Chapter 3 Chapter II Wars in the Age of Greece Epaminondas, Philip, and Alexander

One of the most natural starting points for our research is the first great war in European history, the Great Persian War.During this period, strategy was still in its infancy, so we cannot hope to learn many lessons from it.But the word marathon is so engraved in people's memory, and so powerfully inspired by all who study history, that it must not be taken lightly.For the ancient Greeks, the word made a particularly deep impression.The significance of the Battle of Marathon, therefore, was greatly exaggerated by the Greeks first and then by the Europeans in subsequent centuries.However, if its importance is accurately assessed without exaggerating, its strategic significance will appear more clearly.

In 490 BC, the Persians took aggressive actions and launched a small-scale expedition. The purpose was to teach Eretria and Athens, two small Greek city-states in the eyes of Persian King Darius, called They don't meddle in other countries' affairs, that is, they don't instigate the Greeks in Polish Asia Minor to plot riots.Eretria was quickly destroyed by the Persians, and its citizens were forcibly moved to live along the coast of the Persian Gulf.Then, the Persians began to attack Athens.Everyone later learned that the ultra-democratic party in the city-state of Athens intended to support the armed invasion of the Persians in an attempt to use the power of the Persians to defeat the Conservative Party.Taking this situation into consideration, the Persians did not directly attack the city of Athens, but landed their troops at Marathon, 24 miles northeast of the city of Athens.They took such a maneuver in an attempt to deceive the Athenian army out of the city, so that their supporters could easily seize power in Athens.They were worried that a direct attack on the city of Athens might prevent supporters from insurrection, and might even force them to rise up against themselves.If they take a direct attack, the Persians also face another difficult task, that is, they must carry out siege warfare.

If this was what the Persians were trying to do, then their ruse could be said to have succeeded.Sure enough, the Athenian army drove towards Marathon to meet the Polish army.At this time, the Persians began to implement the next stage of their strategic plan.Leaving part of their force as a cover, they reloaded their main force in ships, with the intention of sailing round to Farillon, landing there, and from there plunging down on the undefended city of Athens.This strategic plan was undoubtedly very shrewd and ingenious, but due to the constraints of various circumstances, it turned out to be unsuccessful.

Due to the tenacious perseverance of the main general Miltiades, the Athenian army adopted its only feasible method, immediately launched an attack on the Persian covering force, and won the victory of the Battle of Marathon.Another reason why this battle was won is that the Greeks had better weapons and equipment. Their spears and armor often had an advantage over the Persians. The Battle of Marathon was carried out very intensely. The description is even more intense.However, the bulk of the Persian covering force was safely boarded and evacuated.After the Athenian army won the honor in the tenacious battle, it immediately marched with more tenacious perseverance, and soon turned back to the city.Their quickness, combined with the slowness of the opposition to seize power, saved them at last.After the Athenian army returned to the city, the Persians saw that if they wanted to capture the city of Athens, they had to carry out siege warfare.The purpose of the Persian invasion was to punish the Greeks. They would not be willing to do so if they had to pay a huge sacrifice, so they automatically withdrew to Asia.

Ten years later, the Persians made another attempt, and once again mobilized a large number of troops to attack Greece.The Greeks were slow and slow to accept the lessons of the past.It was not until 487 BC that the Athenian authorities began to expand their navy, which was the decisive factor in offsetting the superiority of the Persian army.However, there is good reason to assert that Greece and Europe were saved this time by other causes.The first was the riots in Egypt.This kept Persia busy in 486-484 BC.This was followed by the death of Darius.He was the most talented king among the ruling figures in Persia at that time.

In 481 BC, Greece faced the threat of Persian invasion again, and it was on a larger scale than before.Due to the unprecedented scale of the enemy's invasion, the Greek city-states and countries were forced to unite and form an anti-Persian alliance.For Xerxes, King of Persia, he was forced to attack the target directly.The army he summoned was too large to transport by sea, so he was forced to march by land.Due to this reason, the supply reserves of the Persian army could not be resolved, and the navy had to be called in for support and assistance.In this way, the Persian army can only advance along the coast, while the naval fleet must move close to the army.As a result, the operational departments of both the Army and the Navy were hampered.The Greeks, on the other hand, could expect to wait for the enemy's attack in several directions, because it was impossible for the Persians to bypass these routes.

The Greeks used the terrain conditions to build up many positions one after another, effectively blocking the attacking enemy.In this way, as Granty said, if it were not for the differences of opinion among the Greek states, the invaders would probably never be able to break into the area south of Thermopylae (ie Demobil).However, the actual situation is not like this, thus making history an immortal epic.The Greek naval fleet defeated the Persian fleet near the island of Salamis, won high honors, and completely crushed the enemy's invasion.Xerxes and the entire Persian Army saw their fleet destroyed on the shore, but they had no way to support it. For them, this fleet was not so much a means of transportation as a source of supplies. It was more important than transportation. as important.

It should be pointed out that the favorable factor for this decisive naval battle was a trick used by Greece.We can think of this ruse as a way in the indirect route.At that time, Themistocles wrote a letter saying that the Greek fleet intended to surrender.The Persians were deceived into driving their fleet into the narrow fjord, and thereby completely annihilated their numerical superiority.This strategy was able to succeed because the Persians mistrusted past experience and felt that this letter was written very reasonably.In fact, the inside story of Themistocles writing such a letter at that time was that he was afraid that the generals of the Peloponnesian city-states participating in the alliance army would lead their troops to retreat from Salamis, because those generals had spoken at the military council. Such a suggestion was made.If such a retreat were to take place, the Athenian fleet would be compelled to fight the Persian fleet alone, and would give the Persian fleet the opportunity to make full use of its numerical superiority on the high seas.

In the Persian camp, only one objected to Xerxes' decision to launch an immediate campaign.This is Queen Alzimisia from Haricarrassus.She suggested abandoning this campaign and adopting another plan, which would involve the Persian fleet and land forces to attack the Peloponnesus Strait.She expected that this would force the Peloponnesian fleet to flee back to her port under threat, thereby disintegrating the entire Greek fleet.Her suggestion seemed deliberate, and that was what worried Themistocles.If the Persian fleet hadn't blocked the access to the sea in order to launch an attack, the warships of the Peloponnesian coalition forces would have fled the next morning.

Sure enough, the Persian attack was not smooth at the beginning.As some warships in the Greek fleet were retreating, the Persian fleet was deceived and followed to make a turn, and these Greek warships were only acting as decoys to completely defeat the enemy's main force.At that time, the attacking Persian ships entered the narrow channel, followed by the slowly retreating Greek ships. In order to catch up with these ships, they had to speed up their oars, so that many large ships were crowded together.This gave the Greek fleet an opportunity to launch a counterattack to the flank of the Persian fleet and defeat it.

For the next seventy years, the Persians dared not invade Greece again, apparently for fear of the Athenian navy attacking their lines of communication.The following facts can be cited to prove this assertion: When the Athenian fleet was destroyed in Syracuse, the Persian invasion immediately resumed.It is worth noting here that, from the perspective of historical experience, the strategic maneuver of the indirect route is adopted much earlier in naval battles than in land battles. This shows that the army's reliance on lines of communication for supplies is already a later stage of development.But the navy is different. They have long been used to deal with the enemy's sea lines of communication and supply vehicles. The Battle of Salamis eliminated the Persian threat.Since then, Athens has become the leader of the whole of Greece.It was not until the end of the Peloponnesian War from 431 BC to 404 BC that the status of this alliance was considered to be over.The Peloponnesian War lasted twenty-seven years, which is far too long.It not only exhausted the two main parties to the war, but unfortunately severely damaged those who were formally neutral.The reason for this is that the two sides are often indecisive in strategy, and the strategy has no practical effect. In the first phase of the war, Sparta and its allies contemplated a direct invasion of Attica.However, under the influence of Pericles' war policy, the opponent's many plans failed to be implemented.Pericles tried to avoid fighting on land, and advocated the use of Athens' powerful naval fleet to harass the enemy's routes, thereby disintegrating its fighting spirit.This is the so-called Pericles strategy, and it was once as famous as the Fabian strategy that appeared a little later.However, the verbal expression of this strategy has its limitations, making it difficult for people to understand the course of the war.In order to avoid misinterpretation of the original meaning, the use of terms must strictly follow the established meaning. For example, the term strategy, in its direct sense, is best understood as the art of command, that is, the actual leadership of armed forces.It is different from strategy.Tactics not only determine the use of armed force, but also a combination of other means (such as economic, political, and psychological).Therefore, the implementation of strategies is the application of higher-level strategies, that is, the application of so-called grand strategies. The Pericles strategy is also different from the indirect route strategy.The task of indirect route strategy is to destabilize the enemy in order to achieve victory.Pericles' plan is actually a grand strategy, the purpose of which is to gradually consume the enemy, make the enemy believe that he cannot win the victory, so that he can finally win. For the Athenians, a great plague brought them misfortune. Their spiritual strength and economic strength were greatly consumed during the war, and the outcome was very unfavorable to them.Thus, the strategy of Pericles was declared bankrupt in 426 BC, and was replaced by a strategy of direct attacks on Creona and Demosfina.The strategy was costly, and although there have been some remarkable tactical victories, it is not generally better than Pericles' strategy.Not long after that, in the early winter of 424 B.C., Brasidas, the most talented Spartan commander, finally deprived the Athenians of all the advantages they had so hard won. Brasidas achieved this result by adopting strategic maneuvers that directly destroy the enemy's essential places, rather than destroying the enemy's main body of strength.He led his troops around the city of Athens and marched northward, carried out a forced march throughout Greece, and directly attacked Halkitik, the autonomous territory of Athens, which was the key point of Athens. Inside the heel.On the one hand, Brasidas used force, and on the other hand, he made promises to those city-states that betrayed Athens, giving them freedom and protection, thus seriously shaking Athens' rule over Chalkitik and forcing Athens to send its main force to the city. to the rescue.The result was the Battle of Amphipolis, in which the Athenian army suffered a crushing defeat.Although Brasidas himself was killed in battle, the Athenian authorities were still willing to conclude a peace treaty with the Spartans that was not in their favor. In the following years of false peace, although the Athenians launched expeditions again and again, they never recovered the territory of Chalkitik.Later, as a last active measure, they launched an expedition to Sicily in an attempt to capture the ancient city of Syracuse, the key of Sicily, in order to cut off the food supply of Sparta and the entire Peloponnese.From the point of view of grand strategy, this is of course an example of the indirect route, but it has the weakness of attacking not the enemy's real military allies, but the opponent's business partners in trade.Therefore, instead of weakening the enemy's military strength, it has attracted new enemies to itself. Nevertheless, if the expedition had not been so erroneously executed, and had it been successful, its moral and economic results might have changed the course of the war considerably.However, Alquiviad, the planner of the expedition, was framed by domestic political enemies and was forced to leave his command post on the way.He was ordered to return to Athens to appear before the courts for blasphemy.Alquiviad knew that what awaited him was the death sentence.Therefore, he fled to Sparta on the way, intending to help the enemy to destroy the expedition plan he had made himself.It was Nikis who replaced Alkiviad as the commander-in-chief of the expeditionary force.This person was originally an opponent of Algiviad's plan. He was born stubborn and ignorant, so he naturally wanted to bankrupt Alkiviad's expedition plan. Athens lost its army in the siege of Syracuse, and it was only by the active activity of the naval fleet that a disastrous defeat was avoided.After another nine years of naval warfare, Athens won a favorable peace treaty and regained its status as a great empire.However, the good times didn't last long.In 405 BC, Lysander, the commander of the Spartan fleet, finally got rid of the measures for the continued development of Athens.In the book "Ancient History" published by Cambridge University, he wrote about Lysandre: His battle plan was to avoid battles, consume Athens' troops as much as possible, and choose the most vital points of the empire to attack. The first half of this sentence Not necessarily true, for Lysander's plan was not to avoid combat, as he did by the indirect route, but to attack the enemy whenever and wherever the opportunity seemed to be entirely in his favor.Lysandre once cleverly changed the course to give the enemy the illusion that he could not figure out his intentions, so he quietly drove the fleet to the entrance of the Dardanelles, where it waited for the Pantas fleet to transport food to Athens Returning to the voyage, since the food supply to Athens is a matter of life and death, the Athens authorities once sent their entire fleet of 180 ships to escort the food fleet.During the four consecutive days of voyage, the Athenian fleet has been luring Lysander into a naval battle, but to no avail.At that time, Lysander was just doing everything possible to create a false appearance, as if he had fallen into the predicament of doing nothing.Thus the Athenian fleet was deceived.She should have sailed into the safety of the port of Sestos to resupply, but instead of entering, she remained on the open sea near Egos Portame, watching Lysander's fleet.On the fifth day, when most of the people on the Athens ship went ashore to prepare food supplies, Lysander suddenly launched an attack. It can be said that the enemy's ship was wiped out without a fight. Within an hour This ended a long war between the two countries. Throughout the twenty-seven years of war, a great deal of direct line action has yielded no good results, and usually resulted in heavy losses to the attackers.When Brasidas attacked Chalkitik, the foundation of Athens, the unfavorable situation for Athens was definitely formed.If the Athenians carried out the grand strategic plan formulated by Algiviades and took the indirect route of action, that is, seizing Sicily, the economic base of Sparta, then there was still considerable hope for the recovery of their military strength.However, the expedition against Sicily did not save Athens.Ten years later, Sparta finally gave the enemy a decisive blow. This blow was a tactical operation carried out by its own fleet at sea.This is, of course, a consequence of the new, indirect route taken in the grand strategic project.It should be pointed out that the favorable conditions for the Spartans to carry out this attack were created by threatening Athens' most important sea line of communication.If Lysander captured the warships of the Athens fleet, he might also seize the economic base of Athens, thus greatly weakening its economic strength.He aroused the fear and anger of the enemy, created favorable conditions for the implementation of the next assault and a quick military victory. After the decline of the Athenian Empire, Sparta took its place and became the overlord in Greece.Our next problem, therefore, is to figure out what were the decisive factors that brought about the end of the Spartan regime.There can only be one answer to the question, and that is: in one man and his contribution to the science and art of war.In the years before the rise of Epaminondas, the Thebes had freed themselves from Spartan domination, and they adopted a method of avoiding battle, which later generations also called it Fabian strategy.Although the so-called Fabian strategy belongs to the category of the grand strategy of the indirect route, it is essentially a strategy of roundabout tactics.The Thebes army has always adhered to this method, avoiding open combat.Therefore, although the Spartan army drove to Boeotian many times at that time, and did not encounter any resistance, it failed to achieve any purpose.The Thebans used this method to gain time and create a select army of professionals, the so-called Holy Fighting Corps, which became famous for a time.This is the assault force in the army of Thebes later.This approach by the Thebes created the conditions necessary to inspire the people against the Spartans.As for the Athenians, they thus relieved the threat on land and were able to concentrate all their manpower and material resources to rebuild their navy. In this way, by 374 BC, the Athenian alliance, including the Thebes, forced Sparta to sign a peace treaty with them that was more favorable to the alliance.Although the peace treaty was quickly broken by Athenian adventures at sea, peace talks were resumed three years later, as Athens, too, grew weary of war.At the negotiating table Sparta regained much of what it had lost in the war and managed to sever Thebes from its allies.After that, Sparta began to attack Thebes in an attempt to completely destroy it.However, when the Spartan army entered Beeotia in 371 B.C., although it often had an advantage in quality, this time it also had an advantage in numbers (10,000 against 6,000). ), but in the battle of Levketere, it was completely defeated by the Thebes army with new and sophisticated equipment under the command of Epaminondas. Epamidas not only rejected the old tactical methods based on the experience of many previous centuries, but also laid the foundations of tactics, strategy, and even grand strategy.Later generations of famous generals and commanders learned and were trained on this basis.The method of deploying the army he used has not lost its practical significance until our time. further development of the method.In the battle of Levketere, Epaminondas abandoned the traditional practice and concentrated not only his excellent soldiers but also his main force on the left flank, thus weakening the central force and making the right flank Shrink back.In doing so, he created absolute superiority over enemy forces on the enemy's right flank, where their commander-in-chief, the brains of the army, was located. A year after the Battle of Levkertere, Epaminondas marched into the heart of Sparta at the head of the combined forces of the newly formed Acadian League.This march to the heartland of the Peloponnese peninsula, long ruled by Sparta, is marked by the indirect and multifaceted approach taken.The march was carried out in the middle of winter, in three separate columns, and marched in a centripetal direction, with the object of spreading the enemy's forces and weakening their ability to resist.This alone is enough to show that this march is a paradigm of military scholarship, which is unprecedented in antiquity, or rather, before the Napoleonic Wars. However, Epaminondas also has a deeper and more subtle quality. According to his strategic intentions, when his army converged at Carina, which was only 32 kilometers away from the Spartan capital, he took a roundabout way to approach the capital from the rear.He had another purpose in carrying out this maneuver, which was to attract a considerable number of Hilos and other disaffected elements to his side.At that time, however, the Spartans also succeeded in preventing this dangerous movement at home by issuing an urgent proclamation to release the Hilos from serfdom.In addition, the various allies on the Pedoponnese peninsula attached to Sparta also sent reinforcements to Sparta in time.In this way, the possibility of taking the capital without a long-term attack no longer exists. Epaminondas soon understood that the Spartans would not be deceived out of the city, and that a prolonged siege would weaken his allied army of various nationalities.Therefore, he abandoned that kind of conventional warfare and took up a more flexible weapon, that is, grand strategy by taking the indirect route.He used Mount Isomi, the natural barrier of Messenia, to build a city, named Mesera, as the capital of the new country of Messenia, and sent all those who were dissatisfied with the Spartan rule and attached to him , all settled in this city, and gave them all the booty of the war as a fund.This country, located in the south of Greece, became an obstacle to Sparta's activities.As a result, Sparta lost half of its land and more than half of its serfs.The new city-state established by Epaminondas in the Arcadia region of the Peloponnese peninsula was a supplementary line of defense against Sparta.From then on, Sparta was politically and economically surrounded by the fortress system, thus destroying the economic basis of its military power.Epaminondas fought for several months in the Peloponnesus, and finally withdrew.He has not even won a victory on the battlefield, but due to the use of grand strategy, he still severely damaged the foundation of Sparta's national power. However, what the politicians in Thebes hoped for was a huge military victory.They were disappointed that they didn't get that kind of victory.As a result, Epaminondas had to temporarily retire.The democrats of Thebes, by adopting a policy of short-sightedness and pursuing a false diplomacy, gradually lost the leadership that the country had then won.This caused some countries in the Acadian League to grow their arrogance and ambition, and began to forget the grace of Thebes, and tried to seize its leadership.In 362 BC, Thebes finally faced a choice about its future: either to use force to maintain its power; or to give up its prestige.It made a decision to conquer Arcadia, and as a result, the Greek countries were divided again into two hostile groups.Fortunately, Thebes not only had Epaminondas to build up its merits, but also the results of Epaminondas' grand strategy, because the Messenia he created The two countries, Megalopolis and Megalopolis, have now not only become factors to curb Sparta's invasion, but also greatly enhanced the strength of Thebes itself. Epaminondas once again entered the Peloponnese peninsula.He joined their Peloponnesian allies at Zegia, thus placing himself between Sparta and the rest of the anti-Thebes alliance, which happened to be fighting in the area of ​​Mantinea. concentrated.When the Spartan army began to move out of the city, preparing to join its allies, Epaminondas took advantage of the cover of darkness and sent his own fast troops to pounce on the city of Sparta.However, he failed to achieve the goal of winning, because a deserter leaked the news to the Spartans in time, so that the Spartan army immediately took a quick march and returned to the capital.So Epaminondas decided to fight and win.He led the army to leave Jagia, pass through a valley like an hourglass timer, and head straight for Mantinea, which is about 19 kilometers away.At this time, the enemy had already occupied a strong position in the waist of the valley, which was about 1.6 kilometers wide. Epaminondas's attack this time was, in its scale, between strategy and tactics.However, to arbitrarily attribute this maneuver to one or the other may lead to erroneous conclusions, for his victory at Mantinea also had its roots in the use of the indirect route method.At first, Epaminondas marched straight on the enemy's position, forcing the enemy to form his troops into battle order, and to direct his front in the direction in which Epaminondas was about to attack.However, when Epaminondas advanced to within a few kilometers of the Spartan position, he suddenly turned to the left and disappeared behind the high ground where the enemy could not observe.This surprising move immediately threatened the enemy's right flank.In order to make the Spartans further divide their battle formations, Epaminondas stopped suddenly again, ordered the troops to lay down their weapons, and pretended to be preparing to camp.This ruse amplified his victory.Sure enough, the enemy fell for the trick and allowed the soldiers to walk out of the queue and let the horses loose, thus further disrupting the battle deployment.At this time, Epaminondas used light troops as a cover, but in fact, he was completing the arrangement and deployment of the troops' battle formation.The battle formation he adopted this time is consistent with the formation in the battle of Levketere, and it is more perfect.Then, under an order, the Thebes army quickly picked up their weapons and rushed forward bravely to the enemy.By this time, the enemy ranks were in disarray, so that the victory of the Thebes army was almost a foregone conclusion.However, Epaminondas died in this battle.As a result, the Thebes army also panicked, and then retreated.This is a shocking example, and it provides a powerful proof to future generations that whether it is an army or a country, if its brain is paralyzed, then they will soon collapse. The next decisive war did not take place until 20 years later, in 338 BC.This war transferred Greek hegemony to the Macedonians.This war is also a clear example that politics and war are completely complementary and that natural obstacles can be exploited for strategic advantage.Macedonians, although they are also Greeks, are essentially foreigners.At that time, the Thebes had joined forces with the Athenians to form a Pan-Hellenic alliance against the growing strength of Macedonia.In addition, they also found an external ally, that is, the king of Persia.And this can be regarded as a strange story for history and human nature.This time the new attackers also realized the significance of the indirect route.Even Philip of Macedon's pretext for trying to seize hegemony was sham and deceitful.He was invited to participate in the Amphisa Tonic meeting, and he was asked to help punish the small country of Amphisa in the west of Boeotia.The small country was accused of blasphemy.The reason why Philip was invited was probably out of his own suggestion.In doing so, although he promoted the alliance of Thebes and Athens against him, at least the rest of Greece maintained a friendly neutrality. Philip began to march south.When he was near Chitinium, he turned abruptly from the line towards Amfisa, which was his most likely course.He took Erathia and built a fortress there.This initial change of direction indicated the breadth of Philip's political aims and implied his strategic intentions.This was confirmed later in the course of the battle.The combined armies of Athens and Boeotia blocked the mountain pass on two roads leading to Boeotia: on the western front, from Chitinium to Amphisa; on the eastern front, through Parapotemi Mountain passes, from Erathia to Calonia.Before embarking on further military action, Philip took several measures to weaken the enemy: politically he made a promise to restore the Phocian states, which had been conquered by Athens in the past; The protector (successor) of Feishen. Then, in the spring of 338 BC, Philip used a clever strategy to suddenly launch a surprise attack on the Panhellenic League.He first captured Elatea, strategically directing the enemy's attention to the Eastern Front, from where the enemy expected to press the attackers.Later, he played a deceptive trick on the enemy defending the western front, wrote a false letter, saying that he was going back to Thrace, and deliberately let the letter fall into the enemy's hands in order to paralyze the enemy tactically.Having done this, he set out from Chitinium, crossed the pass at night by forced march, and advanced out into the open country of western Boeotia, to the region of Amphisa.Then, he advanced to Napaktu and opened up the communication line to the sea. Now, Philip has drilled into the enemy's rear, but there is still a considerable distance from the enemy defending the eastern mountain pass. Faced with this situation, the Pan-Hellenic Allied Forces evacuated from the Parapotemi mountain pass on their own.If they don't retreat, their retreat path may be cut off, and there is no point in defending there.Philippe, however, turned again from the direction in which the enemy expected to be attacked, and again began his march by the indirect route.Instead of marching eastward from Amfesa, where he had to pass through the mountains favorable to the enemy, he turned his army back, passed Chitinium and Elateia once more, and advanced south, through At this time, the Palapotemi Pass, which was already unguarded, overtook the enemy in Caronia and launched a fierce attack.This maneuver largely guaranteed his victory in later battles.And his clever tactics intensified its effect.Philip resorted to tricks and began to pretend to be defeated, tricking the Thebes army out of their original position and pursuing them.And when the enemy entered the plain, he immediately counterattacked, quickly broke through the enemy's lines, and routed them.The outcome of the Battle of Chaeronia laid the foundation for Macedonian hegemony over Greece. Death hindered Philip from gaining supremacy in Asia.This enterprise was bequeathed to his son, and Alexander inherited from his father not only the plans and armies he had created, but also his ideas of grand strategy. Another inheritance that Alexander inherited, which later appeared to be of great significance, was the bridgehead of the Dardanelles, which Philip seized in 336 BC. If you carefully analyze the route maps of Alexander's previous expeditions, you can see that this is a circuit map with many twists and turns.A study of the history of these marches leads to the conclusion that the reason for the tortuous march was less strategic than political.Of course, these political reasons are also in terms of grand strategy. Alexander's early military operations were often direct operations with little flexibility.The reasons for this appear to be twofold.To begin with, the young Alexander was brought up at court, bred with honor and great victories, and far more heroic than any other great general.Secondly, he has full confidence in his own army and the quality of his commander, and believes that there is no need to prematurely destroy the enemy's strategic balance.Therefore, the experience left by Alexander to future generations is also two aspects: one is in the category of grand strategy, and the other is in the category of tactics. 西元前三三四年的春天，亞歷山大從達達尼爾海岸出發，開始向南行進，在格拉尼卡河上擊敗了波斯的掩護兵力。在這一戰中，波斯人曾力圖擋住亞歷山大那些使用長矛的武裝騎兵，這些騎兵有著驚人的重力和衝力，不過，當時的波斯軍隊也是具有很大靈活性的，如果他們能夠及時集中自己的兵力，能夠擊斃極其英勇的亞曆山大，那麼，亞歷山大的入侵在其剛剛開始的時刻也許就被消弭了。可是，他們差了一點。沒有能夠達到這一目的。 此後，亞歷山大繼續向南挺進，攻入沙爾底。這裡是利地亞的政治和經濟樞紐。到此以後，他便折轉方向，向西進發，抵達埃菲蘇。亞歷山大在這些過去的希臘城市恢復了舊有的民主政府形式和權利，從而在經濟上極有效地保證了自己後方的安全。 現在，亞歷山大又回到了愛琴海的海岸邊上，重新開始向南走，然後再轉到東方，沿途經過了卡里亞、萊西亞和帕姆菲里亞，他之所以採取這種機動形式，其目的是要震撼波斯人對愛琴海的制海權，使用奪占基地的方法來剝奪波斯艦隊的行動自由權。亞歷山大採取這個方法，終於使敵人的艦隊喪失了人力資源的基本來源。從帕姆菲里亞向東，在小亞細亞的沿岸，實際上已經沒有什麼港口。因此，亞曆山大便從帕姆菲里亞轉而向北，進抵弗里基亞，隨後繼而東進，到達安基拉（即現今的安卡拉）。這樣，他在小亞細亞的中部地區鞏固了權力，保障自己無後顧之憂。 此後，到了西元前三百三十三年，他又轉向南方，企圖穿過基里西亞門，直接向敘利亞進攻。而在那裡，波斯國王大流士三世正集中著兵力在等待他。這一次，由於情報不準確，而且自己作了錯誤的判斷，以為波斯軍一定會在平原上等他，加上敵人採取了比較巧妙的機動，亞歷山大曾在戰略態勢上處於很不利的地位。當時，他是採取直接路線行進的，而大流上三世卻前進到了幼發拉底河的上游，穿過阿曼尼克門，鑽到了亞歷山大的後方，亞歷山大是向來重視基地的重大作用的，而這一次卻脫離了基地，他與基地的聯繫被切斷了。然而，他卻在後撤過程中順利地擺脫了這一困境。他回過頭來，接受了伊蘇斯會戰，靠著較為完善的戰術和較為完備的武器打敗了敵人。可以說，像亞歷山大在這次戰鬥中那樣成功地利用間接的突然性的事例，在其他偉大統帥的業績中還沒有見到過。 以後，他重新採取迂迴的方法前進，沒有去進攻波斯帝國的心臟巴比倫，而是沿著敘利亞海岸線南行。很明顯，根據大戰略的需要，他必須採用這樣的一條路線。這是因為，亞歷山大儘管已經剝奪了波斯人的制海權，但他還沒能毀滅大波斯帝國。這個帝國不僅繼續存在，而且還可能對他的後方，以至於對希臘，特別是對雅典造成威脅。當他攻佔腓尼基以後，波斯艦隊也就趨於徹底毀滅了。因為波斯艦隊當時所剩下的，主要就是腓尼基的艦船，其中大部分都向他投降了，而駐紮在提爾港的其餘部分，也在該港陷落之後被他繳獲。此後，亞歷山大仍然繼續向南挺進，一直抵達埃及。他的這些行動，要從海上戰略的觀點來解釋是很困難的。也許可以認為，這是由於過分的小心謹慎。但是如果從政治目標的角度來看，應當承認，亞歷山大走這一步棋卻是很明智的。他要打敗波斯帝國，必須鞏固自己的地位，而首先佔領埃及這塊具有重大經濟意義的地盤，正是為了達到這一目的。 最後，到了西元前三百三十一年，亞歷山大才又開始向北進攻。他首先攻入阿勒頗，然後轉向東面，渡過幼發拉底河，前出到底格里斯河上游。在這裡，在靠近尼尼微（現為英蘇爾）的地方，大流士三世已經集結了一支頗大的新軍。亞歷山大是急於求戰的，但是他仍然沒有採取直奔敵人的辦法。他在底格里斯河的上游渡過河，沿著東岸前進，迫使大流士變換了陣地。於是就發生了高加米拉之戰（人們通常稱之為阿爾貝雷之戰，因為阿爾貝雷是距離戰地最近的一個城市，大約相距一百公里）。在這次會戰中，亞歷山大在軍隊方面佔有絕對的優勢，而在他達到大戰略目的的途徑上，這次的敵軍卻是所有障礙中最嚴重的一個障礙。高加米拉之戰以後，亞歷山大緊接著占領了巴比倫。 亞歷山大此後的行動，在他沒有開到印度邊境以前，從軍事上來說，一直是在對大波斯帝國境內的殘敵進行掃蕩，從政治上來說，則是全力鞏固自己的帝國。他採取間接路線，進行迂迴行動，穿過了烏克西亞隘路，越過了波斯門。當他在赫塔斯佩斯河與印度國王婆拉斯相遇時，他又卓有成效地採取了間接路線的行動，充分證明他的戰略藝術已經發展到了成熟的階段。例如，他把軍隊隱蔽在玉米地裡，又沿著河的西岸廣泛地展開了兵力，以此困惑敵人，使其不瞭解自己的真正意圖。起初，亞歷山大命令騎兵吵吵嚷嚷地衝來突去，使婆拉斯迷惑不解。而後，如此反複多次，使印度國王見慣以後放鬆了警惕。亞歷山大就是這樣使婆拉斯陷入在一個固定的陣地上，而在這時，他以主力監視著婆拉斯軍隊的正面，自己卻率領一支精兵溯河而上，逆進到上游三十公里之處，度過了赫塔斯佩斯河。亞歷山大這一突然的迂迴行動，使得婆拉斯精神沮喪，其軍隊的戰鬥力遭到很大震撼。因此，在以後的戰鬥中，亞歷山大竟然只以自己數目不大的一部分兵力就打敗了敵人的全軍。如果不是預先使敵人遭到削弱，那麼，亞歷山大的這種行動，無論從理論或實際上來說，都是不合理的，因為他率領的一小部分兵力，是孤立無援的，完全有著被敵人一舉擊破的危險。 亞歷山大死後，緊接著發生了長期的繼承者爭奪戰。這些戰爭導致了帝國的崩潰。但是，其中卻有著許多次採取間接路線的戰例，這些戰例同樣證明了間接路線的決定性意義。亞歷山大手下的將領，似乎要比拿破崙的元帥們更有才能。他們憑藉自己的戰鬥經驗，深刻認識了節約兵力的意義。儘管他們有許多的戰例值得我們重視，但是本書的內容只限於分析古代史中那些最重大的戰爭。而在多次的繼承者戰爭中，只有西元前三百零一年那最後一次戰爭，才夠得上本書選擇的標準。對於這個結論，是用不著爭辯的，因為劍橋大學的《古代史》一書早已指出，由於這次戰爭的結果，中央政權和各地諸侯之間的爭鬥終於宣告結束，而希臘｜馬其頓世界的解體，也就成為不可避免的事實。 在西元前三百零二年時，自稱為亞歷山大繼承者的安蒂貢尤，可以說是差不多要達到自己的目的了。他從自己原有的弗里基亞總督管轄區出發，開始向外擴張，終於逐漸地獲得了整個小亞細亞地區，使疆界從愛琴海到達了幼發拉底河。當時，起來反抗他的，有以下幾股勢力：一是塞魯卡斯，他很困難地扼守著巴比倫那個一隅之地；二是托勒密，他手中只有埃及一塊地盤；三是奈西馬丘，他隱藏在色雷斯地區；四是卡桑德爾，他在這批逐鹿者中是一個勁敵，是安蒂貢尤實現理想途中的最大障礙。但是，他當時已經被安蒂貢尤的兒子德梅特里斯從希臘趕出來了。德梅特里斯這個人，在個性品質方面，是有許多地方像亞歷山大的。他曾向卡桑德爾提出無條件投降的建議，可是卡桑德爾卻報之以頗具天才的戰略性打擊。卡桑德爾的行動計畫，是他和奈西馬丘兩個人開會制定的。他們兩人都想把托勒密拉來參加他們的行動，而托勒密還想同塞魯卡斯建立聯繫，因而曾派遣使者騎著駱駝越過阿拉伯沙漠去完成這個使命。 卡桑德爾在阻止德梅特里斯向底薩萊地區進攻時，手中只剩下原有五萬七千人中的三萬一千人了，因為他把其餘的軍隊交給奈西馬丘去使用了。當時，奈西馬丘已經渡過了達達尼爾海峽，正在向東挺進。在此同時，塞魯卡斯也在向西進發，率領軍隊向小亞細亞方面開來，而且在他的作戰部隊中，有著從印度得來的五百頭戰象。托勒密則向北進攻，進入了敘利亞，但因他在途中獲得一個關於奈西馬丘死亡的假情報，於是又返回了埃及。儘管如此，敵人的進攻很快就從東西兩面抵近了安蒂貢尤帝國的心臟地區。這就迫使他不得不火速地把自己的兒子德梅特里斯從底薩萊召回來。當時，卡桑德爾正成功地在那裡牽制住了德梅特里斯。現在，由於自己小亞細亞的戰略後方受到威脅，德梅特里斯只好自行撤退。這一情況和以後西庇阿迫使漢尼拔返回非洲的情況，在戰略原理上正好是一樣的。 以後，在弗里基亞境內發生了依普蘇斯之戰。由於自己的同盟者奈西馬丘在戰術上取得了決定性的勝利，卡桑德爾的戰略得以圓滿成功。這一戰的結果，安蒂貢尤戰死了，德梅特里斯遠逃了。應當指出，在這次會戰中，戰象曾成為決定勝負的主要工具，而勝利者的戰術又是以間接路線為基礎的。當騎兵敗退，而德梅特里斯進行追擊的時候，戰象突然湧出，切斷了他的退路。此後，奈西馬丘又不是立即就去攻擊安蒂貢尤的步兵，而只以攻擊的威脅和弓箭的射擊來渙散他們的士氣，以致把敵軍部隊弄到了四處散逃的地步。直到這時，塞魯卡斯才正式轉入攻擊，而且他的突擊矛頭正好指向了安蒂貢尤本人所在的部隊。 在這次戰爭的開始時期，形勢本來是有利於安蒂貢尤的。可是，曾幾何時，幸運卻產生了急劇的變化。這種由大勝轉成大敗的情景，實在是很少見到的。很明顯，卡桑德爾採取間接路線的方法破壞了安蒂貢尤軍隊的戰鬥力。他採用間接路線的行動，首先動搖了安蒂貢尤的信心，而後震撼了其軍隊的士氣，動搖了其國內的民心，因而削弱了他們的抵抗能力。