Chapter 135 Volume 4, Chapter 25, Decision of the Torch Operation Plan

Need to make a strategic decision with the U.S. July 8th I sent a telegram to President Roosevelt about the choice of commander We recommend General Marshall for the mission of crossing the English Channel Offensive Clearing of code codes I ask General McNaughton of the Canadian Army to study the Cupid plan President Roosevelt on codes Code Reply July 14th I call President Roosevelt with my main observation Tensions in Washington The President decides to send his key advisers to consult with us Dill's detailed account of Washington's arrival of the delegation July 16th Significant Presidential Papers Commander in Chief Franklin D. Roosevelt July 18 at the Chiefs of Staff at Chequers Minutes of my remarks at the July 20 meeting July 22 meeting continued Sportsman Operations Plan Renaming I am pleased with the decisions made on the Operation Torch Plan [1] The President expresses his satisfaction. On July 30th Dill called me to advise the President on the issue of the Commander.

【1】The password codes in this chapter are briefly explained as follows: The Acrobat: The March to Tripolitania. Pollyle: The various preparations for the massive attack on French territory later became the basis of the Overlord's battle plan. Sportsman: Landings in Northwest Africa, later renamed Operation Torch. Cupid: Battle plan in northern Norway. Encirclement and Annihilation: The plan to attack the German occupied areas in Europe, later renamed the Overlord Operation Plan. Bash: Plans to attack Brest or Cherbourg in 1942. Just this July, I am in the most difficult position politically, and I have no hope of winning militarily.I had to accept from the American side the decisions that would govern the war for the next two years, whether good or bad.This decision was to abandon the plan to cross the English Channel in 1942 and send a large Anglo-American expeditionary force to occupy French North Africa in the autumn or winter.For some time now I have carefully studied the President's opinion and its various reactions; I am sure that the North African plan strongly appealed to him.As I mentioned in my December 1941 paper, this plan has always been my goal.We in Britain are now convinced that the Channel crossing in 1942 will fail, and military strategists on both sides of the Atlantic are not prepared to recommend such a plan or take responsibility for it.Up to now, the British side has generally agreed that no large-scale combat plan to cross the English Channel will be implemented before 1943, but all preparations for crossing the sea with maximum force should still be actively carried out.

On June 11, the War Cabinet agreed to vigorously carry out various preparations for the battering operation plan to attack Brest and Cherbourg, but on the condition that no attack was launched without a good prospect of victory.The chiefs of staff of the three services looked at the circumstances again early next month.On July 2nd they drew up a memorandum giving comments to the earlier discussions in the War Cabinet.They wrote: At the meeting of the War Cabinet on June 11, the Prime Minister had recommended, and it was unanimously agreed, that operations in 1942 should be conducted on the basis of the following two principles: (1) Unless we were prepared to hold our ground after landing , No large-scale landings in France in 1942; (2) No large-scale landings in France unless the morale of the German army is lost due to the failure of the war against Russia.In our view, the above-mentioned conditions will not be realized, so the various chances of implementing the bashing operation plan within this year are slim.

So our policy must be simplified.The bashing plan has long been out of possibility, and the time has come to abandon it.In an important telegram to the President, with the unanimous consent of my colleagues and the Chiefs of Staff, I have endeavored to state the matter in the most succinct terms possible. former navy personnel to president roosevelt July 8, 1942 No responsible general in the British Army, Navy or Air Force was prepared to recommend the Bash Plan as a possible 1942 operation.The Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces report that the conditions that would make the bashing plan a sound, rational operation are likely not to arise.They are now sending the report to your Chiefs of Staff.

2. In order to confuse the enemy, we have begun to load the ships with supplies.Of course, this will reduce British imports by about 250,000 tons.But the far more serious fact is that, according to Mountbatten, if we interrupt the training of the army, besides the loss of landing craft, etc., the plan for the encirclement and extermination operation or the plan for the Bolile operation in 1943 will be postponed by at least two or three month; and even if the venture were unsuccessful, the landing force would have to retreat after a short stay, and such losses would be inflicted. 3. If a stronghold can be acquired and held, it must be constantly supplied, and therefore the bombing of Germany must be greatly reduced.All our forces must be concentrated on defending this bridgehead.The possibility of a large-scale campaign in 1943 was hindered, if not lost.All our resources have to be used bit by bit on this very small but uniquely endowed position.We can therefore say that the premature and perhaps disastrous operation of 1942 certainly hampered the prospects for a well-organized, large-scale operation in 1943.

4. I am myself convinced that the campaign in French North Africa (Project Sportsman) is the best chance in 1942 for detente on the Russian front.This plan has always been in line with your opinions.In fact, it is your dominant thought.This is the real second front in 1942.I have discussed this matter with the cabinet and the defense committee, and everyone is in agreement.This is the most reliable and fruitful attack possible this fall. 5. Of course we can assist in many ways, transporting American or British landing forces from the United Kingdom to participate in the sportsman campaign, and providing landing craft and ships and so on.From here you may, if you wish, part of your army, and the rest go directly across the Atlantic, and go hand in hand.

6. It must be clearly understood that we cannot expect invitations and guarantees from Vichy.But no resistance could compare with that which the Germans would wage at the Pas de Calais.Indeed, this resistance may be only symbolic.The stronger you are, the less resistance you will meet and the easier it will be to overcome.This is not so much a military question as a political one.It seems to me that we should not give up the only strike of great strategic importance in the West during this critical year. 7. Apart from the foregoing, we are endeavoring to study the possibility of a campaign in northern Norway, if not in northern Norway, then elsewhere in Norway.The difficulties will be great due to attacks on our ships by coast-based aircraft.With regard to sending a fleet to Russia, we are encountering great difficulties of every kind, but what is more necessary is to try to overcome the obstacles and maintain contact with Russia.

With all these questions concerning the selection of the Commander, I sent two more telegrams to the President: former navy personnel to president roosevelt July 8, 1942 We have thought extensively about the command of the largest project, Project Polejo (a large army across the English Channel).We shall be relieved if General Marshall can undertake this noble task in 1943.We will support him to the end. 2. The War Cabinet authorizes me to inform you of the above opinion. July 8, 1942 Mr. President, I hope that when you appoint an American commander for the 1943 Bollyro plan, you will not interfere with subsequent operations, such as the sportsman.

Another thing is to sort out the code names of the combat plans.In a situation where events are constantly changing, the code names describing the various plans have become seriously confused or outdated.These code names are only practical and valid if they are reformulated. former navy personnel to president roosevelt July 6, 1942 We need to clean up the codenames.In our British view, Project Polejo refers to the enormous arrangements necessary for combat operations against the Continent for two years, 1942 and 1943.The Anglo-American Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee is working on this basis.They are not operations of combat but purely logistical measures.What you call one-third Polier in the conversation, we keep calling it the Bash Battle Plan.The name encirclement and annihilation refers to the 1943 combat operation.

I don't like the name because it's either considered overconfident or tragic, but it's used.Tell me, what are your thoughts on this code name?What you and I call the sportsman's battle plan, I think it is the abbreviation of what your staff members call the semi-sportsman.I also use the name Cupid to refer to a battle in the far north. I'm still holding out hope for the cupid battle.But little progress has been made on its concrete plans.I think this operation will give an honorable chance to the Canadian Army, which for two years has been anxiously preparing in England to meet the invaders.I therefore had a long talk with General MacNaughton in the park at Checkers; I hold him in high esteem, and he has great influence over the Canadian Government.I described the situation to him from all sides, and asked him if he wanted to review the proposal himself and make a plan.Our technical department will help him with this plan.He agreed to take part in the campaign, promising to do his best.

Prime Minister to the Reich Chief of the General Staff and the Council of the Chiefs of Staff July 8, 1942 General McNaughton should be entrusted with the preliminary study and preparation of Cupid's plan of operations, and all necessary assistance should be given by the agency of the Chief of Staff. From the perspective of climatic conditions, the Canadian Army should take up this task, if this task is feasible.Whether this plan should be adopted will be decided later. It was a long time before I heard from General MacNaughton. President Roosevelt responded to the code name.His answer in a way shows that he has a clear and deep understanding of the various issues related to this.He made the following three suggestions: 1. The term Polile is used to indicate the preparations and actions of the U.S. military to be transferred to the European battlefield, receive the various preparations of the U.S. military there, and support the production, assembly, transportation, and reception of equipment and supplies necessary for the U.S. military to fight against the European continent. and storage etc. 2. The term Bash is used to refer to an offensive operation by British and American forces on the European continent in 1942; when the German army collapsed internally, or when the Russian army was in danger and needed to launch an emergency offensive to force the German army to move away from the Russian line. This campaign should be waged. 3. The term "encirclement and annihilation", or any other term you please, refers to an offensive by the Anglo-American forces against German occupation in Europe in 1943 or later. I therefore send the following memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces: Prime Minister to Commodore Hollis 15th July 1942 I am afraid that if the name of encirclement and annihilation is changed, the U.S. military will mistakenly believe that there is a change in the target.So we must keep this exaggerated, ill-chosen name, and hope it does not spell us ill. I think we'd better not change the words the president uses.We're not dealing with policy issues right now, we're just cleaning up codenames. First formulate a plan in this way, and then make an announcement after obtaining the consent of the US side. On the eve of major decisions, I telegraphed my main opinions to the President. former navy personnel to president roosevelt July 14, 1942 I long for you to understand my situation.I have found that no one thinks the thrashing plan is feasible.I very much hope that you will implement the sportsman plan as soon as possible, and also hope that we can implement the Cupid plan with the Russians.At the same time, all preparations for the 1943 encirclement and annihilation plan should be fully carried out, so that the maximum number of enemy troops can be contained on the other side of England.All this seems to me to be perfectly clear. But it will be some time before a final decision is made on these operations.Tensions are high among top U.S. leaders directing operations.There was great disagreement between General Marshall and Admiral King over the European and Pacific sides. Neither of them had any intention of embarking on a North African adventure.Amid this stalemate, the president's interest in the North African campaign grew.Field Marshal Dill's virtue won him the confidence of all the opposition, and his wit was admired by them.My correspondence with him gives a detailed account of the progress of the work. Prime Minister to Field Marshal Deal (in Washington) July 12, 1942 I have airmailed the full text of the General Staff document.Please pay special attention to Mountbatten's opinion; it points out that the plan of thrashing will fatally damage the plan of encirclement and extermination.Even leaving this point aside, there are problems with the thrashing program itself that no one can solve. 2. The Sportsman Project was the only way the U.S. military could fight Hitler in 1942.If the Athletic is victorious, our threat to Italy will divert significant elements of the Luftwaffe from the Russian field.The Athletic Project does not hinder the large-scale preparation and training for the encirclement and annihilation plan that is being carried out here at this time, but it only means the transfer of six American divisions that will not participate in the encirclement and annihilation campaign.They were bound to be replaced by new American divisions.These new American divisions will be ready before the transportation program is completed. 3. However, if the president decides not to adopt the sportsman program, so be it.Because this campaign can only be fought by troops under the American flag.This opportunity was obviously about to be lost.In 1942, the two countries will stand still, and all forces will be concentrated in 1943 to carry out the campaign of encirclement and annihilation. 4. Under such circumstances, there is no reason for the United States to transfer its power (to the Pacific Ocean), and I think this approach is very difficult to pass. Those who attended the meeting at the White House felt that, if decisions were to be made on these matters, no consensus could be expected except by a visit to England.I have heard that the President has proposed to send his most trusted friends and military officers to visit us. Field Marshal Deal to Prime Minister July 15, 1942 Marshall, Hopkins and King will leave the United States for Britain tomorrow night. In summary, the reasons for opposing the sportsman program are: (1) It must divert the U.S. Navy, especially aircraft carriers, away from the Pacific Ocean; You already know that the United States urgently needs these warships for its current operations there. (2) It requires a new line of communication at sea; the US military has difficulty maintaining this new route and undertaking other tasks. (3) Landing in Casablanca was not easy, and there was a lack of maintenance equipment there.And a single attack on Casablanca would not bring the enemy out of the Russian field; it would be too dangerous to attack some places in the interior of the Mediterranean, say, Algiers, or even Bizerte, especially in view of the Axis forces could easily cut off traffic in the Strait of Gibraltar. (4) The Athlete Plan will take on such a large task that it will eliminate any possibility of the 1943 Encirclement and Annihilation Plan. Some rough battle plans in the Pacific were presented to the President. All of these actions would take up all the ships now scheduled for Project Bolero and would reduce the amount of US Air Force redeployed to the UK by about two-thirds. It was obvious that the adventure in the Pacific would not directly relieve the pressure on Russia and would delay any decisive victory in the war against Japan. Marshall undoubtedly wished to carry out his original preferred plan, but he believed that there was no real force behind the European plan.Meeting after meeting, discussion after discussion, the good times passed.Germany will no longer be as busy in the East as it is today.If we do not take advantage of Germany's busyness in the East, we shall find ourselves in the West facing a Germany so strong that our attack on the Continent becomes impossible.At that time, although we can continue to engage in air combat with the enemy, the possibility of decisive victory has disappeared.I believe Marshall must have thought that if a great businessman had a deal that would make him rich or ruin him, he would do everything he could to get rich, and he would probably succeed. King's attention was on the war against Japan. I have a feeling (based on nothing more than the American idea that the Pacific might replace Bolle, and America's strong desire to build an army of seven million men) that some high-status Americans think it impossible to have a It's a better situation for people to stalemate. May I propose to you the following: You must convince your interviewers that you are determined to defeat the Germans, even on a limited scale, and that you will strike them on the Continent as soon as possible; Mainly spiritual actions are completely unsupported by you.Marshall thinks that your favorite is the sportsman's plan, just as his favorite is the Bolile plan; And, you're often tempted to go back to the sportsman program because of trivial details.unless you can convince him that you are committed to the bolero plan, the strategy we have agreed to so far will be abandoned and the united states will retreat to its own war in the pacific, leaving us with limited assistance , We must do our best to resist the German army. President Roosevelt also realized that the arguments against the thrashing program were powerful.Had he mentioned this plan first in his call to us, it would have convinced General Marshall that the chances of its implementation were considerable.But what if no one mentions it?The tendency of the opinion of the U.S. General Staff is, if nothing can be done in Europe this year, let us concentrate on dealing with Japan. This will unify the opinions of the U.S. Army and Navy, and bring Marshall and Admiral King into step.On July 15, the day when the House of Commons debated the vote of no confidence, Auchinleck's battle to defend Cairo was at a critical juncture, and that day was also a very tense day for the White House.We have heard that the Chiefs of Staff of the United States Armed Forces have a feeling that they have to choose between the two, and that the President said that it is almost tantamount to doing what they like.The meaning of these plain language, of course, refers to: If Britain is unwilling or unable to carry out the Bash War Plan in 1942, we will leave the European theater and concentrate our forces on Japan.This, the president said, was effectively giving up the war in Europe.As for whether General Marshall and Admiral King had such thoughts, there is no evidence yet.But there is such a strong feeling among the powerful second-rate American staffs.The president resisted and dismissed such dangerous intellectual tendencies. His second belief was that the U.S. Army must fight the Germans in 1942. So where else could it fight but in French North Africa?Mr. Stimson said: This is the conclusion that the situation of the war made him secretly draw.It is ruthless that the points of the argument and the intentions of the President should boil down to such conclusions.It was to obtain such a decision that I visited Washington three weeks ago.But the fall of Tobruk, the tumult of domestic politics, and the undoubted loss of the prestige of the country which I represented as a result of this calamity, prevented me from obtaining a satisfactory result. Even so, some serious problems must still be addressed.At that time, I was convinced that the clarification and unification of our opinions would definitely lead to good results. On Saturday, July 18th, our American guests disembarked at Prestwich to take the train to London.They immediately consulted with the chiefs of the U.S. armed forces stationed in the capital: Eisenhower, Clark, Stark, and Spaatz.Debate over thrashing plans has resumed.The opinion of U.S. leaders remains strongly in favor of conducting this combat operation.Only the President himself seemed moved by my arguments.He drafted for the delegation the most powerful and concise war policy document I have ever seen written by him. 【１】 [1] Robert Sherwood; Roosevelt and Hopkins, 603 | 605. Memorandum to the Honorable Hopkins, General Marshall and Admiral King Concerning the London Conference, July, 1942 July 16, 1942 You are about to go to London as my personal representative to confer with the proper British authorities how to conduct the war. 2. The changes in army and naval strategy since Mr. Churchill's visit to Washington are so great that Britain and we need to come to an immediate agreement on a common plan of operations along these two lines: (1) A definite plan for the remainder of 1942. (2) Applicable to the 1943 Trial Scheme.This plan will of course be changed due to the impact of the events that occurred in 1942, but it is time, in 1942, to start the preparations for the 1943 action plan. Three ‧ (1) The common purpose of the united countries must be to defeat the Axis countries.On this point, there must be no compromise. (2) We should use our strength in a concentrated manner and avoid dispersion. (3) The British and American forces must be fully unified. (4) The existing American and British forces should be put into action as soon as they can be effectively employed. (5) Most importantly, in 1942, US ground forces were deployed to fight the enemy. 4. The material assistance promised by Britain and the United States to Russia must be delivered in full.If the Persian transport line is used, priority should be given to transporting combat supplies.Such assistance must continue as long as the transport is unimpeded; the continuation of the Russian resistance must be encouraged.This decision should only be reversed on our part, which seems inconceivable in the context of the complete collapse of Russia. 5. You are to investigate carefully the possibility of carrying out the bashing program in 1942.Such a campaign will definitely give Russia a lot of support this year.Since the thrashing plan is so important, there is every reason to promote it.You should do your best to hurry up the preparations and give a big push to the completion of this plan, which should be carried out regardless of whether the collapse of Russia is imminent or not.If Russia were to collapse, a bashing plan would not only be appropriate but necessary.The main goal of the Bash program was to actually move the Luftwaffe away from the Russian front. 6. If you really believe that the bashing plan cannot be carried out because there has not been a proper opportunity to achieve its intended purpose, please notify me immediately. 7. If the bashing plan is finally determined to be an untenable plan, I ask you to determine other locations where the U.S. military fought in 1942 after studying the world situation at that time. My current view of the world war situation is as follows: (1) If Russia contained a large number of German troops and the plan of encirclement and annihilation operations became possible in 1943, this plan should be considered immediately and preparations should be made. (2) Had Russia collapsed and the Luftwaffe and ground forces had been withdrawn from Russia, the encirclement and annihilation program would have been impossible in 1943. 8. Regardless of whether Russia collapses or not, it should try to hold its ground in the Middle East as much as possible.I want you to consider losing influence in the Middle East.Once the Middle East is lost, a sequence of events ensues: (1) Loss of Egypt and the Suez Canal. (2) Loss of Syria. (3) Loss of Mosul oil wells. (4) The Persian Gulf is lost due to attacks from the north and the west, and the road to the oil fields in the Persian Gulf will also be lost. (5) Germany and Japan join forces, and the Indian Ocean may be lost. (6) The German army is likely to occupy Tunisia, Algiers, Morocco, Dakar, and cut off the sea route from Freetown to Liberia. (7) All shipping in the South Atlantic would be in grave danger, and Brazil and the whole east coast of South America would also be in grave danger.In addition, the German army may also use Spain, Portugal and their territories. (8) You should decide the proper way to keep the Middle East.These methods should explicitly include one or both of the following: (a) Send aid and ground troops to the Persian Gulf, Syria, and Egypt. (b) A new campaign in Morocco and Algiers aimed at outflanking the rear of Rommel's forces.The attitude of the French colonial army remains unclear. 9. I do not agree with the view that the United States has devoted all its power to the Pacific Ocean in order to cause Japan to collapse as soon as possible.Above all, we should realize that the collapse of Japan would not lead to the collapse of Germany; moreover, the concentration of American forces on Japan this year or in 1943 would increase Germany's chances of complete control of Europe and Africa.On the other hand, our defeat or containment of the German Army in 1942 or 1943 clearly meant the possibility of the final collapse of Germany in Europe, Africa and the Near East.The collapse of Germany means that we may be able to collapse Japan without firing a single bomb and without losing a life. 10. Please remember three main principles to quickly determine the plan; unify the plan; combine offense and defense instead of pure defense.These all affected the immediate objectives of the US ground forces fighting against the Germans in 1942. 11. I hope that all agreements will be concluded within a week of your arrival in the UK. Commander-in-Chief Franklin D. Roosevelt the same evening, I held a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff at Checkers.The main content of the meeting is as follows: This discussion showed that there was complete agreement between the Prime Minister on the one hand and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Services on the other. With regard to operations in 1942, the only possible option seemed to be that of the Sportsman.It would be extremely advantageous for us to land first in North Africa and gain a foothold there as easily as the Germans took Norway. The sportsman battle plan is actually the right wing of our second battle.It was not enough for the US military to occupy Casablanca and its vicinity.Combat operations needed to be extended to Algiers, Oran, and further to the east.If the U.S. Army cannot provide troops for each of these operations, we can use British troops to support operations further east with a small contingent of U.S. troops.In addition to providing naval forces for the escort of Polile, the United States may no longer be able to provide all the navy it needs for the sportsman plan.If so, we should try to help. I understand, of course, that we still have to work with the American military leaders now assembled in London to convince them that our views are the only ones that actually work.Hopkins came to Checkers for the weekend, and we discussed our differences informally. On the morning of Monday, July 20, we held our first meeting in the Cabinet Office with the representatives of the United States. I briefly touched on the position of the British Government, and this statement is on the record. Highlights of the Prime Minister's Speech at the Meeting of 20th July 1942 It is not my intention this morning to comment on the merits and demerits of the various important proposals before us, but to examine the general situation and to suggest the most appropriate method and procedure for the meeting.We must make decisions, and although these decisions will affect the entire future war situation, there is no reason for us to delay making decisions. The first problem is bashing the battle plan.Should we implement this plan?At this point, another pressing question arises: In what form should this plan be implemented?Our guests may be thinking of one thing while we are already working on another.If we cannot work out a satisfactory plan ourselves, we should follow the plans of the United States with the utmost sincerity and concern.Most importantly, no one comes to the discussion with a preconceived notion of pro or con for any particular plan.Of course, consideration must be given not only to whether a certain task can be carried out, but also whether, at the present time, the result of doing so is a favorable use of our resources. We must discuss the impact of the implementation of the bashing plan on the future of the encirclement and annihilation plan.In order to carry out the encirclement and annihilation plan, all preparations for the Bolile plan are currently underway.We warmly approve of the encirclement and annihilation plan.Speaking of this, we have to figure out what is the content of the encirclement and suppression?Must it be limited to attacking the west coast of France?Does the concept of a second front have to be limited within these limits?Can it be expanded to a wider range, and is it beneficial?We tend to think that the thrashing plan may delay or even hinder the implementation of the encirclement and annihilation plan.On the other hand, it may be argued that the fate of the campaign of encirclement and extermination depends not so much on our actions as on the development of the situation in Russia. The basis on which we have discussed thrashing operations so far has been the assumption of Russian victory or defeat.But more likely, we'll be facing something in between.The Russian war may remain unresolved for a long time; or the outcome is unpredictable, and the Russian front will still exist, but it will only move a little further east. If the bashing plan is cancelled, what will we do before the campaign of encirclement and annihilation?Or, what should we do if the perception is that canceling the Bash program would undermine the Encirclement Program? Now let me talk about the second question, which is the sportsman plan.We should certainly examine the program in its various forms and from all angles.Perhaps the German army would not wait indefinitely before occupying Northwest Africa and drawing Spain and Portugal into its system.The Germans were not yet in a position to attack England, as they still had to deal with Russia, but they might easily acquire sufficient strength to invade Britain.We must face up to the possibility of German occupation of the coasts of North and West Africa.If this happens, what a serious disadvantage it will be! The battle which was raging in Egypt at this time had a great influence on the viability of the sportsman's plan.Had General Auchinleck been victorious, he might have pushed west quickly.Acrobatics at that time, the plan may be expected to be carried out, and action may also be taken against Sicily and Italy, and at the same time it may be possible to regain air superiority over the southern Mediterranean, so that the loss of shipping there may be avoided altogether. Our defense now has a big hole.The eastern Mediterranean and the Caspian Sea are now almost completely defenseless.If General Auchinleck had won the Battle of Egypt, we would undoubtedly be able to build up a force of about eight divisions, which, together with the trained four Polish divisions, would be able to effectively block the southward advance of the German army.However, if General Auchinleck cannot drive the enemy far from Egypt, or if the enemy has been driven and pursued within the area planned by the Acrobatics, the only way to defend the main area south of the Caspian Sea is to troops in southern Russia.It is hard to say what their own future will be.But it's too early to say they're going to collapse.Even in the worst case scenario, they would effectively retreat through the Caucasus and hold the Caucasus Mountains in winter, while possibly maintaining command of the Caspian Sea with the assistance of our Air Force.This force is a mighty fortress.They alone are our fortress at present. There is also a brief discussion about the Anajim plan (the campaign in Burma) and the steps we can take to assist in operations in the Pacific theater. On the afternoon of July 22, the second meeting was held.General Marshall spoke first, saying that he and his colleagues had reached an impasse in talks with the British chiefs of staff, so they had to turn to the President for instructions. I replied that I shared the President's and his military advisers' eagerness to commit maximum force against the enemy as soon as possible.But I am convinced that, because of the limitations of our existing forces, it would be inappropriate for us to try out the bashing program in 1942.I point out the possibilities of failure we face.For example, Russia may collapse, the Germans may enter the Caucasus, or the Germans may defeat General Auchinleck and capture the Nile Delta and the Suez Canal, or the enemy may gain a foothold in North and West Africa, straining our shipping to an almost impossible level.Nevertheless, differences of opinion between Britain and the United States would have more serious consequences than any of the above-mentioned possibilities.I therefore agree that the Chiefs of Staff of the United States Armed Forces should report to the President that the British are not prepared to undertake a bashing program and ask him for instructions on how to resolve this problem. President Roosevelt called back immediately, saying he was not surprised that the London talks had failed.He agreed that, in the face of British objections, there was no need to continue to demand the implementation of the Bash Plan, and directed his delegation to come to a resolution with us concerning the participation of the United States Army in a certain campaign against the enemy in 1942. The bashing project was shelved, and the sportsman project was given the attention it deserved.Although Marshall and King could not help but be a little disappointed, they also obeyed the decision of their commander-in-chief, and the atmosphere of friendship between us was full again. I'm in a hurry now to come up with a new name for my favorite sportsman project. Athletic, Ultra-Athlete, Semi-Athlete, etc. have been eliminated from our code names.In my instructions to the Chiefs of Staff of the 24th of July I used the name of the new ingenious Torch.On July 25, the President sent a telegram to Hopkins, pointing out that the plan to land in North Africa no later than October 30 should begin preparations immediately.That night our friends set off for Washington. My military and political colleagues and I have considered the opinions for a long time, and in this way we have obtained everyone's consent and made a decision.我為此感到十分愉快，特別是因為此事發生在看來是最黑暗的時刻。我希望執行的各項計劃，除了一項以外，都被採納了。這一項沒有得到通過的計劃是丘比特作戰計劃（進攻挪威），但它的價值是無可爭議的。 我並沒有放棄這項計劃，但是，後來我也沒有搞成這項計劃。 過去幾個月來，我所追求的是取消痛擊作戰計劃，而代之以進攻北非和進行丘比特作戰計劃。丘比特計劃夭折了。 但是，我感到滿意的東西是夠多的。 former navy personnel to president roosevelt 一九四二年七月二十七日 我確信，你和我以及我們這裡的全體人員一樣，對這緊張的一周間的成就感到快慰。除了對於作戰行動取得完全一致的意見以外，我們高級官員之間的熱誠親切的關係和戰友情誼也得到進一步的加強。如果沒有哈里的寶貴的援助，我懷疑能獲得成功。 二‧我們必須在今年建立第二戰場，並且盡早發動進攻。 我認為這個第二戰場包含著一支把敵軍拴在痛擊計劃地區對面的主力和一個稱為火炬（以前稱為體育家）的廣泛側擊行動。現在既然所有事情都已作出決定，我們可以照你所說，開足馬力向前進了。一切全靠保守秘密和迅速行動，全靠具有一個井然有序的軍事的行動計劃。必須分秒必爭，我同意你的意見，應該以十月三十日為最遲的日期。 三‧要保守秘密，唯一辦法在於誑敵。為此目的，我正在進行丘比特計劃，同時我們還必須大力進行痛擊計劃。這些將掩護在聯合王國的一切軍事行動。當你們的軍隊開始實行火炬計劃時，機密機關以外的人都會相信，它們是開往蘇伊士運河或巴士拉，以此來說明它們所配備的熱帶裝備。這裡的加拿大軍隊將配備北極用的裝備。如此就能使敵軍直到最後還是弄不清我們的意圖。 四‧與此同時，我希望波利樂的準備工作仍全力進行，只有火炬計劃才能對波利樂給予必要的衝擊，而這種衝擊也只是推遲一段時間而已。這樣一來，我們就能左右開弓或雙管齊下地進行攻擊。 所有專家們在我們雙方向往已久的計劃方面取得了完全一致的意見，總統和我一樣對此感到欣慰。 President Roosevelt to Prime Minister 一九四二年七月二十八日 三劍客【１】已於今日下午平安到達，婚禮【２】仍照原定日期舉行。我對所取得的結果，尤其對這次成功地交心會談，自然感到十分快慰。我不禁感到，過去一周是整個戰爭時代的一個轉折點，而且，現在我們已在並肩前進。我同意你的看法，保密和迅速行動是十分重要的，而且我希望十月的日期能夠提前。關於按船舶噸位和按聯合王國進口糧食和原料等情況來計算給養和裝備多少的問題，我將與馬歇爾商談。我還將冬一切力量使俄國南部側翼得到空軍增援。我也認為此事完全應該辦到。 【１】指羅斯福的代表霍普金斯、馬歇爾、金三人。translator 【２】指英美共同執行經過同意的計劃。translator 現在必須決定司令官的人選。 迪爾元帥致首相 一九四二年七月三十日 我要敦促你立時與總統商定指揮官問題。我自己認為馬歇爾是恰當的人選，而且也相信他是會接受這個職位的。同樣清楚的是，現在這裡離不開他；但是，艾森豪威爾完全可以代行他的權力。總統還未和馬歇爾談到這個問題。這或許因為總統怕他離開；但是艾森豪威爾擔任他的副手的想法是會受到歡迎的。 如果這一點得到同意，那麼艾森豪威爾將能團結他的聯合參謀人員，使他們真正發揮作用。在此過程中，如果艾森豪威爾把痛擊計劃的設計和準備工作委託給別人主持（顯然要委託給一個英國人），而使他自己和自己的參謀人員除了對痛擊計劃實行總的監督之外，能分身出來完全集中力量於應付火炬計劃，這樣做就非常明智。當然，火炬現在比什麼都重要，它需要有許多具體的計劃，以及分配力量、分配任務和進行訓練等等。從現在到戰役開始，要緊張地工作；戰役愈早開始，顯然就更為有利。 我對你使這些困難的談判得到如此成功的結果，實在敬佩。我希望能在下周初到達倫敦，得便時我極願去拜訪你。 我致電總統，談了司令官的人選問題。 former navy personnel to president roosevelt 一九四二年七月三十一日 我迫切希望波利樂、痛擊、圍殲和火炬計劃的司令官人選早日作出決定。（這裡指的是波利樂、痛擊和圍殲等一組計劃和火炬計劃。）如果馬歇爾將軍能被任命為圍殲計劃的最高統帥，而且同時艾森豪威爾將軍能在這裡擔任他的副手，這是我們最為高興的。我們首先要任命亞歷山大將軍為特遣部隊司令，在艾森豪威爾將軍領導之下同他一道工作。這兩人要為火炬計劃工作，艾森豪威爾將軍暫時還要監督波利樂｜痛擊計劃的執行。這樣，他就能為火炬計劃調集各種必要的力量，而不致使波利樂和圍殲計劃蒙受損失。一俟火炬計劃準備就緒，他就要指揮這次戰役，而以亞歷山大和一位美國司令官任這兩支特遣部隊的司令，他們分別從聯合王國和美國出發到任。當特遣部隊開始執行任務時，假如你任命馬歇爾將軍或其他人員作為代理人執行波利樂、痛擊和圍殲計劃的工作，我們當感到高興。我們也願派給他一位助手。 二‧此事宜速進行，因為委員會著實太多，而行動遲遲。 假若你另有安排，請讓我了解你的意向。 迪爾元帥致首相 一九四二年八月一日 總統已去海德公園作短期休息，但在動身前發出命令，要求盡早全力進行火炬計劃。他要求參謀長聯席會議在八月四日告訴他能夠登陸的最早日期。美方把兵力抽到太平洋的危險也許仍然存在，但總統對這一點是完全慎重的。 二‧美國人認為，由於接受火炬計劃，已取消了一九四三年的圍殲計劃。對於這一點，我們無需進行爭辯。我們現在所需要的是專心致志於火炬計劃。我可以斷定，假如總統願意，他會同意馬歇爾擔任指揮的；而且無需在事前為他保留圍殲作戰計劃最高司令的職位，雖然你在七月三十一日致總統的電文中這樣說過。 三‧祝你的各項工作獲得與你的勇氣和抱負相稱的成績。 這份電報是我在子夜時於萊納姆機場收到的。我將要從那裡出發旅行，這次旅行的原由和經過且待下章分解。