Chapter 4 Chapter III Wars in Roman Times Hannibal, Scipio, and Caesar

The next conflict that had a decisive impact on European history was that between Rome and Carthage.The most important stage is the various wars conducted by Hannibal, or collectively referred to as the Second Punic War.This war can be divided into several stages or several battles, and each stage has a decisive influence on the course of the entire war. The prologue of the first stage was Hannibal's march from Spain to Italy through the Alps in 218 BC.And its final ending point seems to be the victory of annihilating the enemy at the shore of Lake Transimeno in the spring of the following year.After this victory, if Hannibal could make up his mind to attack Rome immediately, it can be said that the city of Rome has no other resistance except its own walls and garrisons.

Why did Hannibal choose such a long and difficult overland route in the first place instead of the much shorter sea route?The usual explanation is that the Romans hold the command of the sea.However, in his time, sailing ships were still primitive, and their ability to intercept the enemy at sea was also very limited. Therefore, it is logically unreasonable to apply the modern definition of sea dominance to the situation at that time.Moreover, whether the Romans had command of the sea at that time is also a question.Polybius, who had directly recorded the Battle of Transimeno, pointed out in a work that the Roman Senate was anxious about whether the Carthaginians would gain command of the sea.Even at the end of the war, after a series of sea victories the Romans had deprived the Carthaginian fleet of all its bases in Spain, and had consolidated its foothold in Africa, they were still incapable of preventing the Marcus ( Hannibal's brother)'s expeditionary force landed at Girossi-Rifea, and it was impossible to prevent Hannibal from returning to Africa.Therefore, the more likely reason why Hannibal took the indirect land attack route was that he wanted to rally the Selts in northern Italy against Rome, thinking that this would be more beneficial to him.

Secondly, we must point out that even this land marching route is not a straight line.Because of this, he has gained considerable benefits.The Romans sent their consul Publius Scipio (father of Africa Scipio) to Marseilles to prevent Hannibal from crossing the Rhone.Hannibal, however, not only crossed the impassable river upstream by surprise, but continued far north.He chose a more difficult route through the valley of Iseri, rather than the straight road near Rifea, which was easily blocked by the enemy.Polybius later wrote: When the elder Scipio arrived three days later in the crossing area, he was astonished to find that there was no enemy there, whereas he had previously concluded that Hannibal would not dare to risk it anyway. Entering Italy via this road (i.e. the northern route).Old Scipio made a prompt decision, left part of his troops on the spot, and hurried back to Italy by sea.He arrived just in time to meet Hannibal on the Lombard plains.Here, however, the plains gave Hannibal the advantage and made it easy for his powerful cavalry to move.As a result, Hannibal was victorious in both battles at the Tisina and the Trebia.This enabled him to obtain a large number of supplementary troops and supplies.

Hannibal became master of northern Italy, where he spent the winter.In the spring of the following year, the new consul in Rome expected that Hannibal would continue to attack, so he divided his troops to guard two routes: one led to Rimini on the Adriatic coast; Aretium in Asia (now Arezzo).These strongholds happened to control the east and west roads leading to Rome, and Hannibal was likely to attack the city of Rome along these roads.Hannibal decided to march along the line to Eturia, but he did not choose the usual road.Before marching, he made careful reconnaissance and found out all the roads leading to Eturia. He knew that the mileage and conditions of these roads were also familiar to the enemy, and he knew that there was a shortcut through the swamp that would be beneficial. Sudden attack on Flaminius (Roman consul).Hannibal thought of a surprise attack, and took the short cut through the swamp.However, the soldiers were shocked (Polybian) when they knew that their commander was leading them towards the swamp.

General commanders like what they know and fear what they don't know.Hannibal was no ordinary general, and, like all great generals, he preferred to operate under the most dangerous conditions than to engage the enemy on the ground chosen by the enemy. During the march of four consecutive days and three nights, Hannibal's army has been marching on the muddy road in the swamp.Troops were decimated by extreme fatigue and lack of sleep, and losses in horses were even more severe.However, once he broke out of the swamp, Hannibal immediately found that the Roman army was still in the barracks of Arrettien without doing anything.At this time, Hannibal did not intend to attack directly.On this point, Polybius once wrote: He thinks that if he bypasses the Roman camp and advances to its rear, then Flaminius, because of the fear of the people's condemnation and the stimulation of intolerable challenges, cannot look negatively. When the enemy ravages his country, he must follow immediately.In this way, Hannibal can turn his back on the enemy, and he will have favorable conditions to launch an attack.

Hannibal took such a detour to the enemy's rear because he had carefully studied Flamini's personality and considered its psychological effect.Then, there is how to actually execute the plan.He marched down the road to Rome, organized one of the greatest ambushes ever recorded, and achieved a brilliant victory.In the morning of the next day, when the dawn was foggy, the Roman army chased Hannibal along the mountain road on the shore of Lake Transimeno, but it was suddenly attacked from both sides. and were all annihilated.Many people who study history know the outcome of this victory, but they often ignore that spiritual factors are the basis for this victory.However, Polybius made the following conclusion in his comments on this battle: Like a ship of war, if it loses its helmsman, it will soon become the enemy's capture.The same is true of armies in war.If you can outwit the enemy's leader and put him in a passive position in action, then the Dazhi enemy army may completely fall into your hands.

Then a question arises: Why didn't Hannibal directly attack the city of Rome after the victory at Transimeno?This is a mysterious case in history.All explanations made by later generations are nothing more than guesses.The lack of heavy technical equipment for siege may be the more obvious reason, but it is not a satisfactory explanation.One thing is beyond doubt, that is, in the following years, Hannibal has been eliminating the influence of Rome on his Italian allies, and trying to form a separate anti-Roman alliance.Therefore, a few victories can only be regarded as a kind of mental stimulation for this purpose.If Hannibal could make the conditions of battle favorable to his use of superior cavalry, his tactical superiority would be fully assured.

The second phase of the Second Punic War began with the actions of the Romans taking the indirect route.These indirect route actions seem to be more Greek than Roman in form.This method of action, and many imitations of it by later generations, some of which were poorly learned, are collectively known as the Fabian strategy in history.The strategy adopted by Fabian is not only to avoid battles to buy time, but also to achieve the purpose of affecting the morale of the enemy, and even further affecting the mental state of his possible allies.Therefore, the Fabian strategy is mainly a question of military policy, or a question of grand strategy.Fabian was deeply aware of Hannibal's military advantages, so he was determined not to take risks and seek battles, and he did not expect to win through battles.While avoiding battles as much as possible, he launched small-scale provocations here and there, so as to stimulate the nerves of the invaders and prevent Hannibal's army from getting soldiers from the cities of Italy and his base, Carthage. Replenish.The basic condition for the victory of this strategy, that is, the condition for how to use it to realize the grand strategy, is to make the Roman army often control the mountainous highlands, so that Hannibal's absolute advantage in cavalry does not work.Thus, this stage became a struggle between Hannibal and Fabian simultaneously taking the indirect route of action.

The constant threat to the enemy, the constant interception of the enemy's sporadic troops and forage collection squads, and the inability of the enemy to establish any permanent supply bases made Fabian an elusive shadow, covering everywhere Hannibal's triumphal battle. Parade of triumphant glory.In this way, Fabian himself not only avoided defeat, but also eliminated Hannibal's influence on Rome's Italian allies due to his previous victories, thus preventing them from betraying Rome.Moreover, this guerrilla style of warfare both boosted the morale of the Roman troops and demoralized the Carthaginians, who, far from their homeland, felt that a quick end to the war was no longer possible.

However, the war of attrition is a double-sided weapon, and even if it is used skillfully, the people who use it will still feel overwhelmed.Such a war of attrition would entail especially unbearable suffering for the broad masses of the people, who yearn for an early end to it, and are often prejudiced that victory over the enemy is best achieved by fighting.When Hannibal's victory began, the Romans were terrified.But now, after they recovered slowly, they began to doubt Fabian's wisdom and his actions, forgetting that it was Fabian who gave them the chance to recover.This suspicion incited some brave elements in the army, and they also began to criticize and oppose Fabian's strategy, accusing Fabian of being a coward.This situation led the ruling authorities to make an unprecedented decision to appoint Milatio as deputy commander-in-chief, and he was originally Fabian's first assistant and main critic of Fabian.Therefore, Hannibal quickly found an opportunity to lure Milashur into a trap. Fortunately, Fabian arrived in time to help him, and he was barely saved.

After this incident, criticism of Fabian was temporarily suspended.However, when his six-month term expired, his popularity and policies did not guarantee him a chance of re-election.In the election of the consuls, the arrogant, eccentric, and ignorant Tretz Varo was elected as one of the two consuls.Originally, it was this Varro who made the appointment of Milash.In addition, the Roman Senate also passed a resolution requiring the consuls to make up their minds to fight Hannibal.This decision was made at that time, on the one hand, because many regions of Italy were being ravaged by the enemy, and on the other hand, the Senate also took practical measures.In preparation for the battle of 216 BC, it had established an unprecedentedly large army consisting of eight legions.But the selection of a wrong commander, whose powers of thought and judgment were not adapted to his aggressive spirit, cost the Romans dearly. The second consul was Emily Palouse.He had hoped to wait and use maneuver to create more favorable conditions.However, this cautious attitude does not fit Varro's point of view.Varro's thinking and his public declaration are: Wherever the enemy is found, attack him there.As a result, Varro took advantage of the favorable conditions of the First Consul to provide Hannibal with an opportunity to fight on the plain near Cannes.Palouse had argued that it was necessary to draw Hannibal to terrain more favorable to infantry combat.However, Varo couldn't listen to this opinion. He used his days when he was on duty to command the troops to drive the troops to a position close to the enemy.The next day Palouse locked up the troops in a fortified camp.He believed that Hannibal was running low on supplies and would soon be forced to retreat.And Varro, as Polybius pointed out, was more and more burning in his breast for the battle.At the time, most of the troops had such a belligerent feeling that any further delay would irritate them.Because for people, there is nothing more unbearable than indecision. Once a decision has been made, people have no other choice. In the morning of the next day, Varro ordered the Roman army to leave the camp and prepare for the battle.And it was just such a battle that Hannibal was looking forward to.According to traditional habits, the infantry of both sides should be deployed in the center of the battlefield, and the cavalry should be arranged on the two wings.But Hannibal adopted a new method of arraying.He placed the Gallic and Spanish soldiers, who were less stable, in the center of the infantry battle formation, and moved his African infantry a little back, and arranged them on the wings.Thus the Gallic and Spanish infantry became a natural magnet for the Roman infantry, and the Romans would never give up attacking them.After the Gauls and Spaniards were attacked by the Roman infantry, according to Hannibal's intention, they had to retreat immediately.As a result, Hannibal's half-moon battle formation, which was originally formed as a convex line facing the enemy, immediately changed, and the convex line became a concave arc.Bewildered by the victorious atmosphere in front of them, the Roman infantry gradually rushed into this space, and everyone crowded together so that it was difficult to even use weapons in the end.They thought they had broken through the Carthaginian lines.In reality, however, he was sinking deeper and deeper into the encirclement of the enemy.At that moment, Hannibal's elite African soldiers attacked from both wings to the center, and surrounded the huddled Romans from both sides. This maneuver is a reenactment of the maneuver at the Salamis naval battle, or to be more precise, a repetition of the idea of ​​that maneuver.In form, it is reminiscent of the so-called Japanese judo combat art, which is based on unexpected and sudden actions. At that time, Hannibal's heavy cavalry was deployed on the left flank, and it also broke through the formation of the enemy's cavalry, surrounded the Romans from behind, and assisted the Numitian cavalry to disperse the enemy's cavalry on the right flank.The heavy cavalry of Carthage, at this time, handed over the task of chasing the Roman cavalry to the Numitians, but they kept rushing to the enemy's rear, trying to deal a fatal blow to the Roman infantry.At this time, the Roman infantry was surrounded on three sides; they were too crowded and too dense to resist effectively.From this point on, the battle has turned into a massacre.According to the records of Polybius, there were 76,000 Roman soldiers at that time, and as many as 70,000 died on the battlefield.Palouse was included, but Varo, the culprit who caused the tragedy, managed to escape with his life. This is really an irony of fate. After the crushing defeat of the Romans at Cannes, the Italian Union temporarily collapsed.But Rome itself did not collapse.Fabian organized and united the people there and continued the resistance for a long time.Later, Rome finally stood up again.This was largely because they employed Fabian's strategy of avoiding war at all costs, a strategy that exemplified dogged firmness and patience.At the same time, it was also due to Hannibal's lack of siege equipment and soldiers.As an invader, he was placed in a region that was almost primitive, which made his economic situation very unstable and it was difficult to support war with war. (And later, when Scipio invaded Africa, he found that Carthage's more developed economic conditions ensured that he could carry out his plans.) The second phase of this war ended in 207 BC.At that time, the Roman consul Nero employed another form of the indirect route strategy.He secretly withdrew the Roman army from the position facing Hannibal, and then advanced at a forced march to concentrate against Hannibal's brother (Hasdrubal), who had just reached Italy with an army. Lee North.Nero destroyed this army at the battle of the Metaphor, and with it Hannibal's hopes of obtaining this reinforcement in order to win victory were dashed.Nero immediately returned to camp after fighting.By the time Hannibal found out that the other side's camp was empty, Nero was already in the camp again. Since then, the war in Italy has been in a stalemate.Thus began the third phase of the war.In the following five years, Hannibal has always carried out a tenacious defense in southern Italy.Many Roman generals returned wounded whenever they came too close to Hannibal's lion's den by direct blows. In 210 BC, Africa Scipio was sent to Spain.Facing the vastly superior forces of Carthage, he undertook an extremely difficult task, to save the Roman army commanded by his father and uncle from destruction, and to avenge the death of his father and uncle. , and, if possible, maintain a small foothold for Rome in northeastern Spain.Scipio moved as fast as he could, using tactical advantages and ingenious diplomacy to turn what had been a defensive operation into an offensive one.In fact, it was an indirect attack against both Carthage and Hannibal, since Spain was an important strategic base for Hannibal, where he would train his troops and recruit new recruits from there. .Scipio skillfully combined surprise and timing, and before overthrowing the Carthaginian army, he first won some of the allies of Carthage to his side, and took them in Spain|Carthage (New Carthage) The main base was stripped away. In 205 BC, Scipio returned to Italy and was elected consul.At this time, he was ready to implement the second phase of the indirect route strategy that he had already considered and matured, that is, to attack Hannibal's strategic rear in Carthage.This is a decisive stage.Fabian was already old at this time, and his thinking gradually became rigid. He only knew how to maintain the general method of action, and stubbornly believed that Scipio would first attack Hannibal in Italy.He has repeatedly questioned Scipio: Why do you not want to attack Hannibal directly, but must go around such a big circle?Have you ever thought that when you cross the sea to Africa, Hannibal will follow you? Scipio obtained only one permission from the Senate to cross the sea to Africa, but was refused to replenish his troops.Therefore, when he set out on an expedition in the spring of 204 BC, he led only 7,000 volunteers, in addition to two discredited legions.These were the two legions that had been defeated at the Battle of Cannes, and were sent to garrison duty in Sicily.When Scipio landed on the African continent, Carthage only sent a small cavalry to resist.He skillfully retreated, lured the cavalry into a trap, and wiped them all out.In this way, Scipio not only bought time to consolidate his position on the African continent, but also created a powerful momentum, which both encouraged the Roman authorities to give him more active support and shocked the Roman authorities. Carthage's allies in Africa weakened Carthage's influence over them.However, Sifax, the most powerful of them all, was an exception. Later, Scipio tried to seize the port of Utica, wanting to use it as his base.However, he was unsuccessful.He had wanted to use the method of capturing Carthagera in the early years, and take it without a long siege.But after six weeks he was forced to lift the siege of the port of Utica, because Syfax had led an army of 60,000 against him, that is, to support Hasdrubal Ji. Sigo's newly formed Carthaginian army.Once the enemy's coalition forces arrive, their forces will have an absolute superiority in numbers.Scipio therefore withdrew to a small peninsula, where he erected a fortified line of fortification, in the form of that which Wellington later established at Torres Vedras.There he first managed to paralyze and loosen the blockading forces, and then to distract them by creating the appearance that he was preparing to attack the port of Utica from the sea.When these lures were completed, he took advantage of the night to launch a surprise attack on the two camps of the enemy. The effect of this surprise attack on breaking the enemy's organization and spirit was all the more remarkable because of Scipio's skilful command.At first, he attacked the poorly organized Syfax camp.There, most of the camp shacks are covered with flammable reeds and thatch, and some extend beyond the edge of the camp fortifications.So the Romans set fire first.They burst into the barracks when some huts caught fire and caused confusion.Hasdrubal's troops thought it was an accidental fire, because when night fell, they also saw that the Roman military camp about ten kilometers away was still quiet and there was nothing unusual, so they opened the gate of their own military camp , ran out to help the Syfax troops put out the fire.At this time, Scipio immediately seized the opportunity and immediately attacked Hasdrubal's barracks through the gate, avoiding a strong attack on its fortifications.As a result, both Carthaginian armies were destroyed, losing half their strength each. If we analyze this battle carefully, we will formally pass from the category of strategy to that of tactics, and in fact perceive that strategy not only paves the way for victory, but leads directly to it.Victory is just the last act of strategic maneuvering, and a massacre without tenacious resistance cannot be counted as a battle. After an almost bloodless victory, Scipio did not immediately attack Carthage.why?Although history does not answer in the affirmative, history itself offers a greater possibility of explaining Scipy than the fact that Hannibal did not immediately attack Rome after his victories at Transimeno and Canne. A move.History has taught that, of all operations in warfare, the siege has hitherto been the most unfavorable form of warfare, so long as there is a possibility of rapid and sudden attack and assault, with good prospects to be expected.If the enemy still has field troops in his hands and can take active combat actions, then the siege battle may also lead to the failure of the siege troops, because the sacrifices they suffer in the siege are always greater than those of the defenders. Much bigger. What Scipio had to consider at that time was not only the defensive capabilities of Carthage, but also the issue of Hannibal returning to the army to rescue him.Attracting Hannibal back was originally one of his goals.It would certainly be in his best interest to force Carthage to surrender before Hannibal returned.However, Scipio considered that instead of suffering huge sacrifices to storm the city, it is better to first weaken the morale of the enemy's city defenders, thereby destroying their ability to resist city defenses.If the storm does not go down, and Hannibal comes to attack him from behind, then he is likely to be overwhelmed under the city walls. Therefore, Scipio did not storm the city of Carthage, but imposed a blockade on it.He cut off the food supplies of the city, and made it impossible for the allies to come to its rescue.In addition, he also adopted the method of hot pursuit, defeated the Sifax army, and greatly weakened the overall strength of the enemy.He raised up his ally Masinisha, who seized the throne of Numitia.This ensured that he himself had the necessary supplement of cavalry to counter Hannibal's best weapon. To heighten the potency of the mental shock, Scipio made a foray to Tunisia.It is very close to the city of Carthage.This, he thought, was the best way to induce terror and despair among the Carthaginians.Such actions, together with other indirect forms of oppression, finally weakened the Carthaginians' will to resist, and compelled him to make peace demands.However, while waiting for the Roman authorities to approve the peace terms, news came that Hannibal had returned to Africa and had landed at Leptis.Peace talks broke down. (This was 202 BC) This put Scipio in a very difficult and dangerous position.Although he preserved his strength by not storming the city of Carthage, at that time he had no support from his ally Masinisha, who agreed with Masinisha when peace negotiations began. Sha returned to Numitia to consolidate his new kingdom's dominance.A commander faced with this situation. From an orthodox point of view, there were only two options, either to immediately turn to the offensive to prevent Hannibal from advancing to Carthage, or to hold on to the spot and wait for reinforcements to arrive.Now, however, Scipio performed a completely unexpected maneuver.To map this maneuvering line may at first appear irrational.That's how it was.If the route of Hannibal's march from Leptis to Carthage is marked as a straight line, then the route that Scipio retreated after leaving a detachment behind the city of Carthage to hold its camp is the same as that of Hannibal. Pulling this straight line at right angles, he was going downwards, that is to say, he was walking in the direction of avoiding Hannibal.This is really the most obvious example of the indirect route!The road chosen by Scipio led through the valley of the Baghradha to the heart of Carthage's basic source of supplies from the interior districts.At the same time, every step he took was one step closer to the reinforcements sent by Masinisha. This maneuver of Scipio achieved its strategic purpose.At that time, the Carthaginian Senate was very troubled by the destruction of that important area related to its own survival, and sent messengers to Hannibal one after another, ordering him to take necessary measures and ordering him to fight Scipio.Although Hannibal emphasized in his reply to the Senate that he hoped that they would not interfere with his actions, he was still forced by the situation and could not go north to return to Carthage. Instead, he had to turn west and take measures. Forced march to meet Scipio.In this way Scipio lured Hannibal to his desired field of battle.In this area, it was impossible for Hannibal to obtain reinforcements, there was no reliable support point, and it was impossible to find a place to hide in case of defeat.Had the battle been fought near Carthage, Hannibal would not have been in such danger. Scipio had achieved his purpose in forcing Hannibal to seek battle away from Carthage.Now, he can give full play to his mental advantages.At last Masinissa joined Scipio.Almost at the same time, Hannibal caught up with them.However, Scipio did not move forward, did not approach Hannibal, but continued to retreat, thereby luring Hannibal to a more remote area, which happened to put the Carthaginians in a situation of severe water shortage. .Now, when Hannibal had advanced to the plain, Scipio, hoping to make full use of the superior cavalry he had acquired so recently, made up his mind to engage Hannibal in battle.Then came the Battle of Sama (or, more correctly, the Battle of Naragana).Scipio finally defeated Hannibal's cavalry in this battle.Before that, Hannibal's cavalry had been considered invincible.It was in this battle that Hannibal suffered his first tactical defeat.However, the strategic defeat soon fell on him, because there were neither settlements nor forts near the battlefield, so he could not find a place to take cover.Without shelter, the defeated army cannot escape the fate of total destruction.After this battle, Carthage surrendered bloodlessly. The victory of the Battle of Sama made Rome the overlord of the Mediterranean region.Since then, its ruling power has been continuously expanded, and its suzerain status has been continuously strengthened.Although it was repeatedly, almost regularly, invaded by barbarian peoples, it encountered no serious obstacles.It can therefore be said that 202 BC is a natural dividing line in the ancient history of the world.On this basis, we can more completely study some of the turning points in ancient history and explore the military causes of those changes.Of course, the Roman Empire will eventually go from its peak to its decline.In the end, a huge empire collapsed, forming a fragmented situation.Why is this?Although there were also problems of invasions by barbarian peoples, they were mainly the result of a gradual internal breakdown. Over the course of many centuries, Europe has changed from an old unified situation to a new divided one.Analyzing the art of command reflected in this process of collapse and decline, many useful lessons can be drawn.Some of them are of great significance.For example, the experience of Belisarius of the Byzantine Empire and some of his subsequent commanders is very valuable.On the whole, of course, the final outcome is often difficult to determine, because turning points are almost elusive, strategy is sometimes very unclear, and historical documents are very unreliable, so the basis for scientific conclusions is not solid. However, when Rome was not at the height of its power, there was a civil war worthy of careful study.The reasons why it is worth studying are: first, this war is still an arena for a great commander; second, it has had an extremely significant impact on the course of history.If it is said that the Second Punic War made Rome the center of the world, then the Roman Civil War from 50 BC to 45 BC made Caesar the center of the Roman world, and a Caesarism emerged. When Caesar crossed the Rubicon in December of 50 BC, his sphere of influence was limited to Gaul and Irerigon.At that time, Pompey still controlled the whole of Italy and the various provinces of Rome.Caesar had only nine legions in his hands, and only one was stationed with him at Ravenna, and the rest were in Gaul, at a great distance.Pompey had ten legions in Italy, seven in Spain, and many detachments scattered throughout the empire.However, Pompey's legions in Italy are just some skeleton legions with only cadres and key personnel.Therefore, Caesar's fully mobilized legions were actually more effective than Pompey's two unmobilized legions. Some have criticized Caesar for taking a risk by marching south with such a small force.But time and suddenness are the two most important factors in war.Caesar not only recognized the significance of these two factors, but also took Pompey's personnel quality into consideration when realizing his own strategic intentions. There are two roads from Ravenna to Rome.Caesar chose the road with the longest winding distance.He therefore proceeded along the Adriatic coast, and with the speed of a forced march.As he penetrated deeper and through those densely populated regions, many of the recruits who were gathering for Pompey joined Caesar.This was exactly the case with Napoleon's army in 1815.Shaken in spirit, Pompey's army abandoned Rome and retreated to Capua.At the same time Caesar had advanced to a position between the enemy's advance guard at Corfelon and the main force in Luceria under Pompey's own command, and recruited enemy forces to supplement his own.After that, he continued to attack south along the direction of Luceria, constantly expanding his strength like a snowball.By this time, however, his attack began to become an advance on a direct line, forcing the enemy to retreat all the way to the fortified port of Brindisu (now Brindisi), which is the heel of Italy's boot. .Pursued by Caesar, Pompey was forced to make the decision to withdraw his army across the Adriatic and flee to Greece.In this way, because Caesar's offensive actions in the second stage of the war were too direct, coupled with the lack of military art knowledge, he finally lost the opportunity to end the war with a single battle.This forced him to continue fighting for the next four years and spread military operations all over the Mediterranean coast. 現在開始了第二個戰局。凱撒不是到希臘去追擊龐培，而是把部隊開進了西班牙，其目的是要粉碎龐培的同盟即西班牙的軍隊。為此，他曾遭到過很激烈的責難。但是後來的事件證明，這樣作是對的，正好估計到了龐培的消極無為。這一次，戰局的開始仍是極不合符作戰藝術的。他又採取直接進攻的方式，直接攻擊位於比利牛斯山脈後邊依勒爾達城（現今的萊里達）的敵人主力，結果又使敵人得以避開戰鬥。對城市的強攻沒有獲得任何成效，而且僅僅因為他自己親臨前線督戰，才使自己的部隊免於失敗。部隊士氣低落，在他不得不改變作戰方法以前，一直都在低落下去。 凱撒終於放棄了攻城的打算。他改用全力建立一個人造徒涉場，以此控制著塞格雷河的兩岸，而依勒爾達城也正位於該河岸邊。這一行動使敵人的補給來源受到威脅，龐培的部下不敢久留，於是自動撤退了。對於撤退的敵人，凱撒沒有直接追趕，任其自然遁去。但是他卻同時派出了高盧騎兵，令其前進到敵人的後方進行活動，其目的是阻止他們繼續遠遁。以後，他沒有去進攻敵人後衛部隊把守的橋頭陣地，而是進行著一個冒險活動。他帶領步兵渡過了一般認為只有騎兵才能過去的深水渡場，在一夜之間採取了廣泛的迂迴機動，切斷了敵人的退路。這時，凱撒仍然不打算立即開始交戰，而只是不斷打破敵人尋找新退路的企圖，並派出騎兵進行騷擾，以此消耗敵軍的精力，而用步兵軍團向著敵人的兩翼進行迂迴。他堅決控制著自己躍躍欲戰的士兵，同時又鼓勵他們對敵人的士兵表示同情友好。這樣，使得敵軍士兵精神沮喪，忍饑挨餓，以致士氣日益低落。最後，凱撒迫使他們又掉轉頭來後退，不得不在一塊沒有水源的地方進行防禦。敵人走投無路，終於不戰而降。 這是一個戰略性的勝利，而對勝敗雙方來說，都是沒有流血的。雙方士兵死傷愈少，則凱撒的潛在擁護者和志願兵員也就愈多。由於用機動的方法來代替直接的進攻，這個戰局只用了六個星期的時間就勝利結束了。 可是，到了西元前四十八年的一個戰局中，凱撒又改變了自己的戰略，結果使戰局延續了八個月的時間才告結束，而且所取得的勝利還是不完全的。這一次，他進攻希臘所選擇的道路，不是走陸上穿過依列里貢的迂迴路，而是那條最短的海道。在開始的時候，他確曾以此贏得了某些時間，但是到頭來還是把它丟掉了。首先，龐培有一支大型艦隊，而凱撒卻沒有這樣的艦隊。他儘管早已下達命令，要緊急建造和搜集大量的船隻，可是，待到出發之時，卻還只有不大的一部分可供使用。凱撒不耐煩久等，於是在其兵力大約還只集中一半的時候，就帶著部隊從布林迪西港口出發了。他在巴勒斯特登陸以後，沿著海岸向北走，直抵都拉希（現為都拉斯）那個重要海港。而龐培正巧比凱撒早到一步。對凱撒說來，值得慶倖的是，龐培和往常一樣，行動總是慢吞吞的，因而喪失了在安東尼率領凱撒的另外一半兵力來和凱撒匯合以前利用自己優勢兵力的機會。當安東尼在都拉希以北地區登陸時，正好處在安東尼和凱撒部隊之間的龐培，也未能阻止他們在地拉那地區的會合。此後，龐培又開始退卻，敵人則緊緊跟他的後面追趕，力圖同他進行戰鬥。後來，雙方終於駐紮下來，在流經都拉希以南的格努斯河右岸相互對峙著。 進攻曾經一度停頓，直到凱撤採取間接路線的行動才又打開局面。凱撒完成了一個迂迴行動，沿著山地走了七十公里，前出到了都拉希和龐培軍隊之間的地區。龐培意識到自己所處境地的危險以後，實行了退卻，以便保護那個遠在四十公里以外的基地。可是，凱撒沒能利用自己的有利形勢，因為龐培還是那樣一個性格，只要還能夠從海上得到補充，他並不打算首先發起攻擊。這樣，凱撒勞而無功，只好下了一個對自己很不利的決心，即把敵軍包圍封鎖起來。然而，他的敵人不僅在兵力上比自己強大，而且還有海路進行補給，並且隨時都可以上船撤退。 由於包圍的兵力單薄，即令是龐培這樣一個消極而無所作為的人，也不會不想到要對包圍線上的薄弱地段進行突擊。龐培的突擊取得了一些勝利，迫使凱撒不得不集中兵力來進行反突擊以恢復原來的態勢。這次反突擊又不幸以凱撒的慘敗而告終。只是由於龐培這個人過於消極怠惰，才使得凱撒那支精神沮喪的軍隊免於徹底潰滅。 凱撒的士兵仍然頑強地相信，凱撒會率領他們重新進攻敵人。可是凱撒卻總結了過去的教訓，他在實行後撤改善態勢之後，又開始採用間接路線戰略。在當時的條件下，龐培本來有採用間接路線戰略的更大可能性。他可以帶兵橫渡亞得里亞海，到義大利去恢復自己的統治權，在凱撒失敗以後，那裡曾經形成一種對他有利的局勢。凱撒清楚地知道，如果龐培向西實行這樣一種機動，那對他是極端危險的。於是，他立即組織部隊向東進軍，去攻擊龐培的一個老戰友，即盤據在馬其頓的西庇阿‧納吉卡。這樣，就迫使龐培尾隨凱撒而來。他選擇了另外一條行軍線路，匆匆忙忙地趕去援救西庇阿。凱撒比龐培先到一步，可是，他沒有立即把自己的部隊用去強攻堡壘工事，而是給了龐培一個隨即趕到的機會。凱撒為什麼放棄了這樣一個有利的強攻時機，也許是因為他考慮到都拉希的情況，不相信龐培會在開闊的地形上接受會戰。如果凱撒真是這樣設想，那他的想法是完全對頭的，因為龐培儘管在兵力上還有著二對一的優勢，但他仍然是在部將們的強烈勸說下才下了出戰的決心。當凱撒剛好完成進行機動的準備工作，以為奪得勝利創造必要的條件時，龐培即把部隊開上來了，給他提供了一個在法薩羅取勝的機會。從凱撒的利益來說，這次會戰無疑是來得過早了，其證據就是，戰鬥的結局幾乎是千鈞一髮。凱撒轉而採取間接路線行動以後，終於在戰略上恢復了平衡的局面，並且進而破壞了龐培地位的穩定性。 凱撒在法薩羅取得勝利以後，一直尾追著龐培，越過了達達尼爾海峽，穿過小亞細亞，經由地中海，到達了亞歷山大城。龐培到達亞歷山大城以後，被托勒密殺害了。這樣一來就給凱撒省了許多的麻煩。可是，凱撒本人卻把已經取得的優勢地位給葬送掉了。他留在那裡干預托勒密和其姐妹克里奧派特拉爭奪埃及王位的鬥爭，白白地耽誤了八個月的時間。凱撒這個人，幾乎是定期地重複著，而且不斷地加深著自己的錯誤，很明顯，他老是只關注一些比較明顯但意義卻不那麼重大的目標，而忽視了那些雖然不太明顯但卻是主要的目標。他在自己的行動中，幾乎是輪流採取德熱基爾戰略和蓋得戰略。 由於凱撒喪失了時間，龐培的擁護者得以重新收集兵力，並在非洲和西班牙鞏固自己的地盤。 在非洲，凱撒的部將古里阿採取了直接路線行動，結果使他在那裡的處境很困難。古里阿登陸以後，曾很快取得一些勝利，可是，他卻掉進了盧巴國王的陷阱，並且被殲滅了。而盧巴國王是龐培集團中的一個聯盟者。凱撒在西元前四十六年的非洲戰局，就是這樣開場的。他採取著直接的路線，追求著疾速的行動，可是如同在希臘戰局中一樣，其兵力卻又是那樣地不足。因此，凱撒本人也很快地落入了敵人的圈套。只是由於他有著好的運氣和巧妙的戰術，才避免了失敗。這次失利以後，他便縮到魯斯庇納附近，構築軍營，進行固守，以待其他軍團的到達，無論敵人如何引誘，堅持避不出戰。 此後，凱撒重又運用德熱基爾戰略，其要害就是以較少的流血來爭取勝利。在連續幾個月的過程中，甚至在他的援兵到達以後，他一直堅持間接路線的戰略，即使其行動極有限也罷。他不斷進行機動，發起一連串的小戰，用以打擊敵人的士氣。而從敵軍逃亡數位日益增加的情況來看，他這樣作的效果是很明顯的。最後，由於對敵方的重要基地塔普蘇使用了較為寬泛的間接行動法，造成了有利於會戰結局的好形勢。於是，他的部隊疾速地轉入了進攻，甚至沒有依靠上頭的多少指揮就贏得了會戰的勝利。 西元前四十五年的西班牙戰局，是緊接著非洲戰局之後開始的。它是這場內戰的結束階段。這一次，凱撒力求避免有生力量遭受大的犧牲，便不斷地在敵人鼻子底下實施機動，迫使他們處於不利的境地。由於採取這樣的戰術，凱撒又贏得了蒙達會戰的勝利。然而，這次會戰的頑強程度和戰鬥中的巨大傷亡證明，節約兵力的原則和通常的保護兵力是有區別的。 凱撒的間接路線行動，其規模是比較狹窄的，而且缺乏奇襲的意味。他在每一次戰局中，只是使敵人的士氣有所削弱，而未能使其達到崩潰程度。其所以如此，可能是這樣一個原因：凱撒所重視的，主要是震撼敵軍士兵的心理，其次才是其將領的心靈。如果說，凱撒的幾次戰局可以作為一個例證，用來說明兩種間接路線方式的區別，即對付敵人軍隊和對付敵軍指揮之間的區別，那麼還不如說，除此之外，這些戰局更加令人信服地證明了戰略上的直接路線行動和間接路線行動之間的區別。這是因為，每當凱撒採取直接路線的戰略行動時，他總是遭到失敗，而一旦轉而採取間接路線的戰略行動，他就經常取得勝利。