battle fleet is turned to the extreme north.We do not think it right to risk our Home Fleet east of Bear Island, or in a region strong enough to be attacked by powerful German aircraft from land bases.If our very limited number of powerful battleships lose one or two, or are seriously damaged, while Tirpitz and some of her companions, and soon Scharnhorst, continue to activities, then total control of the Atlantic will be (temporarily) lost.In addition, it will affect the food supply we need to live, thereby weakening our fighting ability; and, most importantly, the huge transport fleet that currently carries 80,000 people a month to transport American troops across the Atlantic will be hindered, so that In 1943 it became impossible to open up a really powerful second front. My naval advisers told me that if they were allowed to keep the German surface ships, submarines, air forces, etc. in their present state, they could say with certainty that any convoy going to the north of Russia would be wiped out.They have not yet been able to hold out any hope of proving that convoys can do much better than convoy P. Q. XVII if they are to make a voyage during polar daylight.It is therefore with great regret that we have come to the conclusion that any attempt to dispatch the next convoy P‧Q‧Eighteenth will do you no good but will only subject our common cause to complete destruction. loss.In the meantime, I assure you that if we can make arrangements to provide a suitable opportunity for at least a substantial proportion of the convoy to reach you, we will immediately restore the convoy.The point of the matter was to make the Barents Sea a danger zone for German warships, as they have done for us.This is what we should be aware of as we use our collective power.I would very much like to send a senior officer of the Royal Air Force to the north of Russia to work out a plan with your officers. At the same time, we are preparing to send immediately to the Persian Gulf several ships that were sailing in the P‧Q‧ transport fleet. You mentioned joint operations in the North.At present, the obstacles to continuing to send convoys are likewise preventing us from moving ground and air forces for operations in northern Norway.However, our officers should immediately consider together the possible timing of joint operations, whether within October or after October, although the timing is not quite clear.It would be better if you could send officers here; but if that is not possible, let our officers come to you. In addition to joint operations in the north, we are studying how to assist you on the southern front.If we can get rid of Rommel, we may send a strong air force to support your left front in the autumn.The difficulties of supplying these forces on the trans-Persian route without affecting your supply are obviously great; however, I hope to be able to make detailed proposals to you before long.In short, we must get rid of Rommel first.The current battle is fierce. Thank you, Prime Minister Stalin, for allowing three Polish divisions to fight alongside their compatriots in Palestine. I am fully convinced that this is entirely in our common interest. We will arm them all in Palestine.These corps would be of the utmost importance in future battles, and would allow the Turks not to lose courage in feeling the increased strength of the south.I hope that this plan of yours, which is so dear to us, will not be thwarted by the fact that the Poles will carry with them a considerable number of women and children who live on the rations of the Polish soldiers.Food supply for these dependents will be a heavy burden on us.We think, however, that it is well worth bearing that burden in order to organize a Polish army which is faithful and useful to our common good.In the countries of the Levant our own provisions are also in difficulty, but in India it is sufficient, if only we could bring it from there. If we do not have these Polish troops, we shall have to take their places from the large Anglo-American invasion of the Continent which is now being widely prepared.These preparations had already prompted the Germans to send two fleets of heavy bombers from southern Russia to France.Believe me, it is unreasonable nonsense to say that we and the Americans are not helping you in your great struggle.The President and I have been seeking ways to overcome the formidable difficulties posed by geography, sea water, and enemy air forces.The telegram had been seen by the President. I hate to say that I received a brusque and tantrum reply. Prime Minister Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill July 23, 1942 1. Received the call on July 17.Two conclusions can be drawn from this.First, the British government refused to continue shipping war supplies to the Soviet Union via the northern route.Second, disregarding the communiqué of the agreement in 1942 on the urgent task of opening a second front, the British government postponed the issue until 1943. 2. Our naval experts have studied the reasons put forward by the British naval experts, and believe that the suspension of the transport fleet in the northern ports of the Soviet Union is completely unconvincing.They believe that as long as they are sincere and willing to fulfill the agreed obligations, these transport fleets can maintain normal navigation, and they can also deal heavy blows to the enemy.Our experts are also puzzled by the purpose of the Admiralty's order to return convoy P‧Q‧17, because of this order, the cargo ships are scattered and managed piecemeal without any protection. Sail to the port of the Soviet Union.Of course, I do not think that the regular convoys to the northern ports of the Soviet Union can do their job without danger or loss.但是，在戰時，沒有一件重大工作的完成是可以沒有危險或損失的。無論如何，我絕不希望，正當蘇聯由於蘇德前線的緊張形勢而較以往更需要戰爭物資的時刻，英國政府會停止輸送這些物資。顯然，運輸隊取道波斯灣並不能抵償停止北方口岸運輸船隊的損失。 三‧至於說到第二個問題，即在歐洲開闢第二戰場的問題，我擔心它沒有受到應有的重視。經過對蘇德前線目前的形勢作了充分的考慮，我必須著重指出，蘇聯政府不能同意將歐洲第二戰場的開闢拖延到一九四三年。 我希望，我這樣坦率而誠摯地提出我的意見，以及來電中所說到的我的同事們對這個問題的意見，不致使你感到不愉快。 這些論點並不是太有根據的。絕非破壞運送戰爭物資到蘇聯港口的約定的義務，在訂立協議的當時都曾特別加以規定，由俄國人負責將戰爭物資運往俄國。我們之所以額外承擔運輸工作，完全是出於我們的善意。至於說到破壞關於在一九四二年開闢第二戰場的信用的論斷，我們的備忘錄就是最可靠的答辯。不過，我並不認為和蘇聯政府去爭論這些問題會有什麼好處。當他們本身未遭受襲擊以前，他們是願意看著我們全軍覆沒，並和希特勒共享勝利成果的，而且即使在我們共同的戰鬥中，他們也難得對於英國和美國因運輸援助物資給他們而受到損失說一句同情的話。 總統同意這個看法。 President Roosevelt's Message to Former Navy Personnel 一九四二年七月二十九日 我同意你的意見，就是你給斯大林的回答必須十分審慎。 我們應該經常將我們同盟國的人格和他們面臨的困難與危險牢記在心。當任何一個人的國家遭受侵略時，我們不可能期望他用世界的觀點來看待戰爭。我認為我們應該為他設身處地地想一想。我想，我們首先應該十分詳細地告訴他，我們已經決定在一九四二年內採取行動。我認為，如果我們沒有把所制訂的作戰計劃的詳情通知他，那麼也應該無條件地將我們正在執行的實際情況告訴他。 同時我認為，關於北方運輸船隊的問題，你不應使斯大林存有任何虛幻的希望，當然我同意你的意見，如果有一點成功的可能，不論冒多大的危險，我們都應該派出一個船隊。 我仍然抱著希望，認為我們可以將空軍直接投入俄國前線，我正在這裡研究這個問題。我相信，只應允在埃及戰事順利的條件下來投入空軍力量的做法是不聰明的。俄國的需要是迫切的，我有這樣的感覺，如果俄國軍隊和俄國人民知道我們的一部分空軍正在用非常直接的方式和他們一起作戰，這對他們將是極大的鼓舞。 而且，我們可以相信，我們目前的和計劃使用的聯合空軍部隊，從戰略意義上說是極好的，儘管我覺得斯大林並不同意這一點。我想，斯大林無意參加戰略理論上的討論，而且我肯定，和我們的主要戰爭行動有所不同，最適合於他的計劃是對他前線的南端給予直接的空軍支援。 因此，我就把斯大林抱怨的電報擱置一邊，不作任何答辯。畢竟，俄國軍隊損失慘重，而戰役正處於成敗的緊要關頭。 在一九四二年八月二十六日德國海軍司令部和元首舉行的一次會議上，海軍上將雷德爾作了如下報告： 顯然，同盟國的運輸船隊並未開航。因此我們可以假定，使敵人最近一次運輸船隊遭受全面破壞的我方潛艇和飛機，已經迫使敵人暫時放棄了這條路線，或者甚至已根本上改變了他的整個供應線系統。對俄國北部港口的物資供應，取決於英國人指揮下的整個戰局的安排。他們必將支持俄國的力量，以便牽制德國兵力。敵人極可能對俄國北部繼續航運供應物資，因此，海軍部必須沿原有路線保留潛艇。德國艦隊的大部分也將留駐挪威北部。這樣做的理由，除了可以對可能出現的運輸船隊進行襲擊以外，是由於敵人入侵的一種經常的威脅。只有讓艦隊留置在挪威洋面，我們方才有希望能成功地避免這個危險。而且，從整個軸心國家的戰略來看，這也具有特殊重要的意義，就是德國的現有艦隊牽制了英國的本土艦隊，特別是當英美海軍在地中海和大西洋上遭受沉重損失以後。日本人也知道這種做法的重要性。此外，近海敵人水雷的危險日漸增大，因此海軍艦艇應該只在修理或作訓練之用時方才移動。 一直等到九月間，另一支運輸船隊才出發駛往俄國北部。 這時候已經對護航計劃作了修改，運輸船隊由一支以十六艘驅逐艦組成的嚴密的護航隊保護著，同時新型護航航空母艦復仇者號第一次參加護航，裝載著十二架戰鬥機。正像過去一樣，英國艦隊還作好了有力的支援準備。德國水面艦隻在這一次終於不想進行阻擾，而把襲擊的任務留給飛機和潛艇。結果是一次異常恐怖的空戰，我們擊落了前來空襲的約一百架敵機中的二十四架。十艘商船在這些戰鬥中失蹤，另有兩艘被潛艇擊沉，不過卻有二十七艘船隻成功地打通了航道。 不僅這些運輸船隊的全部重擔幾乎都落在我們身上，而且，正如此圖表所示，我們還在一九四一和一九四二兩年中從我們緊張的資源中竭力為俄國提供了大量的飛機和更多的坦克。 這些數字，是對那些諷刺我們在俄國困難時對她的幫助不夠熱心的人們的結論性的答覆。我們堅定地把我們的心血交付給我們英勇而受著苦難的盟國。 【１】這些船隻的損失，其中有若干艘發生在北大西洋 一九四二年掩蓋不了皇家海軍在毫無一線勝利希望中所作徒勞無功的努力，我們必須將希望寄託於未來。在一九四二年九月，P‧Q‧第十八號運輸船隊到達以後，派往俄國北部的運輸船隊又停頓下來。不久以後，北非的大戰又把我們在內海的全部海軍力量吸引住了。但是，屯積運往俄國的供應品以及對未來運輸船隊的保護辦法等問題，卻在慎密研究中。一直到十二月底，下一次的運輸船隊才開始它危險性的航程。這支船隊分兩批航行，在本土艦隊的掩護下，每批由六七艘驅逐艦護航。第一批平安到達。第二批的航行卻不是那麼順利。 十二月三十一日清晨，當時船隊正駛達距北角約一百五十哩的海面，在驅逐艦奧斯羅號上指揮護航艦隊的海軍上校R‧捨布魯克發現了三艘敵方驅逐艦。他立即轉身迎戰。戰鬥一開始，在海面出現了德國重型巡洋艦希佩爾號。英國驅逐艦和這艘威力強大的軍艦幾乎糾纏了一個小時。戰鬥炮火的閃光把二十五哩外的海軍上將伯內特和兩艘英國巡洋艦謝菲爾德號和牙買加號招引了過來。這支艦隊直向南面奔去，迎住德國袖珍戰艦盧佐夫號，經過短時間的接觸，盧佐夫號在晨曦朦朧中向西逸去。德國艦隊司令以為這兩艘英國巡洋艦是作戰艦隊的前導，就倉皇遁走。在這次短暫的戰鬥中，謝菲爾德號在近距離擊沉一艘德國驅逐艦。接著是一陣追擊戰。兩艘德國重型軍艦和六艘掩護它們的驅逐艦襲擊了在捨布魯克防護下的運輸船隊，但沒有成功。 運輸船隊平安地到達俄國領海，損失了驅逐艦一艘，此外只有一艘商船略微受傷。海軍上校舍布魯克在戰鬥初起時受了重傷，不顧一目失明，繼續迎戰，並且親自指揮戰鬥。他由於領導有方，獲得了維多利亞十字勳章。 在德國最高統帥部內部，這次戰鬥的反應是巨大的。由於電訊延誤，最高統帥部首先是從英國廣播中獲悉這件事的。 希特勒被激怒了。當他在忿怒中不耐煩地等待著戰鬥的結果時，戈林卻火上加油，強烈地抱怨不該浪費德國空軍中隊去保護海軍的主力艦隻，而這些艦隻他是建議報廢的。海軍上將雷德爾奉令立即作出報告。一月六日舉行了海軍會議。希特勒對德國海軍過去的成就作了冗長而激烈的抨擊。如果元首決定廢棄較大的艦隻，不應認為是一種貶抑。除非他取消一支保有充分戰鬥力的艦隊，才真是對海軍的貶抑。在陸軍方面相應的措施是取消全部騎兵師。雷德爾奉令就為什麼違反規定使用退役主力艦隻的問題作出書面報告。當希特勒收到這份備忘錄時，大加嘲弄，並且，命令作為雷德爾的繼任者鄧尼茨擬訂一項符合他的要求的計劃。在希特勒的周圍，戈林和雷德爾之間就德國海軍和空軍的前途對比問題，爆發了一場激烈的衝突。但是，雷德爾頑固地為一九二八年以來在他主持下的貢獻堅持辯護。他一次又一次地要求成立一支獨立的海軍航空兵部隊，但是，由於戈林堅持認為，空軍在海上可以較海軍更有效地完成任務，因此，沒有獲得結果。戈林勝利了。雷德爾在一月三十日辭職。繼任者是野心勃勃的潛艇司令鄧尼茨。一切有效的新艦隻的建造，從此就由潛艇獨佔了。 就是這樣，英國皇家空軍在這一年的年底為保護駛往俄國的一支同盟國的運輸船隊而作的英勇的戰鬥，直接在敵人海軍政策方面引起了一次嚴重的危機，也結束了建立另一支德國公海艦隊的迷夢。