Chapter 131 Volume 4 Chapter 21 Rommel's Attack

Our defensive positions minefields and outposts May 26th German attack begins Auchinleck's communiqué May 30th our thousand bombers raid Cologne Battle at Bridgehead and Bir Hakaim Our Mobile Strategic Reserve I am in Telegram to Auchinleck, 9th June Auchinleck's estimate of casualties A disturbing feature 12th and 13th June Tank battle between Adham and Knightsbridge 14th June Secretary of State Telegram Auchinleck and Leech: An Unsatisfactory Compromise Tobruk in Danger Telegram from the War Cabinet June 15th Auchinleck's return Telegram June 16 Importance of this fort I decide Visit to Washington not canceled.

Although General Auchinleck did not think he was strong enough to seize the initiative, he waited confidently for the enemy's attack.General Leech, in command of the Eighth Army, under the supervision of his superiors, carefully deployed a defensive line extending from Gachaila on the coast, defended by the South African Division, to Birhakai, forty-five miles due south in the desert. m.It was defended there by the 1st Brigade of the Free French under the command of General Koenig.The system of defense adopted to hold the line was a series of fortified points called outposts, which were held by a brigade or more; the whole front was covered by large minefields.Behind this, we have all our armored units and the XXX Corps in reserve.

All desert campaigns, with the exception of El Alamein, began with a rapid outflank of armored forces on the desert flanks.Rommel took advantage of the moonlight on the night of May 26th and 27th to attack, and with all his armored forces bypassed Bir Hakam and swept forward, intending to engage the British armored forces and destroy them ; and on the evening of the 28th took the position from Adham to Sidi Rezeq, thereby attacking the British positions long established in the rear.He smashed a brigade of Indian bikes and, from the very beginning, was going at a high pace.He was stubbornly resisted by the British armored forces and by all the troops which were in formation for such an attack as he had made.After days of bitter fighting, he found himself unable to make progress, and was hindered by the need to transport supplies and ammunition for this endless battle far around Bir Hakem.He therefore sought a shorter line of communication, and his sappers cut two shortcuts through the British minefields.On either side of these widening roads were the faithfully maintained outposts of the 150th Brigade of the 50th (Northumberland) Division.By the thirty-first, he was finally able to withdraw a large number of armored troops and transport vehicles into the two narrow roads.He built another so-called bridgehead in our direction, enclosing the outpost of the 150th Brigade.This encirclement, what is improperly called the cauldron, becomes the chief object of our Air Force.

Rommel's original bold plan certainly failed; but once he had withdrawn into our minefields they became an effective component of his defense.Here he regroups and waits for another counterattack. The opening phase of this disastrous pitched battle was fully described in General Auchinleck's bulletin of June 1st, which I read almost verbatim in the House of Commons the next day. General Auchinleck and Air Lieutenant General Ted to the Prime Minister June 1, 1942 On the evening of May 26, General Rommel dispatched the German Afrika Korps to attack.In his orders issued that day to all the German and Italian troops under him, he tried to explain that during this large-scale combat operation they were going to make a decisive attack on our troops in Libya, and that, for this purpose, he It is ready to assemble a force that is superior in numbers, well equipped, and supported by a strong air force.At the end of the order he hails His Majesty King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia, Head of the Roman Empire and Führer of the Greater German Reich.We had anticipated this attack and were prepared for it.From the captured documents it is clear that Rommel's purpose was to defeat our armored forces and take Tobruk.

The attack on the northern front of our main position south of Gachala on the 27th achieved almost nothing.An attempt to break through our line of defense along the coast road through the entrance of Ghazaila was also easily stopped.During the days of May 28th, 29th, and 30th, our armored divisions and infantry brigades had been engaged in very intense and continuous battles with the German Afrika Korps supported by the Italian Mobile Corps. fighting.The fighting went back and forth over a wide area from Akrumah in the north to Bir Hakam forty miles south, and from Adham to our minefields thirty miles west.The enemy, finding himself low on supplies and water, had to break through our minefields, one along the general front along the Capuzzo Trail and the other ten miles to the south.It is difficult to estimate the number of vehicles and tanks destroyed or damaged by our side under these attacks, but there is sufficient evidence to show that the results are huge.At the same time, our night bomber fleet was attacking the enemy's forward airfields and lines of communication every night.

On the 31st of May the enemy succeeded in withdrawing many tanks and transports to this or that route, and then he deployed his well-equipped anti-tank guns into position to protect these vehicles from incoming traffic from the east. attack.However, a large number of tanks and transport vehicles are still outside this barrier. Therefore, with the strong assistance of our air force's bombers and fighters, these tanks and vehicles are still being continuously attacked by us. destruction. Our army swept the area east of Bir Hakam, destroyed many tanks and vehicles in this area, and occupied two large factories.The fierce battle is still going on, and the war is not over.Further fierce fighting was expected, but whatever the outcome, there was no doubt that Rommel's plans for the initial offensive had been completely disrupted, and his failure had cost him extremely high in manpower and material resources.General Leech and his corps commanders, Lieutenant General Norrie and Lieutenant General Gott, have shown the highest level of talent, determination and doggedness throughout this week of arduous fighting.

I am satisfied with the remark that, from all that has been said, it is clear that we are justifiably satisfied, even extremely satisfied, with the progress of the war so far; I then spoke of the massive air attack on Cologne on 30/31 May; this time no less than 1130 English-piloted planes flew over the sea.I also reported that last night, 1,036 Royal Air Force planes flew over the mainland again.Almost all of these aircraft were operating in the Essen area.Thirty-five of our bombers were lost in this second large-scale raid.These two large-scale night raids marked a new phase in the British Air Force offensive against Germany; when the American Air Force soon joined us, it was to be significantly expanded in size.

While I was satisfied with the situation opened up by the war, I was extremely apprehensive about the island of Malta. Prime Minister to General Auchinleck and Lieutenant General Ted June 2, 1942 I need not stress enough the vital importance of our convoy reaching the island of Malta; and, I trust, both of you will take steps to allow our air escort, especially the Warriors, to land from as far west as possible. Field takeoff is appropriate.I hope you have drawn up plans for us to use Martuba as a forward refueling base as soon as we capture it, including arrangements for guards, anti-aircraft defenses, aviation gasoline for our fighters if possible, Air transportation of oil, ammunition, etc.Even with two refills, the results are obviously very different.The other points have no doubt occurred to both of you.Please let me know as soon as possible when everything is arranged.

We now know that Rommel wanted to take Tobruk the day after the offensive, and General Auchinleck was right to believe that Rommel's original plan had failed in at least this respect.In order to regain strength and make further progress, Rommel must pass through our minefields, hold and develop that bridgehead.It was only from here that Bill Hakam could reliably move supplies, provided he could hold his ground vigorously against the constant assault from land and air by the 1st Brigade of the Free French. During the first week of June, fighting focused on two places: Bill Hakeem and the Bridgehead.Inside that bridgehead was the tenacious 150th Northumberland Brigade.Rommel was in desperate need of supplies and water supplies.If the battle was not to be lost entirely, he would have to destroy the brigade so that his convoy could pass.This was decided and, on June 1, the brigade was wiped out.Here is a passage from Rommel's own account:

Under the imaginable tenacious resistance of the British, the German and Italian troops struggled forward yard by yard.The British directed the defense with great skill. They fought to the last bullet, as usual. 【１】 [1] Desmond Young: Rommel, p. 267. For us, the key at present is to break through this bridgehead; for, despite the heavy air attack on the enemy's lines of communication, it is only a matter of time before the enemy fully recovers and strikes from there.Days passed while we considered other possible plans, so that no effort was made until June 4th.It was a costly defeat, with one Indian infantry brigade and four field artillery regiments all lost due to lack of support and mismanagement.General Auchinleck called it the turning point of the whole campaign, and rightly so.Our opportunity was lost, and Rommel regained the initiative and dealt a handy blow to Ridge's army.

Soon after, the enemy's armored forces broke out from the bridgehead and attacked again.After an excellent defense, the Free French forces withdrew from Bir Hakam.It was another heavy blow, and the second phase of the campaign began in worse conditions than the first; even the all-out fighting of the RAF could not prevent the subsequent collapse. The means of keeping at hand a strategic reserve with mobility at sea is, as we have seen, one of the means to which I attach the utmost importance. In the summer of 1941, although the United States was not yet at war, I had persuaded President Roosevelt to lend us American transports to take two divisions to the Cape of Good Hope.These transports will enable us to reinforce India after Japan enters the war.On March 4, 1942, I again asked the President to let us use American ships to reship two other divisions to the Cape of Good Hope at this critical time, but the destination was not determined.This considerable force, now at sea, leaves us at liberty to choose our destination at will.It seemed obvious that they should go to Egypt to support the desert campaign.Of course, if the Russian defenses in the Caspian-Caucasus area were breached, thereby exposing us to greater danger, or if India or Australia were actually invaded by Japan, this is at the very least extremely unlikely and difficult. There is a one-month period, which is optional. I hastened to tell General Auchinleck the good news. Prime Minister to General Auchinleck June 9, 1942 I am constantly thinking about your great campaign and how we can best support your army so that it can be fought to a victorious conclusion.There is some good news to tell. The 8th Armored Division is currently at the Cape of Good Hope, and the 44th Division is about to arrive in Freetown.As to the final destination of these divisions, I have deliberately left the choice open until we can better see where we are going.Not long ago I promised the Australian Government that in the event of a major invasion of Australia we would send these two divisions immediately to their aid.To this day Australia has not suffered a major invasion, and in view of the Japanese naval losses in the Coral Sea and the campaigns off Midway, we consider a major invasion in the immediate future to be highly unlikely.Although we never agreed to Wavell, we were prepared to transfer these two divisions to India if it appeared that Japan had any intention of invading India. At present, this is also extremely unlikely, and India has already obtained the British 2nd, 5th and 70th divisions. Therefore, unless Australia is threatened with a major invasion within the next few days, we have decided to transfer to you the 8th Armored and 44th Divisions.You can therefore draw up your battle plan on the assumption that the 8th Armored Division will arrive in Suez by the end of June and the 44th by mid-July. After this, you should be prepared to send one of your Indian divisions and the 252nd Indian Armored Brigade to India, depending, of course, on the overall situation.Please send your suggestion so that General Wavell can be informed. You have been informed separately of the exact situation of the 8th Armored Division, the technical readiness of its tanks, and the exact loads on board the ships and their arrival dates. In this way, you can make the best plans for disembarking, organizing, and going into battle with the least delay and in the most efficient manner.It is our opinion that now that you have a reserve army which is about to arrive, you will have greater liberty in employing your existing forces.Sincerely best wishes. General Auchinleck to Prime Minister June 10, 1942 Your well wishes are a great encouragement to me.I hope to give you some takeaways from the intense and hard-fought battle we've fought over the past two weeks.It is great to know that we can have the 44th and 8th Armored Divisions in this theater; although I expect this decision to change, I will immediately make plans to use them most effectively.The commander of the 8th Armored Division is now in Cairo. I note that I may later be ordered to send an Indian infantry division and an Indian armored brigade to India.You know, I don't have enough troops to meet a German attack from Anatolia, nor do I have the strength to defend Persia; but I have to plan for these threats even though I know they may not come true .I know that the threat to India will come sooner and be of a more serious nature than the threat to my northern and northeastern lines; Prepare for this eventuality.The reason I mention the missions in Syria, Iraq and Persia is only to remind you that unless we can have sufficient reinforcements before the German invasion is too deep, it is impossible to defend this theater with our present strength. There is little hope of success. Knowing, as you say, that we have these two fine and strong divisions coming to reinforce us, will give me greater freedom in commanding the operations of the troops I have now. As you probably already know, I have brought a large number of troops from Iraq to Libya to reinforce the Eighth Army. All of us are very grateful to you. On the 10th General Auchinleck sent an estimate of casualties on both sides as of June 7th.While the fighting was still raging, it was, and is, extremely difficult to come up with exact figures of the loss of troops in men and equipment.Our losses are estimated at around 10,000, of whom 8,000 may have been captured, but the exact number of 5th Indian Division casualties is not yet known.We took 4,000 prisoners, of whom 1,660 were Germans.The enemy lost 400 tanks, of which 211 are guaranteed.Our losses, including possible repairs, amounted to three hundred and fifty.In this way, in the battle on June 9, our armored forces suitable for combat were left with 254 patrol tanks and 67 infantry tanks.We have destroyed one hundred and twenty enemy guns, while we ourselves have lost ten medium guns, one hundred and forty field guns, forty-two six-pounders, and one hundred and fifty-three two-pounders. We lost 176 aircraft due to various reasons, and 70 pilots were killed, missing or injured.The enemy's aircraft losses are estimated at about 165 destroyed, three-quarters of them German. Meanwhile, the 3rd Indian Motorcycle Brigade (unfortunately routed), the 10th Indian Division, an armored brigade and several other units had come to support the Eighth Army, and the 5th Indian Infantry Brigade was also readying itself.Since the beginning of the battle, the Eighth Army had acquired 25,000 soldiers, 78 field guns, 220 anti-tank guns, and 353 tanks. 【１】 [1] This figure includes the 3rd Indian Motorcycle Brigade.It was there at the beginning of the war. The figures for tanks, artillery and aircraft are satisfactory and correct.I was taken aback by the statement that our losses in personnel were estimated at around 10,000, of whom 8,000 may have been captured, but the exact number of casualties of the 5th Indian Division is not yet known.The disproportion between casualties on the one hand and prisoners on the other suggests that something unpleasant must have happened; it also shows that the Cairo command failed to weigh the event in some important respects.I did not mention this in my reply. Prime Minister to General Auchinleck June 11, 1942 Thank you for the situation and figures, in my opinion, are useful.There is no reason to fear a situation of protracted war of attrition, although of course one always hopes to win by strategy or counter-offensive.Because we have an advantage in transportation, this must cost Rommel more than Reacher.That's even more reliable, judging by the fact that reinforcements are brought to you at the fastest sailing speed.The restoration work is extremely encouraging, and the merits of all those involved can be seen here.Please pay my respects to Li Qi, and tell him that his tenacious and resolute fighting has won the praise of the masses.They watch every action every day. General Auchinleck wrote back: General Auchinleck to Prime Minister June 11, 1942 I am very grateful for your encouraging and considerate phone call of June 11th. Our losses have been severe, and I am concerned that they will not be avoided in the next war, but, as you say, we have more resources than he does, and his position is not enviable. I have conveyed your regards to General Li Qi.I knew he would be deeply grateful for it. With sufficient reinforcements and the new freedom of movement gained from the capture of Bir Hakam, Rommel now broke through the cauldron with his armor and attacked us from the south.Our flanks had shifted, and at the northern end of the front the remaining brigades of the 1st South African Division and the 50th Division, still holding their positions, were in danger of being cut off. On the 12th and 13th of June a fierce battle continued for the ridge between Adham and Knightsbridge.This is the pinnacle of tank warfare; by the end of the battle, the enemy has mastered the field and our armored forces are greatly weakened.Knightsbridge, as the traffic center in this area, had to retreat after a stubborn resistance by the Guards Brigade, supported by the 2nd Regiment of the Household Cavalry Division.The 1st and 50th South African Divisions were saved from destruction only by virtue of the timely retreat; their retreat was successful only because of the considerable support of the Royal Air Force. By the fourteenth it was clear that the war had taken a sharp turn.Mr. Casey, Secretary of State, has sent me a telegram emphasizing military intelligence. Secretary of State to Prime Minister June 14, 1942 You know how serious the fighting in the western desert has gotten.Auchinleck and Li Qi spent twenty-four hours together, yesterday and the thirteenth, and came back very late.It was agreed that the Akrumah-Adem line (sixteen miles west and sixteen miles south, respectively, of Tobruk) should be held; Auchinleck had issued orders to Leach on this point.The 1st South African Division and the 50th Division were withdrawing from the Ghazala position.I have maintained close communication with the Commander-in-Chief and have followed closely the ebb and flow of the fighting in the theater and the reinforcements that have been sent and are being sent. As for Auchinleck himself, I have all possible confidence in his leadership and in his method of directing the war with the forces available.My only hope is that he can be in two places at the same time, not only in the center of this spider web, but also on the front line commanding the Eighth Army.I have sometimes even thought in recent days that it would be better for him to go to the front and direct the war himself, while leaving his chief of staff in charge here for the time being;This was a campaign under Auchinleck's command, and questions of his subordinates' leadership were for him to decide. The RAF under Ted fought well and, I think it is fair to say, we had air superiority in this theater.The success or failure of the two transport fleets to the island of Malta depends on today and tomorrow.From the air force's point of view, the western desert undoubtedly helped the westbound convoys.The westbound convoy will be in greater danger tomorrow, probably from the surface ships of the Italian fleet. Mr. Casey's statement that it is advantageous for Auchinleck to conduct the desert campaign himself, as I had indicated to the general a month before.The commander-in-chief in the Middle East has his hands tied because of too many responsibilities.Although his entire work depended on this campaign, he saw it only as part of his duties.There was always a danger from the North, and he felt it his duty to take it seriously; but we at home, in our better position to judge, disagreed with this. The arrangements he made were only half-way.He assigned combat responsibility for the decisive battle to General Leech; however, General Leech had recently ceased to be his deputy chief of staff.At the same time, he strictly supervised the officer and issued instructions continuously.It wasn't until after the disaster that he came to his senses that he decided to do what he should have done from the very beginning, to take direct command of the war in person, and this was the result of repeated advice from the Minister of State.It is for this reason that I ascribe his personal failure to errors for which my colleagues and I are undoubtedly responsible; for, a year earlier, we had assigned the Inappropriately large task.However, we have tried my best to relieve him of these undue burdens through clear, timely and recurring proposals, but he has refused.In my own opinion, I believe that if he had been in command from the outset, and if he had exercised his full right to leave an assistant in Cairo to look after the North and take care of the many chores of the vast theater he presided over, then , he had a good chance of winning the war; indeed, when he came to command later, he also saved the remaining forces. The reader will soon see how distressed I was by these impressions, that in my instructions to General Alexander of August 10th I set out with great clarity the principal duties of him.A person just lives and learns. At this time I telegraphed Auchinleck to say: June 14, 1942 Your decision to fight to the end has my sincerest approval.Whatever the outcome, we will support you.A retreat would be fatal.It's a thing not just about weapons, but about stamina.May God bless you all. We immediately faced the problem of Tobruk; as last year, we should definitely hold it at all costs.After a month of unnecessary delay, General Auchinleck has now brought in the New Zealand Division from Syria, but it is not in time for the Battle of Tobruk. Prime Minister to General Auchinleck June 14, 1942 1. Where does General Li Qi intend to withdraw Gazaila's army?It must be assumed that Tobruk must never be abandoned under any circumstances.As long as Tobruk is held, it is impossible for the enemy to seriously attack Egypt.We have experienced all this in April 1941.I don't know what you mean by withdrawing to the old border. Two. I am very happy that you can transfer the New Zealand division to the western desert.Please advise when and where the division can be deployed. 3. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff agrees to all this.Please keep me informed at all times. General Auchinleck to Prime Minister June 15, 1942 1. General Leech has been ordered to keep the enemy from crossing the general line of Akrumah|Adem|Birguppy.This does not mean that the line can be, or should be, held as a continuous fortified front, but that the enemy is not allowed to gain a foothold east of the line.The two divisions from the Gajala position should be able to help in this.Although I have no intention of letting the Eighth Army be besieged in Tobruk, I have no intention of abandoning Tobruk either.My order to General Li Qi is: (1) The enemy is not allowed to cross the general front of Akrumah｜Adem｜Birguppi; (2) not to allow his army to be encircled at Tobruk; (3) Attack and haunt the enemy at every opportunity. At the same time, I propose to organize the strongest possible reserves in the area of ​​Salum | Maddalena for an early counter-offensive. 2. The New Zealand divisions already on the way out should be fully concentrated in about ten or twelve days, but if necessary, the vanguard should arrive as early as possible. We were dissatisfied with the order given to General Leech, which did not necessarily require him to guard Tobruk.In order to find out the truth, I sent the following telegram: Prime Minister to General Auchinleck June 15, 1942 We are very pleased to hear that you have no intention of renouncing Tobruk's pledge.The War Cabinet interpreted your telegram to mean that, should the need arise, General Leech would leave sufficient troops there to secure Tobruk, if necessary. Call back for sure. General Auchinleck to Prime Minister June 16, 1942 The War Cabinet's interpretation of the telegram was correct.General Leech was leaving as many troops as he thought fit, sufficient to hold even with Tobruk temporarily cut off.The basic garrison is four brigades, with sufficient reserves of ammunition, food and water.The basic movement of the Eighth Army in the near future is to keep the fortified area of ​​Adem as the center of operations, and to use all available mobile forces to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold in the area east of Adem or Tobruk.General Leech has been given very definite orders on this point, and I trust him to carry them out. The situation is quite different from last year, because it is not the enemy but us that currently hold fortified positions on the frontier; and, if we cannot yet use the landing field at Gambut, we can use it over Tobruk fighter. It seems to me that the enemy would need a larger number of troops than our information suggests, in order to surround Tobruk, and to hold back the fire of our troops on the frontier positions.In this case, we will be able to prevent the area between the border and Tobruk from falling into enemy hands. I have discussed the matter with the Secretary of State and the other commanders-in-chief, and they agree with the proposed course. Prime Minister to General Auchinleck June 16, 1942 The news that you have succeeded in redeploying the Eighth Army in close contact with reinforcements on the new front is especially welcome; and the Cabinet is pleased to know that you intend to hold Tobruk at all costs. At present, of course, we cannot judge the tactics of war from this, but it seems that if our whole army can fight together at the same time, and if you can regain the initiative, then it must be advantageous.Perhaps this opportunity will come as the new situation emerges; and all the more so if the enemy can be denied respite, since it is evident that he is already oppressed.For armored warfare permits a tactic of gradual rollout, which favors the offensive; while the defensive, though very powerful in the last war, must constantly submit to the plans of the attacker.We all send you our best wishes. Based on the experience of the previous war, we have full confidence in this.Not only that, but our situation, as General Auchinleck pointed out, is theoretically much better than it was in 1941.We have an army force deployed on a fortified front near Tobruk, supported by a newly built broad-gauge railway.We are no longer confined to deploying our forces on that flank which depends chiefly on sea traffic; but follow the orthodoxy of war from the center point of our front, at right angles, back to our main base.In this case, although I was apprehensive about what had happened, I still thought, considering all the forces on both sides and Rommel's great supply difficulties, that things would turn out well. We don't know what's going on in Tobruk yet, though.Considering that Auchinleck's plan was to wait for the attack, and considering that several months had passed, it was difficult to imagine whether the tried and tested fortifications at Tobruk were still in the most efficient condition and had actually been strengthened.Tobruk's fortifications and exits were an inestimable factor in his decided defensive battle. Finally, the word provisional, applied to the defense of Tobruk, has a meaning which London is not aware of.Our intention, which we think the Commander-in-Chief fully agrees with, is that, even if the main battle is against us, Tobruk should once again be held as an isolated fortress, and the Eighth Army should follow along its lines. The main line of communication, withdrew to the position of Matruh Port.In this way, Tobruk would remain on Rommel's flank, and he would inevitably surround or monitor him, so that his own lines of communication would become longer and more tense.With the New Zealand Division so close at hand, and with strong reinforcements to come from the sea, I myself do not think that a hard fight with the greatest possible strength on both sides will do us any harm in the long run.I therefore did not cancel my planned visit to Washington again, where I needed to deal with issues of vital importance to the overall strategy of the war.I have the support of my colleagues in this matter.