Chapter 18 17. How to Prepare for Naval Battle

The best attack area for the military dangers facing the United States is outside the continental United States, namely at sea.To prepare for a naval battle is to prepare both to retaliate against a sea attack and to launch a sea attack. In our day and age, the question of preparing for war is both wide-ranging and complex.As in the case of building a ship, in which reconciling conflicting efforts leads to a compromise, and compromise is the most uncertain of all military solutions, preparations for war involve many often mutually interacting Contradictory and sometimes almost irreconcilable factors.The ingenuity of the people in the national treasury has not been able to bring these factors into full consideration, and the requirements of the various parts which make up the universe of national military policy are not always reasonable and cannot be fully satisfied.Therefore, they often say bluntly: this is the main thing, and your other requirements must be subordinated to it, unless your ability is of great benefit to it.As a result, either the pendulum of government swings from one end to the other, or because of the so-called fairness, all parties can only get less than what is required, which arouses all kinds of dissatisfaction.In other words, the money in the national coffers was dispersed rather than concentrated on a major assumption that came from sound considerations and was supported by faith.

Under modern conditions, the preparation of materials for war requires a certain time limit, and this work cannot be delayed until danger comes.If, within a year after the keel was laid, a battleship of the first tier could be submerged in full armor, as has been the case with Britain lately, it may well be considered a remarkable display of a nation's talent in the construction of naval vessels.After that, however, there was still the installation of the fire system and many other major details necessary for the warship to function at sea.For ourselves, even with the best efforts, the time required in these areas is not less.

War is a political movement, violent and distinctive in its character.However sudden the occasion for war, its origins lie in antecedent situations; the statesman and the people of a country, at least the thinking part of it, should have seen clearly long before war came. to the general trend of change in the situation.In such a foresight lies the greatest hope for the best solution.The best solution is when people's heads are still cool, and the irresponsible newspapers, the greater their circulation, the higher the public's anxiety and indignation, will be raised. The seditious speech has not yet caused a crisis of fanaticism. , through normal diplomatic action, through the timely conclusion of agreements to preserve peace.But though wise means of keeping the peace bring the statesman laurels, if he can only resort to force, the laurels will pass from his brow to the warrior's, and his statecraft must make him recognize : In disputes between groups, each party often has a reason to speak of, which makes it difficult for any party to give in easily.Therefore, it is better for people to fight than to refuse to uphold their sense of justice in order to save the peace.How deplorable is the war between the North and the South in America!But it would be all the more tragic if a party backed away from what was believed to be its fundamental right.On issues that are only related to material interests, people can back down; on matters of principle, people may fall into fallacies without realizing it.But the unthinking abandonment of a conception of right and wrong, even when it is not true, is only destructive to the personality, except in the face of an apparently irresistible force of compulsion.It is a phrase that is often misused, but it does contain important truths.

It is the duty of a legislative as well as an executive government to provide a force sufficient to protect a nation's foundations and to ensure that it is ready to act swiftly if necessary.Such a force is an inevitable product that affects or may affect the political situation of a country.Its existence and scale are, or should be, reflections of national consciousness about the direction in which national interests or responsibilities lie.Given the horrific devastation wrought by war, the question of when or in what manner to act that might lead to hostility is indeed a major question.But it is also a question of a moment, of how late a final decision of great consequence can be postponed.Preparations for war have only to do with the decision that it should be sufficient to meet the greatest demands that may be put upon it; The situation that has been firmly shown has prevented war from happening.Such a recognition implies only defense, defense of State rights or State responsibility, although such defense may take the form of offensive action.

So, logically speaking, what a country that advocates to equip itself with a navy or army sufficient to meet its needs must first do not judge with a confrontational eye which army or navy is the largest in the world , but to examine the content of the political situation in the world, including the material interests of various countries and their dispositions, which reasonably reflect the crux of the problem that nothing other than war may be able to solve.This matter is first and foremost political.Military issues can be discussed specifically only when political decisions have been taken, since military power is subordinated to political interests and the power of the civilian government of the state.

We should choose those dangers which are most insurmountable, not the most probable, to measure the degree of military precautionary effort embodied by military preparations.If the greater danger is estimated, the lesser danger is not to be feared.A nation can look with equanimity at complex situations that are imminent but not very dangerous, provided they do not exceed the maximum extent that it has reasonably foreseen.Nor should it be denied that in estimating danger one should have a proper imagination, stripped of undue optimism and undue apprehension.Napoleon had warned his marshals not to ignore the constraints on military action and to relax their imaginations about the possible actions of the enemy.This reminder applies to prior judgment and campaign planning.When British commentators, recognizing their country's absolute dependence on the sea, stressed that the British navy must exceed the sum of the two strongest of its likely adversaries.They raise an opinion that deserves at least serious discussion.On the other hand, they believe that the situation that would prompt the UK to change from a two-power naval standard to a three-power standard is almost impossible, and it is so far beyond the realm of possibility that it cannot have an impact on actual operations.

Similarly, when estimating what kind of military preparations it needs, the United States should not only consider how much power a potential adversary can use against the United States in a political situation that is extremely unfavorable to it, but also consider the well-known long-term environment What constraints will be imposed on the behavior of the opponent.In terms of military power, only the great powers of Europe are our rivals.These countries have their own interests in the western hemisphere, and to a certain extent, they unanimously instinctively and resolutely oppose the increasingly strong Monroe Doctrine policy trend of the United States driven by an apparently irresistible internal force.But, nevertheless, there are broader and more significant needs in other areas that attract their attention.Since 1884, Britain, France, and Germany have each acquired colonies ranging in size from 1 million to 2.5 million square miles, mainly in Africa.As it is generally understood, this not only means that some countries have acquired large new territories, but also means that the rivalry and suspicion between countries will continue to exist, and long-lived traditions of hostility are still alive today.Uncertainty about frontiers, the desire to bring under one's influence the original inhabitants of a land, and the fear of invasion and penetration drove nations to secure their dominance in areas that had just been opened.The colonial expansion of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries looms before our eyes again, accompanied by the same ambitions and concerns that were present at the time.Today, however, such expansion is subject to somewhat more orderly arrangements and mutual scruples among nations which are a product of the general preparation for war and which are the distinguishing feature of the present age, which preserves peace to the greatest extent.

All this is evident in the Europeans.Europe is the common source of all kinds of overseas expansion, and any strife arising therefrom must be settled by fighting on European seas and lands, and the loss of property and life therefrom must be chiefly caused by The people of this land will bear it.Apart from these burdens caused by distant unrest, the situation in Turkey and its provinces, which is the inevitable result of centuries of Turkish misrule, is also a near and inescapable anxiety of European countries.As for the political situation on the American continent, although regrettable, compared with the stormy future faced by the old world, it is still very stable in terms of the political distribution of territories and the certainty of ownership.

On all questions which may be attributed under the names of colonial expansion and the Eastern Question, all European powers with a considerable army and navy, except Spain, were directly and deeply involved.It showed little interest in the affairs of Eastern Europe, nor did it engage in the expansion of its still extensive colonial territory.The major current activities of the major powers should be a factor in U.S. military considerations, but not in our diplomatic thinking.For the pride of our country is that it does not wring from the misfortunes of other nations advantages or concessions which cannot be supported by strict standards of justice.However, despite this fact, the United States has experienced disputes with other countries in its past history.In these disputes, although the United States believes that it is right, even to the extent that it can justifiably declare war on the other side, the other side does not seem to agree with us.These disputes revolve mainly around the ownership of the territory, a legacy of the colonial period that the Western Hemisphere went through before reaching the political situation it is today.The U.S. position on them was not initially accepted by the other side of the dispute, even if it was later endorsed.Fortunately, these problems are mainly with the UK.Between ourselves and this great colonial nation which has done so much good to the world there is a kinship deeper than either side admits, based on common fundamental ideas of law and justice, and has always been exists today.The successful resolution of the Venezuelan problem is the latest but not the only proof of this camaraderie.Britain is sometimes said to be the most unloved country in Europe.If so, doesn't our attitude towards the UK on Venezuela reflect something meaningful?It is not this attitude which governs our sentiments towards England, but rather the latter which determines the former.

It is not hard to see that problems broadly similar to those we have experienced may arise in the future.Without adequate military preparations, can we expect to receive acknowledgment of the fundamental legitimacy of our views from countries that have not been bred in our traditional ways of thinking about politics and are therefore less likely to accept our views?Britain has given this recognition and finds itself sufficiently sympathetic to our position.This recognition is not only based on the long-term and close contacts between our two countries and the intertwined interests, but also based on our fundamental similarities in national characteristics and systems.In addition, the British government's broad appreciation over the centuries of the vital importance of distant lands to its own interests, those of its people and commerce, and its political prestige enabled it to understand And understand why the United States will never allow a situation that will cause trouble in the future to emerge and continue.It is almost impossible for a nation in the position that Great Britain occupies in India and Egypt not to appreciate our interest in the Isthmus of Central America and the Pacific Ocean; likewise a nation concerned with the Mediterranean and watching with unease the gradual occupation of the southern coast of the Mediterranean by others. It doesn't take much effort to understand how we feel about the Caribbean.We would hate to see countries from the other hemisphere take on our relatively peaceful neighbors in this region, or spread conflict over them, thereby disturbing existing distributions of power and territorial ownership.It may not be certain what our future interests require, but it is hard to think that British statesmen doubt that we have a clear interest in eliminating any possible trouble.

Britain has experienced the difficulties we face, which makes it easier to come to an understanding with us.Another factor contributing to this was that Britain, as a commercial nation, had a fervent desire for peace and was unwilling to bear the burdens that war imposed on it.Militarism was not a dominant idea in either Great Britain or the United States; the combination of commercial tendencies and isolation in both countries exempted it from its dominance.The belligerent conception of war is repugnant to them because it prevents them from devoting themselves to the activities they value most, and is contrary to their intellectual traditions.However, it would be unfair to say that these two countries lack the sensitivity to the profit and loss of honor. Today, the United States has expressed, in language that is almost impossible to misunderstand, its determination to resort to force, if necessary, to prevent the territorial or political expansion of European states beyond their already occupied territory on the American continent.Regarding border disputes in the Americas, the United States said it insisted on submitting them to international arbitration.If Britain saw this position as a reasonable American policy, it would be able to accept it as it is, without making extravagant claims that it would fight if necessary to resist American policy, thereby affecting public opinion and causing trouble.Britain would naturally fight for its legitimate interests if need be, so why shouldn't another country say the same?What sustains the honor of a nation is not its willingness to go to war, but the legitimacy of its demands.This realization is not militaristic at all, or even has nothing to do with it.In countries imbued with the spirit of militarism, the general perception is that a policy rests on force, and that in the conception of honor that follows, the rationality of policy has no place.No soldier or nation that backs its policy with force wants to appear powerless or unwilling to take it head-on.The life force of the Army lies in its fighting spirit; when that spirit appears to shrink before a threat, it is decimated and the nation's ability to act politically is impaired.This would not be the case in Great Britain or the United States, however, since their main military force is the navy, which has never been an offensive force like the army. Today, the United States has announced that it will use force to support its own policies, if the latter might bring the United States into a collision with countries with military traditions whose interests oppose its position and who are less willing to compromise even when threatened.So, if such a country is determined to fight at all costs against our demands, what kind of preparations do we need to make to defend our position without flinching? In this respect, everyone who realizes that war is still possible and wishes to see his country prepared should first of all have the idea that no matter how much a war may be defensive in its cause or character Yes, to assume that war can only be defensive would lead to disaster.Once war is declared, it must be fought actively and proactively.Enemies shouldn't just be kept out, they should be defeated.You don't have to get anything from the enemy, but you must win him. Preparation includes two aspects: type and degree.When determining what level of preparedness should be, it is necessary to estimate how much force the most powerful potential enemy will use against you in time of war, while also taking into account the difficulties and burdens it faces in other parts of the world. What a discount for power.This valuation is both in a military sense and in a political sense, with considerations in the latter sense predominating. In terms of types, preparations can be divided into defensive and offensive.The former exists mainly for the latter.With a defensive arrangement, the offensive force, which is the decisive factor in the war, can fully exert its power.In naval warfare, coastal defense is the defensive element while navy is the offensive one.If the coastal defenses are sufficiently secure, the admiral may feel safe in the belief that his bases of operations, ports and coal deposits, are safe.He and his government would also be able to lighten the burden and use the offensive power to the fullest, without having to worry about the principal centers of commerce, since they were already better defended. The presence of coastal defenses meant that the coast could be attacked.How vulnerable is the coast?There are two main types: blockade and shelling.The latter is more severe than the former, and often includes the former.A blockade is easier to do with a fleet capable of bombardment.The necessary precaution against bombardment was to set up coastal artillery.Owing to the force and range of such artillery fire, a fleet was often unable to get within reach of the coast where it could bombard it.Where conditions permit, the bar of fire may be advanced so far in front of the towns concerned that the enemy fleet, if it desires to bombard the coast, has no other means but to come within range of said fire.It has also been shown, however, that a fleet, by virtue of the speed with which it moves, can pass through areas of artillery fire without much loss.In this way, it is very necessary to block the progress of the fleet by blocking the channel.In this regard, the common practice today is to employ naval mines, a weapon capable of deterring a fast-moving fleet by its mere spirit.However, once the fleet has successfully crossed the past, it will reach the end of the defensive belt and be within easy reach of the city concerned, which is now only at its mercy. Therefore, coastal defense means setting up artillery belts and mine belts.However, such protection is necessary only for areas of decisive commercial or military importance.It is impossible for a modern fleet to waste ammunition bombarding insignificant towns, at least when it is far from its own base, say, near our coast.Doing so would be less a waste of money than a drain on combat power, a loss that a fleet is not willing to bear. Although coastal defense is passive in nature, there should be offensive forces in the composition of coastal defense forces.It differs from an offensive navy in that its range of activities is geographically limited, but on the other hand it is part of the former.If this kind of power wants to take an offensive against the enemy's floating power at sea, it must also be floating, that is to say, it must be active on the ocean.The offensive element in coastal defense is embodied in torpedo boats.It must be conceptually distinguished from an ocean-going ship, although the two can act in concert.For strait defense in the narrow sense, a regional fleet of small torpedo boats is necessary.Its activities will make survival difficult for an alien hostile force.A late eminent British admiral once said that he believed half the captains of a blockade fleet would break down in the present state of wartime tension.Of course, this sentence is just to illustrate the intensity of the mental pressure that will be endured.Because each boat in a torpedo boat fleet is small and the organization and activities of the entire fleet are uncomplicated, naval volunteers are best suited to serve in such fleets, where they can learn to do their assigned work with relative ease.However, it is important to bear in mind that such fleets are defensive in nature and can only occasionally be used for purely offensive missions. Gunfire belts, mine belts, and torpedo boats are the main components of coastal defense.Without the first two, the coastal cities would be under bombardment; without the latter, these cities would be blocked at will by the enemy unless rescued by the ocean-going fleet.Both methods of warfare, shelling and blockade, are recognized by the international community, provided that proper notification is given before such actions are taken.This kind of restriction is not so much out of respect for the rules, but out of consideration for humanity and fairness.Since the various interests of a country are intertwined into a tight and complex network in this era, the bombardment and blockade of a national center not only hits the location of the incident, but also includes every corner of the country concerned. As mentioned earlier, in maritime warfare, offense is the main function of the ocean-going navy.Such a navy includes battleships, cruisers of various sizes and purposes, and ocean-going torpedo ships capable of supporting a fleet.Any of these ships must be seaworthy and able to proceed at an appropriate speed in all weather conditions.However, the backbone or fundamental strength of the navy should still be those ships with balanced offensive and defensive capabilities, which can both withstand severe blows and inflict heavy damage on the enemy.All other ships are their foils, and exist only for them.To ask where the strength of such a ship should lie, the answer is that it must be strong enough to navigate the seas, and to fight with a fair chance of victory against the most powerful hostile force it may encounter. We have always stated that our past history has also proved our statement. The United States hates aggression and is unwilling to use war to expand its territory or interests.In such a situation, we will measure the adequacy of our armed forces not by our own expansion programs but by the willingness of other nations to oppose what we consider to be reasonable policies.If other countries are against us, what power will they use against us?Definitely the Navy.For there is no exposed point on our soil from which an enemy can take decisive action from land.So what we should worry about is the naval power that is hostile to us.So how big will it be?Just think about how big a navy we need.We need so many large ships, so many guns, and so much ammunition, in a word, so much naval equipment. The war preparation we need most at present is to provide material support for the construction of maritime defense and offensive forces.We need artillery, mines, and torpedo boats to defend our coasts, and we need a strong navy to keep the seas in our hands against potential adversaries.So far the United States has lacked these, so the initiative is still held by the country that is stronger than ours in naval power.If the U.S. Navy cannot keep the enemy off our shores, at least a blockade of us is possible.If we lack even torpedo boats, the blockade will be much easier.Furthermore, if we were unable to place artillery and mine belts, bombardment of the coast would be possible, if not entirely feasible.Once the flames of war ignite, we have no time to prepare. Material readiness is usually not yet the weakest point of a nation's war readiness, since it is only a matter mainly of money and production.If funds are abundantly available, and if the right person is known, the required supplies will not be long in coming, and will always be.Reasonable estimates can be made in advance and corresponding arrangements can be made for losses caused by old equipment, various expenses or new expansion needs.Material preparation is relatively easy to carry out, because once the equipment is ready, it will not lose its usefulness to the country if it is not immediately put into actual combat.They can be stored and maintained at relatively little cost; if cared for properly, they will be as good as they were when they were first produced, and a little wear and tear will not hurt the overall situation. The ability of equipment to do its job well also depends on having a large number of people who are good at using them.Nowadays.These personnel must be specially trained.Although everything learned through a training session will not be forgotten within a certain period of time, the longer the time, the more things will be missed.Therefore, constant practice is essential.Also, in the case of newly enlisted personnel, it takes a considerable amount of time to familiarize them not only with the use of a particular weapon, but with the peculiarities and day-to-day operations of the military organization to which they belong.It is not enough for them to learn how to do the work assigned to each person. They must also understand the relationship between other aspects of work and their own work, and between various tasks and the whole.Possession of this knowledge is essential to a man's full and excellent performance of his duties, not to mention that in combat a man should be ready to take on other tasks for which others are temporarily unable.Without these, it is impossible for a ship to perform to its full potential. It takes a great deal of time for a person to learn how to use naval equipment proficiently and how to play its role properly in the operation of the ship.Not only does it take time to acquire a skill, it takes time to maintain it.If you already have men of high quality, you cannot stockpile them as you store artillery and ammunition, or their quality will decay at a rate that ordinary physical wear and tear cannot.But, on the other hand, if large numbers of people stay in the military to maintain their military skills, a country's productivity suffers.This is also the chief argument against maintaining large standing armies and compulsory service by those who think that the productive forces of the country are more important than anything else. For those tasked with improving military effectiveness in European countries, the personnel issue is the most vexing, and therefore the most pressing, concern.It costs a lot of money to prepare military supplies, but the work is simple, and its cost can be compensated by the increase in employment opportunities brought about by military production.Having the large numbers of military personnel needed to train them and get them ready for immediate use is another matter. The solution found was to move some people from the production branch to the military branch, while trying to find a compromise between the respective needs of the two branches.This compromise inevitably has its flaws, sometimes favoring one side and sometimes favoring the other.Economists complained and objected to the reduction of producers, while military authorities insisted that the armed forces of the state were inadequate.The best solution to this difficulty and to meet the demands of opposing parties was the establishment of a reserve service system, with many serving active duty for as long as they needed to be educated in a particular skill.After receiving the relevant education, they are transferred to the reserve service, leaving the life of soldiers or sailors to live the life of ordinary citizens, but they need to spend a relatively short period of time each year to refresh the knowledge and skills they have learned before. It almost goes without saying that this approach will never be satisfactory for any kind of trade in everyday life.A person who only learns the basics of the relevant knowledge but never puts it into practice will not be considered fit for a job, because the knowledge acquired through systematic education cannot be compared in value with the practical knowledge acquired in daily life.For this reason, the military industry is the same as the civilian industry, perhaps especially the former, because it is a more specialized and specialized field of human activities.It is for this reason that war is a sometimes unavoidable unnatural state, and one that is especially demanding on the combatants who are ordinary people. Therefore, for maritime combat readiness, it is more important to have enough well-trained personnel who can immediately go to sea and skillfully use relevant equipment than to build ships and equip artillery.The word can here covers all the details of the organizational process commonly called mobilization.Once a mobilization plan is formulated, although it can still be improved, it will not lose its effectiveness because it is shelved on the shelf, just as artillery and ammunition will not become waste products because they are stored in a parking place or in an ammunition depot.If there are qualified personnel, the mobilization plan is nothing more than a piece of paper telling everyone where he should go. It is not advisable to keep a navy, especially a large navy, at full strength in peacetime, and it does not make practical sense.If it is much stronger than a possible adversary, this is of course unnecessary; even if it is nearly evenly matched, the object can only be to outnumber the opponent in the number of qualified men available to it.The status of the reserve service system in the combat readiness arrangement should be recognized, because this system is indispensable.The crux of the problem is the scale and characteristics of the reserve forces relative to the active forces, which actually involves the issue of long-term service and short-term service.Under the long-term service system, the number of reservists will be relatively small, and reservists will be able to maintain their quality in the first few years after retiring, because what they acquire is not only knowledge, but also habitual literacy.Under the short-term service system, people are initially sent to training schools and then quickly transferred to the reserves.As a result, because they have not fully grasped what they have learned, their quality is not only poorer, but also degenerates faster.The reserves composed of them will also be larger in number than the reserves composed of trained personnel under the long service system.Those who expressed concern about both said that the former was poorly staffed and the latter was insufficiently staffed. Long service must logically be the result of voluntary military service.If enlistment is entirely a personal choice, then it is more likely that military service will become a lifelong career, and appropriate incentive mechanisms can also promote this tendency.If it were compulsory, the very fact of it would make it irksome, and voluntary extension of it after its expiration could only be rare.A natural consequence of long-term service and small-scale reserves is a larger standing force, which may be more in line with the needs of war and with the meaning of the word reserve.In wartime, the reserve force refers to the part of the force that does not directly participate in the battle, and whose use depends on unpredictable changes in the battle situation.But no general is willing to put only a small part of his forces into battle and leave most of his forces idle forever.It is the criterion of strategy and tactics, as well as the criterion of contemporary mobilization science, to gather forces quickly before the enemy completes the build-up of forces. Both the United States and the United Kingdom have voluntary military service.On the other hand, these two countries place more emphasis on the continuity of service than on reserve building.If a sailor has served for a considerable length of time, his skills will be perfected.At this point, if he chooses to continue serving, he will maintain his high qualifications for some years; if he leaves the army, he will also be fully fit to serve as a reservist for some years.Obviously, a reserve army composed of such personnel will be relatively small in size compared with a reserve army composed of personnel who have only served three or five years in active service; but the latter must be far inferior to the former in terms of personal quality. In fact, the United States, like the United Kingdom, is also an island country.We have only two land borders with Canada and Mexico.In every respect of military power Mexico is absolutely inferior to us.As for Canada, its suzerain, Britain, has a standing army.However, the size of this army clearly shows that it cannot pursue a policy of active attack except in those remote areas where it is impossible to fight it with strong armies of other countries, or if these armies want to take from Britain. control.No modern state has ever dominated both land and sea, but now and then one or the other gains this or that advantage.Great Britain has wisely identified sea power as its priority target, and for this reason, even regardless of other reasons that make Britain unwilling to break with the United States, it will certainly not use its small land force to invade a country. A country with a population of 70 million.Perhaps it should be repeated again that we are also an island nation and therefore also dependent on the navy. Fundamentally, the existence of extensive commercial ties determines why an enduring naval force is needed.From a military point of view, an island nation's navy is rarely aggressive.Its nature is to keep the peace because it has so many interests overseas to look after.In this regard, Britain after becoming a maritime power provides a clear example, and it is showing this feature more and more.The same is true of us, to an even greater extent.由於有著廣闊的國土，我們身上不存在進行海外開拓的意向。正是這種意向驅使著英國將其旗幟遍佈於全球，通過對外商業和在遠方的殖民來獲取豐富的資源。而對我們來說，自然或上天已經賜予了我們這些財富。英國的成功給其帶來了巨大的、廣為分佈的對外利益，可同時它也擔當了風險，單單為保護這些利益它就必須有一支強大的海軍。我們的情況和英國不盡相同，但我們的地理位置和政治信仰也賦予了我們對外利益和對外責任。它們也使我們要承受風險。我們沒有必要四處去冒險，但普遍的觀念和政治上的認真思考肯定地告訴我們，在海那頭的既不由我們造就也不由我們控制的情勢中，存在著自發生成的、需要我們保護的利益。海那頭意味著要有一支海軍。就入侵這個詞的真實含義而言，我們不會遭到此種危險；但萬一它落到我們頭上，它必定是經由海上。所以，我們必須主要在海上予任何侵害我們利益的企圖不管它是針對著遠方的土地，還是以封鎖或炮擊的方式針對著我們的本土以決定性的迎擊。 在過去十年中，我們已採取了一些值得稱讚的措施來加強海軍裝備建設，對此的一個必要的補充應是培養出足夠的、訓練有素的人員以使用這些裝備。把一個一無所知的新兵培養成一個高素質的戰鬥人員要耗費很長的時間，也許比一艘戰列艦從開工建造到編入現役所花費的時間還長。另外，在自願兵役制下，你不可能象對待艦隻或槍炮那樣隨意地使那些訓練有素的人員為己使用。於是，不可避免的結論就是，必須使常備力量處於較大規模，因為你既不可能在倉促間組建出這麼一支力量，也不可能借助於強迫來保有它。一旦裝備的數量確定了，就容易知道需用多少人來使用這些裝備。接下來可以根據某些既定的原則，將總的人員力量在常備海軍與預備役之間分配。筆者相信預備役力量在整體力量中應占較小比重；如果海軍規模較小就像我國海軍，更是必須如此。一支海軍規模越小，它就越需要時刻保持迅捷行動的能力，當然維護費用也會越少。實際上，如果數量上不佔優勢，那麼品質上就應有更高的要求，而品質就整體而言更是人員的問題而不是裝備的問題。人員的品質只可能通過使在軍中服役的人具備高素質來保持，過於依賴人數不少但總體上素質不高的預備役力量只能導致消極的結果。他們只能發揮不盡完美的減輕壓力作用，只有其中的一小部分可被有效地融入主體之中。真正適合預備役人員幹的工作是使用魚雷艇保護海岸以及破壞敵人的商業。在這兩種情形中，任務和組織都相對簡單。 對於美國面臨的任何軍事危險的最佳迎擊區域是在美國本土之外，也就是在海上。對海上戰爭做好準備既準備好迎擊來自海上的進攻也準備好發動海上攻勢就是對任何可能發生的事做到有備無患。