Home Categories history smoke sea ​​power theory

Chapter 13 12. Meaning of Hawaii

sea ​​power theory 馬漢 8497Words 2023-02-05
Strategists are attracted to scenarios like this: monopoly on a key stronghold, few competitors, and no substitutes for that stronghold on a broad scale. Longstanding troubles suddenly culminated, at least or so far, in general public reaction in Hawaii, where a revolutionary government has been formally recognized by our local representatives as a de facto government. know.History has provided many meaningful events, and now there is one more.People in their prime can die suddenly, and nations basking in the halcyon can find themselves confronting unexpected sources of division and conflicting interests.The consequence may be war, or it may be the abandonment of real and essential national interests in order to avoid a problem that catches people off guard.In the absence of prior planning, a series of developments that follow the actions of people but do not consciously respond to the current crisis, America finds itself having to answer a question and make a decision.This question is no different from the question that the Roman Senate had to answer, and it is no less important than the consul who invited Rome to occupy Messina. As a result, the latter abandoned the traditional policy of limiting Rome's expansion to the Italian peninsula.Let us be sure to note that we have to answer that question, we have to make that decision, whether we want to or not.This cannot be avoided.On this occasion, the decision to stand still is as important as the decision to take the most aggressive action.We can move forward at present; if we do not advance but retreat, the situation in the world will change according to its own logic.What the situation involves is not a matter of principle, but a matter of great specificity, which may lead to far-reaching consequences in one way or another.

In fact, the present is not a moment of serious difficulty.Unlike the historical examples just cited, Britain and the United States, whose interests are now linked, are so similar in inherited traditions, habits of thought, and views of rights that one side has to recognize the other side in a certain position where its interests dominate. The harm suffered by the region does not require oneself to be in the position of the other party.Notwithstanding the various immigrants who have poured into America in the past few years, our political traditions and racial character remain British as Mr. Douglas Campbell would like to call Dutch, and even so the blood is the same.While our mouths are stuffed with food that may not necessarily be to our palate, our political digestive system is still struggling to assimilate the vast amount of different things it has been unable to refuse.As long as our assimilation efforts are from time to time imperfect, our political organization and spirit will remain essentially British.We are imbued with similar notions of liberty, law, and rights, and indeed are no less progressive than our countrymen across the sea, and even more conservative than the English in their careful maintenance of our fundamental laws.From the true spirit of liberty we have drawn ideas of rights and the rule of law, and we have kept both and not just one of them.Not only is our inherent tradition imbued with this spirit; but, step by step, as Rome absorbed the rest of the peninsula, we have developed it, so that government should be of the essence of liberty and good will. The principle is a word of respect for the UK. The UK has also maintained this principle throughout its history and has been spread and maintained in every region.Today, in the South, the rights of a race not like our own attract our attention; in the North, the existence of some traditions like ours, whose freedom to choose their respected states.At the same time, we are heading towards the ocean.In our youth we were bordered only by the Atlantic Ocean; in our youth we extended our frontiers to the Gulf of Mexico; and today in our prime we are bordered by the Pacific Ocean.Don't we have the right or need to go further in any direction?Are there no vital interests or obvious dangers to us beyond sea level that require us to have policies that give us certain rights?

For so long these issues have flickered on the fringes of the future, and now they are rapidly embracing reality.What happened in Hawaii is a part of it, perhaps fundamentally a small part.However, in terms of its relationship with the whole, this part is so important that, as mentioned earlier, a wrong decision not only cannot stand on its own, but will also lead to the retreat of the whole line in principle and in fact.In our natural, necessary, non-oppressive expansion, we have come into contact with the progress of another great people; Developing principles that are revealed and manifested from time to time.Under the action of this principle, Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, Aden, and India have shown the world a complete chain in geographical order rather than strict chronological order.The chain is forged link by link, either through the overt use of force or through political bargaining.But it has always been firmly controlled by a national identity.Such a force is so powerful and appropriate that politicians of every faction find themselves, whether they like it or not, driven by a tendency which no individual can resist or greatly change.Unconfirmed rumors and imprudent personal remarks suggest that Mr. Gladstone is impatient to bring the British occupation of Egypt to an end.Yet, ironically, at the same time that his long absence from political life ended, it was the growing British occupation in Egypt that made his return all the more compelling.Again, with regard to the chain just mentioned, it may be useful to note that its two endpoints were first acquired by Great Britain, first India, then Gibraltar, then Malta, Aden, Cyprus. Les and Egypt.And, without exception, every action Britain took was accompanied by an annoyed adversary.Spain has never ceased to mourn for Gibraltar.Napoleon also said: I would rather see the British appear in Montmartre than see them appear in Malta.What France thought about Egypt was well known, even undisguised; and this, added to our warnings, was all the more exasperated by the bad feeling of not being given a chance.

I would also like to mention just one other chain of British possessions on the seas: Halifax, Bermuda, St Lucia and Jamaica.It strengthened British control over the Atlantic Ocean, the Caribbean, and the Isthmus of Panama.In the Pacific, Britain's position was less satisfactory.Compared with the West Coast of the Pacific, commercial development in the Eastern Pacific is much later and still incomplete.When the western Pacific region first opened its doors to European adventurers, there were already ancient economies in China and Japan, and their abundance of exotic and luxurious products attracted merchants driven by the good expectation of profit. them.The west coast of America, so far as it is largely inhabited by savages, offered nothing but the gold and silver of Mexico and Peru.During the long span of Spanish domination even these things were monopolized by Spain, which was not a commercial state.The Pacific coast of America, being so remote from England and having little to trade with, could not attract British enterprise.The chief and persuasive temptation to the sailors of this country was the hope of gain, and in pursuit of profit they established and annexed one after another within the regions they penetrated, and over the sea routes leading to distant lands. stronghold.Accessible only by a long, perilous voyage around Cape Horn, or the still more arduous and perilous crossing of the continent, the western coast of North America was one of the last moderately fertile coasts on earth to be occupied by whites.By the time Vancouver was surveying Puget Sound and was the first man to cross the strait that separates British America from the island that bears his name today, the United States was already one country in fact and in form.As a result of the turn of events, through the later development of British Columbia in Canada in the Northeast Pacific and Australia and New Zealand in the Southwest Pacific, Great Britain once again found itself holding both ends of a line which it inevitably hoped to Get some relay points between the ends.There is no good reason why England should not acquire them, without regard to our own overriding, more pressing, and more crucial needs as another people.Among these junctures, the Hawaiian Islands were of special importance, not because of any inherent commercial value, but because of its vantage point for maritime and military control.

The military or strategic significance of a naval base depends on its geographical location, strength and resources.Of these three, the first is the most important, because it is determined by nature; and whatever is lacking in the latter two, it can always be made up, wholly or in part, by acquirement.Fortification can eliminate the weakness of a stronghold; if nature has not endowed the area with many resources, with a long-term perspective, it can be hoarded in advance.The geographical location of a stronghold outside the sphere of strategic influence cannot be changed by manpower.Note how Napoleon I, in assessing an area as a possible battleground, first considered the most important natural features, then calculated the controlling points, their distances from each other, their relative positions or, in nautical terms, their bearings, and each It is quite instructive to know what concrete help can be provided for the war.These practices provide basic schemes and ideas, undisturbed by confusing secondary considerations, from which decisive points can be clearly weighed.The number of such points varies according to the characteristics of the area concerned: in a mountainous, broken country there may be many; in a plain devoid of natural obstacles there may be few or none at all, if man-made The words of good fortune.If there are few, the value of each is naturally greater than if there were many; and if there is only one, its importance is not only unique, but reaches to the extreme.

A sea close to land is conceptually the same as a large plain cut off by no obstacles.A famous French tactician said that there is no battlefield at sea.It means that there are no natural conditions on the sea that can dominate and often constrain the direction of action of generals.But on the plain, however flat and uniform it may be, there are reasons for concentrating people in towns and villages, and making roads based on the necessary connections between the centres.A junction that has roads also has dominance, depending on the number of roads converging there and their respective values.The same is true at sea.Although in itself the ocean presents no hindrance to a sailing vessel which may follow one of many routes across the surface of the earth between two points, the circumstances of distance, convenience, traffic, or wind It specifies certain frequently-traveled routes.If these routes pass through a stronghold in the sea, and the latter has value in turn, it has influence on these routes.Where multiple routes cross, this influence becomes so great that it dominates everything.

Let us now apply these considerations to the Hawaiian Islands.To anyone who has observed a panorama showing the Pacific Ocean with its two shores, two striking things are immediately apparent.He could see at a glance that the Hawaiian Islands, lying in a relatively isolated state on a vast expanse of ocean, formed the center of a great circle with a radius roughly equal to the distance from Honolulu to San Francisco.If one does not bother to place a compass on a map, it can be found that the circumference of this circle passes west and south through the outer fringe of a series of archipelagoes extending from Australia and New Zealand to the Northeast of the American continent.Scattered within this circle are a few barren, insignificant islands that seem to exist only to emphasize the failure of nature to bridge the gap that separates Hawaii from the islands of the South Pacific.However, it may be noted that some of these islands, such as Fanning Island and Christmas Island, have been occupied by the United Kingdom in recent years.From San Francisco to Honolulu is 2,100 miles, easily crossed by steamship; this distance is almost the same as that from Honolulu to Gilbert, Marshall, Samoa, Society, and the Marquesas.Except for Samoa, over which our country has some influence, the other islands are under European control.

Such a scenario attracts the attention of strategists and, incidentally, businessmen as well: monopoly on a key stronghold, few competitors, and no substitutes for that stronghold on a broad scale.Striking besides this is the apparent relevance of the peculiarly situated islands to the more important commercial routes across the Pacific; The state of affairs in Hawaii, which will surely emerge from the future situation, compels our country to pay such attention to it with great reluctance.The circles mentioned above delineate some central points between which there must be traffic connections; moreover, all will perceive from future developments, however unclear, a point which will alter the present sea routes to a great extent and lead to new ones. New, important centers of generation are about to emerge.Whether the Isthmus Canal ends up in Panama or Nicaragua is immaterial to the question at hand, although like most Americans who have considered this, I believe it must be in the latter.Whatever it may be, the concentration of ships from both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans must lead to the creation of a transoceanic center of commerce.Few other business centers in the world are superior to it.Nations will salivate at the routes linking this center, and its relations with other centers in the Pacific region connected by air routes must also be examined in detail.Such studies of commercial routes and their relationship to the Hawaiian Islands, together with other prior strategic considerations, provide a comprehensive picture of how valuable the islands could be in terms of commerce and sea control.

Referring again to the map, it can be seen that although the shortest routes from the isthmus to Australia and New Zealand and to South America and Hawaii have no possible connection or influence from it, the routes to China and Japan The route still has to either pass through the archipelago or extend from nearby.Ships sailing from Central America to North American ports are naturally within the sphere of influence of our coast.These circumstances, and the current, recognized distribution of political power in the Pacific, have naturally led to international acquiescence to certain definite spheres of influence for our country and others.Britain, Germany and the Netherlands have reached a certain agreement in the Southwest Pacific to avoid conflicts between their respective demands in the region.Although the above-mentioned mutual recognition is artificial in form, it is based on a completely objective and indisputable situation.

Among the countries or regions bordering on the eastern coast of the North Pacific, the United States has a much larger population, greater interests, and much stronger power.The links between the Hawaiian Islands and the United States are naturally also more frequent and important than those between it and any other country.Notwithstanding the unlucky luck of Great Britain and its colonies, with the same natural desire, that a future canal should not be completed, the straight route from British Columbia to Eastern Australia and New Zealand would pass, as before, near the Hawaiian Islands. .The fact that this important shipping line is also close to Hawaii further strengthens and highlights the strategic importance of the archipelago.It's just that this doesn't change the above assertion that American interests in Hawaii outweigh British interests.This is based on a natural reason, that is, proximity, which has always been recognized as a reasonable basis for the exertion of influence by a country.It was certainly not lucky for British Columbia's expectations and its reliance on the Canadian Pacific Railway for commercial and military transportation that the United States lay between it and the South Pacific and was the closest country to Hawaii.However, it is so; and at a point so vital to our role in the Pacific, the interests of our sixty-five million people should certainly be accorded greater weight than the interests of Canada's six million sex.

The importance of the Hawaiian Islands can be deduced from the above investigation.It serves as a stronghold to powerfully influence the commercial and military dominance of the Pacific region, especially the North Pacific, where geographically the United States has the fullest right to function.This is the chief advantage of Hawaii, namely, that it directly contributes to our country's commercial security and control of the seas.A brief mention of the advantage viewed from the opposite side: the acquisition of Hawaii prevents the occurrence of a situation in which some other power takes possession of the archipelago, which would be disadvantageous and threatening to our country.The grave threat to our Pacific coast and Pacific trade, with a point of so great importance in the possession of a possible enemy, has been frequently mentioned in the press, and occasionally published in diplomatic documents. Reflects its consideration.This threat can be considered widely acknowledged.One particular problem, however, which has not received much attention, and to which naval officers are more sensitive than the general public, is that of a naval enemy at any point on our coast from Puget Sound to Mexico. It would be to our great disadvantage to have a coaling station within twenty-five hundred miles.However, there is only one place where such a coaling station can be built.If there were many, we would find it difficult to keep none of them from being used by others.If kept out of the Hawaiian Islands, where a coaling station could be located, the enemy can only get fuel at a distance of 3,500 to 4,000 miles, and a round trip of 7,000 to 8,000 miles. Such inconveniences make sustained sea operations nearly impossible.Of course, the coal mines of British Columbia are a limit to this assertion; but we can at least hope to hit them from the land side if need be.Rarely have factors so important for the attack and defense of a coast be concentrated in one spot.This makes it all the more imperative that we master it, if we can at all. I also hope that we will not view the opportunity given to us one-sidedly, as if it concerns only one region of our country or part of our country's foreign trade or influence.This is not just a question of specific action where appropriate opportunities for such action may not yet exist; it is also a question of principles and policies that will lead to many actions in the future.Now that our country has made sufficient progress, the time has come to define this principle or policy.The admissibility of this principle is conditioned only on whether it accords legitimate, honest attention to the right of other States to take legitimate concerns which the measures under discussion do not violate.The annexation of Hawaii would not be merely an isolated, irrational act detached from all motives, but the first result that the United States, as it has grown, has realized that it lives its life under American influence It is a symbol of the necessity of extending the happiness enjoyed by the people beyond the territory in which it has been filled.I admit that our much-celebrated economic gifts and ingenuity will not be imposed on countries that do not want them, but that does not mean a denial of the rights and ingenuity of those in those countries who wish to come to our country.Religious comparisons teach us that creeds that resist missionary work are doomed to decline.Is the same possible for countries?There is no doubt that England's glorious deeds are chiefly due to her spirit; and this spirit can be traced back to the age when England was just sailing to the deep sea.England had no definite policy at that time, or rather she only foresaw the future to which her stars pointed, following the instincts of a nation which in its infancy prescribes later more rational motives.Let us also learn from the British experience.England did not become the maritime power she is today in a flash; step by step, taking advantage of the opportunities given, she ascended to the supremacy of the world.Today, this status is reflected in the popularity of the British language and institutions of British origin.How much poorer would the world have been if the cautious and indeterminate attitude of the English had now prevented us from advancing every step beyond our shores!Besides, does anyone doubt that if England and America, the two principal nations founded in the English tradition, could come to a sincere understanding and expand freely without suspicion and mutual support, it would not greatly increase the welfare of the world. Total amount? However, if the call for the good of the world seems suspiciously like a cover-up for national self-interest, it is better to honestly identify the latter bluntly as the whole motive.Let us not shy away from the fact that broad self-interests collide with narrow self-interests in which we are somehow bound.Our country's geographical location on the three coasts of the Atlantic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Pacific Ocean inherently requires us to expand those increasingly prosperous common oceans through the Isthmus Canal.Overland transportation has always been limited, and the result has always been slow; brain-wrenching, painstaking, and often disappointingly little progress.It is vain to attempt to replace the thoroughfare of nature's own creation by overland routes.Although a group can have a strong cohesive force, the strength of the army and minority groups lies in the fact that the group's interests can for a period of time resist the unorganized resistance of the public who is only vaguely aware of its needs. No matter what kind of opposition and attack, the latter will eventually overcome the obstacles in its established path of advancement like an uncontrolled force in nature. Therefore, the Isthmus Canal has an inevitable role in the future of the United States; this role is inseparable from the objective implementation results of the canal policy whose specific content cannot be accurately predicted.However, since concrete future actions, either contingent or inevitable, cannot be foreseen with certainty at the present time, it is more reasonable to identify principles that will help guide action when the time comes.We should start from the basic fact, proven by history, that the control of the seas, especially along the vital routes drawn out by the interests and commerce of nations, is the chief material factor in determining the strength and prosperity of a nation.This is so because the ocean is an extremely important communication medium in the world.From it follows naturally the principle of aiming at the control of the seas: Take into your own hands the points at sea which contribute to a firm control of the seas, when you can indeed do so.If this principle is adopted, we shall not hesitate to take those points which lie on the line to the isthmus, and which are attached to it, make us naturally seek them.There are many of them.The current state of affairs in Hawaii exemplifies the application of this principle. But, from a military point of view, there is one more thing to note: the world is not yet at a point where it doesn't need to be done.Military strongholds and fortresses, however strong or well situated, on land or sea, provide little control by themselves.It is a complete, deplorable, and dangerous mistake that it is often said that such and such an island or port controls such and such a body of water.Such words can only be used roughly, taking into account the self-evident conditions of adequate support, sufficient naval power.However, the government's superstitious belief in the power of its own navy and its indifference to the defenses of its own ports and the satisfaction of its fleet's needs gave reason to fear the consequences of certain advances.Napoleon, who had a better understanding, also made such errors in speech when he wrote: San Pietro, Corfu and Malta will make us masters of the Mediterranean.Arrogant bragging!Within a year Corfu, and Malta within two, were severed from France, which could not protect them with ships.The Englishman Ney also pointed out that this Mediterranean fortress might well have never fallen into the hands of his chief enemy had Bonaparte not taken the latter stronghold from his corrupt but harmless government.Here we learn another lesson. It seems illogical to jump from the realization that sufficient naval power is necessary to gain dependencies in the periphery to the conclusion that the United States needs a navy on par with the most powerful navies of today.We, a nation so remote from foreign naval bases, may reasonably hope that distance will impose certain limits on the employment of the European powers with their naval power.But it would be a mistake to think of that distance as a layer of protective armor in which we can be confidently swaggering without the backing of a carefully weighed force.Of course, in estimating how much naval power is sufficient for our country, there is a welcome interval separating our present territories and future concerns from those centers of interest which are indeed vital to the European powers. will be properly taken into account.If, in addition, we have correctly recognized what our reasonable sphere of influence should be, and shown frank impartiality in dealing with foreign interests within that sphere, our dominance there will have few problems. Above all it should be expected that the great country from which our country sprang, that of us and the outside country, is England.The relationship between them grows warmer every year.The great unity of spirit underlying our apparent differences of policy must bring us closer if we do not oppose a tendency which will make our race dominate the world's seas.It is impossible, and not wise even if possible, to force us to this point.Undoubtedly, expecting it to be fulfilled and removing mutual barriers by promoting the very proper conduct which arises from our definite interests and which involves aggression and arrogance is a noble and attendant benefit which is innumerable. The goal.
Press "Left Key ←" to return to the previous chapter; Press "Right Key →" to enter the next chapter; Press "Space Bar" to scroll down.
Chapters
Chapters
Setting
Setting
Add
Return
Book