Chapter 187 Volume 5, Chapter 32, Strategies for Fighting Against Japan

The choice we face Memorandum I wrote on January 24, 1944 Admiral Mountbatten's delegation arrives in England New plan American dissent A powerful Japanese fleet sails to Singapore It thwarts the amphibious Plan of Operations We have lost our local naval superiority My telegram to President Roosevelt on March 10 President Roosevelt's reply I made a decision to the British Chiefs of Staff on March 20 on an intermediate strategy. While the decisive land and air battles described in the previous chapter were being fought fiercely in Burma and the Pacific Ocean, we were in London, the Americans in Washington, and between London and Washington, discussing the overall strategy for the future war against Japan.I have already mentioned the report of the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Cairo meeting on the long-term strategy of the Pacific War, the role of Britain in this war, and the fact that President Roosevelt and I signed the report, but because of Busy, haven't done research yet, haven't discussed it together, or with our advisors.I did not realize how much the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff had changed until I received a request at Marrakech to send a telegram on the subject to the Dominions.I immediately felt that I could not agree with them, and thus the only major disagreement arose between me and the War Cabinet and our trusted military colleagues.

In short, we are faced with the following choice: Should we send our Navy and any Army or Air Force we can draw or ship out, based in Australia, in conjunction with the left flank of US forces in the Southwest Pacific? Our Chiefs of Staff thought we should, and on this point they had no trouble reaching an agreement with their American counterparts at the Cairo Conference. On the other hand, my colleagues and I argued that we should use India as a base to push eastward into the Malaya Peninsula and the Dutch Archipelago.The Chiefs of Staff believed that since Mountbatten could not conduct a major amphibious operation within six months of Germany's defeat, we could carry out their plans for reinforcements in the Pacific well ahead of schedule, as they considered our commitment to the plan responsible.

Immediately after my return, a meeting of the National Defense Committee was called, at which, for the first time, the whole question was seriously studied and thoroughly discussed. A few days later, I wrote the following memo: Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee January 24, 1944 All my cabinet colleagues at the Nineteenth meeting raised strong objections when they spoke to me about the plan that the planners had explained in detail at the meeting.I myself do not agree with these plans.This issue must be debated between the two countries. In addition, it should be noted that this plan is quite different from the one explained to us by General MacArthur's Chief of Staff, so that apparently even the Americans themselves are very much at odds.

2. No one will object to sending a few ships with the American fleet to some campaign they may be planning in June, and we should certainly be ready to form a fleet in the Pacific at any time.However, we cannot regard any operational plan for the Pacific theater as capable of providing us with a place to use our large army and air force stationed in India and around the Bay of Bengal before we defeated Hitler in 1944-45 years. Planning is desirable. 3. For these forces, the only place where effective operations can be conducted is Sumatra (ie, the long artillery operation plan).I have long been convinced that this is a very practical solution, as it can attract a large number of Japanese aircraft, and possibly a large Japanese army; or, on the other hand, it can also recover important territories and We have acquired bases, and starting from these places, we can strike the enemy equally whether in Singapore, Bangkok, the Strait of Malacca, or on the communication lines from Japan to Burma.My colleagues and I agree that this is where we should focus our efforts, while we also make it clear to the Americans that if we assist them in the Pacific (which is what we do), then we expect them to provide We have a certain number of landing craft to help us attack Sumatra in October, November or December.They've built a ton of new LTCs and will continue to build them throughout this year, so it's something they can do.

4. We must wait for the arrival of officers from Admiral Mountbatten, and discuss the matter with them at length; at least we cannot send telegrams to the Dominions until we have formed our own opinion. Mountbatten's delegation, led by his US deputy chief of staff, the able General Wedemeyer, arrived in mid-February 1944.Mountbatten believed that the United States' plan to build a direct two-lane highway between North Assam and China could not be completed before June 1946.He therefore suggested abandoning the plan and instead strengthening the existing air access.If he adopted this suggestion, he would not need to capture large swathes of northern Burma.He hoped to use the freed up force to break through the enemy-occupied area of ​​Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, and to advance quickly to the northeast along the coast of the Asian mainland island by island.This would open up better lines of communication to China at sea, and at the same time directly support the U.S. advance from the Central Pacific and New Guinea to Japan.For this purpose, the capture of Sumatra would first be required, he suggested, as soon as the amphibious forces were freed from northwestern Europe.

Therefore, the long artillery battle plan was brought up again on the agenda. This strategy, however, runs counter to the recommendations agreed upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Cairo meeting.Our differences on long-term policy were directly and concretely expressed on this question of strategy.I have long advocated the Sumatra plan, so I appreciate Mountbatten's new plan.I still think that too many troops were considered necessary for the Sumatra scheme, but if, as Mountbatten suggested, for the troops in the Burmese Land War.Also more than needed. However, I also do not advocate sending these troops to take up secondary tasks in MacArthur's campaign.On this point, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs fully supports me. They believe that in the Far East, Britain should not only play a supporting role for the Americans; I am afraid that this is difficult for the British people to accept. Much less interesting than the vast areas of great significance to them.In contrast, the strategy proposed by Southeast Asia Command had immediate psychological and political implications that could hasten Japan's collapse.

I'm sure Americans must think differently than we do.I was therefore not surprised to see the following passage in President Roosevelt's telegram of January 25, 1944: I am deeply disturbed by the recent tendency in strategy to favor future action on Sumatra and Malaya rather than confronting the immediate difficulties we face in Burma.It is difficult for me to understand how the Sumatra and Malayan campaigns, which required enormous resources and forces, could be fought before the war in Europe was over.While the long artillery plan may be of great benefit if successful, it appears to be far more rewarding if all the resources we now have are devoted to a general offensive against northern Burma; Raise air power to ensure that we get the necessary support when we advance to the Taiwan | China | Luzon area in the west.

This perception bodes ill for Wedemeyer's mission.They met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington in March, but they were not the first to do business.The commanders-in-chief of Admiral Mountbatten's department fully supported the plan he proposed, but his deputy, General Stilwell of the United States, was not the same.This was understandable, since Stilwell held several other positions, notably as Chiang Kai-shek's chief of staff.The arrangement made by the Americans was not very appropriate, but we had no choice but to accept it at the time.Stilwell was always in favor of all measures that might appear to be favorable to China, and believed that the date of realization of overland supplies might be earlier than expected by the Southeast Asian command.He has the right to urge Admiral Mountbatten to accept his views, and if he is not adopted, he can submit them to his superiors in Washington with Mountbatten's consent. Moreover, he has sent a representative without Mountbatten's back The regiment went to Washington to make his case.

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff have recently decided that although General MacArthur should continue to attack the Philippines, Admiral Nimitz should launch the main offensive on Taiwan from the Central Pacific.Therefore, they believed that the strategic value of liberating Malaya and the Dutch East Indies was small and protracted.They saw no need to attack Sumatra.They are still preoccupied with airlifting more supplies over the Hump to China and building the Burma Road.They also had a new plan to establish a long-range bomber base in China to attack Japan, which required more tons of supplies than before.Wedemeyer defended Mountbatten's proposal tactfully, but he failed to convince his audience and superiors.

However, at this time, an extremely important event happened unexpectedly.A powerful Japanese fleet, including seven battleships, sailed from the Central Pacific to Singapore, but its purpose was unclear.We now know that it was on the one hand to temporarily avoid American air strikes, and on the other hand, it was also to get closer to their oil supply stations in the Dutch East Indies.Still, there is a possibility that they could storm the Bay of Bengal, and because of this possibility, plans for long artillery or other amphibious operations in the Indian Ocean are temporarily put on hold.We even lost our naval superiority there.I saw this unpleasant fact at once.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee March 7, 1944 The Sumatra plan was formulated on the assumption that the Japanese main fleet would not field a reasonably strong squadron.Of course, this is purely an assumption based on how the enemy behaves reasonably, but no one can guarantee that the enemy will do unreasonable things.However, at the time of planning, it was generally believed that the Japanese were concerned with defending Truk and Rabaul and other outposts from American attack and enabling themselves to engage in a fleet battle at any time.If they had intended to do so, they had now given up; they had retreated from their outposts and had now deployed the defensive position of their fleet, which included the stationing of some powerful ships at Singapore. And as long as this fleet is in this area, it is clear that we cannot attack Sumatra, or anything like that, unless we build up our naval power to such a degree that we can welcome a fleet battle.It is very beneficial to the United States to contain Japan in Singapore.The longer Japan remained there, the greater was Admiral Nimitz's freedom of movement and the faster he could move forward. How long the Japanese fleet can stay in Singapore depends on the situation of the United States moving forward.It seemed certain that the Japanese would regroup their fleet, after which they would again need to consider a major battle for the defense of the Philippines or points closer to home.If the Japanese evacuated Singapore, whether they would return there can only be estimated according to the situation at the time.The longer we keep Japan in Singapore, the more support we give America.This will be accomplished by continuing preparations for a massive amphibious assault should the Japanese fleet be forced to muster its ships and withdraw to the Pacific due to the main American attack. 2. Be sure to submit this memorandum to the Joint Program Office. Meanwhile, we had lengthy and sometimes tense discussions with our chiefs of staff.The policy of assisting General MacArthur or Admiral Nimitz will depend on how many troops we can keep on Australian bases, and on the east or northwest coast.We do not have sufficient information and it appears that further investigation is required.Enforcing this policy will obviously put a lot of pressure on our shipping.During March, a stalemate seemed to develop within ourselves.The Chiefs of Staff believed that the Americans were expecting us to send a fleet to the Pacific for a possible June campaign.Therefore, I felt the need to clarify this with President Roosevelt and tell him the whole situation. prime minister to president roosevelt March 10, 1944 In the final report of the Cairo meeting, the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that they approved in principle a comprehensive plan to defeat Japan, and believed that further investigation and preparation could be made based on this plan.The plan was to send a detachment of the British Fleet to the Pacific, which was tentatively scheduled to enter combat in the Pacific in June 1944.Although you and I have signed this report, neither of us has had the opportunity to examine these issues for ourselves because we are busy with more pressing business.Since the report was made, the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff have been investigating, but we have not been able to reach a unified conclusion.During this period, the Japanese fleet sailed to Singapore, which seems to me a new major event. 2. After the surrender of the Italian fleet in September 1943, I was eager to send a detachment of our fleet to the Pacific as soon as possible, but when I confided this idea to Admiral King, he explained to me, How stronger the U.S. Navy in this sea area is than the Japanese Navy.The impression I got was that he didn't really need us.I have also seen several telegrams from our naval representatives in Washington, which confirm this impression.On the other hand, I have heard that Admiral King has informed the First Sea Lord that he would be very willing to accept our squadron, but that it would be better not to arrive before August or September, because in August or September , the logistical needs are easier to meet.As a result, I doubt whether we are really needed within this year. 3. Therefore, I implore you to tell me whether the United States is prepared to: (1) Before the end of 1944, (2) Before the summer of 1945, some kind of campaign in the Pacific would be affected or impossible without the participation of the British Fleet detachment. 4. On the other hand, the transfer of the Japanese fleet to Singapore just at the very time (of course coincident with other circumstances) when they learned that our battle fleet was sailing to the Indian Ocean seems to indicate that they are very concerned about the Andaman Islands, the Nicobar Islands Be wary of Sumatra.It would certainly be to your advantage if we could maintain a menacing posture in the Bay of Bengal, thereby holding the Japanese fleet, or a substantial part of it, at Singapore, clearing the Pacific theater for you, and enabling you to weave and advance at full speed . V. General Wedemeyer was able to make clear all of Mountbatten's plans for the Indian battlefield and the Bay of Bengal.It seems that these plans must be able to meet Chiang Kai-shek's requirements, and you support these requirements, but we cannot meet them before the rainy season due to the Mediterranean Sea and the Battle of Bawang.I still personally believe that an amphibious operation across the Bay of Bengal would allow all our forces and installations in India to maximize their usefulness in the war against Japan over the next eighteen months.We are carefully reviewing our logistics.According to preliminary estimates, if we had attacked the islands across the Bay of Bengal and then attacked the Malayan Peninsula, instead of extending the transportation line by about nine thousand miles, round the southern tip of Australia, and starting from the Pacific Ocean to fight on your southern flank, our attack would be better. Strength can be increased to two or three times.Also, there is objection to dividing our fleet and forces between the Pacific and Indian Oceans; so that many of our existing strongholds, from Calcutta to Ceylon, and as far as the Suez Canal area, would be disjointed. 6. But before I make a final decision on this matter in my mind, I should be very interested to know your answer to the question I posed at the third stage above, which is: If at least for the present, while the Japanese fleet is still in Singapore , we keep our focus on the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal, and plan to conduct amphibious operations there once the resources are available. Does this affect your Pacific operations? President Roosevelt gave a clear answer to my direct question. President Roosevelt to Prime Minister March 13, 1944 (1) In 1944 there will be no special battles in the Pacific that would be adversely affected by the future participation of the British squadron. (2) At the present stage, it is impossible to accurately predict the future development of the situation in the Pacific Ocean, so it cannot be asserted that the British squadron will definitely not need to participate in the battle here in 1945, but judging from the current situation, it seems that the Such reinforcements were not needed before the summer of 1945. In view of the enemy's recent deployments, it is my personal opinion that unless we meet unexpected doom in the Pacific, your Navy is more valuable to our common fight in the Indian Ocean if it remains in the Indian Ocean. All of the above opinions are estimates based on current conditions and should therefore change if circumstances change. In this way, I have strong support in dealing with my cabinet colleagues and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Services; I feel it is my responsibility to reach a verdict.This time, I wrote to each of the chiefs of staff individually, rather than giving them collective notice as a committee. Prime Minister to First Sea Lord, Chief of the Reich General Staff and Chief of the Air Staff March 20, 1944 I have sent the attached memorandum to each of the Chiefs of Staff. 1. The question I posed and President Roosevelt's reply was directed to the point whether we were under some obligation to the American authorities to send a detachment of the British Fleet before the summer of 1945 to Pacific, and whether their operations would be affected by our absence. We now know that we have no such obligation, that their operations will not be affected, and that they will not need our help until the summer of 1945 (barring a major accident).Therefore, we are completely free to consider this issue on our own, purely in the interest of the United Kingdom. 3. The reluctance of the Chiefs of Staff to hold talks with their American colleagues for fear of disclosing their differences with me and my Cabinet colleagues in front of the Americans makes me feel the seriousness of the situation.The Ministers in the Defense Committee were convinced, and I do think, that if the question were brought to the War Cabinet they would agree that it was in any case in the British interest to pursue the so-called Bay of Bengal strategy for the next twelve months.It is therefore my responsibility, as Prime Minister and Secretary of Defense, to make the following decisions: (1) Barring unforeseen events, from now until the summer of 1945, the Indian battlefield and the Bay of Bengal will be the focus of Great Britain and the British Empire's operations against Japan. (2) All preparations are made for amphibious operations across the Bay of Bengal against the Malaya Peninsula and the outpost islands defending it, with the ultimate aim of retaking Singapore. (3) Assembling a strong British fleet based in the ports of Ceylon, Addu, and the East Indies, and covered by powerful shore-based aircraft.The auxiliary ships of the Eastern Fleet must be organized as soon as possible, but this organizational work must be subject to the Overlord Operation Plan and the priority needs of Mediterranean operations, and must not affect the basic supply of food to the country according to the current ration. (4) Study, revise and improve the Southeast Asia Command's amphibious operation plan across the Bay of Bengal, in order to engage the enemy in hand-to-hand combat as soon as possible. (5) After I approve the list of members of the investigation mission to Australia, the investigation mission shall depart immediately.They should report as soon as possible on the existing installations in Australia and the recovered islands to the north, and propose specific measures so that we can send the Eastern Fleet and its auxiliary ships and all necessary supplementary ships to the Southwest at any time according to our wishes. Pacific Ocean, and berthed in Australian ports. 4. I would very much like to discuss the above decision with the Chiefs of Staff of the three services, so that when we discuss it with our American friends, we can have an idea of ​​the course we are going to take.At the same time, with these differences concerning long-term plans resolved, we can devote ourselves to the great and urgent work which is now imminent and which requires genuine comradeship and full mutual confidence among us. However, the situation has changed so rapidly that I think it is better not to make a final decision.So we moved on to work on other plans.Since our advance across the Bay of Bengal might be stopped by the Japanese fleet, and since we were incapable of conducting a large-scale amphibious operation in the East within six months of our victory over Germany, a middle course was considered, which (in our case Among a group of people, it is called the middle strategy) is to advance northward from Australia, help General MacArthur liberate Borneo, and then attack Singapore and Malaya, or Hong Kong and the coastal areas of China.The specific method is to organize an Anglo-Australian force under the command of an Australian commander subordinate to MacArthur. This strategy obviously has many disadvantages.An intermediate strategy was of little help to the American campaign in the Central Pacific.Had their plans gone well, we would have arrived in Borneo too late to take part in the attack on Hong Kong, and thus we might have been excluded from the main battle in the Pacific in which we had been determined to take part.The Australians welcomed the establishment of an Imperial Command, which would alleviate the absolute American dominance throughout the region, but the bases on Australia's east coast were all occupied by the Americans.If bases were to be realigned to meet British needs, confusion might arise.In addition, our route to Australia is much longer than to India, which will put a heavy pressure on our shipping. At the time these difficult questions, for the most part, remained unanswered, but they were raised at the meeting of the Dominion Chancellors in London on May 1st.The Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand, convinced that we did not want to add to their national contribution to the war, declared their endorsement of an intermediate strategy.They also agreed to raise troops and most of the aircraft.This proposal gave the dominions a favorable opportunity to contribute, but in the end none of these plans came to fruition.Events rapidly and fundamentally changed the situation at the time of the Cairo Conference, or in the months following it, or could have been foreseen at that time; , I never dreamed of it.