Chapter 4 3. Case Analysis: The Naval Battle of 1778

The war aims of France and Spain were directed against England: to avenge all injuries suffered; to end the tyrannical empire that England had usurped; and to maintain their own sea power. The war between Great Britain and the Bourbons in 1778 was inextricably linked to the American Revolution.This is a naval battle in the purest sense of the word.Not only did the allied dynastic regimes scrupulously avoid the entanglements on the Continent which, according to its former policy, England had endeavored to bring about, there was also a tendency towards equal rivalry at sea which had not been seen since Tourville's time. between the two contenders.The places where this contest was fought, and the objects to which war was fought or prepared to be achieved, were mostly far away from Europe, and none of them were on this continent, Gibraltar was the only exception.Gibraltar lies at the extremity of a rugged and very inaccessible salient, in which France and Spain have completely cut it off from neutral powers, and the rivalry between them has never divided those other than the countries at stake. Fang got involved.

This was not the case in any of the wars between the abdication of Louis XIV and the downfall of Napoleon.During his reign, there were periods when the French navy was superior in number and equipment to England and Holland, yet the policies and ambitions of this monarch were always directed towards continental expansion.As a result, his shaky navy was short-lived.For three-quarters of a century, beginning at the turn of the eighteenth century, England's maritime supremacy went virtually unchecked.So great was its influence on the issues of the day, the absence of a serious competitor allowed England's naval activity to gain little in military doctrine.In the ensuing war between the French Republic and the Empire, the morale of the French officers and sailors was low due to some reasons that do not need to be described in detail here, which made the seemingly equal numbers of warships and artillery tonnages a reality. an illusion.After years of valiant but futile effort, the catastrophe at Trafalgar announced to the world the professional incompetence of the French and Spanish navies.This had long been caught by the keen eye of Nelson and his colleagues, and formed the haughty confidence which characterized the attitude and, to some extent, the tactics against them.Thereafter the Emperor turned his eyes away from the only field of battle in which fate had lost faith, and resolved to contest England on any point but the sea.While he agreed to reorganize his navy, he did not reserve for it any share in a strife of unprecedented intensity until the end of the Empire, and he refused to grant his already reinvigorated and full of passion and confidence. The Navy takes any opportunity to compete with the enemy.Great Britain continued to maintain its old status as the undisputed supremacy of the seas.

Scholars of Naval Combat look to find something useful in the military plans and methods of the parties involved in the massacre, especially with regard to the war as a whole, or some of the larger and more The general behavior of the well-defined section is there.Likewise, they look to find something interesting in the continuity of strategic intent that infuses or should have instilled in their actions throughout, in strategic dispositions that affect the fortunes of a period of time.Although it is not yet possible to claim that certain campaigns are entirely non-instructive in tactics which was one of the goals mentioned in the previous section.It is undoubtedly true, however, that, like all systems of tactics in history, they had their heyday of glory, and their present benefit to the scholar is not so much a model for emulation as a form of mental training, Contribute to the formation of correct tactical thinking habits.On the other hand, the preparatory and preparatory dispositions for the great campaigns, or by superior and active combinations, those operations which are brilliantly won without bloodshed, depend on weapons more eternal than the weapons of that age. factor.This can provide people with principles of more lasting value.

In a war for any object, even if that object is the capture of a particular piece of land or a particular position, a direct attack on the area being pursued is not, from a military point of view, the best way to acquire it. best way.Therefore, the goal of military operations should be different from the goal that the governments of the participating countries hope to achieve, so as to attack the goal with a name of its own.In serious consideration of any war, it is necessary, first, to place before the student's eye at a glance the aims which each party seeks; whether the object of attack is most likely to achieve those which are sought by the government; finally, it is necessary to consider the advantages and disadvantages of the various military operations by which the object of attack is achieved.The degree of precision with which such an investigation is conducted will depend on the self-imposed scope of work of the investigator.However, if it is possible to plan a framework outline that does not need to be entangled in details but only highlights the main outline before a more detailed discussion, it is usually helpful to outline the outline. When the main line is fully grasped, various details It can be easily involved, and each has its own place.

Here, the efforts of this book will be limited to drawing such an outline from the scope of this book. The main participating countries in the War of 1778 were Great Britain on the one hand, and the Bourbon family, which controlled the two kingdoms of France and Spain, on the other.The North American colonies, already engaged in a unequal battle with their overlord, naturally cheered an event so important to them; war.The American goal was quite simple to free their country from the British.Apart from a few cruisers that harassed the enemy's commerce, their lack of combat-capable sea power certainly limited their activities to ground warfare.This indeed constituted a powerful check in favor of the allies, and greatly consumed the vital forces of Great Britain.However, it was within the human power of Britain to abandon the contest and cease fighting immediately.Holland, on the other hand, was freed from land attack, but with the help of the Allied navy, showed little desire to do anything except save as much as possible from external losses.Therefore, the goal of these two small actors is to stop the war, while the main participants in the war, in terms of their continuity, have the goal of trying to change the situation.

Great Britain, too, had simple war aims, embroiled in a tragic disagreement with its most promising colony, which simmered until it was threatened with losing it.Violent control must be maintained when the once willing subjects are gone, so it takes up the sword against them.The purpose of this is to prevent the separation of these overseas territories.In the eyes of that generation, its splendor is closely and inseparably linked with these overseas territories.The presence of France and Spain as active patrons of the anti-colonial cause on the American continent did not change England's aims, whatever the changes in the offensive goals it might have undertaken.With France, Spain and other countries joining the ranks of its enemies, the British not only greatly increased the risk of losing their American continent colonies, but also suffered the threat of losing other valuable territories.It didn't take long for this to become partly true.In short, England was strictly defensive in its war aims; it feared too much to lose and, at best, hoped to hold onto what it had.However, by driving the Netherlands into the war, it gained a military advantage; for, without increasing the strength of its opponent, several vital but poorly defended military and commercial positions were open to its forces. door.

The views and goals of France and Spain were more complex, and traditional enmity and the desire to avenge the not-too-distant past undoubtedly played a large role, just as there were salons and philosophers in France who sympathized with the colonial peoples' struggle for freedom .Yet, though sentimental considerations weighed heavily on the conduct of states, France could hope to regain its North American dominions only if the tangible means of satisfying them could be described and calculated.However, the surviving generation of colonists had too deep personal memories of the past to acquiesce in any such attempt on Canada.A striking feature of Americans during the Revolution was a deep-rooted distrust of the French, but this was largely ignored when the French gave effective sympathy and assistance.However, what was understood at the time, and felt by the French, was that a revival of the old dream by the French might lead to a resurgence through legitimate concessions between two groups of people of the same race, Anglo-American, who had only recently turned against each other. Reconciliation is what a section of powerful and noble Englishmen never ceases to preach.France, therefore, does not recognize, and perhaps is not yet willing to consider, such a goal.On the contrary, it formally renounced all claims to any part of the American Continent then or only recently come under the rule of the British Crown, while declaring freedom of action in occupying and recovering any of the West Indies; All other colonies can attack with it.The main objectives of France, therefore, were to gain control of the British West Indies and India, which fell to England, and, after they had created a sufficiently effective clamp, to secure the independence of the United States of America in due time.Because of the exclusive trade policies held by that generation, the loss of these important holdings was thought to have weakened the commercial success on which England's prosperity depended, which made England decline and France great.In fact, this contest, which should have become more grandiose, may be said to have been the motive that gave France life.All the aims were summed up in the highest purpose they aspired to achieve: the supremacy of England at sea and politics.

Overtaking England along with France was also the goal of the equally humble and less dynamic Kingdom of Spain.Yet there was definiteness to the wounds it suffered, and the objects it was specifically pursuing were not so easy to spot in the wider view of its allies, though no Spaniard alive at the time could recall that the Spanish flag was Menorca, Gibraltar, or Jamaica blowing in the wind, but the passage of time has not reconciled this proud and stubborn people to their loss.The Americans, for their part, did not abandon their traditional opposition to Spain's attempts to revive its sovereignty over the two Floridas.

This is what the two countries were after, and their involvement changed the entire pattern of the American Revolutionary War.Needless to say, apart from various reasons and excuses, they will never admit that going to war is only out of hostility.However, sensible English public opinion at the time rightly referred to the following words in the French Declaration, which in a few words vividly outline the true basis of the united Bourbon conduct: Revenge, end the tyrannical empire usurped by England, and maintain her own power at sea.In a word, with regard to the object of the war, the Allies were on the offensive and England was pushed on the defensive.

That despotic empire of which England is accused of running the seas is not unjustly dependent on its mighty sea power, actual or potential; on its commerce and armed shipping, and on its Commercial installations, colonies and naval bases in various parts of the world.Till this time the sentiments of beneficence, the stronger selfish motives of the close commerce with the metropolis, and the protection conferred by the continued presence of its superior navy, were ties which bound it with it all over the world. The colonies were tightly bound together.As a result of the rebellion of the colonies on the American continent, rifts appeared in the network of fortified ports on which their sea power depended, although the innumerable trade links between them and the West Indies had been shattered by the ensuing hostilities. Weakening also tends to divide the sympathy of these islands.The struggle was not merely for political possession and commercial exploitation, it involved military issues of the first importance throughout the Atlantic coast, linking Canada and Halifax with the West Indies, and gaining Whether the thriving maritime chain of popular naval bases can still be in British hands.It has thus far wielded its unprecedented sea power with sustained, determined aggressiveness, with near-unbreakable success.

While Great Britain was baffled by the troubles of maintaining the naval bases it held, the defensive component of its sea power, its offensive sea power, its fleet, was challenged by the growth of the French and Spanish navies.It is now at hand to hand with an organized military force of equal or superior material strength in a domain it claims as its own.The time is now very favorable for an attack on this sea power which has become so invincible by the wealth it has gained from the sea, the next problem is to choose the place of attack. Attack the object, its defenses shall be disturbed, and its forces shall be dispersed. As the wisest French politician of that era, Togot believed that it was more in the interests of France that the American colonies could not gain independence: if the uprising was suppressed due to running out of ammunition and food, the power they sent would be lost to England; The need for uninterrupted repression would be a constant weakness for the suzerain, if weakened by, but not exhausted by, the military occupation of certain controlling locations.Although this assertion did not dominate the institutions of the French government in anticipation of eventual American independence, it contained an element of truth that effectively shaped the policy of that war.By influencing its relief, if the advantage to the United States were the principal object, the North American continent would become a natural field of military action, and its decisive military points would be the principal objects of attack.However, as France's preferred target, it was not to benefit the United States, but to harm the United Kingdom.Sound military judgment has doomed this Continental rivalry as yet to no avail to draw a conclusion that should be vigorous, a grip so readily available to France and exhausting to Great Britain, that it requires only enough support. To maintain the resistance that the insurgents should carry out in the desperate situation.Therefore, the lands of the Thirteen Colonies should not have been the main target of France, let alone Spain. The commercial value of the British West Indies made them an attractive target for France.With a curious agility the French quickly acclimatized themselves to the social conditions of that region, in which their colonial estate was already extensive, save for the two best sweet potatoes in the Lesser Antilles which it still held. In addition to Drop and Martinique, France also occupied the western half of Stalucilai and Haiti at that time.It might as well have hoped, so to speak, that military victories, with the addition of the British Antilles, would complete a true tropical dependency of the empire.Although France was kept out of Jamaica due to Spanish sensibilities, it was possible to win back that treasure island to the allied and weak nation.However desirable as a possession, and thus as an objective, the military occupation of the Lesser Antilles, however desirable, depends so entirely on control of the sea that it cannot, in itself, be a suitable target.The French government, therefore, forbade its naval commanders to occupy these available places, and they made prisoners of the remaining troops, destroyed every defense, and then withdrew.In the excellent naval ports of Fort Roy, at Martinique, at Cape Francis, and at the fortified Allied port of Havana, a fleet of sufficient size could find good, safe, and well-supplied bases.The early heavy losses of Stalusia must be attributed to the incompetence of the French fleet and the professional competence of the English naval commander.In the West Indies, the belligerents thus found themselves approximately equally aided by the necessary points of support on land, and the mere occupation of other points did not increase their military strength, and therefore depended only on the number of fleets. and quality.In order to further expand the occupation safely, gaining superiority at sea became the first need.This is not just local, but encompasses the entire field of warfare, otherwise occupation would be unstable.And the reinforcements required were of such magnitude that they required expenditure beyond the value of the object.The key to the situation in the West Indies, therefore, lay on the side of the fleet, which became the real object of this military campaign.Owing to the real military use shown in this war, the ports of the West Indies served as intermediary bases on the Continent of Europe and the Americas, and when the armies entered into winter operations the fleets retreated to these ports. Even more so.With the exception of the English capture of Stalucia and the aborted plan to attack Jamaica in 1782, no sane strategic move took place on land in the West Indies until either by fighting or by embarrassment. No serious attempt was made to attack a naval port, such as Barbados, or, if possible, Fort Roy, until sea superiority had been achieved by the excited concentration of forces.It must be reiterated that the key to the situation is the fleet. The influence of sea power, an armed fleet, on the American Continent was also mentioned in the views of Washington and Sir Henry Clinton.As a battlefield in itself, although the situation in the East Indies has been largely discussed under the heading of the Battle of Shavron, it need only be repeated here that everything depended on Control of the seas by a dominant sea power.The capture of Trincomalee, though crucial to the French sea formations, which had no other bases, was, however, as much a windfall as the capture of Stalusia.It was supposed to happen only when the opponent was defeated or the enemy fleet was temporarily absent, and the French army just took advantage of it.In North America and India, more reasonable military policy shows that the enemy's fleet as a real target also depends on communication with the homeland.Europe still has to be mentioned here, because its relation to this wide-ranging war is much more important.It can be quite clearly stated that the only two places in Europe whose political concessions were the object of war were Gibraltar and Menorca.Due to the repeated urging of Spain, the former has completely become the main offensive target of the Allies, and the occupation of the two obviously depends on the control of the sea. In a certain naval battle, as in all other naval battles, two things are crucial from the outset. A base on the frontier, in this case the seashore, from which the military operations are conducted. ; an organized military force, in this case a naval fleet, of a size and quality commensurate with the military operation being launched.As the case so far has demonstrated, if that war were to extend to very remote parts of the planet, safe ports suitable for shipping would be required in each of these remote places as secondary or temporary sex base.Between these auxiliary ports and the main or home base there must be a very stable line of communication, which depends on military control of the intervening seas.The operation of this control must be carried out by the navy, either by clearing the sea of ​​enemy ships in all directions, so that the ships of the country can pass through in complete safety; or by accompanying (escorting) each echelon with force to support distant This control is further strengthened by supply ships necessary for military operations.The former method is aimed at trying to evacuate the country's forces, while the latter is to concentrate forces in that sea area where the escort is at a certain critical juncture.No matter which method is adopted, through the military occupation of the appropriate distribution but not too many high-quality ports along the route, such as the Cape of Good Hope and Mauritius, the line of communication will undoubtedly be further consolidated.Strongholds such as these were always necessary, and even more so now, since refueling is more frequent today than ever before.The coordination of strongholds at home and abroad, and the state of communication between them, can be called the strategic feature of the general military situation. According to this feature, and the relative strength of the enemy fleet, the nature of military operations can be determined.In each of the three branches of this domain, Europe, America, and India, for reasons of clarity, have been dealt with separately; control of the seas has been insisted as the decisive factor; enemy fleets have been designated as A real offensive target.Now, apply the preceding considerations to the whole field of warfare, and see how far the same conclusions will apply to it, and if so, at what the nature of the military operations of each side should have been. What. In Europe, Great Britain's home base was located on the English Channel, with two main supply centers, Plymouth and Portsmouth.The bases of the Allies were located on the shore of the Atlantic Ocean, and the main military ports included Brest, Ferro, and Cadiz.Behind them, there are the Taran and Cartagena shipyards in the Mediterranean.On the other side, the opposite is England's base on the island of Menorca, Port Mahon, but the latter can be completely ignored.For throughout the war it was confined to the position of a defender, and the English fleet could not yet draw any supporting contingents to the Mediterranean.Gibraltar, in turn, could have effectively monitored task forces or reinforcements passing through the Channel if it could be used as a base for a fleet commensurate with its mission because of its geographical location; this was not accomplished.England's European fleet was firmly tied to the English Channel, engaged in home defense, and visited the Rocky at irregular intervals to escort supplies vital to the persistence of its garrison.Compared with Gibraltar, Mahon Port still plays a different role.The former, at that time of no importance at all, did not attract the attention of the Allies until the latter part of the war, and it fell only after a six-month siege; It attracted a considerable part of the offensive firepower of the Allies, forming a valuable restraint situation in favor of England. In North America, New York, Narragansett Bay, and Boston became local bases at the outset of the war.At that time, the first two were still stolen by the English.Judging from their geographical location, they should be the most important depots on the North American continent.They are easy to defend and difficult to attack, and they are easy to supply.Before that, Boston had fallen into American hands and was therefore available to the Allies.In terms of the actual direction in which the war was going, by diverting the active English military operations to the southern states in 1779, Boston was removed from the main field of military operations and, geographically, it was in Militarily it doesn't matter that much anymore.However, had the plan of concentrating military forces eastward by isolating New England by occupying the line between Hudson and Lake Champlain been adopted, it would have been found that all three ports would have been of decisive importance to the situation.South of New York, the Delaware, and the Chesapeake Bay undoubtedly provided attractive battlefields for a maritime career.However, the breadth of access, the lack of protection of seaside naval bases and easily defensible positions, and the dispersion of ground forces due to attempts to occupy numerous areas, combined with inacclimatization for a considerable part of the year, made They cannot play a major role in the original campaign planning, so there is no need to classify them among the local bases of the war.At the southern tip of the American continent, the English were deluded by a vain illusion that they could win the support of the people there.They failed to consider that even if the majority of the people there had peacefully chosen freedom, this quality would have kept them from rising up against the revolutionary government.According to the theory of the English, they were oppressed by this government.Yet the full realization of this distant, and in its final outcome, English project, was staked on such an insurrection.Charleston was another regional base of the war. First, the English Expeditionary Force landed in Georgia. Eighteen months later, it fell into British hands in May 1780. The principal regional bases in the West Indies in this war were known from the foregoing, and to the English there were Stalusia and, to a lesser extent, Antigua.A thousand miles downwind is the main island of Jamaica, which has a very capable shipyard in Kingston.According to the order of priority and priority, the Allied forces first occupied Fort Roy and Havana in Martinique; followed by Guadeloupe and Cape Francis.A controlling feature of the strategic situation at that time, and one not insignificant in our own time, was the trade winds, and their attendant currents.Overcoming these obstacles to gain the upper hand is a long and difficult task even for a single ship, but it is much more difficult for a large fleet.It is understandable that fleets sailed to these western islands only of their own volition, or when they were sure that the enemy was heading in the same direction, as at St. It was not until after the battle that Rodney left for Jamaica.Wind conditions made the windward or eastward facing islands both regional bases for naval warfare and articulation points on the natural lines of communication between Europe and America.It is also understandable that between the two theaters, between the mainland and the Lesser Antilles, lies a large central region, unless the belligerents have greater sea superiority, or unless on a flank A decisive advantage has been won, otherwise, it will be difficult to carry out larger-scale campaign operations safely. In 1762, when England possessed all the Windward Islands and established an indisputable superiority at sea, it attacked and occupied Havana without scruple.From 1779 to 1782, however, French sea power in America and France's possession of the Windward Islands effectively put itself on par with England.This left the Spaniards in Havana free to carry out their intentions of attacking Pensacana and the Bahamas in the central region mentioned. Therefore, strongholds such as Martinique and Stalucia have a greater strategic advantage for the present war than Jamaica, Havana, and other back islands.They control the latter because of the advantage of their geographical location, from which the westward journey will be much faster than the return, and the key points of the continental contest are actually no further from one point than from other points.Most of the islands known as the Lesser Antilles have the same advantage; but the small island of Barbados, facing the wind, has a special advantage, not only suitable for offensive operations, but also difficult to defend, and a large fleet can Close to it, even from such a nearby port as Fort Roy.It is to be remembered that the expedition fleet which finally stopped before St. Kitts was supposed to sail for Barbados, but was prevented from doing so by the tyranny of the trade winds.Under the conditions at the time, Barbados, as a port of refuge along the lines of communication leading to Jamaica, Florida, and even North America, was especially suitable for becoming a local base and arsenal for England to participate in the war; Sta Lucia was guarded by the army and served as an outpost for the fleet, keeping a close watch on the enemy at Fort Roy. In India, the politics of the peninsula made it clear that the eastern coast, or Coromandel, could be a battleground.Te Trincomalee, on the contiguous island of Ceylon, although in poor condition, provided a good, easily defensible port of vital strategic importance.All other anchorages are on the coast, because there are more open anchorages, and from this situation, the trade winds and monsoons in this area are also of strategic value. From the autumnal equinox to the spring equinox, this wind has It blows regularly from the northeast, sometimes very violently, causing huge waves to beat the shore, making landing very difficult; however, in summer, the prevailing wind is from the southwest, making the sea relatively mild and the weather smooth. better than usual.The September-October monsoon is usually accompanied by raging cyclones.From this time until the northeast monsoon dies down, it is not advisable to engage in active military operations, or even to stay on the coast.The question of which port to retreat to during this season became very urgent.Te Trincomalee is the only such port, and in the better season, it can face the main battlefield and wind direction, which further enhances its unique strategic value.The English port of Bombay on the west coast of India is too far away to be regarded as a regional war base. Just like Mauritius and Bourbon Island in France, Bombay should be classified as located on the communication line with the suzerain. list of ports. This is the main place of support or base for the belligerent parties at home and abroad.those overseas bases, it must be shown, are generally poor in resources which constitute an important factor in their strategic value, stores and equipment for naval and land forces, and to a considerable extent, supplies for use at sea Materials had to be transported to them from the mainland.Boston, perhaps the exception to this assertion, was surrounded by a wealthy and friendly crowd, as was Havana, then an important naval ammunition depot, and a thriving shipbuilding industry.It’s just that they are all very far away from the main battlefield. Relying on New York and Narragansett Bay (Nanagansett), the United States is too eager to extort resources from neighboring countries, so that it is largely useless, and the distant ports of the East and West Indies are far away. Total dependence on local supplies brought new importance to the strategic question of lines of communication.Intercepting a large fleet of supply ships is a military operation second only to destroying a single warship. Among many high-profile targets, using the main force or protecting the supply ships by evading enemy capture requires government and naval commanders to dispatch available resources. The great skill of ships and task forces.The ease of Campenfield and the mismanagement of de Guichan in the North Atlantic, combined with gusts of wind, made de Cres a very difficult situation in the West Indies.Saffron in the Indian Ocean was similarly hit by the cut-off of the small convoy in the Atlantic, only the latter having let the loss be offset by a successful capture of the English supply ships by its frigates, and Make it a big headache for the opponent. Only the Navy, therefore, can secure or threaten these vital lifelines, with the same effect on the maintenance of total warfare, which has been examined separately in each chapter.They are the ties that bind the entire battlefield together, and are seen as fitting targets for both belligerents. The distance from Europe to America does not make intermediate supply ports absolutely necessary, and if for some unforeseen reason a difficult situation arises, it is always possible, except in the event of an encounter with the enemy, to either return to Europe or sail To some friendly port in the West Indies.這種情況有別於繞過好望角歷經漫漫長路駛向印度，比克頓於二月隨同一支護航艦隊離開英格蘭，於九月抵達孟買時，就被認為戰績頗佳；而頑強的沙弗倫於三月啟航出發，花費了相同的時間抵達了毛裡求斯，再從那裡開赴馬得拉斯又花去了兩個月的時間，如果不中途停頓以補充淡水、新鮮的給養品，以及通常被稱為港口千篇一律事情的整修船舶，甚至當艦船儲備品提供了必要物質材料時，幾乎是無法進行這樣一場時間跨度的航程的。一條上等的交通補給線需要正如同所說的那樣好幾處港口，它們分佈合理、防禦充實、補給豐足，正如同英格蘭目前所據有的、為昔日歷次戰爭所收穫的它的一些主要商業幹線。在一七七八年戰爭中，沒有任何交戰方在這條線路上擁有這類港口，直至在荷蘭的同意下，好望角置於了法蘭西的控制之中並得到沙弗倫恰如其份的鞏固。由於這一點，再加上沿途的毛里求斯與在線路另一端的特亭可馬利，盟國與法蘭西之間的交通線得到了相當合理的保護。英格蘭雖然據有聖海倫，為了補給和整修其駛向印度洋的特遣編隊與在大西洋的護航隊擴展到馬德拉島與維德角島以及巴西港口，不得不依賴於葡萄牙的善意中立。對於防禦，這種中立的確是一種脆弱的依靠，正如在約翰斯頓與沙弗倫之間於維德角的那次遭遇戰所顯示的那樣。但是，由於具有幾處可供停靠的場所，且敵人無法知道究竟會使用何處港口如果有一處的話，這種隱秘性本身就會帶來不小的安全，如果那位海軍指揮官能夠正確地派調其手中的部隊的話如約翰斯頓在培亞港那樣。確實，由於當時從一個點到另一個點情報資訊傳送特徵的緩慢遲鈍與不確定性，面對一場攻勢，使敵人草木皆兵、疑神疑鬼比起那些只是略加粉飾的少許防範來說無疑是更為有效的防守依憑了。 有用港口的組合與它們之間交通線的狀況正如所說的那樣，就構成了整個局勢的主要戰略構架，作為將整個戰爭聯為一體的有組織的力量的海軍，已被指定為軍事行動的主要攻進目標，為達到進攻目標所採用的方式以及戰爭行為則仍有待於思考。 在進行討論之前，務必簡要地提及對於海洋尤為特別且影響隨後討論的一個條件，這就是，獲取資訊的困難。陸軍穿越或多或少為固定居民所居住的疆域，在身後留下了征途的踏痕。艦隊乘風破浪，橫行於大洋之上，使得遊蕩者四處逃散。只是他們並非原地不動，當它們後面的海水紛紛回攏，甲板上偶爾一瞥的信號旗或許能夠顯示它們的穿行，然而卻無從知曉它們的航程。追逐者發出聲響的風帆或許對於被追逐者一無所知，而被追逐者越過談判地點同樣也許只是幾天或數小時之前。近來，對於海洋風向與水流的仔細研究已揭示了某些具有一定優勢的路線，小心謹慎的水手會習慣性地加以追從，並對他的活動做出某種推測。但是，一七七八年時尚未收集到如此精確的資料。即使他們擁有這些資料，由於許多可能原因中的一個，這條最為快捷的路徑也被經常加以放棄，目的在於避開追捕或埋伏。在這樣一場捉迷藏的遊戲中，優勢在於追逐的一方。監視敵國的出海口，在進入那塊寂靜的不毛之地以前停止追逐，其巨大的重要性是顯而易見的。如果由於某種原因，這樣一種監視不再可能，下一步的最佳對策就是徑直奔向敵人的目的地，在那裡恭候其大駕光臨，而不是試圖去探尋或許根本就不會加以採納的路線。然而，這也暗示了其意圖所在，可能並不會總有收穫。在捕殺約翰斯頓時，沙弗倫的行動在戰略上是完全站得住腳的；在其進攻培亞港與奔向他們的共同目的地的火急火燎中也是如此。而羅德尼在一七八○年和一七八二年兩次攔截通往馬丁尼克的護航隊的失敗卻顯示出，儘管已經得知他們即將來臨，甚至在抵達地點都已得知時，進行埋伏仍然是困難重重。 任何一次海上遠征，只有兩個地點是固定的，出發點與終點。後者或許並不為敵人所知，然而，直至啟航時間，在港口某一力量的出現，不久即將行動的意圖的跡象，或許都能被設想為外界所知。對於交戰的主動方而言，這已是阻止這一舉措的緊要關頭，對於防禦一方來說，這更是特別與普遍地具有肯定性了。因為，在其眾多易於遭受攻擊的地點，他無從知道究竟會在何處遭受威脅，而進攻方卻對自己的目標心中有數，如果他能迷惑其對手的話。假如遠征船隊不意在兩個或更多的港口之間被分散開來這是一種當某一單獨船廠的設施不足以在允許的時間內整修如此眾多的船隻，或在現在所提及的這場戰爭中，當盟國提供各自的特遣艦隊時，十分容易出現這種情況圍堵這樣一次遠征的重要意義就更是顯而易見的了。阻止這些特遣艦隊的集中是一件具有特別必要性的事情。從其名稱上看，防禦一方可以被假定為不那麼強大，因此更準備利用將敵軍分而治之這樣的策略。一七八二年在斯塔盧西亞的羅德尼，密切監視著位於馬丁尼克的法蘭西特遣艦隊，以防止它們與在開普法蘭西斯的西班牙人匯合，這便是一個具有恰當的戰略位置的事例。如果島嶼位置能使他置於法蘭西人與他們的目的地之間，而不是在他們的後方，事情就再也沒有比這設想得更好的了。正如實際所發生的那樣，在那種情況下，他已盡可能地將事情做得最好了。 由於作為弱者，防禦方不可能試圖封鎖住存在著敵軍各個分支的所有港口，同時又不致於在每一支敵軍面前都身處劣勢而使自己的目的歸於失敗這將有悖於戰爭的根本原則；如果它能正確地決定不那樣做，而是在一、兩個地點集中一支優勢力量，決定究竟在何處進行警戒，何處可以加以忽略就變得有必要了在充分地理解了各個方面的主要狀況軍事的，道義的，經濟的之後，這一問題應貫穿於整個戰爭政策的全過程。 一七七八年英格蘭肯定接受了防禦方的角色。然而，不列顛海軍應該與波旁王朝的聯合艦隊在數量上旗鼓相當卻是前一時期英格蘭最稱職的海軍當權者霍克與其同僚們的至理名言。這樣一種狀況，即具有更好的人員素質與可加吸納的更龐大的海洋性人口，肯定將賦予一種真正的力量優勢。只是，這一預防性措施近來卻看不到了。對於這樣一場討論來說，失敗是不是由於內閣的低效率正如他們的對手所指控的那樣，或是由於和平時期代議制政府經常指導的錯了位的經濟，這已無關緊要。事實仍然是，儘管有著法蘭西與西班牙參戰的極大可能性，英格蘭海軍在數量上次於同盟國海軍，但是，在被稱之為局勢的戰略特徵、本土基地與海外輔助性基地中，總體上的優勢仍在它的一邊。英格蘭的地理位置，如果其本身不是更強有力的話，對於戰略效果來說，至少在地理上位置更佳。然而在戰爭的第二要義方面，即足以承擔起展開攻勢的有組織的軍隊或艦隊方面，它甘拜下風。因此，仍然有待於遊刃有餘、氣貫長虹地調動這支處於劣勢的力量，首先奔向大海，巧妙地擺開陣勢，以更大的運動敏捷性搶在敵人的組合之前，作為進攻目標，襲擾他們的交通線，以優勢兵力與敵軍之主要分支狹路相逢，從而粉碎敵人的意圖。 十分清楚的是，除在美洲大陸以外，任何一處維持戰爭都依賴於歐洲的宗主國和與它們相聯的暢通無阻的交通線。如果英格蘭人毫無顧忌地得以用其壓倒性的海上力量絞殺他們的商業與工業的話，那麼，美國人的最終潰敗不是由於直接的軍事行動而是由於糧盡彈絕也就是可能的了。如果能夠從同盟國海軍的壓力下擺脫出來，它就能將這種力量用以對付美國人；如果它能取得對於他們的一個確定性的優勢，不僅是物質上的，而且還是道義與士氣上的，正如二十年後它所取得的那樣，那麼，它就會獲得這種解脫。在這種情況下，其財政狀況早已不堪其負的聯盟王朝肯定就將功敗垂成地退出這場置英格蘭於劣勢地位的角逐。然而，這樣一種優勢只能通過戰鬥才能取得；通過表明這一優勢，儘管在數量上仍處於劣勢，但是，其海員的技能，財富的來源，通過合理地使用這些力量，卻能使其政府在戰爭的決定性環節擁有實際存在的優勢。如果將它的戰列艦指派到整個世界，在試圖保護這個鬆散帝國的各個瀕於暴露的陣地的同時，使它們被各個擊破，這種優勢就永遠也不會取得。 局勢的關鍵就在於歐洲，以及歐洲相互敵對的造船廠。如果英格蘭不能正如它所證明的那樣，挑起一場大陸戰爭來對付法蘭西，那麼，它的一個希望就在於找到並擊垮敵人的海軍。再也沒有比在其本土港口更有把握地發現這支海軍了。在拿破崙戰爭中，這一點指導著它的政策，當時它的海軍士氣的優勢已經確立起來，它敢於以劣勢的力量去應對海洋與平靜地擺放在港內為數更多且裝備精良的戰艦所共同構成的危險。由於能夠從容面對雙重危險，它也獲得了雙重優勢，將敵軍置於眼皮底下，讓港內舒適的生活消磨他的鬥志；而它自己的軍官與海員卻被艱難的遊航磨練得能夠十分迅捷地響應每一征戰的號召。我們沒有理由，維爾納夫海軍上將重複著那位皇帝的話語聲稱道，害怕看見英國的特遣艦隊，他們的七十四艘船在甲板上還沒有五百人呢！一、二年的遊弋已使得他們精疲力竭了。但僅在一個月之後，他寫道：塔蘭特遣艦隊在港灣中看起來威風凜凜，艦員們衣裝整齊，訓練有素；然而，當風暴來臨時，所有的情況都變了，他們根本就沒有經歷過風暴的鍛煉。 皇帝，納爾遜說，現在才發現，如果皇帝們得知真相的話，他的艦隊在一個晚上所遭受的損失比我們一年所遭受的損失還多這些高貴的紳士們無從適應於狂風暴雨，而我們卻在未損失一桅一塢的情況下英勇地與之搏鬥了二十四個月。然而，必須加以承認的是，對於人員與艦船的損耗十分巨大，許多英國軍官在這種消耗當中找到了反對將他們的艦隊置於敵人岸外海中的證詞。我們所經受的每一次打擊，科林伍德寫道，都削弱了這個國家的安全感，上次巡航使五艘大型戰艦失去了戰鬥力，最近又增添了兩艘。它們當中的數艘肯定被架上了船塢。我幾乎無從知道一個睡眠之夜居然是這兩個月，他又寫道，這一持續不斷的巡航在我看來已超過了人類天性的力量，科爾德已經瘦成了皮包骨頭，並垮了下來。我還被告知，格蘭夫斯也沒有好到那裡去。豪勳爵的高度職業化的意見也對這種做法大唱反調。 除了人員與船隻的過度損耗外，還必須承認，沒有一種封鎖能夠有把握地遏制住敵軍艦隊的退路。維爾納夫就從塔蘭得以脫身，密西斯也從羅什福爾得以倖免。現在我在這裡監視著羅什福爾港內的法國艦隊，科林伍德寫道，然而卻感到要阻止他們升錨啟航並不那麼切實可行。然而，如果他們從我身邊溜走的話，我應倍感恥辱。唯一能防止他們啟航逃避的事情，就是他們在不知道我們究竟精確地位居何處的情況下，不期然來到了我們中間。 儘管如此，當時過份緊張窘迫的狀況終於熬過去了。英格蘭艦隊圍住了法蘭西與西班牙的海岸；損失得到了補充，艦船得到修繕；一名軍官倒下了，或在其崗位上精疲力竭，馬上就會有別人來取代他的職位。對布列斯特的嚴密監視粉碎了那位元皇帝兵合一處的夢幻。儘管困難層出不窮，納爾遜的警惕之心卻尾隨著塔蘭艦隊，從其出發的那一刻起，橫越大西洋，最後回到歐洲海濱。這還是在他們進行打擊很久以前，在戰略被撇在一邊而戰術完成了特拉法加大業之前。然而，正是一步接一步，一點捱一點，這群疲憊不堪但卻紀律嚴明的海員，渾身鏽跡斑斑、彈痕累累但卻指揮有方的戰艦，阻擋住了他們那群不學無術的對手們的一舉一動，他們在敵軍每一彈藥補給中心面前都部署了部隊，由小型戰船組成的鏈條將它們聯為一體。他們可能會一而再，再而三地無法遏制止住敵軍的偷襲，然而，他們卻能有效地阻止住所有敵軍特遣艦隊的大規模集中。 一八○五年的戰艦本質上與一七八○年的戰艦並無二致，儘管，毫無疑問，存在著進步與提高，然而，這種變化只是量度方面的，而不是種類方面的。不僅如此，而且二十年前的英格蘭艦隊在霍克及其同僚的率領下，敢於闖入比斯開灣的冬季。在霍克的通信來往中，他的傳記作家說道，並沒有一絲跡痕表明他本人曾經懷疑過，稱雄海洋，經受住冬季的風暴，以及他應不久就能真正地大幹一場不僅是可能的，而且也是他的職責。如果認為比起霍克與納爾遜的時代來，法蘭西海軍的狀況要好一些，其軍官的人格與訓練素質有所提高，那是必須加以承認的事實。儘管如此，海軍統帥部不可能長期不知道這類軍官的數量仍然匱乏，以致嚴重地影響到海軍的品質，海員的缺口是如此之大，以致於有必要支用陸軍士兵來填補這一編制。至於西班牙海軍的人事狀況，沒有理由相信它會比十五年之前會更好。當時納爾遜在談及西班牙向法蘭西讓渡某些戰艦時就曾說過：我想當然地認為，不會由西班牙人來操縱，因為那將是再度失去它們的最快捷的途徑。 然而，事實勝於雄辯。相對於較弱一方而言，摧毀敵軍艦船的最可靠方式就是在港口中對它們進行嚴密監視，一旦它們得以啟航出發，就沖上去開戰。這樣做所遭受到的唯一有力的反對就是在歐洲。法蘭西與西班牙海岸之外氣候的暴虐，尤其是在冬季的漫漫長夜之中，這不僅帶來了迫在眉睫的災難，就連堅固、管理有方的戰艦也幾乎無法經受住，而且還造成了各種資源無計可施的持續緊張，因此需要大量儲備艦船，以備替換那些遣派的艦船以供整修，或者替換艦船之上的水手。 如果執行封鎖使命的艦隊能夠在敵軍必由之路的側翼尋找到一塊方便的停錨之地，正如同納爾遜在一八○四年與一八○五年監視塔蘭艦隊時這是他為其眾多戰艦特別糟糕的狀況能供進一步驅使而採取的一個步驟動用了薩丁島的馬達萊那灣一樣。一八○○年，詹姆斯‧索瑪爾茲爵士甚至使用了位於法國海濱且離布列斯頓僅有五英里之遙的杜瓦納內灣，以便在惡劣的氣候條件下，停泊封鎖艦隊中的近岸艦船。從這一觀點來看，普利茅斯與紐比的地理位置並不能被認為十分令人滿意，並沒有如同馬達萊那灣一樣位於敵軍必由之路的側翼，而是如同斯塔盧西亞那樣，位處路線的後方。儘管如此，霍克證明，戰艦的四處遊弋與管理有序能夠克服這些不利條件，這也如同羅德尼後來在他那處暴風雨並不那麼肆虐的基地所顯示出的那樣。 關於使用手中的戰艦，現在將一千七百七十八的那場戰爭視為一個整體，英格蘭內閣使得他們在美洲、西印度群島與東印度群島駐外分遣艦隊與敵軍旗鼓相當。確實，在特定時期，情況又並非如此；然而，當一般性地論及戰艦的分配時，這種斷言就是正確的。在歐洲，正好相反，在所提及政策的必然後果中，不列顛艦隊通常都大大低劣於在法蘭西與西班牙港口中的艦隻。因此，英格蘭人若想以此發動攻勢，只能極其小心謹慎，並且由於走運而與敵艦零星遭遇；甚至如此：除非獲得的是一個非常決定性的勝利，否則由於交戰艦船隨之而來和暫時喪失戰鬥力所導致的相當風險，所換取的勝利也是代價昂貴的。可以理解的是，英格蘭本土（或海峽）艦隊也依賴於與直布羅陀、地中海的交通線，在涉及戰役和天氣時，使用起來都十分精打細算，並且局限於執行本土海岸的防禦使命，或騷擾敵人交通線的軍事行動。 印度的距離是如此遙遠，在那裡，對這一政策尚不能提出異議，被遣往那裡的艦船停駐了下來，一旦出現緊急狀況，卻既不能得以增援也不能被召回，這塊戰場可謂自立門戶。然而，歐洲、北美與西印度群島本應該被認為是一塊龐大的戰爭舞台。其中，各類事件相互關聯，各個不同地區存在著具有或大或小的重要意義的緊密關係，對此應當給予適當的注意。 作為海上交通線的守護者，假定海軍成為了戰爭中的控制性因素，海軍和那些被稱之為交通線的連續補給皆來源於本土，在那裡，主要的軍需庫被加以了集中化。如此，就會有兩件事情相伴而來：首先，處於防禦地位的國家，如大不列顛的主要努力應集中於那些軍需中心之前；其次，為了進行這種集中，海外的交通線不應進行沒有必要的擴展，以超出加以保護的分遣艦隊最嚴格的需要。與最後一種考慮緊密相聯的是通過強化以及其他方式，鞏固那些交通線路途的至關重要的地點，以使這些地點無論如何也不應依靠艦隊來獲得保護，而僅僅只是獲取補給與增援。對於那些在合理間隔距離內的地點也應加以同樣的鞏固。例如，直布羅陀就十分符合這些條件，因為它實際上固若金湯，所儲存的補給品能夠維持非常長的時間。 如果這種推斷正確的話，那麼英格蘭在美洲大陸的處置舉措就大錯特錯了。由於據有加拿大，以及哈裡法克斯、紐約與納拉甘西特灣，再加上哈得遜一線也在他們掌握之中，孤立一大片起義者的土地，或許具有決定性意義，同時也應在他們力量所及的範圍之內。紐約與納拉甘西待灣本應被置於讓當時的法蘭西艦隊無從下手的狀態，因此得以確保守備部隊的安全，防範來自於海上的進攻，並且使得英格蘭海軍的任務降至最小程度。一旦敵軍擺脫了置列於某一歐洲軍需中心之前的英格蘭艦隊的監視，堂而皇之地在北美大陸沿岸拋頭露面，後者就會在那些港灣中找到安全的藏身之處。相反，這兩處港灣就會被置於虛弱不堪的境地，在一個類似於納爾遜或弗洛格特這類的人物面前就會失陷。而在紐約的陸軍兩度被加以分割，首先開赴切薩匹克，隨後又奔向喬治亞，而這兩支各自為戰的軍隊中的任何一支都沒有強大到足以應付擺在前面的事情。在兩種情況中，當英格蘭陸軍不分兵行事就無從在中間地帶殺出一條血路時，對於海洋的控制就是旨在置敵軍於這兩部分英軍之間的夾縫地位。由於這兩部分英軍之間的溝通完全取決於海軍，因此，隨著這條交通線的延伸，海軍肩負的使命也相應增加了。保護港口與漫長的交通線的必要性共同促使英格蘭在北美的特遣艦隊不斷加以擴大，從而自然地削弱了位居歐洲具有決定性意義的地區的海軍實力。因此，英格蘭遠征北美南部的一個直接後果就是當德斯坦於一七七九年出現在北美海岸時，不得不迅速丟棄了納拉甘西特灣，因為克林頓根本就沒有足夠的力量既保護它，又守衛著紐約。 在西印度群島，擺在英格蘭政府面前的問題並不是要彈壓揭竿而起的領地，而是要永保對於一些狹小但卻物質豐富的島嶼的使用權。不僅如此，還要佔據這些島嶼本身，使它們的貿易盡可能的不致遭受敵軍的劫掠。無須重複的是，這相應地要求既對敵軍艦隊又對單槍匹馬的巡弋敵艦商業破襲艦，正如後者現在所慣稱的那樣確立起明確的壓倒優勢。由於沒有任何一種警戒狀態可以阻止它們全部偷偷進入港口，因此，在西印度群島水域必須有英格蘭的護衛艦與較輕型的艦船加以巡邏。然而，如果可能的話，比起在某一地點由一支英格蘭艦隊進行遏制來，完全徹底地將法蘭西艦隊趕走肯定會更好。由於英格蘭局限於防禦狀態，因此當處於劣勢時，總是易於損兵折將。實際上它逐漸被加以削弱，在突然襲擊時，它的大部分島嶼也逐一喪失，並且在不同時期，在某一港口的轟擊下，它的艦隊往往會沉默不語。而其敵人，當他發現自己身處劣勢之時，就會等候著增援部隊的到達，他知道等待期間沒有什麼好怕的。 這一尷尬場面並不只限於西印度群島。該群島毗鄰於美洲大陸，使其永遠可能在防禦方弄清其意圖之前，進攻方得以集中兩個方向的艦隊，雖然這種集中在某種程度上受限於人所共知的氣候與季節狀況。出於這原因，一七八○年與一七八一年的事件顯示出了英格蘭最能幹的海軍將領所感受到的複雜性，儘管他的戰術運用存在著弊端，但卻反映出了他內心的迷茫。當對大英帝國的繁榮所依賴的貿易的極其關切平添了幾分這種困惑之時在所有情況下，對於防禦一方來說都是家常便飯，必須承認的是，不列顛海軍將領在西印度群島的使命既不輕鬆也不簡單。 在歐洲，由於缺乏如同在西半球那樣的大型特遣艦隊這也可以歸結成為丟失梅諾卡的主要原因，英格蘭自身與直布羅陀的安危受到了嚴重威脅。當同盟國的六十六艘戰列艦與英格蘭東拼西湊弄來的三十五艘戰列艦迎頭相撞，並且將它們全部趕進港口之時，對於英吉利海峽的控制權終於落到了法國人手中。拿破崙認為，這將使法國成為英格蘭的主人。一連三十天，組成法蘭西特遣艦隊的三十艘戰艦巡弋於比斯開灣，等待著行動遲緩的西班牙人的姍姍到來。他們並沒有受到英格蘭艦隊的騷擾。直布羅陀不止一次地面臨著饑荒的陰影，原由即在於與英格蘭的交通線中斷了。對於它的救助終獲成功並不是因為英格蘭政府所適時派遣的艦隊的如何強大，而是由於英格蘭軍官高超的指揮藝術和西班牙人的無能。在最終的大拯救行動中，豪勳爵的艦隊僅僅只是以三十四艘面對同盟艦隊的四十九艘。 在當時英格蘭所歷經的艱難險阻中，哪一條出路是允許敵軍自由進退其港口，通過維持一支充足的海上力量，以在各暴露的陣地上與之決一雌雄，或在各種困難條件下，密切監視其本土的軍需中心，而不至於懷有不切實際的避免每一次偷襲的希望；還是攔截敵軍的每支護航船隊，意在挫敗敵軍試圖實行更大規模集中的計畫，並緊緊尾隨著得以逃脫的任何大型艦隊更佳呢？這樣一種監視切不可與封鎖混為一談，該術語通常適用於其中，但卻並不十分準確，請讓我告知勳爵閣下，納爾遜寫道，塔蘭港從來就未曾為我封鎖過，恰恰相反，敵人獲得放馬出海的充分機會。因為正是在那裡，我們才能指望實現我們國家的希望與意圖。如果他們打算出來的話，他又說道，不會有什麼事情使法蘭西艦隊龜縮於塔蘭或布列斯特。儘管這一說法多少有些誇張，然而，試圖將他們鎖閉於港灣之中的任何舉措都將一無所獲，這一點卻是正確的。納爾遜之所以抵近他們的港口，恰當地部置數量充足的警戒艦船，就在於打算知道他們何時得以啟航，去了哪個方向，用他自己的話來說，以便尾隨他們到地球另一面。我趨於相信，他在另一場合寫道，法蘭西的費羅爾特遣艦隊將會開赴地中海，如果它在塔蘭與其它法國艦隊合兵一處，他們將在數量上大大超過我們。但是，我可不願意找不到他們，皮洛（指揮著費羅爾外海的英國艦隊）將會緊追不捨的。在那次曠日持久的戰爭中，由於氣象的惡劣，封鎖艦隊的暫時退場，或其指揮官的判斷失誤，使得法蘭西艦隊的各分支得以脫逃的事情簡直司空見慣。然而，警報很快就能得以發出，眾多遊弋的護衛艦只中的一些總能發現他們的蹤跡，並尾隨其後以探明他們可能要走的目的地，從一個地點到另一個地點，從一支艦隊到另一支艦隊，資訊得以傳遞，結果不久一支勢均力敵的特遣艦隊便能尾隨他們之後了。直至地球的另一面，如果需要的話。 按照法蘭西政府傳統上對於法蘭西海軍的使用方式，由於他們的遠征並不是為了與敵軍艦隊決一高低，而是具有不可告人的目的，隨之而來的憤怒的滋擾與狂熱的追逐都無助於不受干擾和按部就班地執行政府所制定的計畫，甚至由一支分艦隊去做。而對於大規模的匯合而言，由於取決於將各港口的分艦隊統一起來，他們就是絕對致命的了。布呂克斯冒險的遊弋，於一七九九年在布列斯特撇下了二十五艘戰列艦。這一消息傳播開來的快捷，英格蘭人的騷擾舉措與個別的失策，法蘭西意圖的挫敗與追逐者的迫在眉睫，一八○五年密西斯從羅什福爾、一八○六年維堯姆分艦隊從布列斯特等的脫逃再加上特拉法加大決戰，所有這些都可被說成是為依照本書所提示的方向的海軍戰略提供了令人感興趣的研究材料。一七九八年戰役，儘管在尼祿河取得了輝煌的戰績，然而，當遠征艦隊開拔之時，由於在塔蘭前面並無任何力量，由於納爾遜得到的護衛艦只並不充足，因此，仍可被引證為一個幾乎要導致失敗的事例。一八○八年，岡托姆在地中海九個星期的遊弋也顯示出了甚至在狹窄的水域控制住一支被允許出海，且並沒有遭到一支強大力量監視的艦隊的困難程度。 從一七七八年的戰爭中並不能引證出能與之相提並論的事例，儘管這套古老的君主制並沒有以詭秘來對其艦隊的活動來加以掩蓋，而這種詭秘正是由帝國嚴酷的軍事暴政體制強加上的。在兩個時期，英格蘭都採取了守勢；然而，在較早的那場戰爭中，它放棄了在敵人港灣之外的防禦第一線，將其整個艦隊分散開來，試圖保住這個鬆散帝國的所有港口。在試圖揭示這一政策弊端的同時。卻得承認另一政策的困難與危險。後者通過封鎖或將戰鬥強加於敵軍頭上，旨在縮短與決定戰爭進程，在大海暫態將戰場的不同部分統一和分割之時，意識到這就是局勢的關鍵所在。這就要求有一支數量上旗鼓相當、效率上卻高出一籌的海軍，分配以有限的活動領域，並受限於承認各佔據該區域的艦隊相互進行支援的條件因此，一旦部署完畢，這就取決於攔截或擊敗敵人橫行於大洋之上的分艦隊的技巧與警惕性了；通過對艦隊發動攻勢以保護海外領地與貿易，並將其視為真正的敵人和自己的主攻目標；在靠近本土港口的情況下，對需要修理的艦船的替換與更新都能在最快的時間內加以完成，而且還能減少對於為海外基地十分缺乏的資源的需求。 另一政策，實際上，需要在數量上佔有優勢，因為不同的分艦隊相距太遠而無法相互支援。所以，每一支分艦隊都必須與對之可能發起攻勢的任何兵力集中確立某種均勢。這就意味著處處樹立起比實際作戰的敵軍領先的優勢地位，而敵軍則有可能得到出人意料的增援，在力量並沒有占上風的情況下，這樣一種防禦性戰略是多麼不切實際與危險。這可由英格蘭的這一情況來加以證明，即儘管在每一處都做了同樣的努力，但是英格蘭無論在歐洲，還是在海外都通常處於劣勢。一七七八年豪在紐約、一七七九年拜倫在格林伍德、一七八一年格拉弗斯在切薩匹克外海、一七八一年胡德在馬丁尼克、一七八二年又在聖基特，都是處於劣勢。而與此同時，在歐洲的同盟國艦隊在數量上具有壓倒性的優勢。結果，在增加船員們的危險與船隻本身的損害不斷上揚的情況下，那些並不適合於航海遠征的艦船得以了保留，而不是將它們派遣回國，縮小海軍的力量，因為在沒有跨越大西洋的情況下，殖民地船塢碼頭的匱乏使得它們無法進行廣泛的修理。有關這兩種戰略的比較性開支，問題就不僅僅是哪一種在同一時期會花費更多，而且也成了哪一種將以高效率，最大程度地縮短戰爭的進程。 同盟國一方的政策比起英格蘭受到更加苛刻的評述。之所以如此就在於，進攻一方，事實上具有對於防禦一方的優勢。當集中他們各自力量的最初困難得以克服可以發現，大不列顛在任何時候都未能嚴重危害到他們的聚合同盟國可以選擇在何處、何時、以何種方式動用他們在數量上佔優勢的兵力發動攻勢。那麼，他們又是如何自我利用這一公認的巨大優勢的呢？通過在大不列顛帝國的週邊零打碎敲，通過用他們的腦袋去碰撞直布羅陀堅硬的岩石，法蘭西所做出的最為認真嚴肅的軍事決策就在於向合眾國派出一支特遣分艦隊以及一支部隊，意在使已實際抵達目的地的那些部隊的數量再翻一倍。結果，在不到一年的時間內，使英格蘭驚奇地發現這場與殖民地的搏殺已經毫無希望，因此結束了分散其力量這一對其敵人最為有益的舉動。在西印度群島，通常由於英格蘭艦隊並不在場，這些小島一個又一個地易手，其輕而易舉顯示出，由於對那支艦隊取得了決定性勝利，整個問題是如何得以完完全全地加以解決的。而法蘭西人，儘管具有眾多的機會，卻從未尋找到以攻擊那支被寄予了無限希望的力量的簡單方式來解開這個疙瘩。在佛羅里達，西班牙自行其道，以一支壓倒性的力量換取了一場毫無軍事價值的勝利。在歐洲，英格蘭政府採取的方案使其本來在數量上就處於劣勢的海上力量年復一年地處於無望的境地。然而，盟國所策劃的軍事行動在任何情況下看起來都沒有打算要摧毀那支力量。在最具決定性的關頭，當德比艦隊的三十艘戰列艦被同盟國艦隊的四十九艘戰列艦圍困在托比灣開闊的錨地上時，戰爭內閣的結論卻是不發一槍一彈，僅此就完全濃縮了同盟國海軍戰爭行動的本質特徵！進一步使他們在