Chapter 3 　　

England has undoubtedly reached the pinnacle of maritime supremacy of any modern state.The actions of its government are striking, and in a general direction such action is continuous, though often far from laudable, firmly toward the goal of controlling the seas.One of the most insolent expressions dates back as far as the reign of James I.Outside of its three islands, it had hardly any foothold, and Virginia or Massachusetts had not had time to expand.Here is a passage from Richelieu: The duke of Salisbury, minister to Henry IV (one of the most chivalrous princes who ever lived), was confronted by Came across a British clipper waiting for him there.The commander of the latter ordered the French ship to lower the flag.The duke valiantly refused, thinking that his position would spare him such offence.This refusal, however, drew three cannonballs.The shell that pierced his ship pierced the hearts of all good Frenchmen.Power forced him into submissions that his power would not tolerate.

The English captain's answer to his grumbling was: It is my duty to make you respect his ambassadorship, and submit to the honor of the flag as master of the seas.Perhaps it would have been a little more polite if it had been King James himself.Probably no consequences other than forcing the duke to proceed with caution.The Duke will pretend to be content, but his wounds will always ache and will never heal.Henry the Great was obliged to mediate in the matter; but, on another occasion, resolved to maintain the power of his crown by a force which, by means of time, would enable him to gallop across the ocean.

This inexcusable brutality was not, in modern opinion, entirely alien to the national spirit of the time.What is chiefly remarkable is that, apart from England's original statement of the purpose of proclaiming her mastery of the sea at all costs, the insult was directed by one of its most cowardly princes at a man who directly represented the bravest and most knightly of France. Issued by envoys of rulers.The empty sense of honor called the national flag, which is a meaningless oath except as an external expression of the purpose of a government, has been persevering under Cromwell, just as it has been under the rule of kings. next same.It was also a peace condition agreed to by the Dutch after their disastrous war in 1654.Cromwell was by no means a tyrant in name only; he was acutely aware of all things England's fame and power at the moment, and determined to stride forward in the empty ceremonies of promoting them.At that time, the British navy had almost no hegemony at sea. However, it was under Cromwell's high-handed rule that this navy developed new vigor and vitality.All over the world in the Baltic, in the Mediterranean, in North Africa; the English fleet in the West Indies needs British rights or compensation for its atrocities.It was under Cromwell that the occupation of Jamaica kicked off the expansion of his empire by ship and gun that continues to this day.Equally strong and peaceful measures for the growth of England's trade and shipping must not be forgotten.The famous Cromwell's Navigation Act declared that all imports to England or its colonies must be transported exclusively in ships belonging to England itself, or to ships belonging to the country where the products carried were grown or produced.This decree, which was aimed specifically at the Netherlands, the public transport state of Europe at the time, was universally hated throughout the commercial world.However, in those years of national strife and national hostility, the advantage it brought to England was so evident that it was long sustained under the monarchy.

A century and a quarter later we found Nelson again.Before his vigorous career began, he showed his enthusiasm for the welfare of England's shipping industry by enforcing the same law in the West Indies against American merchant ships.After Cromwell's death, Charles II ascended the throne of his father.A king who, despite his habit of deceiving the English people, remained true to the honor of England and to the traditions of his government's maritime policy.He intended to make himself independent of parliament and the people, and in his treasonous collusion with Louis XIV, he wrote to Louis: There are two obstacles to a perfect union.The first is that France is currently working on creating a kind of commerce and trying to become a maritime power that can call the shots.This is one cause of our misgivings and we can only hold our own by our commerce and our naval power.So great is this cause that every step of action taken by France in that direction will increase the suspicion among the nations.During the negotiations between the two kingdoms for their notorious attack on the Dutch Republic, a moderate dispute arose over who should command the combined French and English fleets.Charles is uncompromising on this point.Control of the seas, he said, was an English tradition.He told the French envoy bluntly that his subjects would not obey him if he made concessions.In the planned partition of the United Provinces, he also won for England positions for raiding by sea, controlling the mouths of the Scold and Meuse.The English navy under Charles had for a time inherited the spirit and discipline created under the iron fist of Cromwell, although the general low morale of the English navy later became a major feature of its villainous rule.Munch had made the colossal strategic error of sending off a quarter of his fleet, yet in 1666 found himself in command of a vastly superior Dutch army.Regardless of what happened, he launched the attack without hesitation, and achieved brilliant results for three days in a row, although he also suffered some losses.Such an act is not war, but a single-minded pursuit of Britain's maritime position, which guides its actions.For the people of England and its government, this has long been their consensus and pursuit, but it took many centuries of ups and downs to establish the mysterious spell of final victory.Charles' successor, James II himself had a sailor background and had commanded two large-scale naval battles.When William III came to the throne of England; the English government and the Dutch government joined hands and continued to conspire to deal with Louis XIV wholeheartedly, and continued until the signing of the Utrecht peace treaty in 1713, establishing the maritime superiority over France.This process has gone through a quarter of a century.

The English government has become more stable and has clear goals, and continues to advance the scope of its maritime dominance and promote the growth of its maritime hegemony.As an avowed enemy, at sea, it struck France hard; as a cunning friend, at least so many believed, it drained the Dutch of their strength at sea.The Anglo-Dutch treaty stipulates that the Netherlands should have three-eighths of the sea power, while England should account for five-eighths, nearly twice the size of the Netherlands.Such a clause, and another, that even if Holland maintained an army of one hundred and two thousand men, compared with England's forty thousand, it would be practically throwing land wars to a country that would The war at sea was thrown to another country.Whether intentional or not, the trend is palpable.In the Utrecht Peace Treaty, the Netherlands received land compensation.In addition to the commercial privileges in France, Spain and the Spanish West Indies, England also obtained important maritime strongholds such as Gibraltar and Mahon in the Mediterranean, as well as Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and North America. of Hudson Bay.Since then, the sea power of France and Spain has disappeared from the horizon, and the navy of the Netherlands has also declined because of this. Instead, it is based in the Americas, the West Indies, and the Mediterranean Sea. Therefore, the English government can step by step change the Kingdom of England into the British Empire. path of.

In the twenty-five years following the peace of Utrecht, peace became the main goal of the ministers who held great power in the two maritime powers of England and France.However, during one of the most unstable periods in history, with continental political vicissitudes, petty wars and fleeting treaties everywhere, England's eyes were firmly focused on maintaining its maritime supremacy.In the Baltic Sea, its fleet contained Peter the Great's bad intentions against Sweden and maintained the balance of power in that sea area.It was from the Baltic that England obtained not only a great trade, but also the main source of its naval stores. It was the Tsar who was trying to turn the Baltic into a Russian lake.Denmark tried to establish a foreign-financed East India Company, and England and Holland not only prohibited their subjects from participating in it, but also threatened Denmark, thus preventing a project that they believed would run counter to their maritime interests.The Netherlands had been ceded to Austria by the Treaty of Utrecht, and by the Emperor's sanction a similar East India Company was formed with Ostend in Belgium as its port.This step meant restoring the lost trade to the Low Countries through the natural mouth of the Scoldes, a move which, of course, was opposed by the maritime powers of England and Holland.Greed for a trading monopoly position aided in this situation by France, which, after several years of life-and-death struggle, killed the company.In the Mediterranean, the agreement of Utrecht was disturbed by the Emperor of Austria, who was a natural ally of England in the configuration of European politics at the time.With the help of England, the emperor has already occupied Naples, and also declared that he would exchange Sicily for Sardinia, but was rejected by Spain.Its navy, which had just begun to revive under the command of an energetic minister, Serberoni, was in 1718 smashed and wiped out by the English fleet off Cape Pasano.In the second year, under the will of England, a French army crossed the Pyrenees Mountains, and finally completed the mission of destroying the Spanish docks and shipyards.

At this time, in addition to holding Gibraltar and Port Mahon in its own hands, England also held Naples and Sicily under the control of its allies, while one of its old enemies was beaten to a pulp.In Spanish America the commercial rights enjoyed by Great Britain were abused through an extensive and barely disguised system of smuggling, which had been usurped by Spain in times of difficulty.When the exasperated Spanish government went to extremes and turned to repression, the two English ministers, the peace and the war, argued, either for England's supremacy at sea, or for the effect it would have on England's reputation. Fight for it.England's policy was to steadily broaden and strengthen its own base of sea control, while the rest of Europe's governments seemed blind to the dangers posed by fear of the growth of its sea power.The bitter consequences of the arrogance of Spanish power long ago seemed to have been forgotten; the recent lessons of Louis XIV's ambition and the bloody and costly wars his exaggerated power had inspired seemed to have been forgotten. erased from people's memories.

In the eyes of European statesmen, a third overwhelming force is steadily and clearly growing here.It is destined to be used selfishly, aggressively, though not so ruthlessly, and more successfully than by any power that preceded it.This is maritime supremacy.Its movements, being much quieter than the clash of blades, are not so often noticed, though they are emerging clearly enough on the surface.It can hardly be denied that England's failure to establish control of the seas during almost the entire period chosen for our subject undoubtedly played a major role in the military factors that determined the final question.So far, however, this effect was foreseen after the peace of Utrecht.For the next twelve years, France was driven by the ruler's personal crisis to join forces with England against Spain.In 1726, when Fleury became prime minister in place of the Duke of Bourbon as the teacher of Louis XV, although his policy was reversed, the French navy was not taken seriously, and the only blow to England was a The Dauphin de Bourbon ascended the throne of the Two Sicilies in 1736, and the Bourbon dynasty was its natural enemy.When war with Spain broke out in 1739, the English navy was more than equal in numbers to the combined Spanish and French fleets.In the ensuing two decades of successive wars, this disparity in numbers has widened.During the war, England initially relied on intuition, but later realized that seizing this opportunity would most likely establish its unparalleled maritime supremacy, and the government took the initiative to guide it.Indeed, the rapid rise to power of a colonial empire had its foundations entrenched in the character of its colonists and the strength of its fleets.In strictly European affairs, its opulence, together with its sea power, enabled it to play, during the same period, an obviously significant part.The subsidy system, which began half a century before the Marlboro War and was most widely developed in the Napoleonic Wars half a century later, served as a transfusion of encouragement to its allies.Without these perks, its allies would be either crippled or decimated.Who can ignore a government that, on the one hand, bolsters its stunned allies on the Continent with a pecuniary lifeline, and on the other, drives its enemies from the seas and from their main holdings—Canada, Martinique, Colombia? Drop, Havana, Manila make their country the king of European politics?Who can fail to notice that the power concentrated in that government is small in land area, and its natural resources are so poor that it originates directly from the ocean?The policy pursued by the English government with regard to the war is clearly illustrated by a speech by Pitt.Pitt was an important representative of that historical process, although he was out of office until the process was over.Pitt lashed out at the peace of 1763 that his political opponents had concluded, declaring: France is chiefly, if not absolutely, our great enemy as a maritime and commercial power.In this respect, what we get must be worth something to us.After all, this comes from its pain.You gave France the possibility of a comeback and a comeback for its navy.However, England's harvest was very rich after all. Its rule over India was assured, and all of North America east of the Mississippi fell into its hands.By the time the trajectory of the English government's forward movement became apparent, it had drawn on the strength of tradition and followed it steadfastly.From the point of view of sea power, the American War of Independence was indeed a colossal blunder, into which the English government had been unwittingly involved by a series of natural errors.It casts aside political and constitutional considerations and sees the issue as purely military or naval.What happened was that, far from England, the American colonies became large and growing communities.Of course, so long as their hearts remained as passionate as they were at home, they could form a solid base for England's maritime supremacy in that world.But their extent and number, and their distance from England, were too great to hope to control them by violence, if any Power would do so.

This if contains a very obvious possibility.The humiliation suffered by France and Spain was so unbearable, and so fresh in their memory, that they must always seek revenge.It is well known that France is carefully but rapidly expanding its navy.If the American colonies had consisted of only thirteen islands, England's maritime supremacy would have quickly solved the problem.In fact, however, what arose was not that ordinary danger, which is separated only by narrow mutual suspicions, which is not so difficult to overcome.Deliberate entry into such a conflict, attempting to control by force such a vast land with such a large rebellious population, and at such a distance from the mainland, was destined to reignite the flames of the Seven Years War with France and Spain , and the population in the American colonies would rebel against England rather than support it.The Seven Years' War had become such a burden that a sensible government would have known it would not be able to bear the new burden, and it was necessary to appease the colonists of America.However, the government at that time was unwise, and a large part of England's maritime supremacy was sacrificed as a result.Of course, this was a mistake, not intentional; arrogance, not weakness.

Given the deterministic nature of the state of the country, a firm execution of a consistent policy is not difficult to achieve in England with its frequent changes of government.To some extent, singularity of purpose is only imposed.The steadfastness of its supremacy of the seas, the arrogance of its judicious readiness to maintain its military component, etc., are more due to the peculiarities of its political system.This system actually puts it in the hands of a class of landed aristocrats in times of government trouble.Such a class, whatever its flaws, is quick to accept challenges and execute a sound political tradition.Naturally, it is deeply proud of the country's honorable status.Relatively insensitive to the pain of the community that keeps this honor alive.It is willing to add to the financial burden of preparing for war and continuing it.And since it is a wealthy group, it will feel that these burdens are not too much.Being not commercial in nature, the source of this class's own wealth is not immediately at stake, and it does not share in the political prudence of those whose property is left unprotected and whose business is hit. timid.In England, however, this class was not indifferent to the good or bad of the trade which touched it.The two houses of Parliament competed for careful attention to its expansion and its protection, and one naval historian has attributed the growing efficiency of executive powers in naval administration to the frequency of parliamentary inquiries.Such a class also naturally absorbed and maintained a sense of military honor.This was crucial at a time when military organizations did not provide an adequate substitute for what is known today as teamwork.Although this class is rife with class sentiments and class prejudices, which make themselves as formidable in the Navy as elsewhere.Their practical thinking, however, left open the way from humble birth to the highest.In every age there are found men who have risen from the lowest ranks of the populace to the command of the navy.In this respect the temperament of the upper classes of England differs markedly from that of France.As late as 1789, at the outbreak of the Revolution, there was still an officer on the rolls of the French Navy whose mission it was to find evidence of noble birth for those trying to enter the Naval Academy.

Since 1815, and especially in our day, the English government has put so much into the hands of the common people that it remains to be seen whether its supremacy at sea will be compromised by it.Its broad roots still lie in a vast trade, a vast mechanical industry, and colonial institutions all over the globe.Does a democratic government have the foresight, a keen sense of the country's status and credibility, and a willingness to ensure its prosperity by investing sufficient amounts of money in times of peace, all of which are necessary for military readiness to still Still a matter of debate.Governments with a good public reputation generally dislike military spending, no matter how necessary.It was here that the signs of England's tendency to fall behind began to appear. It has been seen that the Dutch Republic distilled its prosperity and life from the sea to a degree even greater than that of England.The character and policies of its government were far less favorable to the continued maintenance of a sea power.The Netherlands consists of seven provinces, whose political name is the United Provinces, whose actual distribution of powers can be roughly described by Americans as an exaggerated example of the Länder Licensing Act: each of the Maritime provinces has its own Fleet and Fleet Command, and the ensuing suspicion.This tendency toward unorganization was partially offset by the enormous predominance of the provinces of Holland, which alone provided five-sixths of the country's fleet and fifty-eight percent of its tax revenue.As a result, it also takes a proportional share in directing the country's policies.In spite of the patriotism so strong that it was able to make the ultimate sacrifice for liberty, the commercial spirit of the people, however, permeated the government, so that the Dutch government should properly be called a merchant aristocracy.This has made this government loathe war and every expense necessary to prepare it.As mentioned earlier, until the danger was imminent, the mayors and elders were willing to reluctantly open their pockets for their defensive battle.Although the government of the Republic was eventually sustained, the expenditure on its fleet was, however, the least savage economy.Until the death of Johann de Witt in 1672 and the conclusion of a peace treaty with England in 1674, the Dutch navy was in a position to compete with the British and French combined navy in terms of numbers and equipment.The efficiency of the Dutch navy during this period undoubtedly saved the country from the ruin so carefully planned by those two kings.With de Witte's death the period of the republic passed, and what followed was the de facto monarchy of William of Orange.The monarch's lifelong policy was to counteract Louis XIV and the expansion of French power.The tendency for this resistance to take the form of a land battle rather than a sea force was entirely caused by England's withdrawal from the war.As early as 1676, Admiral De Rueter had found that the forces allotted to him could not stand alone against France.With the Dutch government's single-minded focus on land frontiers, the Dutch fleet soon declined.When William of Orange needed a fleet to escort him to England in 1688, the mayors of Amsterdam revolted that the navy had declined in strength and lost its ablest commander.After becoming King of England, this William III still retained the post of Supreme Administrator of the United Provinces, as well as his consistent European policy.He found the sea supremacy he needed in England and used the resources of the Netherlands for land warfare.The Dutch royal family agreed that Dutch naval admirals should be subordinated to lesser English officers when combined fleets negotiated wars.Dutch interests in the sea were sacrificed when the Dutch catered to England's needs.After the death of William III in 1702, his policy was still followed by his successors, and his purpose was completely concentrated on land.When the Treaty of Utrecht was concluded, the Netherlands had no access to marine resources, colonial expansion, or commercial interests because the Netherlands had no claim to the sea. Concerning the last battle of this series of wars, an English historian says: The Dutch calculations greatly damaged their prestige and trade.Their warships in the Mediterranean were always in short supply, and their convoys were so debilitated and poorly supplied that they lost five for every one we lost.This has to create a general impression that we are the more reliable shipping fleet.This is sure to have good results.In war, therefore, our trade is not reduced but increased. From that period on, Holland ceased to be a great maritime power.It quickly lost its lead among all nations made for that kind of sea power.It can only be said in fairness that, in the face of Louis XIV's continual hostility, no wise policy emerged to save this small, though determined, country from decay.The friendliness of France secured the peace of its land frontiers, which would have enabled it, at least for a longer period, to compete with England for dominion of the seas.Moreover, as allies, the navies of these two continental countries could have contained the expansion of the great maritime hegemony just considered.A peace at sea between England and Holland was only possible on the condition that one or the other submit, since the object of both was the same.Between France and Holland, it is another matter.The Netherlands fell first, not necessarily because of its size and population disadvantage, but because of the wrong policies pursued by the two governments.Of course, it is not our concern to determine who should bear greater responsibility. France's advantageous geographical location makes it suitable for holding maritime supremacy.It also received a set of definite policies that acted as guidelines for the government, passed down from two great rulers, Henry IV and Richelieu.Some kind of well-planned continental eastward expansion plan should be supplemented by resistance to the Austrian royal family, which controlled Austria and Spain at the time, and there must be a determination to resist England at sea.To achieve the latter goal, among other reasons, the Netherlands needed to be co-opted as an ally.Commerce and fishing should be encouraged as the foundation of maritime supremacy, and a combat-capable navy should be put into construction.Richelieu left what he called a political testament, in which he identified opportunities for French supremacy at sea, based on its location and resources.Therefore, French writers regard him as the actual founder of the French navy.This is not just due to the fact that he equips battleships, but from the breadth of his views and measures to ensure sound mechanisms and steady growth.After his death, Mazarin inherited his views and major policies, but he did not have his arrogance and martial spirit.As a result, nothing remained of that newly formed navy during his reign. In 1661, when Louis XIV took over the government himself, there were only thirty warships left in France, and only three of them were armed with sixty guns.Then began the most astonishing works of art which can only be accomplished by despotic governments, which are able and systematically carried out.The role of government in dealing with trade, manufactures, shipping and colonies was all given to a man of great political talent, Colbert the Chancellor.He worked with Richelieu and was able to integrate his ideas and policies.He achieved his goals in a thoroughly French spirit.All things must be organized, and the source of all things gathered in the cabinet of this great minister, to organize manufacturers and merchants into a mighty army, subject to a vigorous and wise and sound guideline. so that by order and concerted efforts an industrial victory may be won for France.To obtain the best products by imposing upon all workmen those processes which eminent men of caliber have deemed to be the best schemes, in order to incorporate seafarers and far-flung commerce into such vast systems as manufactures and domestic commerce, and as A support for the commercial power of France, creating a navy built on solid foundations and a power hitherto unknown.These, we are told, are the aims of two of the three links in the chain of Colbert's maritime supremacy.The same directives and organization of the government evidently involved the third link, the colonies at the far end of the horizon, for the French government had begun to redeem Canada, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and the French West Indies.These powers, which are regarded as pure, absolute and uncontrollable, are being gathered into the reins to guide the process of the country in their hands, so as to achieve a great maritime power. It is beyond our original intention to delve into the details of Colbert's actions.Noting the important part played by government in the making of the nation's sea power, and realizing that this great and great man did not focus on one underlying cause on which any sea supremacy rests to the exclusion of others, but in his wisdom and wealth It is enough to be inclusive in a visionary government.Agriculture, by which the produce of the land can be increased; manufactures, by which the output of human industry can be multiplied; domestic trade channels and regulations, by which the exchange of products from home to abroad can be made easier; In placing the transshipment trade in the hands of the French and the system of tariff regulation, and thereby encouraging the vigorous development of the shipping industry in France, whereby native and colonial products could be shuttled back and forth; colonial management and development , according to which a market far and wide may continue to grow into the monopoly of domestic trade; treaties with foreign governments in favor of French trade, and tariffs on foreign ships and products designed to crush hostile nations All these means, in endless detail, were employed to establish for France: (1) products; (2) shipping; (3) colonies and markets, in a word, supremacy of the seas.Such a research work is simpler and easier to be carried out by one person, and unfolded according to a certain logical process, than to slowly wander among conflicting interests in a more complex government agency. During the years of the Colbert government, the whole doctrine of sea power can be found put into practice in a systematic, centralized French manner.In the history of England and Holland, however, the interpretation of the same theory is scattered over several generations.Such developments, however, are only imposed and entirely dependent on the continuation of the absolute power that pays attention to it.Colbert was no king, and his position of control lasted only as long as he lost the king's favor, however, it is of great interest to note the proper field of the navy for which he toiled for government activities.In 1661, when he came to power, France had only thirty ships of war, of which only three had more than sixty cannon.In 1666, France had seventy ships of war, of which fifty were battleships and twenty fireships; in 1671, the number of seventy had risen to one hundred and ninety-six in 1683 France had one hundred and seven ships of war, of which twenty-four had one hundred and twenty guns, twelve carried seventy-six guns, and there were many more small ships.The introduction of laws and institutions in the docks made them far more efficient than in England.A British captain was serving his sentence as a prisoner in a French prison while the lasting effects of the Colbert Project were being lived on in the hands of his son.He wrote: When I first went to prison from there, I spent four months in the Brest hospital for my injuries.There, however, I was amazed at the control and equipment of the expedition ships, which I had until then thought impossible anywhere but England.In England we have ten times as many ships, and correspondingly ten times as many seamen, as we have in France.At Brest I saw twenty galleons, each with about sixty guns, and ready to go in twenty days; they were brought in, the sailors scattered, Once the order from Paris was received, the warships were reclined, the hulls were straightened, the cables were laid, supplies were replenished, personnel were manned, and they sailed again with incredible ease within the scheduled time.In the same way I have found warships armed with a hundred guns, which can keep all their guns in readiness for four or five hours.I don't think anyone in England can do this within 24 hours, and they can do it quite easily, and it is not so risky compared to England.這都是我在醫院的窗戶下看到的情況。 一位法蘭西海軍史學家曾經引用了一些根本就不可思議的成就，例如，四點鐘時一艘大帆船的龍骨被安置完畢，九點鐘時它就全付武裝地離港而去。用那位英國軍官更為嚴肅認真的話語來說，這些傳統可以被接受為指出了法蘭西體制與命令以及隨處可見的工作設施的非同尋常的程度。 然而這一奇蹟般地崛起完全是由政府的行為強加的，當失去了政府的恩寵之後，就如同先知約拿的葫蘆一樣萎縮了。沒有更多的時間能夠允許它的根系掙扎著深入到國家的生活中去。柯爾伯特的所作所為完全是黎塞留政策的內在延續，曾經一度看起來這一行為的過程將會得以堅持，使得法蘭西能夠在大洋之上威風八面，正如同在陸地上不可一世一樣。由於尚無需弄個水落石出的原因，路易逐漸對荷蘭懷有了深深的敵意。當查理斯二世也同有此感時，這兩位君主下定決心要消滅聯合省。這場於一六七二年爆發的戰爭，對於英格蘭來說，儘管更多地有悖於天然的情感，然而，對於它卻並不比法蘭西而更成其為一項政治上的失策，尤其是就海上霸權而言。法蘭西正在協助消滅一個可能必定也是不可或缺的盟友；英格蘭正在為自己摧毀其海上的最大對手在此時，確實還是其商業上的優勢敵人，而充當協助者的角色。當路易登上法蘭西的王位時，那個國家還在債務和對於其財政狀況的一籌莫展中徘徊掙扎。在柯爾伯特的改革下，法國已有某種令人興奮的結局，在一六七二年時正好發現柳暗花明又一村。這場燃燒了六年的戰火，使柯爾伯特所作努力的很大一部分頓時化為烏有。實業階級、製造業、商業以及殖民地皆遭此重創。柯爾伯特的體制一蹶不振，他在財政體制中所創立的法令被一舉推翻。路易的行動他一個人就是法蘭西的督導政府，破壞了其海上強權的根基，使它與最佳的海上盟友反目為仇。法蘭西的領土與軍事力量上升了，然而，商業與和平航運業的活力卻在這一過程中精疲力盡。並且，儘管法蘭西海軍在一些歲月裡還保持住了榮耀與效率，然而它不久就開始走上了下坡路，在路易統治末年則實際上已蕩然無存。至於海洋，同樣錯誤的政策為其長達五十四年統治的其餘時間深深地打上了烙印。除去那些戰艦以外，路易頑固地背離了法蘭西的海上利益，如果用於和平目的的航運與工業這正是它們得以支撐的一敗塗地的話，他要麼不可能，要麼不情願看到前者毫無用武之地且前途未蔔。路易的政策旨在通過軍事力量與領土擴張，瞄準歐洲的統治力量，這就驅使英格蘭與荷蘭攜起手來，成為戰時盟國。如前所述，這種聯盟直接地將法蘭西從海洋之上趕了出去，間接地由此又使荷蘭的力量深陷其中而不能自拔。柯爾伯特的海軍殞落了。在路易生命的最後十年時間，法蘭西再也拿不出像樣的海軍投入大海，儘管戰爭依然是連綿不斷，絕對君主制形式上的單一性就此強有力地顯示出政府對於海上權力的興衰成敗會有多麼之大的影響。 路易在其生命的後半部分親眼目睹了那種使自己的根基隨著法蘭西商業的削弱以及由這種削弱所帶來的財富的衰落而漸趨動搖的力量。隨後接任的法蘭西政府，就如同絕對制政府一樣，在英格蘭精心擺弄和明確的要求之下，居然放棄了所要建立一支能有效地進行戰鬥的海上力量的努力。其中的原委就在於，新國王尚未成年，而攝政王當時對於西班牙國王抱有深深的敵意，為了動搖其地位並且維護自身的權力，他與英格蘭同流合污，結成了盟國。為此，他在損及西班牙利益的情況下，協助英國支持奧地利法蘭西的宿敵，在那不勒斯與西西里確立起了支配地位，並與英格蘭並肩作戰，擊跨了西班牙的海軍及其造艦設施。在這裡，再度可以看到一位無視法蘭西的海上力量的統治者，他毀掉了一位天然的盟友，並且正如路易十四那樣，直接地或間接地、無意識地促成了一名海上霸王的崛起。當一七二六年，那位攝政王去世之後，這一政策上短暫的階段很快就過去了；然而，從那時直至一七六○年，法蘭西政府繼續無視其海洋利益。據說，確實由於其財政法規的某種明智的變動，主要在自由貿易的方向上（並由於羅，一位蘇格蘭血統的大臣），與東、西印度群島的貿易量奇蹟般地上升了，瓜德羅普與馬丁尼克島亦充足富裕，呈現出一派欣欣向榮的景象。然而，由於法蘭西海軍一蹶不振，因此當戰爭降臨時，它的商業與殖民地只好聽任英格蘭去加以處置了。一七五六年，當事情似乎已走出低谷時，法蘭西才只有四十五艘戰列艦而英格蘭此時卻擁有將近一百三十艘戰列艦，並且當打算對這四十五艘戰艦加以武裝與配備時，卻發現既沒有原材料，也沒有纜繩，更沒有補給用品，甚至還沒有火炮。這當然還不是全部。 政府制度的缺陷，一位法國著作者曾說，滋生了冷漠與無動於衷，開啟了通向無序與目無紀律的大門。不公正的提升從來也沒有如此頻繁，也從未見到過如此廣泛的怨聲載道。金錢與詭計取代了別的所有一切，相應地導致了命令與權力。對於首都具有影響力且能讓港口城市自給自足的貴族與暴發戶們自認為普天之下，老子第一。對於國家財政的浪費與港口碼頭的廢棄不計其數。榮譽與謙遜變成了滑稽可笑的東西。仿佛這些邪惡看起來還不夠大，內閣竭盡全力地試圖消除只是免於一般毀滅的過去的英雄般傳統。在法院的一紙命令之下，王朝繼承的難解難分的打鬥變成了一件謹慎從事的事情；一些戰艦成了被保存的廢棄材料，敵人得到了越來越多的機會。從這一令人沮喪的原則看，我們註定要被動挨打，其對於敵人的好處正如同為我們民眾的才幹不相稱一樣，這種在敵人面前的謹小慎微通過命令為我們所設置的從長遠來看，出賣了法蘭西的民族特性。對於這種制度的大肆濫用，滋生出了眾多倍受斥責的目無法紀與胡作非為，而在上一個世紀，想要找出僅僅一個這樣的事例都幾乎不可能。 大陸擴張的錯誤政策耗盡了這個國家的資源儲備，並且極其有害。由於使其商業與殖民地處於無法設防的境地，法蘭西使其最大的財富來源易於為敵國所攔腰截斷。正如所發生的事情那樣，冒然出海的小股海軍被擁有巨大優勢的對手消滅殆盡，商業性航運被掃蕩一空。殖民地中，加拿大、馬丁尼克、瓜德羅普與印度紛紛落入英格蘭之手。如果不是會占去太多篇幅的話，或許還能進行一些有意思的概述，以顯示法蘭西一個拋棄了海洋的國家，英格蘭不斷增加的財富正是建立在其犧牲與付出之上的這場可怕的災難。一位當代的著作者這樣表述了他對這一時期法蘭西政策的觀點： 由於全身心地投入到了與德意志的戰爭，法蘭西將其如此多的注意力與資金從其海軍身上挪走，以致於我們可以對它的海上力量進行一擊，使其或許永遠也不能夠恢復。它對德意志戰爭的投入同樣使它不能對其殖民地設防，這就意味著我們占據了一些為它所擁有的最為至關重要的部分。捲入戰爭使它無法保護自己的貿易，結果被完全摧毀了。而在意義極為深遠的和平中，英格蘭從來也沒有處於這樣一種欣欣向榮的狀況裡。就這樣，由於躋身於德意志戰爭，目前就其與英格蘭特別而又直接的衝突而言，法蘭西已自作自受了。 在那場七年戰爭中，法蘭西損失了三十七艘戰列艦與五十六艘護衛艦這是一支比在帆船時代的任何一個時期裡的美國海軍都要多三倍的力量。自從中世紀以來，第一次，一位法蘭西歷史學家在論及同樣一場戰爭時如此說，英格蘭單槍匹馬地制服了法蘭西，幾乎沒有任何盟友，而法蘭西卻有強有力的追隨者。它僅僅只是由於其政府的優越性而進行征服。是的，然而這是能夠運用其海上強權這是對於執著地朝向一個單一目標的連續性政策的獎勵這一令人望而生畏的武器的政府的優越性。 法蘭西的奇恥大辱在一七六○年至一七六三年間達到了無與倫比的地步，它不得不在一七六三年締結了和約。在我們這個商業與海軍頹廢時期，其對於合眾國留下了發人深省的教訓，使我們免受了它的那種恥辱，並企盼能從它隨後的事例中獲益。在同一時期內（一七六○年和一七六三年）法蘭西民眾揭竿而起，正如隨後在一七九三年那樣，明確宣佈他們需要一支海軍，公眾的情感受到了政府巧妙的指導，人云亦云地對法蘭西頭頭腦腦們進言：必須重振海軍。城市、團體及私人認購者獻出艦船的禮物，那些直至最近還死寂一片的港口鋪張豪華的活動層出不窮，到處都在建造或修理船隻。這一活動得到了延續；後勤倉庫得到了補足，各類物質都被置於令人感到滿意的堆積場所，火炮得到了重新調整，一萬名訓練有素的炮手得以集訓與維持。 此時海軍軍官們的語調與行動都迅即感受到了公眾的這種激情，確實，在他們之中某些高尚的精神不僅存在而且能夠起作用了。再也沒有什麼時候能象當時一樣可以發現法國海軍軍官們心底的激情與職業的素養了。因此，我們今天的一位聲名顯赫的法國軍官寫道： 由於對軍官們關閉了大膽創業與戰場取勝的光榮職業的大門，路易十五統治下海軍的糟糕狀況，迫使他們不得不自謀出路。他們從研究當中獲取了幾年之後就要加以驗證的知識，將孟德斯鳩的精闢格言困難是我們的母親，繁榮是我們的繼母付諸實踐。一七六九年時，法蘭西海軍軍官的活動足跡遍及到了世界的每一角落，在他們的著作與調查中涵蓋了人類所有的知識領域。他們群星燦爛，耀眼奪目，於一七五二年成立的海軍學院此時得以重組。 學院的前任院長是一位名叫比格特‧戴‧莫納秀斯的前海軍艦長，他寫出了一篇構思精巧的有關海軍戰術的論文。這是自保羅‧赫斯提以來有關這一領域的第一篇優秀作品，而且它還力圖青出於藍而勝於藍。莫納秀斯肯定早在法蘭西尚無艦隊，在其宿敵接連進逼而尚無法在海上嶄露頭腳的歲月裡，即研究和構思了其在戰術方面的問題。在同一時期裡，英格蘭還沒有類似的作品。一七六二年，一位英軍中尉才著手翻譯赫斯提大作的一部分，並且還省略掉了更大的部分。直至將近二十年之後，克拉克，一位蘇格蘭籍的無官職紳士，公開出版了有關海軍戰術的一部天才般的著述。他向英格蘭海軍統帥們指出，法蘭西的體制已經威脅到了他們毫無創造見地、組織拙劣的進攻戰術。法蘭西海軍學院的研究，以及它對於軍官們的勞作所帶來的富有活力的衝擊，並不是正如我們後來所希望顯示的那樣沒有對處於美國戰爭之初的海軍的相對繁榮的狀況產生過影響。 已經指出過，對於英國人來說，與美國人之間的戰爭與其傳統戰略方針相去甚遠，他們被迫去從事一場與本土相距甚遠的地面戰爭，而其強勁的敵手正在企盼著從海上對它發動進攻的機會，正如同處於當時迫在眉睫的德意志戰爭中的法蘭西，隨後處於西班牙戰爭中的拿破崙。由於不切實際地過份自信，英格蘭將盟友變成為敵人，使其霸權的真實根基去接受殘酷的考驗。另一方面，法蘭西繞開了它曾頻繁跌進的陷阱，轉而依賴於存在著中立可能性以及與西班牙結為盟友的確定性的歐洲大陸。法蘭西以一支裝備精良的海軍、一個光彩照人儘管或許有點相對經驗不足的軍官團，投入到這場角逐之中。在大西洋的彼岸，它贏得了一個友好民族的支持，還得到了自己或盟國在西印度群島以及大陸上的港口的協作。這項政策的明智之處，法蘭西政府這一行動對其海上實力的有益影響，都是顯而易見的。然而，這場戰爭的細節並不屬於主題的這一部分之內，對於美國人來說，那場戰爭的主要興趣只有在陸地上才能找到；對於海軍軍官而言，這種興趣只能來自於海洋，因為這在本質上就是一場海戰。二十年智慧與系統性的努力終於能夠結出了應得的果實，因為儘管大海之上的戰鬥以一場巨大的災難而告終，然而，法蘭西與西班牙艦隊的共同努力毫無疑問地消耗了英格蘭的實力，剝奪了其殖民地，在形形色色的海上任務與戰役中，總體上而言，法蘭西的名望得到了維護。 考慮到本文的一般性的主題，我們還是不能不提到這樣一個結論，即與英格蘭人相比較，法蘭西水手們的稚嫩；對於有著不同背景的人，貴族性的法蘭西軍官團所表現出的猜忌的狹隘精神；以及至關重要的、四分之三個世紀所暗示出的法蘭西那種可悲的傳統，一個訓導他們首先挽救戰艦、節儉原材料的政府的可悲的政策等，所有這一切都妨礙著法蘭西海軍統帥們獲得榮耀，並使之失去多次可為他們唾手可得的積極優勢。蒙克曾說過，統治海洋的國家必須永遠進攻。他為英格蘭的海上政策確定了基調。如果法蘭西政策的教義當中持之以恆地吸收著同樣的思想，一七七八年的戰爭本來是要比實際結束得更早，並且結果也更好些。看在上帝的份上，批評一個我們認為其誕生並不能說成是一種失策的軍種的行為或許算不上得體，然而其本國著作卻在層出不窮地反映出這種批評的精神。一位曾在這次戰爭期間服役於海上的軍官在其一本充滿著冷靜與明智口氣的著作當中說道： 當這群年輕的海軍軍官看到這些軍官無功而返時，他們對在薩地胡克與戴伊斯滕在一起、在聖克里斯多夫與德‧克雷斯在一起，甚至那些與戴‧特納抵達羅德島的人，會存有何種看法呢？ 另外一名時間上要晚得多的軍官，在下面的行文中談及美國革命戰爭時，為這種思想進行了辯護： 有必要擺脫掉攝政時期與路易十五時代那種令人憂鬱的偏見；然而，這其中充斥的不幸歷歷在目，以致於難以為我們的部長們所忘卻。由於災難性的優柔寡斷，本來足以震驚英格蘭的艦隊，減額到了令人覺得寒倫的地步。內閣小器吝嗇，作繭自縛，由於為維持一支艦隊所必需的經費的過度開支，必須下令海軍統帥部維持最大限度的謹慎，似乎在戰爭中，半途而廢的措施永遠也不會招致災難。因此，下達給我們編隊指揮官的命令也要盡可能長地維持下去，不要去進行有可能導致難以彌補的艦船損失的軍事行動。就這樣，本來可以讓我們的海軍統帥們的指揮藝術以及我們的艦長們的勇氣光彩奪目的不止一次的大捷，最終變成了一些無關痛癢的小勝。一種把海軍指揮官不得動用其手中的力量確定為一項原則的制度，使得他們在抗衡敵軍時就有了預先確定承受而不是發動進攻的目標。一項消耗道義力量以節省物質資源的制度，肯定會得出令人沮喪的結局可以肯定的是，這一令人傷感的制度是缺乏組織紀律與存在著令人瞠目結舌的缺陷這在路易十六、（第一）共和國與（第一）帝國時代打下深深的烙印的原因之一。 在一七八三年的十年後又爆發了法蘭西革命。然而，那場動搖了國家的根本基礎，鬆懈了社會秩序的紐帶並將幾乎所有固執地堅持舊有國家事物的君主制時代的訓練有素的軍官驅趕出了法蘭西海軍的大動盪，並沒有使法蘭西海軍免受錯誤制度的侵害。推翻政府的形式比起將根深蒂固的傳統連根拔起要容易一些。在這裡又可聽到第三位具有高軍銜並頗有文學造詣的法蘭西軍官論及維爾納夫的無能這位海軍上將在一七九八年的尼羅河戰役中統管著法蘭西艦隊的後方，在艦隊的先頭部隊正遭摧毀時卻按兵不動： 維爾納夫當值的那一天就要來臨，就像在他之前的德‧克雷斯，像迪亞拉，會不斷抱怨為其艦隊所拋棄不顧了，我們趨向於懷疑這一致命巧合的某種隱秘的原因。在眾多的名聲顯赫的人物中，居然發現如此之多的海軍統帥與艦長們發出諸如此類的責難，這是不正常的。這一天，如果他們當中某一位的大名不幸與我們對於那場災難的記憶相聯，我們或許可以肯定，這並不完全是他們自己的錯誤。反過來，我們應當抨擊他們所投入的那些行動的性質，以及為法蘭西政府所明確規定的防禦性戰爭的制度。這一點，皮特在英格蘭議會中就宣稱為某種毀滅的先期徵兆。當我們指望拋棄它時，這種制度已深深地滲透到了我們的習慣之中。換言之，它削弱了我們的武裝，破壞了我們獨立自主的能動性。我們的小型艦隊肩負著要加以完成的特殊使命且懷有逃避敵人的意圖而出港開赴的情況已經司空見慣，隨之而來的便是惡運立即降臨，正是因為如此我們的艦隊才投入了戰鬥。他們屈從於它而不是扼住它的咽喉運氣本來會在各支艦隊之間徘徊得更久長的，並且不會最終如此不利於我們，如果在半途與納爾遜不期而遇的布呂埃斯能毅然決然與之大戰一場的話。由維拉雷和馬丁指揮的這場磕磕碰碰、膽小如鼠的戰爭只是由於某些英格蘭海軍將領的小心翼翼與舊式戰術的傳統，才得以拖延了一些日子。尼羅河戰役的爆發，正是體現了這些傳統；決定性行動的時刻來臨了。 幾年後又迎來了特拉法加戰役，法蘭西政府海軍又提出了一項新政策，最後提及的那位作者再度慷慨陳辭： 皇帝敏銳地掃視著其艦隊的戰役計畫，正如其陸軍的計畫一樣，他對這些意想不到的挫折而深感憂鬱了。他將眼光從戰役的這一領域挪走，命運對他失去了信任。他決定在別的地方與英格蘭一爭高低，而不是海上；他同意重建他的海軍，然而卻沒有為它在已空前絕後地激烈的戰鬥中安排一個角色儘管如此，我們船塢的活動成倍增加了，遠沒有陷入鬆懈狀況之中。每一年，戰列艦要麼被建造，要麼被編入到艦隊之中去。在他控制之下的威尼斯與熱那亞再度顯示出昔時的光彩，從易北河的入海口直至亞德裡海的突出部，歐洲大陸所有的港口都在競相激盪起皇帝的創造性思維，難以數計的編隊彙聚於須耳德河、布列斯特灣、塔蘭然而，最後，皇帝卻拒絕給予群情激昂、自力更生的法蘭西海軍一次與敵人一決雌雄的機會接連不斷的損失使他精神頹喪。他維持著我們的戰艦僅僅只是為了讓我們敵人轉而採取封鎖政策，其巨大的代價必須通過耗盡其一切開支才能加以彌補。 當這位皇帝倒臺之時，法蘭西一共有一百零三艘戰列艦和五十五艘護衛艦。 現在讓我們從過去歷史所提取的特定教訓方面，轉移到政府對其民眾海洋生涯的影響這一一般性的問題上來。可以看出，這種影響以兩種明顯有別然而又緊密相聯的方式起作用。 首先，在和平狀態中：政府通過其政策可以有助於一個民族的工業的自然成長和加強通過海洋的方式尋找投資與獲利的趨勢。或者它還能嘗試著發展此類工業與此種走向大海的趨向，當它們並不天然存在時。另一方面，政府可能會由於錯誤的舉措，遏制與妨礙那些依賴民眾自己本來即可以取得的進步。在這些方式的任何一種當中，都能感覺到政府的影響：以和平貿易的手段，締造或破壞一個國家的海上力量。貿易，僅此一點就成了一支完全強大的海軍的基礎所在，這一點已是眾所周知的了。 其次，投入戰爭：政府的影響可以以其維持一支海軍的最為合法的方式加以感覺到，海軍的規模大小應與其航運業的增長和與它相聯繫的利益的重要性相稱。比起海軍的規模，更為重要的是其機構的問題。這包括考慮到其民眾的特徵與追求，贊同健康向上的精神與活動，在戰時，通過人員、戰艦的充份儲備與通過正如以前所指出過的徵用一般性戰備力量的方式，以便有利於迅速發展。毫無疑問，在類似於戰爭準備的第二個標題下，必然要述及維持適當的海軍基地，述及在戰艦必須尾隨著和平性商業船隻進入的世界的那些遙遠的部份。保護這些基地，要麼必須依賴於直接的軍事力量，正如在直布羅陀與馬爾他所做的那樣；要麼依託於分佈在四周的友善的人群，正如同美洲殖民地一度對於英格蘭一樣，並且還可以假定，澳大利亞殖民地現在對於英格蘭一樣。這樣一種友善的環境與支撐，配合以適當的軍事存在，則可成為最佳的軍事防禦。當它們與在海洋上的明確的優勢地位結合起來，就能夠使一個形體鬆散、範圍廣泛的帝國就如同英格蘭帝國那樣安然無恙，平安無事。在某個時段內，一場意想不到的衝突或許會引發一場災難這是完全可能的，而海上力量實際存在的優勢地位就能防止這種災難演變為普遍性的或失去控制，歷史已經充分地證明了這一點。英格蘭的海軍基地遍及世界的每一個角落。它的艦隊能夠立即保護它們，開通彼此之間的交通線，並依賴它們成為庇護的場所。 因此，隸屬於宗主國的殖民地成為了在海外支撐這個國家海上權力的最可靠手段。和平時期，在竭盡各種手段促進隸屬關係的溫情脈脈與利益協同一致方面，應該要感覺到政府方面的影響，使之覺得一榮俱榮，一損俱損。戰爭時期，或通過引入諸如將會使所有的人都感覺公正合理的承擔負擔並且每個人都能從中受益的組織與防禦措施，準備應付戰爭。 合眾國沒有這類殖民地，而且將來也不太能會有，關於純粹軍事性的海軍基地，合眾國民眾的情感，恐怕可以通過一位一百年前論及當時的直布羅陀與馬翁港的英格蘭海軍史學家來加以準確地表達。軍政府，他說，與一個商業性民族的勤奮格格不入，並且，就他們自己而言又與英格蘭民眾的才幹不相一致。我不奇怪所有通情達理的人和所有黨派的成員都傾向於放棄這些，正如同摩洛哥的坦吉爾港被放棄一樣。美利堅合眾國並沒有海外設施，無論是殖民性的，還是軍事性的，其戰艦一旦進入戰爭狀態，就會如同陸上之鳥一樣，不能飛離他們自己的海岸太遠。為自己的艦隊提供棲息之地，使之在那裡，可以加煤和進行修理，將是一個致力於確立起這個國家在海洋中的霸權地位政府的首要任務之一。 作為實際目標，這一研討就在於從能夠適用本國及軍種的歷史結論中提取教訓。現在就可以恰如其份地提問：為了重振其海上力量，美國的狀況使其能夠在捲入嚴重的危險，並且由政府方面採取行動上走多遠？可以並不過份地說，自從內戰開始至今，美國政府的一舉一動都在有效地專心致志地致力於造就海上霸權之鏈條的所謂第一個環節。國內的發展，巨大的生產能力，以及相伴隨的自給自足的目標與誇耀，這些都成為了目標，在某種程度上，也成了結果。在這一方面，合眾國政府令人信服地反映了這個國家控制性因素的傾向，儘管並不總是能夠輕而易舉地感覺到這些控制性因素在一個自由國家，甚至很難說這種控制性因素具有真實的代表性。然而或許是吧，毫無疑問的是，除了沒有殖民地以外，和平性航運業中間環節，以及涉入其中的利益所在，目前都同樣缺乏。簡而言之，合眾國只有三個環節中的一個。 在過去的一百年時間內，海上戰爭的環境變化如此之大，以致於人們懷疑，這些災難性的衝擊，以及那些光彩奪目的繁榮，現在是否還會重演？正如在英格蘭與法蘭西之間的戰爭所能看到的那樣，在它對於海洋穩固而又自傲的控制中，英格蘭對中立國強加了無法容忍的束縛，米字旗包容貨物的原則永遠不會變化。交戰一方的貨物可以因此由中立國的船隻安全地運載，至於後者，可以肯定也同樣如此。除開保護其港口，使之免遭佔領或徵稅的問題以外，並沒有更多的徒有虛名的封鎖。這一點，在理論上具有實際可行的一致性，在實踐中卻完全不是這麼回事。 合眾國的海上力量有何需求呢？它的商業甚至於今日還在由他人託運。一旦擁有，為什麼它的民眾希望付出極大的代價對此加以維護，到目前為止，這一問題都還是經濟學性質的，並不在這一著作的範圍之內。然而，戰爭給國家帶來災難與損失的條件卻直接與此相關聯，假定合眾國的進進出出的對外貿易，是運載於敵人不能輕易碰及的甲板船上除了船隻駛向一處被封鎖的港口之外，何種因素將會構成為一種有效的封鎖呢？目前的定義是，它能夠達到對尋求進入或駛離這一港口的船隻構成明確的威脅。很明顯，這是極其富於彈性的。許多人都還能記起美國內戰時期，在對查爾斯頓外的合眾國艦隊發起了一次夜襲之後，南方同盟次日上午即派出載有幾名外國顧問的汽船，這些顧問們認定了尚未發現任何封鎖船隻，便發表了一紙內容大致相似的聲明。有關這一聲明的力度，某些南方同盟的首領宣稱從技術上來說，封鎖已經破產了，並且沒有新的通知，在技術上也是不能重新確立的。為了對偷越封鎖線的船隻構成實際的威脅，封鎖艦隊是否有必要出現在視野以內呢？六艘在新澤西與長島海岸之間且離岸二十英里遊弋的快速汽船將對尋求通過紐約主入口進出的船隻構成真正的威脅。類似的位置也能有效地封鎖波士頓、特拉華與切薩匹克。封鎖艦隊的主力，不僅準備捕獲商船，而且還準備抵制打破封鎖的軍事企圖，它們無需暴露於視野之內，也不必處於一個為岸上所知的位置之上。 在距離特拉法加戰役還有兩天時，納爾遜艦隊的主力距離西班牙南部港口加地斯尚有五十英里之遙，只是有一支小型特遣隊抵近觀察這一港口。西班牙和法國聯軍艦隊於上午七時開始出發，而納爾遜甚至在那種時代的條件下，於九時三十分就得知了這一消息。在那個距離上的英格蘭艦隊對其敵人是一個真正的威脅。在還用海底電纜的時代裡，處於岸灘或岸灘之外的封鎖部隊，從一個港口到另一個港口，似乎有可能沿著合眾國的整個海岸線相互進行電報聯繫，迅速給予相互支持。通過某種頗為走運的軍事協同，如果一支先遣隊遭受攻擊，它就能向其他部隊發警告，並撤向他們。假如有朝一日對於某一港口的封鎖以參加封鎖的艦隻被趕跑的方式打破，下一步，其重新確立封鎖的安民告示可能還要電傳至全球各地。為了避免這樣一種封鎖，必須有一支水上軍事力量，它能時時刻刻地威脅著封鎖艦隊，使其無論如何也不能堅守其陣地。除了那些攜帶有戰爭違禁品者以外，中立國艦船可以自由來往，維持該國與海外世界的商業關係。 可以認為，具有漫長海岸線的美國，對其全線的封鎖是無法得以有效地維持的。對於那些尚能回憶起光是保持對南部海岸的封鎖就如何頭疼的軍官來說，再也沒有誰會比他們更為爽快地承認這一點。然而，在美國海軍目前的狀況下，試圖封鎖波士頓、紐約、特拉華、切薩匹克、密西西比諸巨大的進出口中心，將不致要求海洋大國的行動規模宏大到空前絕後的地步。在港口中仍有強大的艦隊編隊的情況下，英格蘭就曾同時封鎖過布列斯特、比斯開海岸、塔蘭與加地斯。可以正確地認為，中立國船隻的商業往來還能夠進入除了那些叫得上號的港口之外的其他美國港灣。然而，美國貨運交通的錯位，時常供需品的短缺，經過鐵路或水路運輸、船塢碼頭、駁船以及倉儲等手段的不足，將會出現在這一強制性地更換進出港口之中隨之而來的，將不會出現金錢損失、人身傷亡嗎？在付出極大的痛楚與代價之後，當這些弊端部分得以醫治之時，敵人或許就能被吸引到封鎖新的出入口的方面來，正如同他們封鎖原有的港口那樣。合眾國的民眾肯定不會產生饑荒，然而他們可能要深受其害，關於戰時違禁品的供應，一旦出現緊急情況，難道沒有理由擔心合眾國將被迫放棄我行我素、傲然獨立嗎？ 十分明顯，這個問題是，為了這個國家而締造一支海軍，如果它尚不具備抵達五湖四海的能力的話，至少能夠清理通向自己的主要途徑，而政府應該使其影響無所不在。美國的眼光已經有四分之一個世紀遠離了大洋。這樣一種政策以及與之相反政策的結局在法蘭西與英格蘭的事例中赫然醒目。這倒不是力圖在合眾國與兩個國家之中的任何一個進行一種狹隘的對比，只是可以有把握地說，在盡可能的範圍內，合眾國的貿易、商業狀況不會受到外部戰爭的影響，這對於整個國家的福祉都是至關重要的。為了實現這一目標，就必須使敵人無法靠近我們的港口，而且還要遠離我們的海岸線。 如果不重振商業性航運，會有這樣一支海軍嗎？這是值得懷疑的。歷史已經證明，一位獨裁君主可以組建起一支純粹軍事性的海上力量，正如同路易十四的所作所為那樣。然而，儘管從表面上看，這樣一支海軍威風凜凜，不可一世，經驗顯示，他的海軍就如同沒有根系的植物一樣，不久就便會枯萎。然而，在代議制政府裡，任何軍事開支在其背後都必須存在有一種表現強烈的利益，確證其確實有必要如此。如果沒有政府方面的行動，對於海上力量的興趣並不會存在，也不可能存在。這樣一支商業航運隊應如何加以組建，是通過補貼還是自由貿易，是通過持續不斷的管理還是放任自流，這並不是一個軍事問題，而是一個經濟問題。如果美國沒有一個龐大的國家航運業，一支相稱的海軍是否會接踵而至，這是值得懷疑的。將它與其他大國分隔開來的距離，一方面是一種保護，另一方面又是一種陷阱。促成合眾國海軍誕生的驅動力，如果存在的話，那它目前就正在中美洲地峽加速運轉。讓我們期盼它的誕生並不會來得太遲。