Chapter 2 2. Elements of sea power

The main factors affecting a country's maritime power can be listed as follows: geographical location; morphological composition, including the natural productivity and climate connected therewith; territorial extent; population size; population characteristics; government characteristics, including state institutions. From a political and social point of view, the first and most obvious feature that the ocean itself presents is that it is like a great road, or better yet, a wide commons where one can walk in either direction, It's just that on the ground, some paths apparently traveled show controlling reasons for choosing certain routes of travel over others.These routes of travel are called trade routes, and the reasons that identify them are to be sought in world history.

In spite of all the known and unknown dangers of the sea, it is always easier and cheaper to travel and trade by water than by land.The commercial success of the Netherlands rested not only on its sea navigation, but also on the numerous favorable waterways that made it cheap and easy to enter its own hinterland and that of Germany.The advantages of transport by water over land are even more pronounced in times of scarcity and dire condition of roads, frequent wars, and social unrest, as was the case two hundred years ago.Although sea traffic was in danger of robbers at that time, it was still safer and faster than land transportation.A Dutch writer of that period, in estimating his country's chances of war with England, noted, among other things, that the English waterways were not able to penetrate the country to any depth; To transfer from one part of the ship to another, it must cross the sea, so that it is easy to encounter interception in the middle.As far as purely domestic trade is concerned, this danger generally no longer exists at present.In most civilized countries, the coasting trade is lost or vanished today merely as an inconvenience, though water transport is still cheaper.Nevertheless, as late as the war between the French Republic and the First Empire, those familiar with the history of the period and the understated naval literature that arose around it knew references to sneaking in from a point along the coast of France. How frequent is the transport fleet at another point, although the sea is full of British patrol ships and has good inland roads.

However, under contemporary conditions, domestic trade is only one part of commercial activities in the coastal state.Necessaries or luxuries imported from abroad must be brought into its ports, either in its own ships or in foreign ships.On the return voyage, it may be loaded with the goods exchanged with that country, whether they be the gift of the land, or the fruits of human hands.It is the wish of every country to use its own ships for transporting commerce, so the ships traveling to and fro must have a port from which they can return safely, and must also accept the protection of the country in which they are located throughout the voyage as far as possible.

In time of war this protection must also be extended by armed shipping.The necessity of a navy, in the narrow sense of the word, derives from the existence and disappearance of a fleet of peace transports.Except, of course, in the case of a country harboring aggressive tendencies that maintains a navy merely as a branch of the military establishment.Since the United States currently has no aggressive intentions, and its commercial services no longer exist, a shrinking armed fleet and general lack of interest is a logical corollary.When, for some reason, maritime trade is once again considered to be costly, a shipping interest swells large enough to revive the war fleet.When the rivers that run through Mesoamerica seem to be a reality, it is entirely possible that the impulse of desire is strong enough to produce the same result.However, it is questionable how far-sighted a peaceful, business-loving nation is, and such vision must have sufficient military deployment, especially in an era like this?

When a nation with ships, both unarmed and armed, sends its ships far away from its homeland, it will soon feel the need for a view of the dependence of ships on peaceful trade, sanctuary, and supplies.Today, strange but friendly ports can be seen all over the world, and their protection is enough as long as world peace lasts.However, things will not always be like this, and the peace will not last forever, and the United States has greatly benefited from the lasting continuation of the peace.In the early days, merchant seafarers were constantly seeking trade in new and unexplored lands, profiting at the risk of loss of life and liberty from doubtful or hostile nations, and were slow to gather profitable cargo. Open hands and feet.Intuitively, therefore, they tended to seek one or more sites on the other side of their trade lanes, either by force or by boon.There they can keep themselves or their agents in a state of reasonable security; there their fleets can remain intact; arrival, to be able to carry them to their homeland.With great profits and risks, such establishments multiplied naturally in early voyages and became colonies; their ultimate development and success depended on the policies and talents of the nation in which they emerged, and therefore It has formed a huge part of world history, especially the history of the world's oceans.Not all colonies have the simple and natural process of birth and development mentioned above. Many colonies are more formal and purely political in terms of their gestation, formation, and rulers of the people rather than the behavior of individual individuals. Up.However, the trading ports and their subsequent expansion were initially only the work of adventurers looking for profit, and their reasons and essence were no different from those of deliberately organized and established colonies.In both cases the native land wins a foothold on foreign soil, finds new inlets for its exports, new ranges for its shipping, capable of bringing more employment to its people, and Seek comfort and wealth for yourself.

However, the needs of business are not all satisfied by obtaining safety at the other end of the road.The voyage is long and dangerous, and the seas are often full of traces of enemies.Few memories remain of the lawlessness that prevailed over the oceans during the most active period of colonization.Among the nations of the sea, the days of stability and peace are few and far between.This stimulated the need for stations along the way, as the Cape of Good Hope, St. Helens and Mauritius were originally formed not for trade reasons, but for defense and war.The need to occupy fortresses such as Gibraltar, Malta, Fort Louis at the entrance to the Gulf of St. Lawrence, etc., was of primarily, though not exclusively, strategic value.Colonies and colonial fortresses were sometimes commercial and sometimes military in character, and, as in New York, the same status was equally important from both points of view, an exception.

In these three things production, with the necessity of exchanging products; shipping, by which the exchange takes place; and colonies, which facilitate and extend the movement of shipping, and which are protected by the establishment of a large number of safe zones, are deemed great. Part of history and policy, and the key to coastal states, this policy changes with the spirit of the times and the character and knowledge of the rulers.However, the history of the coastal states is not so much defined by the brilliance and foresight of their governments.It is better to say that any appellation determined by the status, scope, combination, quantity and nature of its people, in a word, is determined by the natural situation.However, it must be admitted, and it must be found, that the actions of individuals, wise or unwise, have had, at certain historical periods, a tremendous and deterministic influence on the growth of maritime hegemony in a broad sense.These include not only military power on the seas, which governs the seas or parts of them by force, but also peaceful trade and shipping.Only in this way can a naval fleet be born naturally and healthily, and it can be as stable as Mount Tai.

The main factors affecting a country's maritime power can be listed as follows: 1. Geographic location; 2. Morphological composition, including the natural productive forces and climate connected therewith; 3. Territorial scope; 4. Population; 5. Characteristics of the people; 6. The characteristics of government, including state institutions. 1. Geographic location First, it may be noted that if a nation is in such a position that it is neither compelled to defend itself on land nor induced to expand its territory through It possesses an advantage over a people whose borders are all continents.In this regard, as a maritime power, Britain has a huge advantage over France and the Netherlands.The strength of the latter was at first exhausted by the necessity of maintaining a large army, and by the costly wars for its independence; while the policy of France was always inconsistent, sometimes wise, sometimes very Stupid, both in terms of its oceanic and continental plans.These military operations cost people money and money, but their geographical location can increase wealth if they are used wisely and consistently.

On its own, geography may reach the point of enhancing or distributing military power at sea.At this point, the British Isles once again have an advantage over France, whose location, in addition to being on the Atlantic Ocean, also extends to the Mediterranean Sea.While this has its merits, it is, in general, the crux of the weak military at sea.It was only after passing through the Strait of Gibraltar that the French East and West Fleets were able to join forces, and in doing so they often took risks and often suffered losses.The position of the United States of America on two oceans would be either a source of great disadvantage, or a cause of excessive expense, if it had its large maritime commercial interests on both sides.

With its vast colonial empire, Great Britain had given up much of the advantage of having a naval presence on its coasts, but the sacrifice was a wise one, and the advantages still outweighed the disadvantages.As events testified, as its colonial system swelled, so did its naval fleet, and its mercantile shipping and wealth grew even faster.Also in the American Revolutionary War, and in the French War of the Republic and Empire, a French writer pointedly pointed out that, despite the rapid rise of the British fleet and the wealth piled up around it, it still felt as always the embarrassment of all poverty.The power of Great Britain was sufficient to feed and clothe its mortals; while the Spanish colonial empire, which was equally vast, suffered humiliation and injury because of its inferiority at sea.

A country's geographical location not only helps to concentrate its military power, but also provides strategic advantages such as a further central location and a good base for launching hostile military operations against its potential opponents.The situation in England is often consistent with this.On the one hand it faced Holland and the northern powers, on the other it faced France and the Atlantic.When threatened by the intelligence of France with the maritime powers of the North Sea and the Baltic, as she often did, her fleets cruising the Dover and English Channels, and even not far from Brest, went to occupy the depths. bases, and thus be able to rapidly deploy its combined forces to counteract any enemy that opportunistically crosses the English Channel, thereby affecting its alliance with the Allies.Likewise, on either side, Providence has given it better harbors and coasts more suitable for safe approach, which formerly was a very serious factor in crossing the English Channel; The improvement of its ports alleviated this disadvantage that France once suffered.In the days of the galleons, the British fleet attacked Brest and established its bases at Torbay and Plymouth.In short, the plan was this: in strong easterly winds or milder weather conditions, the blockade fleet would have little difficulty holding its ground.But in the west wind, when conditions were very bad, they turned back to the English ports, knowing that the French fleet could not come out until the wind turned, and they were driven back to their forts by the wind. Nowhere is the advantage of being geographically close to the enemy or the target of attack more apparent than in the form of warfare.This has only recently been given the reputation of disrupting commerce, what the French call guerrilla action.This operation of warfare requires only lightly armed ships, since it is entirely directed against peaceful merchant ships, which are usually undefended.Such ships, having little strength for self-defense, depend upon places of refuge or points of support at hand.This can be found either in a certain section of the sea controlled by the country's combat ships, or in friendly ports.The latter are able to give the strongest support, because they are always in the same position, and the proximity to them is more familiar to the merchant fleet under attack than to the attacking enemy.France's proximity to England greatly facilitated guerrilla action directed against the latter.Since it has ports in the North Sea, the English Channel and the Atlantic Ocean, its cruisers set out from places close to the British trade hub, and their advances and retreats are well-founded.The distance between these ports is not so favorable for regular combined military operations, but it has its advantages for this kind of unconventional and auxiliary operations, because its essence lies in the concentration of forces, and for As far as disrupting business is concerned, spreading power is the law.When the commercial raid ships are dispersed, they can find and capture more prey. These indisputable facts can be well interpreted from the history of the tough French pirates.Their bases and operations were largely in the English Channel and the North Sea, or in remote colonial territories, where islands such as Guadeloupe and Martinique in the French West Indies offered the same Near the shelter.The necessity of replenishing coal makes today's cruisers even more dependent on their ports than warships of old.In the United States, public opinion has always had a great deal of confidence in trade against its adversaries, it must be remembered, however, that this republic has no ports in close proximity to the great centers of overseas commerce.As such, its geography is particularly unfavorable for a successful Merchant Raid unless it can find a suitable port with an ally. Apart from being favorable to offense, if Providence so arranged a nation that it had easy access to the high seas themselves, and at the same time controlled a choke point of world shipping, then, clearly, the strategic value of its location would be very high.This is again, and to a large extent, the position of England, and the commerce of Holland, Sweden, Russia, Denmark, and those trades upriver straight into the heart of Germany, had to cross the Channel at its doorstep; Galleons always keep close to the coast of England.Furthermore, such northern trades had a unique impact on maritime supremacy, since, as they were commonly called, the naval stores came to a large extent from the Baltic states. Apart from the loss of Gibraltar, Spain's geographical position was originally very similar to that of Britain.In the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, with Cadiz on the one hand and Cartagina on the other, the trade to the countries and islands of the Levant had always passed under its watch, and the commerce round the Cape of Good Hope was a distance away. Its home is not far away.However, the loss of Gibraltar not only deprived her of control of the straits, but also constituted an obstacle to the very convenient rendezvous of her two fleets. Today, as long as we look at the geographical position of Italy, without regard to other conditions affecting its maritime power, it seems that because it has a vast coast and natural harbors, it is in a country that can reach the east coast of the Mediterranean Sea. And the position where the island trade route and the Isthmus of Suez have a decisive influence.This is true to a certain extent, and will be so in the future so long as Italy can now hold the islands which have always been Italy.However, the advantages of their location were thus largely offset by the fact that Malta was in the hands of the British and Corsica in the hands of the French.From the perspective of ethnic blood relationship and geographical location, these two islands are in the pocket of Italy, and their legitimacy is the same as that of Gibraltar to Spain.If the Adriatic Sea had been a busy commercial shipping lane, Italy's position could have been more influential.These deficiencies in its geographical perfection, combined with other causes which impair the full and steady growth of maritime power, make it all the more doubtful whether Italy will ever rise to the forefront of the maritime powers. The purpose of this article is not to engage in an outright debate, but simply to try to show, by way of explanation, how a country's geography actually affects what it does with its oceans.The present disagreement on the subject can be disregarded; examples of further unfolding importance will continue to be repeated on historical occasions, yet both statements are valid here. Circumstances have allowed the Mediterranean to play a more significant role in world history, both from a commercial and military point of view, than any other body of water of its size.One country after another is trying to control it, and the struggle will continue.A study of the conditions upon which dominance in the seas depends, and of the relative military value of the different points on its shores, will therefore be more instructive than an equivalent effort expended in other fields.And at present, in many respects, it bears a very distinct resemblance to the Caribbean Sea, which will become even closer once the Panama Canal channel is completed.A study of the strategic conditions of the Mediterranean, which is well explained, would be an excellent start to a similar study of the Caribbean, an area of ​​which there is little history in comparison. The second statement concerns the geographic location of the United States of America relative to a Central American canal.If the canal is completed, and fully fulfills the wishes of its builders, the Caribbean will emerge from a terminus, a place of partial intercourse, or, at best, a poor and incomplete tourist route, As it is now, become a huge shipping hub of the world.Along this path great commercial interests will extend, bringing to our shores the interests of the other powerful European nations in ways they have never done before.If you really want to do this, it will not be so easy to stand alone outside the international political situation as before.The geographical position of the United States relative to this route will be similar to that of Britain to the English Channel, and the Mediterranean countries to the Suez route, and the influence and control of it will depend on geographical location.Of course, it is, frankly, much closer to the center of American national power as a permanent base than any other power, and no place, no matter how powerful, will be occupied by them now or hereafter, on an island or on a continent. Become the bridgehead of their strength.Although no country surpasses the United States in the raw materials of military power, it is also vulnerable in its perceived unpreparedness for war and geographically close to the contending land. land.The character of its Gulf coast lacks ports for safety from the enemy and for the maintenance of first-class warships, without which no nation of warships would be able to attempt to control any part of this sea to lose it part value.In the event of a conflict for dominance of the Caribbean Sea, from the depth of the Mississippi River's southern channel, the proximity of New Orleans, and the benefits of the Mississippi River Valley for dredging waterways, it is obvious that the main efforts of the United States should be concentrated in that river valley to ensure Make sure to get its permanent military base there.But securing access to the Mississippi presented its own particular difficulties.Although the only two competing ports, Key West and Pensacola, lacked deep water and were far too poorly situated relative to the country's resources.However.These deficiencies must be overcome in order to fully reap all the benefits of this advantageous geographical location.Moreover, its distance from the isthmus, although relatively small, is still considerable, and for this reason the United States will have to acquire sites in the Caribbean Sea suitable for bases of emergency or secondary war operations, which, by virtue of their natural advantages, are easily Defensiveness, and proximity to the center of this strategic issue, kept the US fleet as close to the scene as any adversary.With the access to and from the Mississippi adequately secured, such forts in possession, and the lines of communication between them and home bases unhindered, in short, a proper military preparation having all The necessary means, then, starting from its geographical location and strength, the US's dominant position in this field will definitely follow. 2. Morphology The salient features of the Gulf Coast have just been hinted at and can typically be listed under the heading of the morphological composition of the country.In the discussion of various conditions affecting the growth of maritime hegemony, the factor of morphological composition can be said to be ranked second. A country's coast is one of its boundaries.The more conveniently this frontier provides access to outer regions, in this book seaports, the more a people is inclined to communicate with the rest of the world through them.In a hypothetical state, if it has only a long coast line, but has no port at all, such a country cannot have its own sea trade, sea transportation, and navy.This was the case in practice when Belgium was a province of Spain and Austria.In 1648, after a victorious war, the Dutch ordered the Scheldt to be closed to maritime trade as a peace condition, thereby closing the port of Antwerp and transferring Belgian maritime trade to the Netherlands .The Spanish Netherlands has since ceased to be a maritime power. Large and deep harbors are a source of power and wealth, all the more so if they are also the mouths of navigable channels.This would facilitate the concentration of a country's domestic trade on them.However, since they are so accessible, they can be a weak link in war if not properly defended.In 1667 the Dutch broke into the Thames with little effort, and destroyed a considerable portion of the British navy right under London's nose.And a few years later, when the Anglo-French combined fleet attempted to land in the Netherlands, it encountered trouble from the coast that could be compared with the bravery of the Dutch fleet.In 1778, New York Harbor, which had undisputed control of the Hudson River, almost fell into the hands of the inferior British because of the indecision of the French naval commander.In its control, New England could have been restored to close and safe communications with New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.This blow, on the heels of Gurney's defeat the previous year, might have brought the British to an earlier peace with us.For the United States of America, the Mississippi River is a great source of wealth and strength, yet the weak defense of its inlets and the number of tributaries penetrating the United States make it a weak link for us, and thus a source of disaster for the Confederacy .Finally, the occupation of the Chesapeake and the destruction of Washington in 1814 left a profound lesson in the dangers of traversing these waterways, if left undefended.This lesson is not remote enough to be easily recalled, but, judging by the present state of coastal defense, it seems to have been forgotten.It should not be assumed that the conditions have changed, the circumstances and details of offense and defense have been revised, the basic conditions have remained the same throughout the years as they have always been. Before and during the Napoleonic Wars, France had no ports for battleships east of Brest.For Britain, this is a very great advantage. It has two huge arms centers in equal range, located in Plymouth and Portsmouth, not including other ports of refuge and supply.This structural deficiency was not remedied until the works at Cherbourg. Access to the sea, the conditions that lead people to it or isolate them from it, and other material factors are included in addition to the outline of the coast.Although France has very few military ports in the English Channel, it has good deep-water ports both there and in the Atlantic Ocean, in addition to the Mediterranean Sea, and its location is very favorable for overseas trade, and these ports are located at the mouth of the great rivers. It is of great benefit to promote internal trade and communication.When Richelieu ended the civil war, however, the French did not throw themselves at sea with the zeal and success of the English and Dutch.Among the material conditions, one of the main reasons can be traced on the surface, that those conditions make France a happy land, with a pleasant and mild climate, and the domestic production is always in excess of the demand.England, on the other hand, had very little of God's gift, and had little to export until her productive capacities were developed.Their many wants, combined with their indefatigable activity and other conditions suitable for sea-based enterprise, drove their people to ever-expanding seas; and they found islands more charming and richer than their own native lands.Their pursuit and genius made them merchants and colonists, and then manufacturers and producers.Shipping is an indispensable link between products and colonies, so their maritime power is increasingly bullish. If England was attracted to the sea, Holland was driven to it.Without the sea, England would probably be in ruins, and Holland would be in ruins.At the height of its glory, it was a decisive factor in European politics.At the time, a prominent and powerful figure in the country estimated that the land of the Netherlands was unlikely to support one-eighth of its inhabitants.The country's manufacturing industries are numerous and important, however, their growth has been much slower than interest in shipping.The barrenness of the land and the indefensible nature of the coast drove the Dutch to fish in the first place.Subsequently, the discovery of ways of processing and preserving fish gave them material for export, in addition to domestic consumption, and thus established the basis of their wealth.So the Dutch became merchants at a time when the Italian republics were under the pressure of Turkish hegemony and were beginning to decline due to the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope route.As a result, they became the heirs of the states and islands of the eastern Mediterranean and of the great Italian trade. The Dutch also benefited further from their geographical location.As the mediators between the Baltic countries, France, the countries along the Mediterranean Sea and the major river ports in Germany, they soon took almost all the transit business in Europe.Wheat was traded with the naval stores of the Baltic states, Spain with its colonies in the New World, French wine and coastal trade, no more than two hundred years ago, were transported, however, by Dutch fleets.Most of the British entrepot trade was done in Dutch ships even then.This is not an attempt to create the illusion that all this prosperity stems solely from the meager nature of the Netherlands.Things in the world cannot be created out of nothing.The reality is that, because of the poverty of their people, they were forced to throw themselves into the sea, coupled with their virtuosity in the art of navigation and the size of their fleets, through the spirit of exploration and With the rapid expansion of business, they are in a profitable position.There were other factors going on at the same time, yet their whole prosperity rested on the power of the seas bred out of their poverty.Their food, clothing, raw materials for production, timber and hemp nooses they used to build and fit their ships (they built almost as many ships as all of Europe) had to be imported.When a disastrous war with England in 1653 and 1654 finally lasted eighteen months, their shipping industry came to a standstill, and sources of income, such as fishing, are said to have often been used to maintain the country's wealth With commerce, it is close to the point of desperation. Factories and workshops have closed down one after another, and production activities have ceased.There are no ships going to sea in the port, and it has become a world full of masts.The land is full of beggars, the streets are overgrown with weeds, and there are fifteen hundred houses in Amsterdam that are not rented.Only a humiliating peace deal saved them from total destruction. This tragic outcome shows the ills of a country that relies entirely on external resources to play the role it is playing in the world.A large number of conclusions can be drawn from this.The situation in Holland at that time bears a very strong resemblance to that in Great Britain today, owing to differences of conditions which need not be stated here clearly.Although there seems to be a slight sense of honor in their respective countries, history is a living prophet, warning that the continuation of domestic prosperity depends mainly on the maintenance of sea power.People may all be dissatisfied with the lack of political privileges, but they are all the more disquieted if they are increasingly deprived of bread.It is more meaningful for the Americans to note that the consequences of maritime supremacy originating in the extent, amenity, and opulence of the land in France are reproduced in the United States.Initially, their ancestors had only a small piece of land near the sea, and although it was almost undeveloped, some of the land was still rich and productive.There, ports are numerous and close to productive fishing areas.These material conditions plus the innate love for the sea, the impulse in the blood of the British is still jumping in their veins, so that the trends and pursuits that a healthy maritime power depends on can always be full of vitality.Almost every piece of land in the most primitive colonies was either near the sea or by a major tributary.All imports and exports tend towards a coast.Interest in the sea and an intelligent appreciation of its role in the public good spread easily and widely among the populace.A more influential motive than concern for the public interest was also active, for shipping became a lucrative private enterprise, with shipbuilding materials plentiful and relatively few other investments required. But the center of power is no longer based on the seashore.Books and newspapers competed to describe the splendid development and untapped wealth of the inland regions, where capital could find its best investment objects and take advantage of its greatest development opportunities.The sea frontier is neglected and politically dead, as is the case with the Gulf and Pacific coasts, and the Atlantic coast is relatively close to the heart of the Mississippi valley, when the days of the shipping bonanza rising again, when the three major As the sea frontiers find themselves not only militarily vulnerable, but also impoverished by the lack of national shipping, their concerted efforts may help to once again lay the foundations of our maritime supremacy.Until then, those who previously ignored the limitations of maritime power because of France's achievements may have some introspection, and they cannot ignore the significance of developing the ocean because of the abundance of domestic wealth. Among the restrictive natural conditions, one may perhaps notice a long peninsula in a form similar to that of Italy, divided by a central mountain range into two narrow strips, on which the roads linking the different ports wind their way.Only absolute control of the sea could fully secure such lines of communication, for there was no way of knowing where an enemy force from beyond the visible line of sight might attack.However, so long as a sufficient sea force is stationed in the central part, it can be expected to attack the fleet approaching its bases and lines of communication before very serious losses are caused.狹長的佛羅里達半島上，其底端就是基維斯特，儘管半島地勢平緩且人煙稀少，然而，對它的第一印象就是其呈現的狀況類似於義大利。這種相似性或許還僅僅是表面上的，可能的是，如果墨西哥灣成了一場海戰的主要戰場，由陸地通往半島底端的交通線或許將事關重大，十分容易遭受攻擊。 當海洋不僅成為邊界，或者四面環海，而且還將一個國家隔開成兩個或更多的部分，那麼對於它的控制就不再僅僅是眾望所歸，而且也是絕對必需的了。這樣一種自然狀況要麼產生和增強海上霸權，要麼就使得國家變得軟弱無力，這就是目前義大利王國連同其薩丁島與西西里島的狀況。因此，還在其年輕並且依然存在著財政窘困時，他們卻能發現這點並做出富有勇氣與眼光的努力，建立起一支具有戰鬥力的海軍。他們甚至認為，一旦擁有一支決定性地優於其敵手的海軍，義大利就能比起其本土來，更好地將其霸權樹立在各島嶼之上。正如所指出的那樣，半島交通線的不穩定，必將十分嚴重地使一支為對立民眾所包圍且受到來自海上的威脅的入侵軍隊陷入困境。 分隔不列顛諸島的愛爾蘭海，與其說是一種實際分割，還不如說類似於一個港灣，但是歷史已經顯現出了從中對聯合王國的威脅。在路易十四時代，當法國海軍幾近與聯合的英荷不相上下之時，在愛爾蘭卻存在著最為嚴重的糾紛，當時這個島國幾乎完全處於土著與法國人的控制之下。儘管如此，愛爾蘭海與其說是法國人的一個優勢，還不如說是對英國人的一個威脅一個在他們交通線上的薄弱環節。法國人並沒有冒險將他們的戰列艦開進到這片狹窄的海域，而試圖強行登陸的遠征隊也是把目標指向在南部與西部的英國海港。在最為至關重要的時刻，大法蘭西艦隊被派往了英格蘭南部沿海，在那裡，它決定性地擊潰了同盟軍；與此同時，二十五艘護衛艦駛往聖喬治海峽，攻擊英國的交通線。在奮起反抗的人民之中，駐紮在愛爾蘭的英軍岌岌可危，只是由於博因河一戰及詹姆斯二世的逃往法國才得以倖免於難。進攻對手交通線的舉措嚴格而言是戰略性的，而它對於目前的英國所具有的危險性，仍與一六九○年相同。 同一世紀的西班牙，當其各部分尚無法由一支強有力的海上力量聯結為一體時；他們為這種分隔所導致的劣勢而付出了發人深省的教訓。當時，它仍握有只是它昔日顯赫一時的殘餘尼德蘭（今日的比利時）、西西里，以及其他一些意大利土地，更不用說起其在新大陸所擁有的廣闊殖民地。然而，西班牙的海上實力一落千丈到這種程度，以致於當時一位博學多才、頭腦清醒的荷蘭人宣稱在西班牙，所有的海岸都航行著荷蘭船隻，自一六四八年和約以來，他們的船隻和海員如此稀少，以致於他們開始公開租用我們的船隻駛往西印度群島，而在那裡，他們先前總是小心翼翼地將所有外國人趕出來的十分明顯，他接著說，西印度群島作為西班牙的軟腹部（因為幾乎所有的收入都從中榨取），必須要由一支海上力量才能與西班牙之頭腦連結起來。那不勒斯與尼德蘭就像兩支胳膊，他們不可能為西班牙賣命效力，因此，除了以航運的方式外，也將一無所獲所有這一切在和平時期皆能為我們的船隊輕而易舉地做到。在戰爭時期我們則能以此相撓。 半個世紀以前，薩利，這位亨利四世的重臣，就曾形象地把西班牙刻畫為作為一個腿與胳膊強健有力，然而心臟卻無限衰弱與疲軟的國家之一。自從其誕生之日起，西班牙海軍就不僅遭受到災難，而且還被一掃而光；其國家不僅蒙受了奇恥大辱，而且也是江河日下。一言以蔽之，其後果是，航運業損失殆盡，製造業也隨之而消亡。西班牙政府依靠各種支撐，不只是取決於遍及五湖四海的健康的工商業它們可以承受住許多壓倒性的打擊，而且取決於通過來自美洲的運寶船滴淌不息的細細的銀流。只是這些船隻本身時常輕易地遭受到敵國巡洋艦的攔截，半打西班牙大帆船的損失就不止一次地使其活動癱瘓達一年。當尼德蘭大戰曠日持久之際，荷蘭人對於海洋的控制，迫使西班牙不得不通過漫長而又代價高昂的陸地行程而不是通過海路來派遣它的軍隊。同樣的原因又使得它陷於必需品的困境而不能自拔，以致於通過一項與當代思維格格不入的相互協議，即它的必需品要由荷蘭船隻來供應，由此又維持住了他們國家的敵人。作為回報，荷蘭人得到的是在阿姆斯特丹交易市場上倍受青睞的香料。在美洲，在得不到國內的援助的情況下，西班牙人竭盡所能地躲藏在城堡後進行自我保護；在地中海，他們得以免受屈辱與傷害，主要是由於荷蘭人的漠不關心，因為法國人與英國人還沒有為那裡的控制權而展開競爭。在歷史的長河中，尼德蘭、那不勒斯、西西里、梅洛卡、哈瓦那、馬尼拉與牙買加，在此一時或彼一時，從這個並不擁有航運力的帝國紛紛易手。簡而言之，儘管西班牙在海洋上的無能或許本應當主要成為其全面衰落的一個徵兆，然而，它卻成為了促使其跌入這個至今它還沒有完全冒出頭來的深淵的明顯因素。 除去阿拉斯加，美國並沒有外部的佔據之地沒有一英寸土地不能從陸地上到達，從特徵上看，其輪廓到達了並沒有呈現出多少特別薄弱之處的地步，邊界地區所有的重要地段都能迅速到達通過水路時，成本低廉；通過鐵路時，快速敏捷。防禦最為薄弱的太平洋地區，則距離潛在敵手中最具危險性的攻擊手段十分遙遠得多。與目前的需求相比較，美國國內的資源可謂無窮無盡。我們可以無限期地在我們的小角落裡傲然獨尊這是一位法國軍官對於作者表述的想法。然而，一旦通過地峽，一條新興的商業驛道侵入這個小角落，或許美國就應該猛然警醒，面對那些擠掉了美國在所有民眾、海洋之中共同分享與生俱來的權利與份額的人。 三、領土範圍 最後一個影響國家作為海上強國而崛起，並就國家而言，自別於居住在那裡的民眾的條件，這就是領土範圍。用相對較少的寥寥數語，或許就能將其打發了。 就海上霸權的形成而言，它並非指一個國家所擁有的平方英里的總數，而是必須加以考慮的海岸的長度及其港口的特徵。關於這些，據稱，在地理與自然條件一致的情況下，依據人口多少而定，海岸長度就成了強大或弱小的癥結。在這一點上，國家就像是一座城堡，警備部隊必須被派駐於城郭之上。在美國南北戰爭中還能找到最新的相似事例。如果南方人數眾多就如同其好戰一般，有一支能夠作為一個海上強國且與其他資源相稱的海軍，那麼，其海岸的巨大規模與擁有為數眾多的港灣本來是能夠成為龐大力量的基本因素的。合眾國的民眾和那時的政府應該對於封鎖南方整個海岸的有效性而自我慶幸。這是一項了不起的功績，一項十分了不起的功績。然而，如果南方人口更多且是全民皆海員的話，本來這是一項幾乎不可能的事情。正如所說的那樣，這裡所要顯示的並非這樣一項封鎖是如何得以維持的，而是只有在一群不僅不習慣於水性，而且為數甚少的民眾面前，這一封鎖才是可能的。那些能回想起封鎖如何得以保持，以及在戰爭的大部分時間裡參與封鎖艦船等級的人，深知這一計畫，在那時具體的環境中尚屬行得通，然而，在一支真正的海軍面前卻不可能得以執行。合眾國的艦船沿著海岸稀疏地分佈著，相互無法支援，它們單獨或一小組地堅守各自的陣位，面對的著卻是廣闊的內陸水路交通線絡，這一網絡對於敵軍的秘密集結大有助益。在水上交通第一線的背後就是漫長的港灣，四處散佈著固若金湯的堡壘，依賴它們，敵軍艦船永遠都可以為了逃避追殺或尋求保護而退據其中。如果有一支南方海軍能夠充分利用自己的這些優勢，或者合眾國方艦船零零落落的劣勢，後者本來也是不太可能如同它們當時那樣配置的，並且還將可能集結以進行相互支援，從而為南方商業打開許多小的但卻有益的途徑。 然而，從其範圍廣與港灣多的角度看，正如南方海岸本來可以成為一種力量的來源那樣，由於策略與軍隊構成，這些特徵卻成了眾多傷害的根源。開啟密西西比河的偉大故事就是對正在整個南方持續不斷展開的行動的最具感染力的說明。在海疆的每一個缺口處，戰艦正在長驅直入，昔時滿載財富，支撐這個反叛國家貿易的河流，如今已開始反戈一擊，坐視它們的敵人直逼其心臟地帶。根據更為樂觀的估計，在那些經過最為精疲力竭的戰爭，本來還可以使得一個國家保存下去的地區，卻在四處彌漫著失望、不安全感與無能為力。海上力量從來沒有比在這樣一場競爭中扮演過更大或更具決定性的角色。 這場競爭決定了世界歷史的進程將在北美大陸呈現出的景觀是一個偉大國家而不是幾個相互敵對的國家。儘管對於昔時應得的榮耀可以感到正當的自豪，對於由於海上的壓倒性優勢而產生的結局的輝煌應予以承認，然而，瞭解事實真相的美國人應該對國人那種過份自信加以提醒：南方不僅沒有海國，不僅不是一個海洋性的群體，而且其民眾也沒有被恰如其份地派駐到本應必須加以防範的瀕海地帶。 四、人口數量 在思考完畢一個國家的自然狀況後，緊隨其來的應該是對於作為影響海洋權力成長的其人口特徵的一番考查。由於其與領土範圍的關係這已在剛才討論過，首當其衝的應該是居住於其中的民眾數量問題，正如所述，就其層次而言，這並不僅僅只是平方英里的數目，而是必須加以考慮與海上權力相關的海岸範圍與特徵。因此，就人口而言，這並非僅僅是指純粹的總數，而是指從事於海洋事業的人口數量，或者至少能夠迅速為航海業所使用且從事海洋物質生產的人口數量。這些必須加以計算。 例如，在法國革命以前和直至緊隨法國革命而來的波瀾壯闊的戰爭結束之際，法國的人口都比英國要多得多，然而一般就海洋權力而言，無論是和平貿易還是軍事效能，法國都要比英國大為遜色。就軍事效率一事看，事實就更為明顯。因為在戰爭爆發之初的軍事準備方面，法國通常佔有優勢，然而，它卻不能維持住。因此，在一七七八年，當戰爭爆發時，通過其海上動員，法國能夠迅速控制住五十艘戰列艦。而英國則正好相反，由於其海上力量所充分依賴的船隊遍及全球，要想在本土集結四十艘戰列艦都困難重重。然而，在一七八二年，它已有一百二十艘戰列艦投入或準備投入戰爭，而法國則從來沒有超過七十一艘。遲至一八四○年，當兩個國家再度於地中海東部劍拔弩張，大戰一觸即發之際，一位當時十分傑出的法國軍官，在一方面極力頌揚法國艦隊極高的效率狀態及其海軍統帥與眾不同的素質，表達對於與一個旗鼓相當的對手發生遭遇戰的結果充滿信心的同時，他繼續說道：在我們當時所能集結到的二十一艘戰列艦隊伍之後，就不再具有了預備隊，沒有別的艦船可以在六個月以內投入現役。這並非僅僅由於缺乏艦船與適當的裝備，儘管兩者當時都青黃不接難以為繼。我們的海上動員已由於我們的所做所為（集結了二十一艘戰艦）而精疲力竭到這種地步，在各個方面所建立的永久徵召制度卻不能徵集到足夠的後備力量，為那些已經巡遊了三年多時間的人提供休整的機會。 諸如此類的鮮明對照顯示出了所謂的永久實力或預備力量中的差異性。這甚至比起表面上顯現出的還要大。因為，除了船員以外，一支飄浮在外的龐大船隊還必須雇傭一大批從事各種手工勞作的人員。他們的手藝有利於製造與修繕海洋裝備，或隨後的或多或少的與海洋有關及具有各種技巧要求的其他行業。從一開始，這類同質性行業就毫無疑問具備了對於海洋的傾向性。這裡有一件有關一位英國傑出的航海家愛德華‧皮洛爵士顯示出對於這一問題奇特洞察力的軼事。當一七九三年戰爭爆發時，一向征招不齊的海員務必得以補充。皮洛急於出海迎戰，然而除了使用陸上人員以外，別無他法可以補充其人員編制的缺額。他命令手下軍官去招募柯尼希礦工；從條件與他們職業的危險性對此他本人深有體會推斷，他們將會很快適應海上生活的需要。結局證明了其明智之處，並且避免了採用其他方式將必然造成的延誤。他還十分走運，在一場戰鬥中，捕獲了整個戰爭中的第一艘護衛艦。尤其富有啟發意義的是，儘管他的礦工士兵投入現役才只有幾個星期，而他的對手卻呆了一年多，儘管雙方都損失慘重，但卻幾乎旗鼓相當。 或許可以認為，諸如此類的預備力量如今已失去了其一度擁有的那種重要性。因為現代戰艦與武器裝備的製造耗時甚長，現代國家意在發展武裝部隊的全面實力，打算在戰爭之初，就能以迅雷不及掩耳之勢，在其敵人能夠做出同等的努力之前，即予敵以毀滅性的打擊。使用一個為眾人所知的術語，那就是沒有時間再讓國家結構的全面抵抗一露身手了。打擊將會降臨到組織起來的海軍艦隊頭上，如果艦隊失敗了，那麼，國家結構其餘部分的穩定性統統都將無濟於事。在某種程度，這一點是正確的，然而，在當時，這卻總是正確的。過去只是在程度上不如現在，假定兩支艦隊迎頭相撞，它們在實際當中代表著它們兩個國家全部現役的實力。與過去相比，眼下就被殲一方想要為著那場失敗再度復活其海軍的希望就要渺茫得多，結果將會是災難性的，其程度與這個國家對於海上霸權的依賴度相適應。如果當時英國艦隊正如同盟軍艦隊那樣，代表著整個國家實力的整體，那麼，特拉法加一役本來對英國造成的打擊要比對法國致命得多。在這種情況下，特拉法加之對於英國正如奧斯特裡茨之對於奧地利，吉納之對於普魯士。一個帝國本將由於其武裝力量的殲滅或潰散而被迫屈膝，據稱，這正是拿破崙嚮往的目標。 所以，過去對於這類罕見的戰爭災難的思考足以證明，不重視基於適應一定種類的軍事生活的居民數量之上的預備役力量是有欠考慮的。這一點在此還將加以考查。剛才所提及的那些打擊是由具有特殊天才的人物給予的，並且對準了訓練特殊的武裝團體的頭部。除此之外，團隊精神與榮譽感也會由於甘拜下風與先前敗績累累而或多或少遭到打擊。緊隨著烏爾姆一役後，便見奧斯持裡茨戰役，二萬名奧地利人不發一槍一彈，便放下了武器。先前歲月的歷史就是一部奧地利不斷受挫而法蘭西凱歌高奏的歷史長卷。特拉法加緊接著幾乎是持續不斷地失敗。進一步追溯上去，則是在神聖同盟的艦隊裡，西班牙人在聖文森特，法國人在尼羅河的回憶，並且距離我們還並不遙遠。除了吉納的情況以外，這些毀滅性的打擊並非單個的災難，而是最後一擊。在吉納一役中，在人員數量、武器裝備以及一般的備戰狀況方面，都存在對比懸殊的狀況，這就使得其在考慮從一場單一的勝利中會有何結果時，變得不太那麼適用。 目前，英國是世界上最偉大的海洋國家。在蒸汽與鋼鐵的時代中，它保持住在風帆與木材的日子裡所擁有的那種優勢。法國與英國是擁有最大規模作戰海軍的兩大強國。迄今為止，兩者之中究竟誰更加強大有力，尚有眾多爭議。實際上，它們或許可以被看成在海戰的物質力量方面棋逢對手，將遇良材。在發生衝突的情況下，是否可以假定人員或戰備方面的差異，能夠導致一場戰鬥或一次戰役決定性的力量失去平衡呢？如果不是這樣，那麼，預備性力量將要開始作出解答，首先是有組織的儲備力量，其次是海洋性人口的儲備、機械技巧的儲備、財富的儲備。現在仿佛已有點淡忘英國在機械工藝上的領導地位使其具有的機械工程人員的預備力量。他們能夠使自己輕而易舉地熟悉掌握現化重型鐵甲下的工具；而當其工商業倍感戰爭重負之時，多餘的海員與技師又將投身於武裝航運之中去。 有關建立或不建立預備力量的價值的問題現在可歸結為：現代條件下的戰爭是否已使得這種情況成為可能，即兩個勢均力敵的對手中，一方將會僅僅在一場戰役中告負而決定整個戰爭勝負天平的指向？海上大戰並沒有作出回答。普魯士對於奧地利，德意志對於法蘭西的壓倒性勝利，看起來都是一名強者對於一個弱小得多的國家的勝利，而無論這種弱小是由於自然因素，還是官方的無能。如果土耳其還擁有國家的儲備力量可以徵用，那麼，類似於普萊文之圍（Siege of Pleven）的那種軍機延誤本又將會如何影響戰爭的勝負呢？ 正如每一處都承認的那樣，如果時間在戰爭中是一個極其重要的因素的話，它應該使得那些其才能實際沒有用在軍事上，其民眾正如所有自由人民一樣。反對供養規模龐大的軍事組織的國家，感到有義務促使其自身支撐足夠的時間，使它們的臣民的精神與才幹得以轉化成為戰爭所需的新努力。如果現存在陸地或海上力量能夠據力堅守，即使處於劣勢，這個國家或許還能依賴其自然資源與即將投入的力量，物盡其值其民眾的數量、財富以及各種才能。另一方面，如果它所擁有的力量被迅速摧毀消滅，那麼最為可能的是，自然的力量也無法使其擺脫屈辱的境地，而且，如果其對手尚屬明智的話，還不會讓其免除抵押品的重負，這將使其伺機復仇的機會被推到一個十分遙遠的未來。在更小的戰爭領域內，這種故事在持續不斷地反覆傳播著：如果某某能堅持得更長一點，這就能加以拯救了或那個就能成功了；又如在醫療上，經常就說：如果病人能夠挺下去，其體質的力量就能使他度過險關。 在某種程度上，英國現在就是這樣一個國家，荷蘭也是這樣一個國家。如果能僥倖逃脫的話，它就不會付出代價。在和平時期並且也擔心鬧翻，他們的偉大國務活動家德維特寫道：然而，他們卻永遠也不會決心明確到足以使他們事先在金錢上作出犧牲。荷蘭人的性格就是這樣，除非大禍迫在眉睫，否則，他們就不會為他們的防務支付錢財，我與這樣一幫人打過交道，在應該節省的地方，他們隨心所欲地大肆揮霍，在應該有所花費的地方，他們又經常惜財如命。 我們自己的國家應遭受同樣的譴責。對於全世界而言，這都是顯而易見的。美國目前還沒有那個防禦性力量的盾牌，使我們藏身其後就能贏得時間來發展其預備力量；至於滿足其可能需要的從事航海業的足夠人群，又在哪裡呢？這樣一種與其海岸線與人口相稱的資源僅僅只能在全國性的商業航運與其相關行業中才能找到，然而目前這些根本就不存在。如果能夠效忠於這杆國旗，那麼這些船隻上的水手們是否出身於本土或是國土，都將無關緊要。它在海洋上的力量足以使得他們當中的大部分人在一旦發生戰爭時，就能夠悉數集中。當數以千計的外國人被允許走向投票箱，那麼，他們獲得在艦船上的戰鬥空間，就不再是那麼難以辦到的了。 儘管這種處理本主題的方式有點不著邊際，但是卻必須承認，從事與海洋有關職業的龐大人群，一如既往的是海上權力的重要因素。美國就缺乏這種因素，而使之成長壯大的根基只能在自己旗號下那龐大商業活動中才能加以奠定。 五、國民性格 下一步將要討論的是國民性格與傾向性對於海上權力之崛起的影響。 如果海上權力真正建立在和平與廣泛的商業基礎上，那麼，對於商業追求的傾向性就肯定是在此一時或彼一時稱雄海洋的國家的顯著特徵。歷史幾乎毫無例外地證明這是千真萬確的，除了羅馬人以外，並不存在與此相反的明顯事例。 所有的人都尋求收穫並且或多或少地追逐金錢。然而，尋找收益的方式卻會對居住於一國之內民眾的歷史與商業運氣造成顯著的影響。 如果歷史還是可以值得信賴的話，那麼，西班牙人和與他們一脈相承的民族葡萄牙人，尋求財富的方式，不僅對其國民性格抹上了污點，而且對於健康商業的發展也是致命的。他們對於商業所賴以生存的那些行業，以及最終對於通過錯誤途徑所獲取的國民財富，都是如此。在他們當中升騰起的獲利欲望到達了如癡如狂的地步。因此，他們在美洲大陸的大肆搜尋，雖對於歐洲國家的商貿與海洋發展產生了一種動力，但其效果並不在新興的工業領域內，甚至還不是對於探索與冒險的一種健康向上的刺激，因為他們感興趣的似乎只是金塊與銀錠。 他們具有許多崇高的品質，他們勇敢，富有事業心，性格節制，吃苦耐勞，充滿熱情，並且具有強烈的民族情感。當這些品質融入西班牙的地理與所處優越的港口的長處時，事實是它成了佔據廣大而又富饒的新世界的急先鋒，並且長期以來仍無敵手可與之相提並論。在發現了美洲大陸後一百年的時間裡，它一直是歐洲佔據主導地位的國家。本來是可以指望它在眾多海洋強國中力拔頭籌的。然而結果卻恰好相反，這已眾所周知。自從加入神聖同盟在一五七一年勒頒多一戰之後，儘管還投入過許多次的戰爭，但再沒有任何是有重大意義的海上勝利在西班牙歷史的卷面上光彩奪目。其商業的一蹶不振足以能夠解釋在其戰艦甲板之上所顯示出的那種痛苦的並且時常是荒唐可笑的笨拙無能。毫無疑問，這一結果並不應僅僅歸結為一個原因，在許多方面，西班牙政府確定無疑地對私營企業的自由而又健康的發展進行了箝制與摧殘。然而，一個偉大民族的性格可以突破或塑造其政府的性格的。幾乎不容置疑的是，如果民眾傾向於商業，那麼政府的行為本來也是因循此道的，廣大的殖民地也是遠離著那種專制主義的中心的，而阻礙著古老的西班牙脫胎換骨的正是這一專制主義。事實是，數以千計的勞工與上流社會的人離開了西班牙。他們所從事的海外擴張活動，給予國內帶來的別無它物，只有香料，或少量的商品一小支船隊就能夠滿足其運載所需。而西班牙本土只能生產羊毛、水果與鐵器，其製造業也空白一片。 西班牙的工業飽經滄桑，其人口穩中有降。在如此多的日常生活用品方面，西班牙及其殖民地都得依賴於荷蘭人，以致於其本來就寥寥無幾的工業產品不足以與之對抗。因此荷蘭商人，一位同時代的人寫道，腰纏萬貫地奔波於世界大多數地方購買商品，肯定從這個歐洲國家找到了滾滾財源，並以此支付他們所購買的商品。就這樣，他們曾夢寐以求的財富的象徵很快就悄然離去。正如所指出的那樣，從軍事觀點上看，由於其航運的一蹶不振，西班牙是多麼的虛弱不堪，它的為數不多的財富運載於幾條船上，定期或不定期地穿梭於幾條航線之上，要為敵人所捕獲，可謂輕而易舉，不用吹灰之力，結果，戰爭的中堅力量陷入了癱瘓。而英格蘭與荷蘭的財富卻散佈於穿梭於世界四大洲五大洋的數以千計的艦船之上。它們在歷次精疲力竭的戰爭中屢遭重創，儘管十分痛苦，然而卻沒有遏制這種財富的增長，它始終是穩定的。在其歷史上最為生死攸關的時期與西班牙結為患難之交的葡萄牙，它的財富與後者如出一轍，也走上了一條同樣的下坡路。儘管在通過海洋競相發展的競賽之初，葡萄牙還能夠名列前茅，然而它卻最終被遠遠地拋到了後邊。巴西的礦場就是葡萄牙的墳墓，正如墨西哥與秘魯的礦場是西班牙的毀滅之地一樣。所有的製造業部門受到了不理智的鄙視，隨即英國人開始向葡萄牙不僅提供布料，而且還提供所有的商品、貨物，甚至於醃魚與穀物。為了追逐黃金，葡萄牙人背井離鄉；而奧波托的葡萄園最終卻被英國人用巴西的黃金加以收購，這些黃金只是通過葡萄牙之手，卻遍及於整個英格蘭。我們比較有把握的是，在五十年的時間裡，有五億美元榨取於巴西的金礦之中，並且在那段時間的最後關頭，葡萄牙只剩下了二千五百萬美元的香料了這是顯示在實際存在與子虛烏有的財富之間差異的一個令人觸目驚心的例子。 比起這些歐洲南部的國家來，英國人與荷蘭人並非不想發財致富。實際上，每一個國家都被依次稱為店主之國。然而，到目前為止正如其所存在的那樣，這一嘲諷應完全歸功於他們的明智與果敢。他們並不缺少勇氣，並非缺乏敬業精神，也不是沒有耐心，實際上，他們更具有忍耐力。正是憑藉於此，他們追求財富不是通過刀劍，而是通過勞作。這也正是那一綽號當中所隱含的意義。因此，他們選擇了通向財富最為漫長而非最為快捷的道路。然而這兩個民族基本上是同一種族，還具有其它品質，雖不如剛才所雲的特徵那樣重要，卻能與其周邊環境融為一體，有助於他們在大洋之上有所成就。就其根性而言，他們都是生意人、交易者、製造商與談判家，因此，在其本土與海外，無論是定居於文明國家的港口，或者是東方野蠻國家的口岸，還是他們自己開拓的殖民地，他們都在到處努力榨取陸地上的各種資源，竭盡所能地開發與增加這些尤物。生意人如果你願意的話，也可稱之為店主那種由上帝造就的需要持續不斷地尋求新的可供交換的物品，這一探索加上經過世代艱辛勞作培養而成的勤奮性格，必然促使他們成長為製造者。在國內，他們由於成為製造商而顯赫榮貴；在海外，凡所控制之處，土地更是富足，產品成倍增長，本土與殖民定居點之間必不可少的溝通與交換需要呼喚著更多的船隊。因此，他們的航運業隨著這些貿易的需求而持續看漲。而那些對於海洋事業並不那麼投入的國家，甚至於法蘭西本身，儘管它是一個大國，卻都得需要他們的產品以及渴求他們船隊的幫助。就這樣，在許多方方面面，他們逼近了海上霸權。由於其他政府的干預，這一順其自然的趨勢與增長確實時常被加以扭轉與嚴重的扼制。這些政府對於其本國民眾只能依賴於人為的支持才能佔有的繁榮嫉恨不已，而在政府行為的名義下，這種支持將會被視為是在刻意創造海上霸權。 對於建立海權而言，進行貿易的傾向這其中包括生產某種產品以進行交換的必要性，恐怕是最為至關重要的國民性格了。如果真是如此，再加上具有天然優良的海岸，那麼，來自於大海的風險，或者對此的任何憎恨與反感，都不太可能阻擋一個民族通過海上貿易的途徑去尋求財富。在以其他方式也能發財致富的時候，這種作法或許仍可以發現，然而，它卻並不一定導致海上霸權。以法蘭西為例，法蘭西具有優越的土地環境，一群勤奮勞作的民眾，一個使人羡慕的地理位置。法蘭西海軍有其眾所周知的光彩奪目的時期，即使處於最低潮的關頭，也從未使深為這個民族珍惜的軍事名望抹黑。然而，作為一個海洋國家這個國家必須穩定地立足於廣泛的海上貿易的根基之上，與其他歷史上以海為生的民族比較起來，法蘭西卻從未獲得過一個令人欽佩的地位。其主要原由，就國民性格而言，仍是對於財富進行追逐的方式。當西班牙與葡萄牙當年通過挖掘地表之上的金銀而追逐財富之時，法蘭西民眾的脾性卻在促使他們通過精打細算、節儉與積蓄的方式來達到這一目標。據說，看管財富要比掙得財富困難得多也許的確如此。然而，趨於冒險的性格在得大於失的情況下去進行探險，與為了進行貿易而征服世界的冒險精神具有諸多的相同之處。儲蓄與節儉的趨勢，進行謹小慎微與範圍狹窄的投入，可以導致財富在一個類似的較小規模方面的一般性分佈，然而卻不會產生探險與對外貿易及航運業的發展。為了解釋這一點之所以給出這一事例，僅僅因為它能物盡其值一位法國軍官曾說：其中我有兩個份額。在法蘭西，我們沒有如同你們一樣，每一個都持有眾多的份額。與我們一起，大量的民眾持有一個或非常之少的份額。當它們進入市場時，我的妻子就對我說：你有兩個份額，一個是你的，一個是我的。就一個人的私人財產