Chapter 15 14. Strategies for the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea

The two islands, Cuba and Jamaica, are considered points of most substance for controlling the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea.In terms of advantages and disadvantages in terms of location, strength and resources.Cuba is clearly and absolutely in the upper hand. The absolute and relative importance of certain parts of the earth's surface varies from time to time according to their interest to men.For many years, those early civilizations and our own civilization originated from this and exerted influence and developed around the center of the Mediterranean Sea.In the tumultuous years of the constant struggle between the decline of these civilizations and the dawn of our own time, the Mediterranean region has retained its general importance, despite its political Dominance was challenged and eventually lost by younger, livelier and more militant states that formed beyond the Alps and on the coasts of the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans.Until the end of the Middle Ages, the Mediterranean was the link between East and West that maintained commercial links.For trade from the Levant to the east required a long and painful overland journey, over mountains and desert wastelands, and the Mediterranean provided the only water link.The discovery of the Passage of Good Hope robbed the Mediterranean of this advantage; at the same time the discovery of the New World opened up to the Old World new luxuries and whole new realms of ambition.The Mediterranean at that time had only its own creative resources to draw upon, under the influence of the hopelessly barbaric Turks on the east, the decadent despotism of Spain on the west, and many others in between. Divided by small nations incapable of coherent and forceful action, it is reduced to a factor of lesser importance for the world's going forward.

During the French Revolutionary War, the survival of Britain and the success of wars related to it depended on the vitality of British commerce, but at that time British merchant ships were almost all driven out of the Mediterranean, and only 1% of the greatly increased British trade volume during this period Two come from this area.As for how the opening of the Suez Canal and the development of the Eastern Question changed this situation, there is no need to say much.Nevertheless, throughout the relatively insignificant period of the Mediterranean, the relationship between the Mediterranean and the East and West has given it a certain political significance for the whole world, making it always a place for great political ambitions and military events. A place of enterprising spirit.At no point since Britain began its active involvement in the Mediterranean two centuries ago has it been willing to relinquish its claim to be the leading power in the Mediterranean, even though its occupation there was of purely military importance. is a naval value.

The Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico are put together to form an intercontinental sea and a sea with many islands.They, too, have undergone a change of fate that is also manifest in the history of nations and in the lives of individuals.For many generations, chiefly our own, the first act of the discovery and conquest of the two seas above the New World, with its islands and neighboring continents, has been like a visit to a real El Dorado A piece of land whose new owner can exchange the least labor for the most and the most abundant production.The abundance of natural resources, the pleasant climate, and the docile character of most of the local population brought them under the system of slavery, securing items that, once loved, were as indispensable as silk and spices from the Orient cheap, high-volume output.In Mexico and Peru, the gold mines voraciously sought by early Spanish explorers became a reality; meanwhile, a short, perilous tropical voyage sent the riches of the West Coast across the Isthmus to the land that washes both Old and New Spain. coast on either side of the vast ocean.At that time, even though its rivals preempted Britain from getting the most and richest land, Britain in her tense period obtained nearly 25 percent of her total commerce from the Caribbean Sea, while the Mediterranean region was only contributed two percent.

But these fair regions were also afflicted by a disease, not a simple despotism which was characteristic of the age, but a disease which met no opposition in the temperament or political ability of the people over which it ruled. despotism and whatever will lead to their future emancipation.Queen Elizabeth of England was an absolute monarch in what she did, and so was Philip II of Spain.But in the subjects of the former there is clearly a will and a strength not only to resist oppression but to build freedom, which is absent from the subjects of the latter.This willingness and strength, after many successive modest victories, were exemplified in the American Revolution.England has not forgotten the teachings of this revolution; for England herself has taught it for centuries, so that her people and statesmen have easily grasped it.A century and a quarter has passed since this teaching was given, not only to England, but to the whole world.Today, facing the contrasting colonial systems of Britain and Spain, we see political intelligence in one, and irreparable political stupidity and backwardness in the other.

The reasons appear to be very different, but in fact they all arise from and depend on the lack of local political capacity.These reasons place the Mediterranean and the Caribbean in a similar situation in the contemporary era, both considered locus of substantial interest in the field of international relations.Whatever the inherent value of these two waters in themselves and their surroundings, and whatever their significance to human prosperity or culture today, they are now marked by their political and military importance .In the broadest sense, this importance concerns not only their neighbors, but the world as a whole.Both are seas surrounded by land; both are links in the chain of communication between East and West, and the chain is here broken by the isthmus; and both are limited in extent compared with the ocean.And, because of these common characteristics, they all epitomize political and military strengths and weaknesses affecting sea power.This conclusion is clearly true for the Mediterranean, as its history shows.It is all the more plausible for the Caribbean, both because, unlike the peninsular Mediterranean, the shape of its coast prevents land forces from wedging so far and so strongly into the sea; circumstances, the character of the first settlers, and the short time that the land was inhabited by civilized people.In the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, not counting the United States, there is no land power comparable to those continental powers in Europe, which rely more on land than navy.As long as the tendency of national sentiment, which is obviously different from the prudent considerations of politicians, can be discerned, it is not difficult to see that in today's Mediterranean, the maritime powers of Britain, France, and Italy are competing with the land powers of Germany, Austria, and Russia. Confrontation, while the latter is active.There is absolutely no chance of this happening in the Caribbean in the near future.As affirmed in a previous article, the Caribbean is primarily the domain of maritime powers.Here, it is based on this understanding that we examine this region.For us, the sudden awakening of concern over the past two years has given it the political importance that our forefathers once recognized, and compelled us to give it due attention.

Perhaps the reader should be asked to bear this in mind: the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, though linked like the Siamese twins, are still distinct geographical units.A leading British journal has accused the author of calling the Gulf of Mexico the Caribbean Sea out of reluctance to associate the name of some other country with a body of water over which his own country claims dominion.The extent of the Gulf of Mexico is clearly defined by a projected line extending from the Florida Peninsula in the north to the Yucatan Peninsula in the south.Between these two points, a distance of two hundred miles is inserted by the island of Cuba, which leaves on one side a passage about a hundred miles wide to the Atlantic Ocean, and on the other to the Caribbean Sea, The slightly wider Yucatan Strait.It is worth mentioning here, as an important military consideration, that from the mouth of the Mississippi westward to the tip of the Yucatan peninsula at Cape Catoche, there is no port which can be considered fully adequate to the needs of large ships of war, which are currently being Such harbors, common to other parts of the region in question, are not to be found on this long stretch of coast.This is an element of military importance in the problems we face.

In each of the two bodies of water, the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, there exists a site of outstanding commercial significance.In the Gulf of Mexico, the mouth of the Mississippi River is the meeting point for imports and exports of goods via waterways from the Mississippi River Basin.No matter where these goods came from or where they were going, they converged here as if at a great crossroads, or as if the avenues of an empire converged in a metropolis.Whatever the value to the United States of the Mississippi, with its many long subsidiary channels, as a convenient medium of communication between the remote interior and the world's oceanic passages, all goods entering and leaving the Mississippi must be gathered at the mouth of the river.The presence of the small but important Gulf Coast cities of Mobile, Galveston, or Mexican ports does not diminish the importance of the Mississippi Estuary, but rather makes it stand out in comparison.These cities also have meaning, and they are equally connected to the outside world through the Strait of Florida or the Strait of Yucatan.

Likewise, in the Caribbean, the presence of numerous important ports and the heavy traffic for tropical products grown in the region accentuate the sheer importance of the point commonly, though still ill-defined, called the Isthmus.Here, too, the decisive factor is the intersection of paths.Whether this situation is natural, as in the previous example, or caused by simple human tendencies, it is the primary factor that determines the commercial and strategic significance of a location.It is for this reason that, despite the shortcomings of land transportation and cargo transfer, from the time of the first explorers, the isthmus has been an important link in the line of communication between East and West for many centuries since the time of the first explorers. Varies from time to time.Moreover, once the isthmus is penetrated by a canal, it will create a maritime center comparable to the mouth of the Mississippi.But the two will be different.In the latter, those water-courses which meet on one side lie within a great country and carry the wealth of that country; while in the isthmus the roads which meet on both sides lie entirely on the sea which is common to all nations.So control of the isthmus depended either on control of the isthmus itself, or indirectly on control of the access to it, or on having a navy of superior strength.In the affairs of the sea, the latter has always been the dominant factor, just as an army mobile on land must determine the gain or loss of a fortress.

Thus, we have two centers of military discussion on the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico.These two bodies of water together control or influence one side of the road to these two commercially valuable, and therefore politically and militarily significant centers.Here the road on the other side, the inland route of the Mississippi River and the sea route on the Pacific side of the isthmus, is of little concern to us.Roads are called lines of communication in military science.Lines of communication are perhaps the most important determinants of strategy, military or sea.Literally, they are the most fundamental, since all military operations are as inseparable from lines of communication as the fruit of a plant is from its connection with its roots.Therefore, we draw the traffic lines between the above two centers and the outside world on the map.These lines embody the interdependence between these centers and the outside, by means of which the two complement each other; once they are cut off, neither is of much use to the other.The military value of all locations in the Gulf of Mexico or the Caribbean depends precisely on their potential impact on these lines of communication.

It is impossible to presuppose or accompany this with a discussion of the technical aspects of naval strategy.If such an explanation is required, its use should be alternative, random and strict.Therefore, I just want to briefly mention here that the strategic value of any location, regardless of its size, whether it is a seaport or a strait, depends on first, its location (mainly relative to the line of communication); second, its strength (inherent or acquired); three, its resources (natural or stored).People can gather strength and resources in a suitable location, but they are powerless to change a location that is not superior in itself, so location should be the first concern.Power and resources can be artificially supplied or increased, but moving a port outside the strategic sphere of influence is not humanly capable.If Gibraltar were placed in the middle of the ocean, it might be four times as powerful as it is today, but militarily it would be useless.

With these considerations in mind, some of the sites shown in black squares on the map were selected after careful study of the merits inherent in the various ports and coasts of the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico.This is not to say, of course, that there are no advantages elsewhere, or that all the strategies of the region under consideration are embodied in these locations.The extent to which they are worth in a given situation is conditioned by the concrete circumstances; and some attention must also be paid to the political situation, which can be said to be largely site-neutral.Some sites were left unexamined because they paled in comparison to others that were so close to them that they were in such a strong position that they could actually bring them under their influence.In addition, the common sense in strategy is: no matter how powerful the passive location, the place to be protected, even if it is an indispensable support for military operations, it should not occupy too much.Doing so would waste power.Similarly, in a study of a site of maritime operations, the number of objects under consideration should be narrowed down by a process of tapering to include only those apparently significant to Important and representative places.Including more will only interfere with attention, waste thinking and prevent the formation of correct understanding.Excluding some details within the permissible and reasonable range helps to better understand, a large number of details will only harm this, just like a large number of graphics or characters will only give people the final impression of a work of art or novel Can't stay either.To form an idea, at the beginning it is necessary to carry out close and careful investigation; but after that, objectively selecting those most important places, which are most vividly expressed by some points and lines, can make people most sure to get the idea of ​​an idea. An understanding of essential connections in the context of military operations. In the United States, Pensacola and the mouth of the Mississippi River are alternative locations for naval bases, with a recent decision by a specially created panel favoring the latter.While the author fully agrees with this decision, it does not at all mean that the former is useless.The combination of these two places can well meet the needs of strategic maritime strategy and land strategy.Operations based on a country's coastal borders should not be dependent on a single location.While the two are so close together that an enemy nation can easily spy on them without spreading its forces, Norfolk and New York are not, compared to the hoped-for ideal.But, considering the draft of the heavy ships, they were still the best we could choose on that coast.Also, Key West, an island off the tip of the Florida peninsula, has long been considered the principal and almost the only good and defensible anchorage in the Florida Straits, reasonably controlling its importance to our wartime Atlantic Transportation links between the coast and the Gulf Coast are essential.Key West is, as it stands, the furthest point we have at our disposal when the war takes place in the Caribbean.If it were adequately fortified, our fleet could rely upon it; and the island, if so employed, would effectively draw the enemy's forces away from Pensacola and the mouth of the Mississippi.However, it could never be the kind of main base of operations that Pensatech and New Orleans could be, since it's just an island and has no resources, not even fresh water.It can however be modified to be very effective in supplying a fleet with the day-to-day needs of coal, ammunition, etc.Sixty miles west of Key West is an ancient fort on Dry Tortugas Island.It could be a useful addition to Key West, it's just that it can hardly be considered at the moment.Key West is five hundred and fifty miles from the mouth of the Mississippi and twelve hundred miles from the isthmus. The islands of Saint Lucia and Martinique are singled out on the map because they are, respectively, the main British and French strongholds around the broad area in question.For reasons already stated, Greenwood, Barbados, Dominica, and the other British islands close to the above two islands were not considered, or more properly, because we believed that they could be sufficiently representative of them. Saint Lucia is covered.If England needed an auxiliary point in this area, it would be in Antigua.The island is to St. Lucia what Pensacola is to the mouth of the Mississippi.Likewise, French Guadeloupe has significance for Martinique.The inherent importance of these points consists in the fact that they are the nearest of the islands held by England and France to the mother country, and that there are no dangerous points between them and the mother country which have to be bypassed.However, they also have their disadvantages: they are small islands, do not have enough natural resources, and are prone to total blockade.Thus, their usefulness in warfare still essentially depends on the control of the seas.Not so with Pensacola or New Orleans, which have the mainland behind them. It is in this respect that the island of Cuba, to which Spain belongs, exhibits its own outstanding advantages, and so does British Jamaica, but it is still much inferior to the former.The island of Cuba, though narrow as a whole, is more than six hundred miles long from Cape San Antonio to Cape Macy.In short, the island of Cuba is more of a continent than the other islands and, with proper development, contains a wealth of resources that would make it self-sufficient.The island of Cuba is half the size of Ireland, but due to its peculiar shape, it is more than twice as long.Therefore, the coastline of Cuba Island is extremely long.Measured militarily, its many natural ports can be concentrated into three major blocks, represented by Havana on the west, Santiago on the east, and Cienfuegos near the middle of the southern coast, the shortest distance between any two ports. The distance by water is 335 miles from Cienfuegos to Santiago.The waterway from Cienfuegos to Havana is four hundred and fifty miles, and crosses the western extremity of the island of Cuba; but the two are separated on land by a very easy country road of a little more than a hundred miles. open.Therefore, if Cuba is regarded as the location of a naval operation base and a source of supply for a fleet, then among the islands in the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico that belong to it and are the only islands that belong to it like Cuba, its situation is absolutely Unique.Its size is unique, making it largely self-sufficient, either by utilizing its own produce, or by amassing readily available foreign necessities in a large, prosperous maritime community.It was also unique in that supplies could be transported by inland roads from one point to another as needed by the fleet without risking being intercepted at sea.In addition, the long coastline, numerous ports, and diverse shipping routes minimized the risk of a complete blockade of the island of Cuba.Such situations have advantages in themselves, especially with an inferior navy, since they allow forces to be transferred from one side to the other as the action shifts, and shelter can be found in any direction. and supply sources. Jamaica is only one-tenth the size and one-fifth the length of the island of Cuba, and has no inherent merit of the latter either as a source of supply or as a center from which direct action can be taken.However, if it is held by a sea-absolutely superior power, as it is held by Great Britain today, the several questions of convenience of supply, blockade, and direction of action are of less importance.What used to be a matter of life and death is now just a matter of some headaches, requiring attention and careful handling, but not at all insoluble.In the long run no superiority in location can outweigh a fundamental weakness in the field of organized mobile forces, especially in the field of armies and navies.If Spain were to become involved in a war with England, as it often did, the Spaniards in Cuba would have had the advantage that their lines of communication with the United States, especially the Gulf ports, would be better protected Down.That's not to say that ships bound for Cuba along these routes won't be attacked, just fine.No line of communication, sea or land, is immune to attack.I mean, it's less effort to protect these lines of communication than it is to attack them; the attacker has to be much more aggressive, has to take a lot more action than the defender because it's farther away from the base.Therefore, the effectiveness of the attack also depends on how much power Britain can draw from other battlefields.In such cases, positional advantages will not merely compensate for small disadvantages in local power.Napoleon once said that war is about the point.This master of lightning-quick movement certainly meant that war was all about getting the point and holding it.The outcome of a war depends on the use of a key point by means of mobile power, just as the effectiveness of a chess piece depends on its own value and relative position.So, although in the combination of these two factors strength and position, strength is inherently more valuable, it is always possible that a large advantage in position makes a smaller disadvantage in strength unnecessary, and one plus five may be more valuable than Two plus three is bigger.The location value of Cuba Island is great. If it is completely regarded as a maritime point without considering the power based on it, Jamaica Island has far less effect on the outcome of the war than Cuba Island, although Kingston on Jamaica Island has excellent ports and naval bases.It is only with respect to the isthmus and related local Caribbean issues that the island of Jamaica possesses a certain superiority, which will be dealt with later.The first thing to do is to complete the description of the squared places, which is necessary to explain why they were singled out. Of these sites, three are in close proximity to each other in the isthmus region.According to the rules adopted above, they should have been appropriately reduced to only one representative location.But since these sites are so close to the Isthmus, the center of great Caribbean interests, their respective importance is constituted for different and specific reasons, and a brief mention of them individually and collectively is essential for a comprehensive account of the strategic state of the Caribbean. very important.These locations are: the port town of Coron sometimes called Cartagena, a port city three hundred kilometers east of Coron, and Chiriqui Lake, a large enclosed bay, one hundred and fifty kilometers west of Coron, along the Virtually uninhabited, its many accompanying islands provide excellent and varied anchorages.Colon is the terminus of the Panama Railway on the Caribbean side and of a planned and partially excavated canal.The port, though prone to some storms, was a good one, and it was a natural starting point for traffic across the isthmus.It is not my intention to enter into a debate about the relative merits and demerits of the Panama Canal project and the Nicaragua Canal project, but it is safe to say that if the former were to be built, Colón would have been an entrance on one side.As for the city of Cartagena, it is the largest and most prosperous city in the vicinity of the isthmus, and has a good harbour.With these conditions, the merit of Cartagena is based on the axiomatic principle that a place of commercial concentration is more strategically important than another place inferior to it in this respect, if other respects are nearly equal.The latter situation is reflected in Lake Chiriqui.The fact that this precious body of water, Lake Chiriqui, was visited by Columbus and recorded by the name of one of its inner bays, Admiral's Bay, has all the natural conditions required for a purely naval base, but is not suitable for commercial activities. It is not so suitable.Here, everything needs to be built from scratch.And it is inseparable from the continuous external support.Lake Chiriqui is located between the mouth of the Colon and San Juan rivers, which have been selected as the entrance to the envisaged Nicaragua canal.Lake Chiriqui thus reflects in a special way the unresolved stage in which the isthmus question is currently in.Notwithstanding all the potential that exists in the Chiriqui Lake area, little can be said at present, except to point out that a basic knowledge of the lake's existence and characteristics is essential to a full understanding of the isthmus' environment. The Dutch-owned island of Curacao is also marked, mainly because its natural features make it impossible not to ignore it.Today, though, it is among those places that can be expected to remain so indefinitely in a politically neutral environment.Curacao has a good harbor which can be made impregnable; moreover, it is naturally near the course of any ships bound for the isthmus and via the eastern side of the island of Jamaica.These circumstances constitute the undeniable military importance of Curacao.However, the Netherlands is a small country, and it is impossible to participate in a full-scale war again.In fact, there was a growing concern that the German Empire, which was seeking colonial expansion, might try to annex the Netherlands because it still held large colonies.This may seem impossible, but it is not entirely incomprehensible compared with the recent mysterious moves on the European chessboard that are widely believed to be caused by the dominant influence of the German Empire.Those of us who are wondering have spent the past few months trying to make sense of these moves, to no avail. It should be recognized that the same neutrality may apply to the remaining marked sites.They are Cancun Island, Samana Bay and St. Thomas Island.The first of these is at the tip of the Yucatan peninsula, belonging to Mexico, a country that also has a very real interest in the isthmus, since, like the United States, it has a vast expanse bordering both the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean (in the Gulf of Mexico). ) coast.But the islands that lie in the Yucatan Strait, on the necessary route from any Gulf port to the Caribbean and the Isthmus, have little else to offer than their location.Its berthing conditions are almost unbearable, with no resources, and it can only be equipped with defensive capabilities at a disproportionate cost.Moreover, viewing the island as a promising military point only accentuates the fact that even the most superficial glance will impress: in terms of location, the island of Cuba is in control of the Yucatan Strait. There is no possible rival, just as it is unmatched for control of the Florida Strait that connects the Gulf of Mexico to the Atlantic Ocean. Samana Bay, in the northeast corner of Santo Domingo, is one of the few good anchorages on the big island whose land is divided between two French-speaking and Spanish-speaking black republics.It was its location and the fact that we sought to give a panorama of the Caribbean rather than just a specific area of ​​it that determined its inclusion in our discussion rather than being excluded along with some other sites.For example, in view of the existence of the two major naval ports of Santiago de Cuba and Port Royal, Jamaica, which are close to the Windward Strait, where the shortest route from the Atlantic coast of North America to the Isthmus passes, one can involuntarily think that just on the edge of the Strait The Molle Saint-Nicolas provides a location from which to clamp down on other ports if need be.our answer, however, is that what we seek is not to contain something or someone, but simply to look at the natural strategic characteristics of a maritime area as a whole and note in passing the area of ​​special interest to the united states political situation.As already remarked, the political condition of a place has an inescapable effect on its military value. Therefore, our investigation is extensive.Samana Bay and St. Thomas have been given prominence here because they represent, more fully and better than any other location, the significance of controlling the two main straits between the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea.The Mora Strait between Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico, where Samana Bay is located, is especially suitable for sailing from the north, because there is no danger to navigation here.Of course, in today's age of steam, this doesn't matter militarily.However, Morne Channel has military value as an alternative to the Windward Channel or other channels to the east if one of them is controlled by the enemy.St. Thomas is bordered by the Anegada Strait, which is actually heavily used, and is crossed more than any other by routes from Europe to the Isthmus, just as the Windward Strait is more often used by the North American Atlantic The passage from the port to the isthmus is the same.Neither site can be said to possess considerable natural strength or resources.St. Thomas is a small island with all the inherent weaknesses mentioned; and as for the bay of Samana, though the island on which it is situated is larger and more productive, it does not at present have, nor can it hope to have, the resources and power to obtain Take full advantage of political stability and commercial prosperity.Both places also needed to develop their defenses considerably to cater for a naval port.However, despite these deficiencies of both sites, their proximity to the straits warrants their prominent consideration in a comprehensive study of the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico.They are, in the underlying sense, related to control of the Le Mona and Anegada Straits, as Kingston and San Diego are related to control of the Windward Channel. The isthmus is the seat of decisive commercial and military interests in the Caribbean, and it is the United States that bears the brunt of the special attention of countries whose territories border two oceans that are now separated by the isthmus but will one day be united.A natural inference in this case is that the entrance to the Caribbean Sea and the line of communication across the Caribbean Sea to the Isthmus are the two principal indispensable factors for the functioning of the Isthmus.Therefore, in wartime, controlling these two factors becomes a military goal that is not inferior in importance to controlling the isthmus, and the influence of the numerous locations examined above on these two factors also needs to be taken into account, primarily in the individual sense above, and then in a general sense. There is neither time nor space here for an exhaustive examination of the first phase of individuals.However, the reasons for the selection of the aforementioned locations have been stated as briefly as possible.Let us now look at the map, and examine the graphical picture as a whole. Leaving aside for a moment the points of the Isthmus which were more of an end than a means to an end, we now see several points on the frontiers of the region under consideration which are held by the first-rate powers of Martin. Nickelodeon and Saint Lucia belonged to France and Great Britain, while Pensacola and the mouth of the Mississippi belonged to the United States. In addition, the first-class nations hold two forward points remote from their most forward bases of power, namely, Key West, 460 miles from Pensacola, and 930 miles from St. Lucia. jamaica.The distances from these two places to the isthmus are 1,200 miles and 500 miles respectively. A series of points from Yucatán to Santo Tomás were distributed between the above-mentioned main base and forward points, dividing it.不考慮機動力量因素，完全就位置而言，這些地點體現了對於控制加勒比海的北部入口最重要的入口所具有的意義。它們其中沒有一個屬於任何一個被普遍地認為具有一流力量的強國。 遠至但不含阿內加達海峽的加勒比海北部各入口被認為是最重要的，因為它們的數量是如此之少這種情況向來使價值上升；離地峽是如此之近；而且尤其對美國來說，除非以繞一個大圈子為代價，它們是自己與地峽以及所有位於加勒比海範圍之內的地區進行交通往來的必經之路。 在一個非常原則的意義上，加勒比海是一個陸間海；不過一旦相比於舊世界的地中海或墨西哥灣，這個修飾詞就顯得有限了。墨西哥灣和外洋只通過極少的海峽相連，這使得容易從一個靠近的地點對它進行監視。另外。在地中海和墨西哥灣都存在著極具力量的地點；對前者而言是直布羅陀和其他一些地點，對後者來說只有哈瓦那。與這兩片海域相反，加勒比海的東緣為一系列小島所封，而這些小島之間的通道儘管實際上不比直布羅陀海峽寬，但數量是如此之多以至於加勒比海在這個方向上的入口可以正確地講伸延至了近四百英里。的確，這些島嶼構成了許多能從其為控制入口從而實施軍事行動的地點雖然一些條件較好，一些較差；不過，它們的數目之多使這種影響不能集中地、有把握地得到發揮，而以直布羅陀或哈瓦那為基地的充分的力量就可能實現這點。 加勒比海北側的情形則十分不同。從古巴島的西端至波多黎各島的東頭伸展著一條一千二百英里在加勒比海東側是四百英里長的陸地阻隔帶，其間只為兩條海峽所斷。每個海峽寬五十英里，一隻中等馬力的汽輪能在二個或四個小時之內從這一岸駛至另一岸。這種自然環境對通往地峽的道路的影響幾乎是愛爾蘭島對於英國的戰略影響的最大限度的翻版。愛爾蘭島這個英國的陸地阻隔長二百英里，居於彭特蘭灣和英吉利海峽之間的正中位置，也就是說，它為大西洋朝向英國的所有道路所圍繞。這情形給予了一支有著相當力量的海軍在愛爾蘭南北兩端或其中一端側擊和騷擾英國的特殊能力。現今的政治形勢和其他狀況無疑使上述兩處阻隔之地對於受其影響的國家有著相對不同的重要性。與大西洋的交通的暢通對英國生死攸關，而與地峽的交通直至今日對美國也不是如此。然而，在生死攸關之外還有多種不同程度上的重要性。考慮到加勒比海的一千二百英里的阻隔地帶中有六百英里在古巴土地上，接下來是五十英里寬的向風海峽。其次是三百多英里長的海地，最後是莫納海峽，無可辯駁的是，一支以古巴的聖地牙哥或牙買加為基地的優勢海軍可以給予美國和加勒比地區尤其是地峽之間的所有通道以非常嚴重的干擾。 與此相聯繫，也應考慮佛羅里達半島和將其與巴哈馬及古巴分離開來的海峽的狹窄對於我國大西洋海岸和墨西哥灣海岸之間商業上和海軍上的交通聯繫的影響。如果能想像佛羅里達半島這個長但是不寬的地帶被完全移走或為一條貫穿其頸部的海峽分為一個島嶼將會導致什麼情景，它對於我們的海上利益的作用就能夠被最好不過地認識到。在後一種情形下，我們必須確保對於海峽的兩個入口的控制，但我們的運輸也不會被迫經由一條狹長的、在其一側與他國可能也是敵國的領土相鄰的海峽。在我國與英國或西班牙發生戰爭的情況下，這條海峽或許會受到離己方基地不遠的敵國巡洋艦的騷擾，不過我們在如今的狀況下保護我們的商業將比在有著那條假設的海峽或者佛羅里達半島不存在的情形下付出多得多的努力。這個半島的作用是將我們從大西洋至墨西哥灣的航線向南推遠了二百英里，從而使得我們必須為控制佛羅里達海峽而擁有一個基地。然而，我們差不多完全缺乏有用的港口這點又將事情弄得更糟。在大西洋海岸這個最暴露的一側，不存在這樣的港口；在墨西哥灣，沒有哪個港口能比離基韋斯特一百七十五英里的坦帕灣離前者更近。 實際上，我們對於美國在地峽運河上的利益並不能說些什麼，目前這樣的一條運河對美國的重要性尚不能和佛羅里達海峽相比。前者將把大西洋和太平洋連接起來，而後者連接的是大西洋和墨西哥灣。在這裡還可附上一句：狹長的佛羅里達半島連同其海峽的影響也被翻版到了古巴、海地、波多黎各以及將它們分離的海峽上面。它們整個地構成了一條長長的阻隔，它對於加勒比海的戰略意義是不可忽視的；如果其中的海峽為敵人所控制，這一阻隔帶就會將墨西哥灣推至絕對孤立的境地。 牙買加島對於由古巴、海地和波多黎各組成的大阻隔帶是這麼一種關係：它是一塊天然的起跳石，借助於它，我們就從對入口的考慮過渡到了對於一直為我們所關注的、從入口至地峽的交通的考慮。下邊我們就必須探討這個話題。 在涉及加勒比海的入口以及該海域的內部控制的問題上，牙買加處於一個突出的中心地位。它到科隆、尤卡坦海峽和莫納海峽的距離相同，都是五百英里；與南美大陸上和它最接近的地方加伊納斯角及中美大陸上和它最接近的地方格拉西亞斯-阿迪奧斯角的距離更短，都是四百五十英里。另外，牙買加島緊貼向風海峽的後梢，它對後者的控制力一點不比聖地牙哥差。任何一個軍人讀者都幾乎不會不注意到，牙買加島作為一支大型艦隊的基地會象一個將只在幾個點上可以出入的一條邊界線置於自己的影響範圍之內的陸軍據點那樣發揮作用。如從牙買加島向每個方向上派出一支相對精幹的快速偵察船隊，它們能予上述三個海峽的通行狀況以及時的注意。即使船隻是在其他地點上出入加勒比海，以牙買加島為基地，可抵至加伊納斯和格拉西亞斯-阿迪奧斯的機動力量也可以將交通狀況置於自己觀察之下，以便運輸任務能不受干擾地得以完成。 由於擁有位置上的優勢以及一個可以被令人滿意地發展為一支大型艦隊的海上基地的港口，牙買加無疑是加勒比海中間最重要的地點。如果一個人回想起牙買加島是在克倫威爾時代偶然地落到了英國手中，當時英國首要的征服對象是聖多明哥；回想起自那時起的兩個半世紀中，牙買加島的那些如今隱現於其上的優點並沒有得到充分的發揮；回想起基於各種可能性，在美國革命戰爭中牙買加島都應被西班牙重新佔有；回想起同樣的偶然和不確定性也曾存在於英國對直布羅陀和馬爾他這兩個地中海中的關鍵地點的征服和保有上，他就不禁會對這個問題產生興趣：這些在時間和空間上都是相隔如此之開、但又增進了同一個目標英國的海上霸權的事件究竟純屬偶然，還是僅是一種作用於整個歷史、自覺一貫地遵從於某個尚未為人所辨出的目標的個人意志的表現？ 可是，和古巴相比，牙買加還不能被認為是加勒比地區最具決定意義的地點。一個地點的軍事價值既是數量意義上的，也是品質意義上的。不論一個地點的位置多麼優良，單憑這一點也不能充分地彌補力量和資源方面的缺陷。直布羅陀是一個典型的例子，它是固有力量的代名詞，但它的狹小、孤立和資源的貧瘠構成了對於它的進攻性力量、甚至對於它的堅不可摧性的限制，這些對軍人來說不難理解。牙買加由於其位置，為從古巴至地峽的航線實際上為所有從大西洋、墨西哥灣至地峽的航線所圍繞；但作為一個軍事存在，它與古巴這個再清晰不過地座落於它面前的大島相比就完全地相形見絀了。即使如前所說，牙買加的位置截斷了古巴至地峽的路線，但它與北美大陸這一直是基本生活必需品不能自給的西印度群島的主要的、天然的供應來源之間的交通也為其大鄰居所切。在戰時，即使美國保持友好與中立，位置和面積賦予古巴的優勢根本不是供應來源可被有效掐斷的牙買加的長處可比擬的。再考慮到牙買加與美國之外的其他地方哈利法克斯、百慕大和歐洲的交通，它的劣勢地位絲毫未被改善。牙買加離這些地點以及聖盧西亞來自歐洲方面的支持牙買加的資源可以說集中於此的距離使它處於一個極為孤立的境地。這種狀況還因下列事實而愈顯突出：無論百慕大還是聖盧西亞，都依賴於外部提供經由它們運至牙買加的任何東西。而古巴的幅員、人口數量、海港數目及產業規模則使它自然地積聚起了一個大的商業社會必須具備的資源。這些連同古巴與美國的鄰近和它的其他位置優勢幾乎使得世界上的其他島嶼中再也找不到一個可在軍事意義上與古巴媲美的地點。只要和美國有著友好關係，古巴就不可能被孤立。 任何這類的探討的目標都應是通過逐步縮減所考察的眾多因素從而使餘下的決定性的因素可以變得更引人注目。只有這樣，樹才會越來越細，戰略圖景的特點才能日益顯現。這方面的主要工作在前面已經進行。概括起來，我們主要涉及了三個方面：一是兩個決定性的中心：密西西比河口和地峽。二是四條主要的將這兩地與其他地區連接起來的航線。它們分別連接地峽和密西西比河口、地峽和北美海岸（經由向風海峽）；墨西哥灣和北美海岸（經由佛羅里達海峽）；地峽和歐洲（經由阿內加達海峽）。三是所討論的地區的主要的軍事要點以及它們獨自的和相對的重要性。 基於有關的討論，看來顯而易見的是，因為交通線是戰略中如此重要的一個因素，所以那些所處位置決定性地影響著數量眾多的或很大範圍之內的交通線的地點是最重要的。在上述的四大交通線中，三個經過古巴和牙買加附近並在實質上為它們控制，它們也就是從密西西比河口經尤卡坦海峽至地峽、從密西西比河口經佛羅里達海峽至美國的大西洋海岸及從地峽經向風海峽至北美大西洋海岸的航線。從地峽至歐洲的第四條航線與牙買加島比與古巴島更為貼近，不過這兩個島還是比該地區島嶼中的任何其他島對它更具控制力，因為其他島嶼相比於牙買加或古巴更容易為這條航線所避開。 所以，古巴和牙買加這兩個被視為要點的島嶼對於控制墨西哥灣和加勒比海有著最具實質性的意義。此外，對墨西哥灣和加勒比海都具作用的戰略中心是在向風海峽，因為在這裡古巴和牙買加兩島嶼對加勒比海的控制力的相對大小得到了最終的檢驗。如前所說，在一場戰爭中起著決定性作用的不是要點，也不主要是要點，而是機動力量。對於任何情形的充分說明都存在於這兩個因素的組合中。就位置而言，古巴島是比牙買加更具優勢的要點，原因前面已經給出。在掌握著這兩個島嶼的國家發生衝突的情形下，雙方機動力量的相對大小將為向風海峽的受控制狀況所檢驗，因為該海峽是牙買加與美國海岸、與哈利法克斯、與百慕大進行聯繫的最短、最佳路線必經之處，為此它對牙買加來說必須保持開放。如果牙買加的力量未強大到足以強行使該海峽保持開放，它就只好通過規避、通過採取隱蔽的手段來維持基本的供應，因為它無力在海峽方向上充分顯示力量，無力在任何方向上從靠近它的古巴的影響之中擺脫出來。在這種狀況下，放棄最佳道路意味著受孤立；這種情形一旦是長時間的，那就可能只有一種結局了。 於是，最終的結論可以這樣說：就位置、力量和資源上的優劣而言，古巴相比於牙買加明顯地、絕對地處於上風。要使牙買加和古巴平起平坐或有過之而無不及，就需要有一支能夠使向風海峽一直開放不僅是暫時地或在任何一段可計的時間內，而且是在整個戰爭期間的機動力量。在目前的政治歸屬狀況下，如果發生一場僅包括英國和西班牙兩國的戰爭，英國在機動力量方面不會存在問題；可是，在一場幾個海上強國參加的全面戰爭中，這方面就不太好說了。在一七七八年的戰爭中，一度英國方面很多人都認為英國幾乎沒有什麼希望繼續控制向風海峽，保有牙買加。但千真萬確的是，後來敵人方面的大失誤和不走運揉合在一起拯救了牙買加。 可以想像，曾經出現的可能也許會再次來臨。