Military leaders of all world renown agree that the study of military history of the past, as this work does, is crucial to correcting the guiding ideology of warfare and helping to create deft strategic and tactical operations. To a great extent, if not all, we can regard the history of sea power as one of rivalry between nations, mutual enmity, and the kind of violence that frequently culminates in the course of war. narrative.The far-reaching influence of maritime commerce on the wealth and power of nations was discerned long before the true principles which guided their growth and prosperity were known to all.In order for the population of the country to gain more than its usual share, it is necessary to do everything possible to exclude other competitors: either by means of peaceful legislation of monopolies or coercive regulations, or, where these means fail, by resorting to direct violence .

Conflicts of interest, and outrage over competing attempts to carve up, if not all, the greater commercial interests and distant commercial territories to which no one belongs will surely lead to a bloody battle.On the other hand, the strife of other causes has been radically altered in its manner and nature according to whether or not the seas are controlled.The history of sea power is, therefore, largely a military history.Its vast picture contains the secrets and grounds that make a nation that is on the verge of the sea or with the help of the sea a great nation.It is this that constitutes what we will discuss in this book primarily, if not exclusively.

Military leaders of all world renown agree that the study of military history of the past, as this work does, is crucial to correcting the guiding ideology of warfare and helping to create deft strategic and tactical operations.Napoleon pointed out the part that must be studied by ambitious soldiers in many decisive battles, such as the battles of Alexander, Hannibal and Caesar.Of course, gunpowder was unknown to them at that time.Among many professional researchers there is now a major consensus that, while the specifics of many wars have changed with the advancement of weapons and thus with the times, there are, however, certain historical Doctrines are eternal and universally applicable, and they can be raised to the level of general principles.For the same reason, although the scientific progress of the past half century has brought unprecedented changes to naval weapons and equipment, and the introduction of steam has become a source of power at sea, through the interpretation of the general principles of decisive battles at sea, reviewing the history of old sea battles Historical research will still be instructive and instructive.

It is therefore necessary to study critically the history and experience of naval warfare in the age of galleons, for, although it is not difficult to find applicable lessons and values ​​at present, the steam age navy has not yet written on its teachings which can be summarized as A history of decisive significance.On the one hand we have a great deal of experimental knowledge, on the other hand we have nothing but practical experience.Theories about the future of warfare at sea are therefore almost entirely speculative; and although there is a long and long history of similarities between the steam fleet and the single-decked galleon fleet propelled by oars, various attempts to make the Efforts have been made to give these theories a firmer basis, but until they are fully confirmed, one cannot be completely satisfied with this analogy alone.Indeed, the similarities between the two fleets were far from superficial, and the characteristic shared by both steamships and galleons was their ability to gallop freely at sea independent of the direction of the wind.This power makes a marked difference between ships of these classes and ordinary galleons, which can only cover a limited range when the sea wind blows, and when the sea wind dies, they are absolutely motionless.While it is wise to look for things that seem similar, it is also wise to look for differences.One of the most exciting aspects of the spiritual quest is when one's imagination is captivated by first perceived similarities, and one is very apt to become impatient with differences in one's newly discovered analogies, and may therefore ignore or reject them. acknowledge them.Therefore, although the development is uneven, the single deck galleon and the steam ship also have the important characteristics mentioned above, but they are different in at least two points.In revisiting the history of the single-deck galleon for lessons to be drawn on the steam fighting ship, the differences must be as firmly imprinted as the similarities, or false inferences will be made.In use, the propulsion of a single-deck galleon necessarily diminishes rapidly, since manpower alone cannot sustain such an exhausting maneuver for long, and consequently tactical maneuvers are only possible for a limited time; moreover, in a single-deck In the era of galleons, offensive weapons not only had a short range, but were almost entirely confined to hand-to-hand combat.These two conditions almost inevitably lead to a collision, however, not without some dexterous maneuvers, such as outflanking the enemy, followed by hand-to-hand combat.In such a shock and melee, a now widespread and even eminent naval opinion recognizes that the inevitable result of modern sea armament is a Donnybrook-like situation in which, as the history of sea combat shows, As shown, it can be difficult to tell friend from foe.We hold that whatever justifies the supremacy of this opinion is that single-decked galleons and steamships are capable of rushing at the enemy from any The fact that galleons differ from steamships in what respects cannot be declared a historical basis.So far, this opinion is only a hypothesis, and until further interpretation is made by actual combat experience, the final judgment based on this basis may be quite different.Only then will there be room for opposing views, viz., a combat between two fleets of equal numbers, in which the importance of tactical skill has been reduced to a minimum; Under the conditions, it is not the best choice.The more confident a naval command is, the more well trained its fleet is in the tactical arts, and the more competent its captains, the less it must necessarily be willing to engage in hand-to-hand combat with an equal number of opponents.Because, in this case, all advantages will disappear, and accidental fluke becomes the basis of decisive victory.On equal terms, its fleet will join forces with a fleet of warships that have never fought together before.History has, in sequence, a lesson in when to engage in melee and when not to.

The galleon had one striking resemblance to the steamship, but was far removed from it in other important respects, features which are not obvious and therefore seldom mentioned.As for the galleons, on the contrary, their striking features were their differences from more modern ships, and their resemblance, though present and easy to spot, was not obvious and was therefore seldom noticed.This impression is all the more impressive by knowing the sheer weakness of the galleon compared with the steamship, since it must depend on the wind.Forget this point, just like fighting against an equal opponent before, the tactical lesson will be able to hold water.Single-deck galleons have never been reduced to the point of being useless in calm wind conditions, but are more reused than galleons today.However, this is a bit misplaced.Until the steam engine was developed and exploited, the galleon reigned supreme, capable of inflicting damage on the enemy from great distances, capable of manoeuvring for an infinite period of time without exhausting the crew, and employing a larger portion of the crew for offensive weapons rather than oars and so on.These capabilities, which the galleon shared with the steamship, were at least as important from tactical considerations as the ability of the single-decked galleon to advance in calm or against a wind.

In looking for similarities, there is a tendency not only to ignore differences but to exaggerate similarities, which is somewhat comical.Perhaps it can be pointed out based on the following considerations that since galleons are equipped with far-end cannons, which have relatively strong penetrating power; Cannon groups and torpedo groups, the latter only effective at a limited distance, then damage the opponent by impact, while the artillery, like its predecessors, aims at penetrating the opponent.However, there are obvious tactical considerations here that necessarily affect the combat deployments of naval commanders and captains; the analogy is realistic, not invented.Thus galleons and steamships are used in direct engagement with an enemy ship when the former drags her by forcing her approach, while the latter rams her to the belly of the fish.However, this is their most difficult task for both, and in order to be effective, the enemy ship must be brought to a single point in the area of ​​attack operations where projectile weapons can be fired from a wide Find use at many points within the region.

The relative position of two galleons, or fleets, because of the direction of the wind, involved very important tactical issues, and was perhaps the main concern of the sailors of that era.At first glance, the lessons of history in this respect are therefore worthless, since this has become such an insignificant thing to steamships that there is no longer any analogue to it under the conditions of the present age.But a careful consideration of the salient features of the lee and the state of the climate, dealing directly with their essential features and ignoring minor details, will show this perception to be a mistake.The distinguishing feature of relative position in a given sea state is that it gives a party the power to initiate or evade combat at will, with the result that, in choosing the mode of attack, there is an advantage normally associated with an offensive posture.This advantage was accompanied by certain disadvantages, such as the irregularities introduced into the ranks, the exposure to longitudinal fire, and the sacrifice of some or all of the shelling opportunities available for the attack, all of which occurred when approaching the enemy.A ship of war, or a whole fleet, once in a leeward position, cannot attack; and if it does not wish to retreat, its actions can only be confined to a defensive position, and meet the challenge on the enemy's terms.This disadvantage was, of course, compensated for by the relative ease of keeping the battle formations free from impact, and by the continual bombardment when the enemy was for a time unable to return fire.Historically, these beneficial and unfavorable features have had their counterparts and analogies in offensive and defensive operations in various periods.The attacker assumes certain risks and disadvantages in order to approach and destroy the enemy; the defender, as long as he remains the same, refuses to take the risk of advancing, and maintains a carefully organized position, enables himself to take full advantage of the attacker. Give yourself an opportunity to take advantage of.Piercing through the accompanying dark clouds of not so many details, the fundamental difference between the climate and the relative position of the lee is revealed to the world.The former is usually talked about by the British, because their sound policy is to attack and destroy the enemy's army; while the French are very fond of the leeward position, because by this technique, they can paralyze the enemy when it approaches, and thus avoid Decisive encounters, save their battleships.

The French, with few exceptions, basically put their naval warfare in the service of other military considerations and were shy about naval expenditures, so they sought to counteract their fleets by adopting a defensive posture and confining their efforts to repelling attacks. Budget carefully.For this reason, as long as the enemy's thunder is loud and the rain is small, the position relative to the leeward can be used skillfully.However, when Rodney showed his intention to take full advantage of the wind, not just for offense, but to concentrate absolute superiority against a part of the enemy's front, his somewhat restless opponent De Guichen , Changed tactics.In their first turn against each other, the Frenchman took advantage of the leeward position; but, realizing Rodney's intentions, he resorted to maneuvering to gain the advantage of the wind, not for attacking , on the contrary, it is a free card, unless it is acting on its own terms.The power to attack or avoid a fight no longer depends on the wind, but on the side with the greater speed; in the case of a fleet, not only on the speed of individual ships, but also on the tactical integrity of their actions .Therefore, the ship with the highest speed will have the climate facility.

So it is not, as many imagine, to look for useful lessons in the history of galleons and single-decked ships, as a pale fantasy.Both have similarities to modern ships; and of course there are significant differences which make it impossible to quote their experiences or modes of operation as sufficient tactical precedents.A precedent, however, is different from, and less valuable than, a principle, which may be wrong at first, or may be rendered useless by changing circumstances and circumstances; , no matter how varied its application is, it still becomes the standard that must be followed in order to achieve victory.War has such principles, and their existence is revealed by the study of history, which shows their successes and failures, or their persistence from one age to another.Circumstances and armaments may vary, but in order to deal with this class, or to employ others successfully, full attention must be paid to the continuing historical teachings of battlefield tactics or of the wider operations of war constituted in the name of strategy .

However, the so-called broader war operation encompasses the entire arena of war and, in the case of naval contests, perhaps a considerable portion of the globe.It is in this kind of action that the teachings of history have a more obvious and eternal value, because the basic conditions never change.The stage of war may be large or small, the difficulty may be obvious or not, the fighting team may be large or not, and the necessary actions may be easy or difficult. These are only differences in scope and degree, not in kind. .As barbarism gave way to civilization, means of transportation and communication improved rapidly, roads were opened, rivers were bridged, food sources increased, and the operations of war became easier, faster, and more extensive; yet the principles upon which they necessarily followed But nothing has changed.When marches on foot gave way to troop carriages, and when the latter in turn gave way to railroads, the scale of distances of action increased, or, if you prefer, the scale of time decreased; The direction to which to turn, the part of the enemy's position to attack, and the principles of protecting the lines of communication remained unchanged.Thus, across the vast oceans, the evolution from the single-decker ship cautiously squirming from port to port to the galleon's ambitious expeditions around the world, and from the latter to the steamship of our day, is a series of evolutions. Expanding the breadth and speed of naval operations does not necessarily alter the principles that guide them.The speeches of Hermocrates of Syracuse more than 2,300 years ago, when they were too late to be quoted, contained a correct strategic plan, and in its principles it is as valid now as it was in the past.Before encountering enemy forces or fleets (a term that perhaps better than any other expresses the dividing line between tactics and strategy) many questions remained to be decided, involving the entire plan of operations covering the entire battlefield .Among these are, among other issues, the proper role of the navy in war; its real object; the points at which it should muster; the establishment of coal and supply depots; the maintenance of lines of communication between depots and home bases; whether by means of scattered cruising cruisers, or by the forcible capture of some vital central fortress through which commercial shipping must pass, to destroy the system which commerce can most effectively influence. These are all strategic issues, and history has a lot to say about them.As far as the British Navy's approach to the war with France was concerned, until recently there had been only a worthwhile debate in the British Navy about the relative merits of the policies of the two British naval magnates, Lord Howe and Lord St. Vincent.The issue is purely strategic and not just of historical value; it is of paramount importance for the present, and the principles on which decisions are based have always been the same.St. Vincent's policies kept England from being invaded, while Nelson and his close generals kept the British drive as far as Trafalgar.

It is precisely in the field of maritime strategy that the value of the teachings of history has never been diminished.Because of the relative continuity of the situation, they are there not only to illustrate principles but also to serve as precedents.This is not so obviously true in matters of tactics when opposing fleets clash on strategic grounds.The unremitting progress of mankind has led to continuous innovation of weapons and equipment; and because of this, a continuous change in the way of warfare is bound to usher in the handling and control of troops and warships on the battlefield.This has led many persons connected with sea things to think that there is no profit to be gained from previous experience, and that it is a waste of time to spend on it.This view not only disregards the broad strategic considerations of guiding the nation's warships across the oceans, commanding and demarcating areas of action, thereby changing and continuing to change world history, but also a one-sided and narrow view of tactics.The success or failure of fierce battles in the past depended on whether they followed the laws of war.The admiral who reads carefully the causes of success or failure will not only discover and gradually assimilate these laws, but will also benefit greatly from applying them to the tactical operation of the warships and armaments of his own era.They will also note that not only must tactical changes occur after weaponry updates, but that the intervals between such changes are unduly long.All this undoubtedly arises from the fact that the improvement of weapons is largely due to the work of one or two individuals, while the renewal of tactics has to overcome the inertia of a whole conservative class.Yet again, this is a great sin.Only by a careful study of the strengths and limitations of a new type of warship or armament, by the attendant adoption of the best use of what will constitute its tactical norms, and a sincere awareness of the changes that are often made, can this evil be saved. cure.History shows that it is utterly vain to expect soldiers in general to perform such laborious work; yet the laborious man goes into battle with great advantage—a lesson that is invaluable in itself. So we may now be able to take lessons from a French tactician, Morogues.He wrote a century and a half ago: Naval tactics are based on their primary cause, the conditions under which armaments may change, which in turn must give rise to the construction of warships, the manner in which they are employed, and ultimately the control and employment of warships. Changes across the fleet.His further elaboration led to a greater argument that it is not a science based on absolute immutable principles.More precisely, the application of its laws will change with the replacement of weapons and equipment.The strategic application of these laws has undoubtedly changed with the times, but much less so; and it is therefore easier to recognize the basic principles.This statement is important enough for our citizens to gain some insight from historical events. The Battle of the Nile in 1788 was not only an overwhelming British victory over the French fleet, but also had a decisive impact on the French line of communication between the Egyptian army that destroyed Napoleon.As far as the battle itself is concerned, Nelson, the British Commander-in-Chief, gave a marvelous demonstration of great tactical thinking.If that's the case, as defined, it's an art of bridging the beginning of a campaign with its progression.That particular tactical connection depended on a condition that no longer exists today, namely, the inability of a fleet anchored to leeward to rescue a battleship that was upwind before being destroyed.However, the principle underlying cohesion has not become obsolete, that is, to select the part of the enemy's ranks that is least likely to be rescued, and to concentrate superior forces for attack.Admiral Jervis followed the same principle at Cape St. Vincent.At that time, he outnumbered twenty-seven ships with fifteen ships, although in this instance the enemy was not at anchor, but was on the move.The human mind, however, is so constituted that they are more apt to be impressed by the fleeting moments of conditions than by the eternal principles which deal with them.In the strategic implications of Nelson's victory for the course of the war, on the contrary, the spirit of it was not only easy to grasp, but was immediately seen as a principle still relevant in our day.The key to the survival of Egyptian businesses depends on unimpeded links with France.The great victory on the Nile destroyed such a sea power, the only hope of securing the lines of communication, that final defeat was certain.Anyone with a discerning eye can see that not only was the strike followed in accordance with the laws of destroying the enemy's lines of communication, but that the same principles are still valid today, in the age of the single-decker ship as in the age of the galleon or steamship Sincerely. Nevertheless, a vague feeling of contempt for what was once taken for granted as obsolete now conspires with a natural inertia that is blind to the perpetual strategic lessons of maritime history.How many, for example, have not seen the glorious climax of Nelson's genius at the Battle of Trafalgar, the defeat of the combined French and Spanish fleets in 1805, as an isolated event of extraordinary grandeur?How many people have asked themselves such a strategic question: How did these ships happen to be there?And how many people realize that this is the final act in a great strategic drama that lasted more than a year, in which two of the greatest leaders of all time, Napoleon and Nelson, were intrigued by each other?At Trafalgar it was not Villeneuve who lost, but Napoleon who was defeated; and it was not Nelson who won, but England who was saved.This is why?Because Napoleon's connection failed, and Nelson's intuition and tact always kept the British fleet in pursuit of the enemy, and stopped abruptly in time at critical moments.The tactics at Trafalgar, though the details are still open to debate, nevertheless, in their main features, were still consistent with the fundamental laws of warfare.And their audacity was justified by both the urgency of the situation and the final outcome.But the great lessons of thought and insight on the part of the British leader in the months leading up to the war were strategic in the timeliness of preparation, in the activity and energy of their execution, and they remain true to this day excellently. In both cases, events were originally told.The third case to be cited does not have such a firm bottom line, and views on what should have been done are open to debate.In the American Revolutionary War, France and Spain became allies against the British in 1779.The United Fleet swaggered through the English Channel three times, and once it actually lined up sixty-six warships, driving the British fleet into the port to hide, because the British fleet was far inferior in number.At that time, Spain's grand goal was to regain Gibraltar and Jamaica.In order to achieve the former goal, the Allies made great efforts both on land and at sea to attack the almost impregnable fortress.However, they got nothing. The question that arises from this, which is a purely naval strategic question, is: would it not be a much greater effort to threaten Britain by controlling the English Channel, and even attacking the British fleet in its ports, to destroy her commerce and invade her homeland? Assault on a remote and exceptionally fortified Imperial outpost; more certain to retake Gibraltar?The British people, long protected from foreign aggressors, were especially sensitive to the fear of being attacked, and it would have been unusually demoralizing if their firm confidence in their fleet had been shaken so strongly.Regardless of the decision, it is fair to ask this question as a strategic point.In another form it was proposed by a French officer at this period, in favor of directing a great effort to a West Indian island, in lieu of an attack on Gibraltar.However, it is unlikely that Britain would give up this Mediterranean chokepoint for any other outside holdings, although it should have given up its fort to protect its homeland and capital.Napoleon once threatened that he would re-establish his colony on the banks of the Vistule in Poland.If he could control the English Channel, as the Allied fleet had once done in 1779, there was little doubt that he would take Gibraltar or the British coast. History both serves as a reminder for the study of strategy and, through the facts it conveys, spells out the laws of war.This is a truth, and in order to make it more strongly impressed, two further examples are to be given, both of which are more distant in time than the period specially considered in this book.In one of the two great contests between the great powers of the West in the East and the Mediterranean, an empire of the known world was at stake, and opposing fleets were assembled at the neighboring Capes of Actum and Lepanto in the southwestern Balkans.what on earth is it?Is this a pure coincidence, or is it due to some inherent condition that makes it recur again.If the latter is the case, it's worth the time to find out why.Because, if an eastern maritime power like Antony or Turkey is raised again, the strategic issues will remain the same.Indeed, for now, the centers of maritime power are overwhelmingly in the West, primarily Britain and France.However, if there is an opportunity to control the Black Sea Basin, which is currently owned by Russia, and to occupy access to the Mediterranean Sea, the current strategic conditions affecting maritime hegemony will all be changed.Now, should the West unite against the East, England and France would immediately and unimpededly sail to the Levant and Aegean coasts, as they did in 1854 and as England alone did in 1878 .Once the suggested changes occur, the East will, as always, be bound to collide head-on with the West halfway. The impact and importance of naval supremacy during a very visible and momentous period in world history is underappreciated.There is also no information necessary to trace its influence on the Second Carthaginian War in detail, however, the few remaining signs are still sufficient to confirm that it is a conjecture with certainty.It is impossible to draw precise judgments from this point of view, merely by grasping the facts of a particular type of contest which have been widely circulated, since, as is often the case, the course of events at sea has been disgracefully neglected.It is also necessary to be familiar with the details of general naval history, in order to draw correct inferences from the poor traces, on the basis of knowledge of what may have happened during the period whose history is known.The control of the sea, however effective, does not mean that enemy warships, single or in groups, cannot sneak out of the port, pass through the many apparently busy sea lanes, and destroy the unprotected areas of the long coastline. Conduct harassing attacks, or break into heavily guarded harbors.On the contrary, history has shown that, to some extent, side-cutting tactics such as these are always possible for the weaker side, regardless of the difference in mutual naval power.Thus, in the fourth year of the war, when Cannae was miraculously captured, Baumical, the Carthaginian naval commander, landed in southern Italy with four thousand men and a troop of elephants; After the Roman fleet near Syracuse, he reappeared at Taranto and fell to Hannibal.Hannibal sent a task force to Carthage, and even with the remnants of his army, he retreated safely to Africa.All this is not inconsistent with the general control of the sea by the Roman fleet or its decisive role in controlling the power of the sea.None of these events proves that the Carthaginian government could have given Hannibal continued support if it had wanted to, and yet, in fact, he received none.They did intend, however, to give the impression of going with the flow that such help could have been given.Therefore, the assertion that Rome’s superiority at sea had a decisive impact on the course of the war needs to be refined and perfected by reflecting on the hard facts, so that the type and degree of its influence can be properly evaluated. The German historian Mommsen said that at the beginning of the war, Rome controlled the sea.Whether it can be attributed to one reason or some group of reasons, in the first Punic battle between Rome and Carthage, this essentially non-oceanic country established maritime superiority over its predominantly maritime opponents , and has been maintained.In the Second Punic Campaign, the event itself, which did not lead to an important naval decisive battle, let alone connected with other well-documented facts, showed that there was a predominance of Rome similar to other historical periods with the same characteristics. Since Hannibal left no memoirs, there is no further information to determine the motives that drove him on his perilous and almost destructive journey across Gower and the Alps.However, what is certain is that its fleet off the coast of Spain was not strong enough to compete with the Roman fleet.If that were the case, he would be able to follow the road he actually was on; 60,000 experienced soldiers lost 33,000. While Hannibal was on his perilous march, the Romans, led by two of their senators, marched on to Spain.Some of their warships also carried a large army of Archons.This allowed for their voyage without serious losses, and the Roman army then succeeded in gaining a foothold in the area north of the Ebro in Hannibal's line of communication.At the same time, another squadron was sent to Sicily with a large army under another consul.The two Roman armies combined amounted to two hundred and twenty warships.Wherever they went, they each encountered and routed a Carthaginian fleet with an ease that may be deduced from the understatement of the account of the battle, showing the actual superiority of the Roman fleet. After the second year, the war showed the following situation: Hannibal, who entered Italy from the north, advanced southward to the vicinity of Rome after a series of victories. This situation created a lot of popular discontent and was especially dangerous if it came into conflict with the strong system of political and military control that Rome had established there.Hence, from the outset, he specifically needed to establish a supply and reinforcement pipeline, in modern warfare terms, a line of communication between himself and some reliable base.There are three friendly regions that can be such bases, Carthage, Macedonia, and Spain, respectively or all of them.The former two can only establish lines of communication by sea.In Spain, however, he could find his strongest support, and he could communicate with it both by land and by sea, unless the passage was blocked by the enemy, which was quicker and easier. In the early years of the war, Rome, by virtue of its maritime supremacy, absolutely controlled the basin between Italy, Sicily, and Spain, namely the Tyrrhenian Sea and the Sardinian Sea.It is kind to it from the Ebro to the Tiber.Following the Battle of Cannae, that is, in the fourth year of the war, Syracuse abandoned the alliance with Rome, and the tide of resistance swept Sicily, followed by an offensive and defensive alliance between Macedonia and Hannibal.These upheavals widened the space in which the Roman fleet needed to operate and weakened its strength.What contingencies did Rome take, and how did this affect the war? 有跡象表明，羅馬並沒有放棄對於第勒尼海的控制，因為其分艦隊要不經襲擾地從義大利駛往西班牙。在西班牙沿岸，它也完全掌握著主動權，直到一名年輕一點的執政官認為已是適於保存艦隊的時候了。在亞德里亞海，一支分艦隊與一處海軍基地設立在義大利的布林迪西，以遏制馬其頓。它們的任務完成得如此之好，以致於沒有一名希臘方陣士兵踏上義大利本土。作戰艦隊的缺乏，毛姆森說，使得菲力浦舉步維艱。在這裡，海權發揮著巨大的影響甚至不是推論的結果。 在西西里，鬥爭集中在敘拉古。迦太基和羅馬的艦隊在那裡迎頭相撞，但後者卻明顯地佔有優勢；因為，儘管迦太基人時常成功地向城市輸入了補養，他們還是避免與羅馬艦隊交火。而後者有馬薩勒、巴勒莫和墨西拿在握，在該島的北部沿岸可謂根深蒂固。對迦太基人而言，南部通道暢通無阻，他們因此就可以支持反叛力量了。 綜合這些事實，就可以得出一個合理的推論，即羅馬的海上霸權得以控制了從西班牙的泰拉弋那（Tarragona）到西西里島西端的馬薩勒，再從那裡到亞德里亞海的布林迪西一線以北的海域，這已為歷史的進程所證實。這種控制不受衝擊地持續於戰爭的全部過程。這並不排除或大或小的海上襲擊，正如前文已講到過的那些情形一樣。然而，它確實遏制住了持續而又安全的海上交通線，而那又是為漢尼拔所急需的。 另一方面，同樣顯而易見的是，在這場戰爭的前十年，羅馬艦隊還沒有強大到可以在西西里和迦太基之間的海域展開持續性軍事行動的地步，而在所表明的界線以南海域也同樣無能為力。當漢尼拔開啟戰端之時，他傾其所有，將艦隊派去維護來往於西班牙與非洲之間的交通線，而在當時羅馬人也並沒試圖對此進行干擾。 所以，羅馬的海權完全使馬其頓置身於戰爭之外。它並未阻止住迦太基人在西西裡進行有用並最具騷擾性的佯攻，然而，它卻使得迦太基人應該向其遠在義大利作戰的官兵提供關鍵性支援的時刻，卻一兵未發。西班牙又如何呢？ 西班牙是漢尼拔之父和漢尼拔本人賴以發動他們計畫中的向義大利進攻的根據之地。在這場戰爭開始前，他們用了十八年時間佔領了這個國家，並以罕見的睿智，在政治和軍事上擴展並鞏固了他們的權力。他們招募並通過局部戰爭，訓練出了一支龐大而又經驗豐富的軍隊。就在其即將遠征之際，漢尼拔將政府委託給了其弟弟哈茲德魯拔（Hasdrubal）。其弟始終對他忠心耿耿，任勞任怨，而這一點又是他無法指望從派系林立、內訌不已的非洲本土所能獲得的。 在漢尼拔點燃戰火之際，在西班牙的迦太基政權從南部港口加地斯到埃布羅河之間地區還是比較穩固的。在該河與比利牛斯山之間地區居住著對羅馬人十分親善的部落，在沒有羅馬人的支援時，他們卻也無法對漢尼拔進行成功的抵抗。漢尼拔鎮住了他們，並留下由漢諾（Hanno）統帥下的一萬一千名士兵對該國進行軍事占領，以免讓羅馬人在那裡站穩腳根，從而對其與基地之間的聯繫進行騷擾。 然而，西庇阿（Scipio）親率二萬名士兵於同年由海路及時趕來，擊敗了漢諾，佔據了埃布羅河沿岸和內陸以北地區。羅馬人就此安營紮寨，完全封鎖了漢尼拔與哈茲德魯拔增援力量之間的通道，並從那裡對迦太基在西班牙的勢力大舉進攻，而他們自己通過水路與義大利相連的交通補給線卻由於所擁有的海上優勢而平安無事。他們在泰拉弋那（Tarragona）設立了一處海軍基地，與哈茲德魯拔在西班牙東南港口喀它基那（Cartgena）的基地分庭抗禮，並隨後大舉攻入這塊迦太基人的領地。西班牙之戰由年少的西庇阿指揮，看起來真像是一個細枝末節的問題，七年多來風雲變幻，難解難分；最後，哈茲德魯拔給予了他們毀滅性打擊。迦太基人幾乎成功地將增援漢尼拔的預備力量突進到比利牛斯山脈。然而，這一意圖暫時受挫；就在迦太基人準備捲土重來前夕，卡普阿（Captla）的失陷使得羅馬人得以騰出一萬二千名久經沙場的將士，在克勞迪阿斯‧尼祿（Nero）的率領下浩浩蕩蕩地開赴西班牙。尼祿才華橫溢，能力非凡，在第二次羅馬與迦太基間的布匿戰爭中，後來正是由於他，最具決定性的軍事行動才得以進行。這是任何羅馬將軍都無可比擬的。這支通過海路及時送來的增援大軍，再次鞏固了對於哈茲德魯拔出征道路本來業已搖搖欲墜的控制這種方式最為快捷與簡便，並使得羅馬海軍逼近了迦太基人。 過了兩年，後來作為阿非利加執政官而一舉成名的年輕的西庇阿接過了在西班牙的統帥權，他通過陸軍和海軍的聯合進攻，佔領了喀它基那；隨後，他又邁出了最不同尋常的一步，即解散其艦隊，將水手們全部調拔進陸軍。西庇阿並不滿足於僅僅通過關閉比利牛斯山通道而扮演遏制哈茲德魯拔的角色，他還長驅直入挺進南部西班牙，在瓜達爾基維爾河進行了一場艱苦但卻不是決定意義的戰鬥。在這之後，哈茲德魯拔從他身邊悄悄地溜走了，火速北進，在其最西端，穿越了比利牛斯山，逼入義大利。在那裡，漢尼拔的境遇每況愈下，其大軍的自然減員絲毫無法補救。 戰爭持續了十年，在沿途幾乎沒有遭受多少損失的情況下，哈茲德魯拔從北部開進了義大利。如果他們能夠平安地與當時所向無故的漢尼拔統帥的大軍匯合的話，那麼他所率部隊本來是可以決定性地扭轉戰局的，因為羅馬本身已接近於山窮水盡的地步，連接其殖民地與盟國的堅固紐帶已到最後關頭，有些甚至已經元氣耗盡。然而，這兩兄弟的軍事狀況也極其險惡，一個位於梅陶羅河（Metaurus）畔，另一個還在阿普利亞（Apulia），兩者相距仍有二百英里之遙，並分別被一個優勢敵國纏住不得脫身，而羅馬大軍卻處於他們被分而治之的對手之間。這一險惡戰局，除了哈茲德魯拔的姍姍來遲的因素之外，則是由於羅馬控制了海洋。這在整個戰爭期間鉗制住了兩位迦太基兄弟通過高盧地區取徑進行相互支援的可能。就在哈茲德魯拔通過陸路進行其漫長而又危險的兜圈迂迴之術時，西庇阿通過海路已從西班牙派遣出一萬一千名士兵增援堵截他的軍隊。結果，由於不得不穿越大片敵佔區，從哈茲德魯拔派往漢尼拔處的信使們紛紛落入克勞迪阿斯‧尼祿之手。正在統帥南部羅馬軍團的尼祿因此得知了哈茲德魯拔打算要行走的路線。尼祿正確地分析了形勢，趁漢尼拔不備，派出其幾千精銳之師，十萬火急地與北部大軍會師。兩軍兵合一處，兩名執政官便以占壓倒性優勢的兵力對哈茲德魯拔發起了進攻，全殲了其軍隊。這位迦太基將領在戰鬥中命喪黃泉。當其兄弟的頭顱被拋進其大營時，漢尼拔才如夢方醒，情知大難臨頭。據傳，他當時驚呼羅馬已成了世界的主人。於是，梅陶羅河之役通常就被認為是這兩個國家之間的角逐中具有決定性意義的了。 最終導致梅陶羅河戰役和羅馬獲勝的軍事形勢可以總結如下：要推翻羅馬，就必須進攻其在義大利的權力中心，撕碎由其領導的緊密團結的聯盟，這是目標。為了實現這一目標，迦太基人必須擁有堅固的戰爭基地和一條穩定的交通運輸線。前者由於巴卡（軍事統帥）大家族的天才而得以在西班牙建立，後者則從未有過。這裡有兩條可能的線路一條直接通過海上，另一條則迂迴穿越高盧。第一條線路為羅馬的海上力量所封鎖，第二條一度岌岌可危，並最終由於羅馬軍團佔據西班牙北部而被截斷。只有控制了海上局勢，佔領才成為可能，而這一點正是迦太基人從來沒有對羅馬軍團構成其威脅的。所以，就漢尼拔和他的基地而言，羅馬佔據了兩個中心位置，即羅馬本身和西班牙北部。它們之間通過一條輕便的內部交通線加以連接，以及海洋；這就使得相互支援能夠得以持續不斷地進行。 如果地中海本是一處平蕩的荒漠之地，其中，羅馬人在科西嘉島和薩丁島堅守山脈，加強在泰拉弋那、馬薩勒與墨西拿、義大利沿海靠近熱那亞一帶的據點，以及在馬賽與其它地區同盟國的堡壘；如果他們也還擁有一支具備自由穿越沙漠的特徵的武裝力量他們的敵人又十分低劣，並因此為集結部隊而被迫進行大的迂迴，那麼，軍事局勢本應被立即承認，無論如何表述那支特定部隊的價值與效果的言辭都不會過份。當然，也應意識到，具有同種力量的敵軍，無論實力上如何懸殊，都有可能對由此佔據的土地進行襲擊，有可能焚毀一座村莊，或使一些邊境地區成為荒蕪之地，有可能甚至於時常截擊護送隊伍。然而，從軍事意義上說，卻無損於交通運輸線。諸如此類的捕食性行動在所有時代都有海上較弱一方的交戰者大行其道，這卻絕對不能保證得出這一種推論這與已知的事實並不相符合即羅馬或迦太基都不能說對於海洋擁有無可爭議的統治權，因為羅馬艦隊有時光顧非洲海岸，而迦太基艦隊也以同樣的方式招搖於義大利沿海。在所設想的那種情況下，海軍扮演了對所假定荒漠起作用的角色；然而，當它作用於一種對於大多數作者而言是陌生的因素，當其成員從遠古時代起就是一個與眾不同的人種，並且沒有他們自己的先知，他們本人或他們的階層對此皆一竅不通，那麼，海上力量對於那個時代歷史巨大的確定性影響，以及隨之而來的對於整個世界歷史的影響，就被忽略掉了。如果前述的論證是站得住腳的，那麼，正如同隱晦地宣稱它具有唯一的排它性的影響一樣，最終將海上力量從主要因素的序列中排除掉，也是同樣錯誤的。 上面所引述的諸如此類的事例，完全來源於彼此間隔十分巨大的時間區域，要麼在本書所專論的時期之前，要麼在此之後，從而起到了闡釋主題的內在利害關係以及歷史所給予的警策性之作用。正如前面所注意到的，這些因素更多地處於戰略運籌而非戰術考慮之中，它們與其說是作用於戰鬥行為，還不如說是影響著戰役部署，並且因此而具有更為持久的價值。在這一方面，可以完全引述一位了不起的權威人士的箴言。傑米尼說：一八五一年底，我碰巧正在巴黎，一位聲名顯赫的人士不恥下問地詢及近來在武器裝備上的進展是否將會對從事戰爭的方式帶來任何大的變化。我回答說，它們或許會對戰術的細節帶來衝擊，然而，在驚心動魄的大戰略行動中，以及一連串空前的戰鬥組合裡，現在正如同過去那樣，勝利將來自促成在所有時代裡的偉大軍事統帥獲勝的那些原則的運用無論是亞歷山大還是凱撒，弗雷德里克還是拿破崙。對於海軍而言，這一研究現在已比過去變得更加重要，正是因為當代蒸汽艦隊所具有的巨大而又穩定的運作能量，精心策劃，巧妙構思的作戰計畫也有可能。而在單層甲板船與大帆船的時代裡它則可能僅僅因為老天的作弄而化為泡影，現在，這一困難已幾乎不見蹤跡。指導大型海上軍事行動的規則能夠在所有時代裡放之四海而皆準，並且它們就都是從歷史中演變而出然而，運作它們的力量與天氣幾乎沒有多少瓜葛和新近的發展。 通常賦予戰略一詞的定義將其限定於軍事組合之中，其包括一個或更多的行動領域，要麼完全地各具特色，要麼相互密不可分，但是都被視為實際的或迫在眉睫的戰爭場景。然而，這恐怕只是指在岸上，最近一位法國著作者十分正確地指出，這一定義對於海上戰略，過份狹隘。海上戰略，他說，並不同於軍事戰略，因為它在和平時期正如同戰爭時期一樣是必不可缺的。確實，在和平時期，它能夠採取購買或條約的手段，通過佔領一方疆土，可能會取得最具決定性的勝利，其優越的態勢或許是通過戰爭都幾乎不能取得的。要學會通過在海岸的某些選定之地站穩腳跟的所有機遇來獲得好處，還要學會給最初只是僅作短暫用途之地予以確定性的佔據。有這樣一代人，他們在十年時間內目睹了英國成功地佔領了塞浦路斯和埃及，表面上是以暫駐的條件，然而這卻無法促使他們放棄所佔領之地。這樣一代人可以欣然同意這一評論：這種暫駐確實可以從那種暗地裡鍥而不捨的精神中得到持續不斷的說明，正是憑藉這種精神，所有的海上強國取得了它們的人民和戰艦滲透進的不同海域一處又一處的要衝，儘管比起賽普勒斯和埃及來，它們不太那麼引人注目或不太那麼值得注目。海上戰略確實因此得以奠定、支撐、提升一個國度的海上力量。戰爭時期如此，和平時期也如此。所以，對它的研究對於一個自由國家的所有公民都是利害相關具有價值的，對於那些承擔有外交和軍事關係的國家而言，尤為如此。那些要麼對於一個瀕海國家至關重要，要麼能夠極大地塑造其偉大成就的一般條件，現在將要得到檢驗。在此之後，對在十七世紀中葉的各種歐洲領海國家的更為專門的考查歷史總結就是從這裡開始的將會起到闡釋與驗證有關這一主題性結論的作用。