Chapter 2 Foreword to the US Edition
When the war ended, hostilities ended and peace was re-established between the two belligerent nations.At this time, those who not so long ago held sabers often took up pens.These authors, either wanting to lessen the crimes of their own country, or justifying their own participation in this war to some extent, deliberately used their own viewpoints to narrate historical events, or to influence other people's narration of history.
The bankruptcy of the plans of the defeated side always pains the representatives of that side.Naturally, therefore, they endeavored to make known to the world those actions which were truly commendable, and it is rare for a soldier of a defeated country to write a book in which he denounced the false military doctrine followed by his own country during the war.
It is wrong to blame the author of this book for distorting the facts; perhaps on the contrary, Hashimoto is, at least on paper, keen to expose the truth.There is no praise in the book, but some revelations hidden between the lines.The facts he revealed are worth pondering for every soldier and historian.
Various theorists and historians of World War II have argued that the modest Japanese submarine record was due to their use being erroneous.It is easy to draw such sweeping conclusions.But what is wrong with the use of Japanese submarines?How did Japan's approach to using submarines differ from that of the United States?Could it be that the missions of the American submarine fleet and the Japanese submarine fleet were different at the beginning of the war?Wasn't the USS Wasp sunk in the South Pacific, the USS Yorktown off Midway, the cruiser Indianapolis towards the end of the war, and many other important ships all sunk by Japanese submarines ?
But facts are facts.The Japanese submarine fleet, which had about 60 submarines at the beginning of the war, lost a total of 130 submarines throughout the war. In fact, all of them were wiped out, without any impact on the course of the war.My former enemy, Imperial Japanese Navy officer Hashimoto (who commanded the submarine that torpedoed one of our largest warships, the USS Indianapolis), explains in this book the reasons for the failure of the Japanese submarine fleet.
This book is one of the first published works written by Japanese soldiers, and it truly reflects the main reasons why all Japanese efforts have failed.This book seems to tell us: In the future, we should formulate our own combat plans more carefully according to the enemy's attempts and plans.
If one evaluates the strength of the Japanese navy in 1941 calmly and fairly, it should be concluded that both ships and personnel of the Japanese navy surpassed those of the United States.This conclusion should not surprise us, as long as we accept the sagacity and valor of the Japanese.In 1812 our navy also surpassed that of the British navy.Obviously, if one already knows who one is fighting against, one can build ships, produce weapons, and organize armed forces according to the opponent's situation, so that it can surpass the future enemy.However, because the enemy does not know in advance who he will fight with, even if he has more troops, he may not be able to modify or adjust his deployment on the eve of the battle.
In this case, the weaker side may temporarily win some important victories over the stronger side.At this time, if the stronger side cannot repel the enemy when necessary, or cannot maneuver its army in time to eliminate this sudden threat, those who have potential advantages may be defeated by the weaker side.Judging from the Japanese plan, this is how they estimated the course of the war.The Japanese intended to extend the empire of Japan all the way to the south before the United States had time to heal the initial wounds of war.However, the invaders were somewhat rigid in carrying out their expansion plans; we, the defenders, were very flexible.
However, the above are only some of the conclusions that can be drawn after reading the book "The Return of the Yi-58 Submarine".Under the conditions of the absolute superiority of the British navy, the German submarine almost won the sea victory for Germany alone twice.And the fact that the U.S. submarine force forced Japan to its knees is also acknowledged by Hashimoto and Shigeru Fukuku, a former Imperial Japanese Navy admiral who writes the book's concluding remarks.
So, what was the reason for the fiasco of the Japanese submarine fleet?
Fukuru admitted that Japanese naval authorities underestimated the U.S. submarine fleet.In fact, for every ton of merchant ships Japan built, three ton merchant ships were sunk by American submarines.Japan is a country that relies on imports of raw materials. The loss of merchant ship tonnage will inevitably greatly reduce the import of iron ore, so that copper production will also decline.As a result, Japan was building even fewer ships, and submarines and other warships were running low on fuel, a situation that continued to worsen.
We already know that the method of economic blockade can reduce the operational effectiveness of Japanese submarines and even the entire Japanese navy.However, we do not yet understand why Japanese subs played so little role.It is because of the lack of flexibility of the Japanese base camp, and the Japanese military command is so short-sighted when judging the war situation.
Japanese soldiers have always adhered to such a traditional view throughout history, believing that victory comes from heroic sacrifice, denying that they will be defeated; believing that they can win by defending desperately until one man dies.We also have our own traditional ideas.We believe in true love, which seems to be invincible.We emphasize that the final victory always belongs to the victim, at least in the films and in the press.
Unlike us, however, Japan has a superstitious belief in these traditions and bases its strategy on them.For example, if a part of Japan, a hastily formed empire, was surrounded by the enemy, the defenders in that area were ordered to hold out to the end.After receiving this order, the defenders followed the Japanese tradition and sacrificed their lives needlessly, and this senseless sacrifice would even turn into a kind of fanaticism in the end.It was well known that a great deal of transport was required to transport the supplies of the besieged outpost across the enemy-held ocean.And a person with a sound mind and an understanding of the art of war should make a decision in this case: if conditions permit, these troops must be withdrawn.
As a result, submarines had to take on the role of supply ships as a last resort tool.It should also be mentioned here by the way that Japanese submarines did not formulate their own combat methods according to the progress of the war or changes in the situation, whether it was the installation of radars or the acquisition of steel materials for the construction of new boats. The personnel of the submarine acted as the captain, but instead assigned various unreasonable and futile tasks to the captains that could not be completed.The submarine crews who are accustomed to this training method always faithfully execute these incredible orders out of instinctive obedience. As a result, except for a very few lucky ones, almost all submarines and crew members were buried in the seabed.
What Hashimoto narrates in the book is the tragic historical fact that his comrades in arms died one after another.
The last few chapters of this book describe the desperate activities of Huitian manned torpedo pilots.A manned torpedo is a larger torpedo with a cockpit for the dead.It is the underwater application of the kamikaze scheme.Unlike similar torpedoes in Italy, Britain, and Germany, this manned torpedo has no life-saving equipment, so it has a greater potential to attack ships sailing at sea; and in the subjective imagination of the Japanese military authorities, its power is even greater up.The Japanese did not adopt the method of hanging mines on the bottom or under the keel of enemy ships.Their tactics were much simpler: run straight at the target, and the torpedo explodes on impact.
It must be pointed out that the Japanese manned torpedo is only different in structure from the two-seater pocket submarine that attacked Pearl Harbor, but its function is exactly the same.Pocket submarines are true battery submarines, equipped with torpedoes that can be launched from the boat.According to the provisions of the use plan, the pocket submarine should return to the mother ship (large submarine) after completing the attack mission.But none of the five pocket submarines returned to the mothership after the attack.A risky way to use them, in effect turning them into suicide submarines.
After that, the Japanese Bushido spirit drove them to an idea; if the pocket submarine is not required to return after the attack in advance, then its combat distance.That is to say, the combat ability can be doubled.As a result, Japan built a manned torpedo.
A chapter in the book also talks about the issue of submarines carrying aircraft. Through one of the ridiculous plots, we once again see the Japanese style of caring for the lives of personnel.This kind of care is really different.A submarine carried an aircraft to Pearl Harbor for reconnaissance.Due to our tight anti-submarine defense, the captain never dared to take the risk of sailing into the scheduled launch location of the plane.The submarine surfaced twice, but far from shore.Later, at a place far away from the scheduled launch site, the captain ordered the plane to fly to the destination for reconnaissance.The speed of the plane is one hundred and sixty kilometers per hour, and the fuel reserve is only enough for one hour of flight.Hashimoto wrote.The plane made it to Pearl Harbor before it ran out of fuel and radioed something.The submarine captain left the area as soon as he got the information, and upon his return to Japan, reported to his superiors how he had successfully employed this military ruse.
This frenzy for self-sacrifice made Japanese soldiers brutal and insane, and it also deprived Japan of the well-trained pilots and submariners it felt it lacked.This loss is irreparable.
In the previous battles in Pearl Harbor, Midway Island, Gilbert Islands, Philippine Islands, Mariana Islands, Solomon Islands and Ryukyu Islands, although the Japanese paid many lives, they failed to achieve the expected goals.In each of the above-mentioned battles (with the exception of Pearl Lane), Japan spared no expense in each one.This caused great difficulties for it, and finally led Japan to embark on the road of extinction.
This book gives a detailed account of the Japanese views on warfare, which are very applicable to the warriors and the forty-seven ronin in ancient mythology; according to legend, the forty-seven ronin all committed suicide by cutting open their heads after the death of their master.But these views were totally inapplicable to 1941.On this point, Hashimoto has clearly stated in this book, although it can be seen that he has no intention of further exploring it.
The author has an obvious purpose, which is to try to prove in the book that Japan lost its own submarine fleet due to technological backwardness, thus defeating the war.Hashimoto wrote in the preface: In the future, if we only have bamboo spears, we should never take part in wars.The author believes that radar has a greater impact on the outcome of a war than any other weapon.We cannot disagree with this view.
However, it turned out to be much more than that.Many facts show that Japan's military doctrine is poor and incomplete.By the way, here is a transcript of the interrogation of Japanese officials, which is very convincing.This conversation is excerpted from the book "Rising Sun in the Pacific", the author of which Rear Admiral Morrison believes that Japan's decision to attack Pearl Harbor was very clumsy and extremely strategically stupid.Here's what the conversation was about:
Former Japanese Navy Admiral: Why do you think Pearl Harbor was a strategically stupid one?
U.S. Navy Lieutenant: Without this surprise attack, the United States might not have declared war on Japan; if war had been declared, we would not have been so determined to prevent Japan from going south because we were busy fighting Hitler in Europe.Now that you have invaded the territory of the United States, of course the United States must stand up and fight.
Former Admiral of the Japanese Navy: However, we believe that we can only attack south after destroying your fleet and thus rendering you incapable of attacking.
U.S. Navy Lieutenant: How long do you estimate it took the U.S. fleet to attack after the attack on Pearl Harbor?
Former Japanese Navy Admiral: We estimate that it will take eighteen months.
U.S. Navy Lieutenant: Since when did the U.S. fleet actually attack?
Former Admiral of the Japanese Navy: In late January and early February 1942, less than sixty days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, your fast aircraft carriers carried out an aviation assault on the Gilbert and Marshall Islands.
U.S. Navy Lieutenant: So how many bombs did you drop on the fuel depot?
Former Japanese Navy Admiral: None, because the main target of our attack is your large warship.
Lieutenant of the U.S. Navy: Didn’t the officers of your War Department, when drawing up the plan for this sneak attack, not think that if the fuel depot on Oahu is destroyed, then before the fuel comes from the mainland, it will be tantamount to destroying the Hawaiian Islands the entire fleet?At that time, if your submarines obstruct the delivery of fuel oil at sea, wouldn't the United States be unable to attack within a few months?
The book does not record the Japanese Navy Admiral's answer to this question. It only says that he turned pale immediately after hearing these words, which shows that he never thought of destroying the fuel reserves.It can be seen from this that the Japanese naval authorities have always regarded the U.S. fleet as their main opponent, which is indeed the case, but they have never thought about what is the most effective method and means to make the fleet lose its combat effectiveness. Although the planned sneak attack achieved the original purpose, the ending was completely opposite to the original idea.
This book is written by the author based on official and semi-official information, the author's own experience, the memories of his colleagues, information in newspapers and periodicals, and some summary materials.This is a method commonly used by the Japanese to write books. Unfortunately, this method has never been adopted in our country. There are many places in the translation that are not accurate enough, because it is indeed quite difficult to be accurate.Many scholars believe that it is simply impossible to accurately express the style and meaning of Japanese in another script.
"The Return of the Yi-58 Submarine" is a book without any prejudice.It was written for Japanese readers by our enemy in the past, the former top-ranking submarine captain in Japan. They are always the ones who fail in every battle.The author also talked about the difficulties he encountered when he tried to install radar on the submarine, his eagerness to solve these difficulties and how he was opposed by the authority of the military command for no reason.Hashimoto said these men were most concerned with their own reputations, not how to improve conditions for combat duty.The author also talks about how they tried to fight on with uncanny bravery and how they struggled desperately for survival.The difficulty of this struggle increased with the wear and tear of the submarine equipment; by the end of the war, the wear rate had reached 50%.The material learned after the war should also be added here.The characteristics of Japanese submarines are: large size (almost twice that of American submarines), difficulty in underwater manipulation, complex and unreliable control system, few living quarters on board, poor medical equipment, large hull vibration, and The noise reduction equipment is not good, and so on.These features completely violate our common construction standards for safe underwater navigation.It is strange that such submarines can sail and sink our large combat ships.
"The Destruction of the Japanese Submarine Fleet" is not a work of self-defense; Hashimoto is not seeking sympathy, but criticism.Nor is this book a work of rhetoric; the author presents his thoughts in a peculiarly Japanese way, which, although it creates many difficulties in translating the book, will at least give the reader a partial grasp of the Japanese way of expressing his ideas.The length of this book is not large, but the content is very rich.One of the most touching is the description of Huitian's manned torpedo combat activities.The young patriots who manipulated this torpedo firmly believed that self-sacrifice could make the war process beneficial to their country, so after three shouts of long live the emperor, they embarked on an inevitable but meaningless dead end.What ordinary soldiers can contribute is limited to this, and the rest is just a matter for the superiors.
The Japanese Navy had sixty submarines when the war began; a hundred and thirty were lost during the war; and only a dozen or so remained by the end of the war.The United States had roughly the same number of submarines as Japan at the beginning of the war; fifty-two were lost during the war; but by the end of the war they had increased to more than two hundred.
We have no shortage of officers who understand our needs, and the country has the power to meet our needs.Unlike the Japanese submarines, we were operating under completely different conditions.In the early days of the war.Except for the conditions of Japan's preemptive strikes and the possession of a relatively strong fleet, the difficulties of the enemy and ourselves are almost equal.At the beginning of the war, the operations of the submarines on both sides were tentative: whenever possible, they always tried their best to avoid battles; in sea areas where enemy reconnaissance planes might be active, the submarines stayed underwater all day; , Never launch an attack rashly.In addition, both sides are also very careful to maintain concealment.According to the results of the battle, it can be seen that after several months of the war, the submarines of both sides still did not take active combat operations at sea.
As this book recounts, the utter failure of Japanese submarines to attack Pearl Harbor greatly dismayed the Japanese.It was only after many months that Japanese submarines dared to make a decent attack on combat ships.On the other hand, during the first months of the war our submarines were not active due to the lack of torpedoes, which was especially evident during the futile attempts to prevent the Japanese occupation of the Philippine Islands.
But then the two sides used submarines in a completely different way.Our submariners have all seen their own shortcomings and bravely overcome them.We have excellent commanders, and at the same time have various decrees of practical value, so our combat activities have gradually become more active.The Japanese, on the other hand, cannot adapt to changed conditions or sudden changes.Japan's war plan was drawn up by outstanding military strategists in the country.The problem, therefore, is not that difficulties arose and the plan was flawed, but that the plan was not carried out properly.
Critics on both sides agree that the American submarines grew stronger and became a decisive factor in bringing Japan to its knees, while the Japanese submarines became weaker and almost completely useless.
In this book, the author narrates these historical facts to readers frankly, in detail, and of course very painfully.
It will be of great interest to the reader to compare some of the events Hashimoto recounts with what we know or have personally attended in order to clarify certain historical facts.Therefore, I would like to talk about the sinking of the USS Grunon.According to our estimates, the boat sank on July 30, 1942, off Kiska Island (Aleutian Islands).However, the materials about the sinking of the boat cited by Hashimoto in this book are different from the materials we have so far.The author writes that his colleague Akiji Taue, captain of the I｜25 submarine, sank an American submarine on his way back from his third mission off the coast of Oregon in October, apparently by taking the The timing was wrong, and he actually sank an American submarine at the end of July, on his way back from his second mission off the American coast.Another submarine, S｜27, sank due to grounding, and all the crew members of the boat were rescued.The only thing Tanue Akira sank was the Grunion submarine.The Scale submarine was also in the Aleutian Islands at the time, and I was the communications officer on that boat.I happened to be in the radio room, just as the operator was receiving the last telegram from the Grunon.The operator and I noticed at once that the intervals between the first sets of messages were different from those of the last sets, which were clearly sent in haste and were therefore confusing.I am sure the Grunon was under attack, or was seriously injured.After discovering the track of the torpedo launched by the I｜25 submarine, the captain of the Grunion will inevitably issue an order to evade the torpedo or dive quickly. However, the torpedo may have exploded at this time.According to the general routine, the operator always sends the last few groups of messages in a very short time in this case, in order to try to finish sending the messages before the antenna runs out of water.During the next twenty-four hours, the radio center of our headquarters in Dutch Harbor kept calling the boat, asking it to resend the last few sets of messages, but there was no answer.
In the last telegram, the submarine Grunon reported its battle with the Japanese anti-submarine ships. The captain estimated that it had sunk two enemy ships and damaged several ships.Until I read Akiji Taue's original newspaper material and the material detailed in this book, I always believed that the submarine Grunon was sunk by an anti-submarine vessel.
Secondly, the Americans are undoubtedly also very interested in how the Japanese submariners evaluate the results of the attack on Pearl Harbor.For the Japanese submarine crews, the surprise attack dashed all hopes, as neither the pocket submarines nor the large I-type ocean-going cruisers bound for the Hawaiian Islands achieved any results.At that time, Hashimoto was the mine chief on the I-24 submarine, so he described the battle as an eyewitness.The difficulties of launching a pocket submarine to attack proved that storms at sea can also disrupt pre-established plans.It may have been expected that none of the five pocket submarines launched returned to their motherships, and they became Japan's first suicide submarines in World War II.
The large submarine stayed on the approach to Pearl Harbor for several days in an attempt to join the pocket submarine, but failed.The Japanese found no ships other than a few American destroyers.At the same time, Japanese submarines were unable to attack the U.S. fleet due to the active presence of U.S. anti-submarine forces in the air and at sea.
From the perspective of the Japanese submariners, Pearl Harbor was a failure.It is not other arms, but it is the Japanese submarine that did not play a decisive role in this battle. This incident has a great impact on the Japanese submarine.The Japanese value prestige far more than the Americans.Loss of prestige in the United States is only a temporary embarrassment and loss of composure, but in Japan it is a long-lasting shame.
During the Battle of Pearl Harbor, Japanese submarines lost their prestige.While submarines and aviation had contractual attack plans, all sabotage and destruction tasks were performed entirely by the carrier aviation.Since then, Japanese submarines have been unable to re-establish their prestige.
All over Japan, the combat actions of pocket submarine crews have been highly praised, and all crew members will be upgraded to two ranks after they die.However, the prestige of the Japanese large submarines could not be improved at all.As a result, submarines received little attention, especially in terms of securing, supplying and appropriating all necessary equipment.It is precisely for this reason that the crew's request to install a radar on the boat has not been met.In the end, the submarine only played the role of a supply ship, delivering some urgently needed supplies to the besieged defenders to prolong the resistance time.
Europeans felt that the Japanese might have paid too much attention to the effects and possible consequences of the attack on Pearl Harbor.However, here we should notice a fact that is not mentioned in this book.
Japan released about 10,000 balloons with incendiary or small bombs from Japan in an attempt to sail them downwind across the Pacific to the continental United States.About 900 of them reached their destination, causing minor fires and causing some damage to residents in Washington state, Oregon and California.The United States did not disclose any of these circumstances at the time.Due to the measures taken in advance, Japan did not receive any information.
Major General Grass Leaves, who led the balloon release work, believed that this was a measure to counter General Dolittle's air strikes; but he had to stop releasing balloons after the launching troops were equipped with improved new military balloons.After the war, Major-General Kusanagi confessed during interrogation that he was forced to stop launching balloons because he had no hard information to prove their effects.He was later dismissed and the balloon launch was canceled.It is said that after the surrender of Japan, Kusanagi also lamented the bankruptcy of the plan to use balloons on a large scale.
Everything else aside, it can be seen from this interesting incident that many things that are considered commonplace in peacetime are of great secrecy to the enemy in time of war.
American readers must also want to know how Hashimoto, the captain of the Japanese submarine No. 58, which sank the USS Indianapolis cruiser on July 3, 1945, described the incident.We know that Japan likes to use manned torpedoes very much.Based on the analysis of the sinking of the ship, I can conclude that the Japanese must have launched one or several manned torpedoes on the cruiser Indianapolis at that time.
On the last combat voyage, Hashimoto's boat did have a manned torpedo on board, but he said it did not seem necessary to use it against the cruiser.Although the torpedo pilots insisted on an attack, Hashimoto refused, fearing, according to him, that such an attack would not succeed because of the poor visibility that night.
The author writes in the book: I decided to use manned torpedoes only when normal torpedo attacks failed.Very little is written in the book about the tactical approach to approaching cruisers.At that time, the cruiser USS Indianapolis was sailing on a straight course.After the Yi｜58 submarine occupied the salvo position at 60° to the starboard side of the cruiser at a distance of 1,350 meters, it launched a fan-shaped salvo with six torpedoes, and three hit the target.When Hashimoto observed with a periscope, he saw the torpedo hit, and at the same time heard the sound of successive explosions on the cruiser.At this time, the Kaitian pilots again requested to attack and wanted to die with the cruiser, but Hashimoto said that he felt pity for these people, because someone fired a torpedo and could not return.The submarine then dived into deep water and reloaded the torpedo; about an hour later, it resurfaced to the periscope depth.At this time, Hashimoto found nothing on the surface of the water, so the submarine sailed northeast. Hashimoto thought with satisfaction that he had sunk an Idaho battleship.
There is something puzzling about the above description.According to the author, the salvo position of the submarine is only 1,350 meters or closer to the cruiser, and the torpedo can only cover this distance within a minute at most.However, Hashimoto said that after the salvo, Yi｜58 had enough time to turn to a course parallel to the target ship.This maneuver takes about three minutes for American submarines.Hashimoto even said: Every minute seems to be infinite.Of course, I will also choose such words and phrases when describing the anxious mood of waiting for the explosion, but if the minute used here is not a literary exaggeration, it once again proves that the torpedo exploded only a few minutes after it was launched.
For American submarines, the enemy ship's bow angle is 60° and the position at 1,350 meters is the most ideal salvo position.No matter the American torpedo or the Japanese torpedo, the time to reach the target from this position is very short, only about 40 seconds. Such a short time is not enough to complete the turning action and enter the voyage parallel to the target.If the torpedo did sail for several minutes, it was clearly a manned torpedo; for only the use of a manned torpedo would be consistent with the firing situation described by Hashimoto.Therefore, my original doubts are far from dispelled.Hashimoto may have indeed used manned torpedoes; if so, why did he deny this fact in 1954?
Hashimoto asserted that the day after the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, he attacked an American convoy, fired two manned torpedoes at it, and claimed to have sunk two destroyers.at the same time.He also said that on August 12, 1945, a third manned torpedo was launched and sank a 15,000-ton seaplane carrier.However, we cannot find any record in our historical materials about the fact that these two destroyers and a seaplane carrier were sunk by Japanese submarines or other ships on August 10 and August 12 respectively.All we know is that the USS Indianapolis hit three torpedoes.Therefore, people would naturally think that the last few attacks were just fabricated by Hashimoto in order to explain the whereabouts of the last three manned torpedoes.
The book closes with the feelings of the submariners as they learned that the end of the war and the surrender of Japan were inevitable.This feeling cannot be translated from Japanese to English.Hashimoto wrote: The radio operator was very sad when he received the emperor's truce, as if he was about to cry.Just put yourself in his shoes, and you can appreciate how strongly the news of the complete downfall was to him.
On August 18th, Yi｜58 returned to Wugang, and all the crew members, together with other submarine crews in the port, accepted the emperor's proposal regardless of the opposition of some individuals (the author called these people active fighters). Surrender order.
People who lived in Japan for a long time after the war and were familiar with Japan's national conditions said that this only defeat could not completely destroy the Japanese martial spirit.It is true that there are some in Japan at present who are even opposed to rearming to defend their country.But there are others, like Hashimoto, who value the noble cause of the military, their kamikaze planes and their return torpedoes, very dearly.In Hashimoto's view, the latter kind of people are happy because they don't have to endure the shame of failure. In the struggle to realize the cause they have devoted themselves to, although they feel pain due to failure, they retain high morale.
Japan remained a threat to the United States, less obvious but perhaps more difficult to eliminate than it had been in 1941.The Japanese are energetic and mostly wonderful people.The question now is whether we can gradually convince the Japanese of the superiority of our way of life.
If Japan's existing power is gradually directed towards the struggle for freedom, Japan will become a powerful ally of ours in the Far East.
U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander Edward L. Beach