Chapter 2 Chapter 1 History is Practical Experience

Fools often say they learn from their own experience.I think it is better to use other people's experience.This is a famous quote from Bismarck, but he was not necessarily the first to discover this truth.In military matters this maxim has a special significance.A regular soldier, unlike people engaged in other occupations, cannot constantly perform his combat duties.Therefore, some people even assert that the profession of a soldier is simply not a real profession in its direct sense, but a temporary employment relationship.And there is a strange phenomenon: when the mercenary system was replaced by the standing army, the soldier's profession ceased to be a profession.

When the mercenary system was implemented in the past, being a mercenary could also be counted as a profession, because soldiers would be hired and paid only when there was a war; regular soldiers of the standing army could continue to receive their salaries when they were not fighting. The assertion that there is strictly no such profession as a soldier is not very accurate in the case of the majority of modern armies, from the point of view that they are constantly employed.However, if one takes into account the fact that in the present age, although the scale of wars is increasing compared with the past, the number of wars is becoming less and less, then the above assertion is still not unfounded.It may even be said that in time of peace, even the most rigorous training of the army is always more theoretical than practical.

However, Bismarck's famous saying can help us solve practical problems more correctly.He makes us realize that there are two different kinds of actual experience: one is direct and the other is indirect.And between the two, indirect experience may be of greater value, since its scope is undoubtedly much wider.Even in the most favorable fields of work, the scope and possibilities of gaining direct experience are always extremely limited, let alone in military service.Compare the profession of a doctor with the profession of a soldier.Physicians, of course, have far more opportunities for practice than the military, but the greatest achievements in medicine and surgery should be attributed more to researchers than to actual practitioners.

Direct experience is by its very nature extremely limited.It is insufficient to form a solid foundation, neither for theory nor for practice.At best, it can only create an atmosphere conducive to scientific conclusions.Indirect experience is of greater value.The reason is: it has a lot of content and a wide range.History, this is the universal experience.It is not the experience of a single individual, but of a multitude of persons acting under complex and diverse conditions. It is reasonable to use the history of war as the basis for military education, because the use of war history data can produce good practical effects in the training and development of soldiers.However, the value of this experience, like any other, depends both on how close it is to the definition of historical experience quoted above and on the method by which it is studied.

Napoleon said that in war the ratio of spirit to matter is three to one.Generals generally admit that this oft-quoted maxim is true.However, is this arithmetic comparison really reasonable?It is difficult for people to answer this question.This is because if the weapons and equipment cannot meet the requirements, the morale will inevitably drop, and if a huge amount of energy is consumed and only small benefits can be obtained, and even death is incurred, the morale will definitely be lost.Moreover, spiritual factors and material factors are unified and cannot be separated from each other.Nevertheless, Napoleon's maxim has its immortal value, because it reflects the idea that the spiritual factor has an overwhelmingly superior role in all military activities, and it can often determine the outcome of wars and battles.In the history of war, the spiritual factor is a constant factor, but its degree sometimes changes slightly.The material factor, on the other hand, is constantly changing, and is different in almost every war and every military situation.

Recognizing this situation helps to study military history from the perspective of practical application of the history of war.In the past, the implementation of military training and the establishment of military theory were based on the in-depth study of one or two battles or campaigns.And the scope of this basis is very limited, because the military methods and tools of struggle used in each war are constantly changing.The danger of this change is that it narrows our horizons and prompts us to draw erroneous conclusions.In the material realm there is but one fact that is the only constant, and that is the constant and constant change of all instruments and conditions.

Unlike the above situation, people's reactions to danger are generally similar.Some persons, by virtue of their disposition, exercise, and special training, may be less sensitive to danger than others.However, the difference between them is not that great.The more special the situation is, the more local our analysis and research are, and the more difficult it is to judge the spiritual factors.Under such circumstances, it is difficult for people to accurately judge how much resistance an army can show on a specific occasion.This, however, does not, in any case, prevent one from drawing the conclusion that an army must be less resistant to surprise, or to starvation and fatigue.The more fully the psychological analysis is done, the stronger will be the basis for drawing conclusions.

Since the psychological factor is more important than the physical factor, and it is also more fixed, it can lead to the conclusion that the basis of any military theory must be as broad as possible.If there is no deep understanding of the entire military history, and there is no such a basis, but only an in-depth study of a battle case, then this kind of research may draw incorrect conclusions.On the contrary, if we can study dozens of battle cases in different eras and in different environments, and prove that a certain cause can produce a certain effect, then this causal relationship should be regarded as a part of military theory. , it is not without reason.

What is presented in this book is the result of an extensive research.In fact, it can also be regarded as a compound result caused by certain factors.These factors are related to my former position as editor-in-chief of the military department of "Encyclopedia Britannica".Previously, that is, earlier, the author dabbled in the history of war in certain periods only according to his own interests.The tasks set forth by the encyclopedia obliged me to conduct extensive research on the history of war in various historical periods.It is as if a topographical surveyor, or even a tourist, if he cared about it, had a vast horizon before him, and he could get a general idea of ​​the whole terrain.However, if it is a miner, he can only see what is in the tunnel in which he works.

Through such research, I have gradually formed an impression: in the long river of human history, if the route taken in war does not have a certain degree of indirection, so as not to make the enemy feel unprepared and difficult to deal with, then it will be difficult. It is difficult to bring effective results to the war.This indirect route is both physical and psychological; usually it is physical, but it is always psychological.In strategy, the longest detour is often the shortest way to achieve the goal. This accumulated experience clearly shows us that a direct attack along the lines naturally expected by the enemy, whether directed towards spiritual or material objects, often leads to the opposite result.The reason for this is obvious, and it is the dictum of Napoleon quoted above: the proportion of spirit to matter is three to one.That is to say, although the strength of an enemy army or country depends on the number of troops and the amount of material resources in form, its final result depends to a large extent on the stability of command, the mental state of the people, and the source of resources. Continuous material security.

Action along the lines the enemy naturally expects will allow the enemy to improve its situation and thus increase its ability to resist.War is the same as wrestling in the stadium. If the opponent is not shaken in advance and loses balance, then if you want to knock the enemy down, you have to have a tense contest with the opponent, which consumes too much strength.Adopting such a method of struggle, in order to win victory, one must greatly surpass the enemy in strength. Even under such conditions, he may not be able to achieve decisive results.In most battles, knocking the enemy off balance, both psychologically and physically, is often an important prerequisite for the final defeat of the enemy. Debalancing the enemy psychologically and physically is achieved strategically by the indirect route.This indirect route may be planned in advance or taken by accident.As the analysis shows, the modes of action for this strategy are varied.General Carmon's research proved that detours to the enemy's rear were Napoleon's constant purpose and basic method of warfare. The so-called indirect route strategy actually included this concept, and it was broader than that.Carmon only made a general study of physical factors such as time, space and lines of communication.However, through the analysis of various psychological factors, it can be clearly seen that there are internal links between many strategic actions.Superficially, these strategic moves do not resemble the pattern of maneuvering around the enemy's rear, but they are striking examples of indirect route strategy. To ascertain the interrelationships of the various strategic operations, and to ascertain their nature, requires no enumeration of the strengths and numbers of the combatants, their means of supply, and their transportation.For many events in history, we are only interested in the same phenomena, and the subsequent working conditions and the psychological measures that lead to the results. If, under conditions so different in nature, size, and time, similar measures are to be taken to achieve the same result, it is evident that there must be some interrelationship.When we study this, we can logically find out its common laws.The more extensive and varied the difference of these conditions, the more definite and certain will be the resulting laws. Therefore, a comprehensive and in-depth study of war can help people find new principles of war.And it's worth more than that.If such research is the necessary basis for any military theory, it is equally important for the ordinary military man who aspires to study the history of war and seeks to develop his own views and judgments about war.Otherwise, his knowledge of military theory will not have a solid foundation, like an upside-down pyramid, top-heavy and in danger of toppling at any time.