Chapter 9 Chapter 8 The French Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte

Thirty years have passed before the prelude to another great war begins.The genius of Napoleon Bonaparte made this war shine.As in the previous century, France posed a serious threat to the rest of Europe, causing them to unite against her.However, the development of this war is different from the past.Post-revolutionary France had many sympathizers, but they were neither the government authorities of various countries, nor could they control their own armies.When France started the war alone, she was forced to isolate herself from other countries, as if suffering from an epidemic.However, France not only defeated the coalition forces who wanted to put it to death, but also formed a serious military threat to the rest of Europe after the revolution, and eventually became the master who dominated a large part of Europe.Why did France's strength reach such a huge level?The reason should be found in the interior of France at that time, and its favorable conditions and various stimulating factors should be combined and analyzed.

The formation of these conditions and factors is inseparable from the revolutionary spirit of the French national army.Because of this revolutionary spirit, it is impossible for the French army to carry out the formal and conventional drills, but to fully develop individual talents and initiative.Therefore, a new flexible tactic was born.A basic fact of this tactic is the change in marching speed.At that time, the French marched at one hundred and twenty steps per minute, while their enemies insisted on the traditional rule of seventy steps per minute.When the army was not equipped with mechanized means of transport, the main means of movement was two legs, so the difference in marching speed at that time was of great significance to the mobilization of troops and the transfer of army groups.With this condition, the French army, according to Napoleon, can achieve the principle of mass multiplication by speed (the principle of gravity multiplied by speed), and it can be implemented not only in strategic battles, but also when completing tactical tasks.

Another favorable condition is the division of the army into regiments (divisions) with a fixed organization and the ability to act independently.These corps (divisions) are not dependent on each other, but can cooperate with each other to achieve a common goal. Theoretically speaking, this internal reorganization of the French army was proposed by Borset as early as the 1740s, and he also carried out a certain degree of experimentation.In 1759 Marshal de Brogiri was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, thereby officially accepting the theory of reform.However, another revolutionary military thinker, Guibert, in the military reform in 1787, that is, on the eve of the French Revolution, further developed the theory of military reorganization and put it into practice. specific improvements have been made.

The third condition is related to the above factors.Due to the extremely chaotic supply system of the revolutionary army and relatively poor organizational discipline, the French army returned to the old method of feeding on the spot.After the army is organized into divisions, the effect of local feeding on its combat ability is not as serious as before.In the past, to use an army to carry out a campaign, it was necessary to gather the scattered units in advance. Now, under the condition of obtaining food locally, each unit can independently complete its own tasks. Moreover, due to the reduction of the supply burden and the increase of movement speed, the mobility of the French army is also higher.They can move freely in mountains and forests.Just because it was impossible for the French army to obtain supplies of food, fodder, clothing and equipment from their own army warehouses, those soldiers who were suffering from hunger and cold were willing to muster up their courage to attack the enemy's rear in order to directly seize the enemy's supplies.

In addition to these conditions, there is a decisive character factor, that is, there is a Napoleon Bonaparte as their commander in chief.Napoleon's military talent was obtained through the intensive study of war history, and more directly, he was influenced by Borset and Guibert in military theory.These two figures were among the finest and most imaginative military thinkers of the eighteenth century. From Borsett's theory, Napoleon learned a principle of using troops, that is, first deliberately disperse his forces, and lure the enemy to follow suit, and then he suddenly concentrated his forces quickly, and at this time the enemy , but could not gather the scattered forces.In addition, he also correctly realized that a plan with several scenarios is of great significance.He learned how to choose the direction of operations so that his lines of operations could threaten several targets at the same time.Moreover, the basis of Napoleon's battle plan for his first campaign was the plan drawn up by Borsetter half a century earlier, which was in fact only copied.

From Guibert, Napoleon also learned a lot.The first is to fully understand the extreme significance of the rapidity and flexibility of the army's actions, and to see the potential capabilities produced by organizing the army into independent divisions. Guibert had already imagined Napoleon's combat methods.He wrote half an age (ten years) ago: The art of war consists in deploying one's forces skillfully so that they are not in danger of being attacked by the enemy; And when attacking the enemy's flank, don't expose your own flank.These words seem to have been written precisely for Napoleon.Guibert advocated attacking the enemy's rear in order to destabilize the enemy.This is exactly what Napoleon used to do.Napoleon also learned from Guibert the method of concentrated use of mobile artillery to break through enemy lines in decisive directions, opening gaps.Moreover, it was Guibert who carried out military reforms shortly before the French Revolution and determined the organizational system of the army. Later, Napoleon continued to use this system in the war.Finally, and more importantly, Guibert once predicted that in the near future, fundamental reforms must take place in the war, and those who complete this reform will come from a revolutionary country.This prophecy ignited the flame of fantasy and ambition deep in the heart of the young Napoleon.

Napoleon, though he made no significant additions to the ideas he had received, greatly developed and perfected them in practice.The so-called new mobility would have remained a theory were it not for Napoleon's doggedness to put these ideas into practice.Because the theories he studied were in line with his nature, and the environment at that time allowed his talents to develop, he could fully develop the advantages of the new system of using divisions in the army.Napoleon was able to make his important contribution to strategy as a result of the expanded scope of strategy and the wider possibilities of strategic maneuvers.

In 1792, foreign troops invaded France separately for the first time.The astonishment at the crushing defeats of the enemy at Valmy and Gemapei overlooked the less obvious fact that France and its revolution were thereafter in greater danger. .Is it not?It was not until King Louis XVI of France was sentenced to death that Britain, the Netherlands, Austria, Pu, Spain and Sardinia began to organize the first anti-French alliance.At that time, the situation was reversed only by the firm determination of the French and the pouring of all human and material resources.Although the invasion forces on the Union side lacked clarity of purpose and skillful leadership throughout the course of the war, the situation on the French side was still bad and growing.

Only in 1794 did the situation change radically and France began to gain the upper hand.Since then, France has changed from being invaded to being an aggressor.What caused this shift?Of course, although the objectives of the war are unclear and limited, the reason for this is not a good strategy for carrying out surprise attacks, but precisely the result of unconditionally adopting the indirect line of strategy. While the main forces of the two warring parties were engaged in a fruitless bloody battle in the Lille area, Jordan's army, which was far away in the Moselle River area, was ordered to concentrate an assault force on the left bank of the river, and then attack westward through the Ardennes area. , heading towards Liege and Namur.They marched hungry, subsisting on looting supplies along the way, but at last they reached Namur.Jordan judged based on the intelligence he had just arrived and the sound of artillery in the distance that the main wing (left wing) of the French army was fighting fruitlessly on the side of Charleroi.Therefore, he did not follow the original order to besiege the city of Namur, but changed his determination, marched towards Charleroi from the southwest, detoured the enemy's flank, and went out to the enemy's rear.When he arrived, the fortress (Charleroi) surrendered.

Jordan does not seem to have set himself a larger goal, but this maneuver to the enemy's rear, although not a deliberate move like that of Napoleon and other famous generals, had the same result, that is, it worked psychologically .As a result, Coburg, the commander-in-chief of the Anti-French Alliance Army, hurried eastward, collecting and replenishing his troops along the way.Subsequently, Coburg led the army to attack Jordan who was stationed outside Charleroi.This battle at Flelius (fourteen kilometers northeast of Charleroi) is quite famous, and its fighting was also very fierce.The French had an absolute advantage in this battle: not only did the enemy lose their strategic balance, but they also forced the enemy to invest only a part of their troops. After this part of their troops was defeated, the entire anti-French coalition army followed up with a general retreat. .

The French turned into invaders, despite their numerical superiority, failed to achieve any decisive results in the main campaign eastward across the Rhine.In fact, because the enemy took an indirect course, the final result of this campaign was not only frustrated, but defeated.In July 1796, when the Archduke Karl of Austria faced the attack of two superior enemy forces, Jordan and Moreau, he made a decision: to make the two armies of the alliance (that is, himself and Wattens) Ribon) retreated gradually to avoid engaging the enemy.Then, try to gain an opportunity to bring the two armies together, so as to meet one of the two enemy armies with a superior force, or at least an equal force.However, due to the oppression of the French army, Karl had no chance to implement this kind of inside strategy.He had to continue to retreat in order to create more favorable conditions for the assault.But not long after, the French army suddenly changed the direction of advance, which enabled him to carry out a resolute assault.He was able to carry out such an assault, first of all, because of the initiative of a cavalry brigade commander, Raundorf.The brigade commander learned through reconnaissance that the French troops had separated from the front of the Grand Duke, and turned to attack Wattens Liebon with all their strength.Raundorf immediately reported to Archduke Karl, saying: If His Royal Highness can send 12,000 troops to attack Jordan's rear, then he will soon be finished.Although the Grand Duke was not so bold in answering the request of his subordinates, the action he took was very effective in breaking the French attack.Jordan's garrison reached the Rhine late and disorderly, and continued to flee back even after crossing it.Therefore, Morrow, who had already invaded Bavaria, was forced to fail to develop a victory, and had to retreat back. While the main body of the French army suffered repeated defeats on the Rhine, another field, the secondary Italian field, decided the fate of the war.There Napoleon Bonaparte won a great deal of victory by turning from the dangerous position of the situation to the decisive indirect course of action.Two years before, when Napoleon was still serving as a staff officer at the French headquarters in this area, the rudiments of this plan had been hatched in his mind; .This plan was actually compiled based on the 1745 plan, and it was only supplemented and modified based on the experience accumulated later.This just shows that Napoleon's basic military views were deeply influenced by past military experts.When he was studying in a military school, he used to greedily seek all kinds of military knowledge.However, his learning period is very short.At the age of twenty-four, as a captain artillery officer, he was appointed commander of the artillery that besieged Toulon; and at the age of twenty-six, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Italian Army.In the first few years, although he read a lot of books, delved into various archives, and absorbed a lot of ideas, but in the following years, he had little time for careful thinking.Napoleon was a man full of vitality, but lacked deep thinking in comparison.Therefore, he failed to create a coherent philosophy of war.Looking for a theoretical perspective on war from what he wrote essentially yields only compilations borrowed from other historical figures.If military theorists of later generations regard his remarks as dogma, they will sometimes inevitably be misunderstood and led astray, and cannot correctly explain the theory of war. This tendency, and the natural influence of Napoleon's early experience, will be evident from the following examples.Napoleon had a very important principle, which is often quoted by people, that is: the principle of war is the same as that of siege, firepower must be concentrated on a point (on a field), and a large area must be opened. The gap, once the enemy's stability is destroyed, the next task is to completely defeat him.Later military theorists mostly focused on the first half of this sentence, especially emphasizing the concentration of firepower on one point, while ignoring the significance of destroying the stability of the enemy.In practice, concentrating firepower on one point obviously does not produce definite results, whereas destabilizing the enemy may produce psychologically realistic results and ensure the complete defeat of the enemy.As long as we carefully analyze the various strategic campaigns that Napoleon conducted, we can see what he was most concerned about in the campaign. Braille, in particular, is a source of confusion and controversy.Some people believe that Napoleon's true intention was to launch a concentrated assault on the enemy's strongest point, and that only in this way can decisive results be achieved.Because once the resistance of the enemy's main group is destroyed, its entire defense will also collapse.This view does not take into account the cost factor.In fact, the victor is likely to exhaust his strength in the attack, so that he is completely unable to expand the results later.And by this time, even though the enemy has been greatly weakened, he still resists, and his resistance may appear greater than at the beginning.Another school held that it was better to adhere to the principle of economy of forces, that in the initial stages of the battle only a limited expenditure of forces should be made, and that the point of attack should therefore be chosen at the weakest point of the enemy.However, if this point is a very obvious weakest point, then, if it is not far from the enemy's nerve center or main artery, it is likely to be a deliberate trap set by the enemy.If it is the former, it is not worth attacking; if it is the latter, it cannot be attacked. Here, we can also find an explanation for Napoleon's adherence to the second principle from the Italian campaign he actually conducted.This battle clearly shows that what Napoleon really meant was not a point but a knot.At this stage of his career (the Italian campaign) he had been obliged to observe the principle of economy of force, in order not to waste his limited forces uselessly, and never to attack the strong positions of the enemy.Generally speaking, this knot (or joint) is of great significance because it is the weakest link. There is another well-known and often quoted passage of Napoleon's justification for his reckless and rash concentration of forces against the main body of the enemy.He said: Britain is our most powerful enemy. As long as Austria is defeated, Spain and Italy will collapse on their own.We must not disperse our assault forces, but use them centrally.But it is clear from the memorandum, which includes this passage, that Napoleon's real opinion at that time was precisely against a direct attack on Austria, and in favor of deploying his forces on the Piedmontese frontier, that is, by an indirect route. Against Austria.According to Napoleon, northern Italy was just a corridor leading to Austria.It was on this secondary battlefield that Napoleon, following the principles laid down by Borsetter, first defeated Austria's weaker partner, Piedmont, and then attacked the old opponent, Austria itself.In carrying out this plan he took the indirect route, and employed it with considerable skill.After the first few victories, he hastily reported to the government authorities, saying: I hope to reach the Tyrol within a month, join forces with the Army of the Rhine, and enter Bavaria together.However, the development of the situation broke his dream.But then again, because the original plan failed to materialize, it gave him a good chance of real success later on.He drew out the great Austrian army, and attacked him one after another in Italy, enabling him to defeat them one by one, so that after a year he was able to attack Austria directly. When Napoleon officially took over command of the Army of Italy in March 1796 AD, his army was spreading along the coast of Genoa.At the same time, the combined Austrian and Piedmontese forces on the enemy's side held the mountain defiles leading to the Po plain.Napoleon's plan was to cross the mountains in two directions, to launch a concentric assault on the fortress of Chiva (seventy kilometers west of Genoa), and after capturing this gate into Piedmont, he threatened to attack Turin, forcing The Piedmontese government negotiated peace alone.He counted on the continued wintering of the Austrian troops in winter barracks.Of course, they may also walk out of the winter camp in order to join up with their allies and take joint action.But Napoleon believed that he only needed to take a feint attack in the direction of Akkui, which was enough to draw the Austrian forces to the northeast. In fact, although Napoleon gained an initial advantage and was able to separate the two enemy armies, this was not the result of the original plan, but only a chance.This favorable opportunity was due to the Austrian attack.They moved forward in an attempt to threaten Napoleon's right flank and prevent the French from advancing on Genoa.Napoleon met this threat by surprise, attacking the junction of the Austrian offensive.Although it took two assaults before the Austrians conceded defeat, they were eventually forced back to Akkoy. At that time, the main force of the French army was not used to attack Cheva.On the 16th of April (some say the 13th), Napoleon tried unsuccessfully to capture the fortress by direct attack.So he changed his plan, prepared to make a roundabout maneuver on April 18, and changed his line of communication to make it farther away from the enemy to avoid possible Austrian attacks.When this new offensive did not start as planned, the Piedmontese army voluntarily withdrew from the Cheva Fortress.In the pursuit, Napoleon suffered yet another disastrous defeat, for he had attempted to charge the Piedmontese defensive positions from the front.However, due to the adoption of a new maneuver, that is, the simultaneous encirclement of both flanks of the Piedmontese army, the Piedmontese army retreated again and retreated to the plains. The Piedmontese government believed that the threat facing Turin was extremely serious as the French army was getting closer, and the Austrian army had to take a detour to advance, so the rescue they expected would come very late.The psychological effect of this fact undermined the stability of the Piedmontese government, which compelled them to demand a truce and negotiate peace.For Napoleon, it was no longer necessary to fight to destroy them.So Piedmont withdrew from the war.No other campaign by any commander has shown so convincingly the importance of the element of time as this one by Napoleon.If the Piedmontese persisted, even for a few days, Napoleon would probably have to retreat to the coast near Genoa because of supply difficulties.In Napoleon's later remarks, it is clear that the fact of Piedmont's surrender had a profound effect on him, making him realize the importance of time.He said: In the future, I may lose a battle, but I will never lose another minute. Napoleon now possessed a numerical superiority over the Austrians (35,000 men to 25,000), but he was still too cautious to engage in a direct attack.On the second day after signing the armistice with Piedmont, he proposed the operational goal of capturing Milan by taking a roundabout maneuver and entering Milan's rear via Tortona and Piacenza.He first used tricks to deceive the Austrians into concentrating their forces in the Valencia area.Then he advanced east along the southern bank of the Po, bypassing all lines of Austrian resistance, and captured Piacenza. In order to ensure his own advantage, Napoleon did not hesitate to destroy the neutral rights of the Grand Duchy of Balma.He invaded Piacenza, located in the principality, in the hope of obtaining means of crossing there (boats and ferries).However, this violation of the right of neutrality also brought an unexpected side effect to the French.When Napoleon moved northwards to advance to the rear of the Austrian army, the Austrians followed the example of the French army and retreated through the territory of neutral countries through the Veneto region.In this way, like Napoleon, they disrespected the moral rules of war and saved themselves.Napoleon had tried to use the Adda (a tributary of the Po) to cut off the Austrian retreat, but before they could get there, the Austrians were far away from the French troops chasing them and retreated to Mantua. And guarding this famous quadrilateral fortress. Napoleon's desire to enter Austria within a month became a distant phantom because of the stubborn resistance of the Austrian army.Worried about the failure of the French army and the serious danger of resource depletion, the French government ordered Napoleon to march south, pointing directly at Livorno, and withdrawing from four neutral countries along the way. According to the literal interpretation at the time, that is To plunder all their resources.As a result, Italy suffered unprecedented catastrophe, and it was completely swallowed up, so that it has never been able to recover to the former prosperity. However, from a military point of view, the restrictions imposed by the French government on Napoleon's freedom of movement turned out to be a blessing in disguise.Napoleon had to postpone his dream of invading Austria because of restrictions.Under the resistance of the enemy, he can instead adjust his purpose according to the existing tools in his hand.Until the balance of power on both sides became favorable to him, his original purpose of conquering Austria also had a realistic basis for attainment.Here, it seems appropriate to quote a passage from the great Italian historian Ferrillo.He once made the following judgment in the book: For almost a century, Italy's first campaign has been portrayed as the triumph of the offensive.According to this version, Napoleon is believed to have taken the offensive continuously, and how resolute and resolute he attacked, combined with his good luck in the war, enabled him to conquer Italy with ease.But if we make an objective study of the history of this battle, we can at once see that both sides were on the offensive, or that they took turns in attacking and defending, and that in most cases they were The attacker was defeated. Mantua once became a sweet bait, continuously attracting Austrian reinforcements, keeping them away from their bases, and unconsciously falling into the trap of the French.This is not so much an accident as an attempt by Napoleon.And it is worth noting that Napoleon did not follow the traditional practice of the time, instead of finding a sheltered position, not digging trenches in front of the castle, but spreading out his troops and operating in small groups.Thus he could concentrate his forces in any direction without difficulty. In the first attempt by the Austrians to rescue Mantua, Napoleon's reluctance to abandon the siege of the fortress nearly failed his methods.Later Napoleon freed himself from this restraint and gave up the siege of Mantua, thereby gaining the freedom to maneuver and using the mobility of his army to defeat the Austrians at Castiglione. Afterwards, Napoleon followed the orders of the French government and expected to march north through the Tyrolean mountains to join forces with the main force of the French army, the Rhine Army, for coordinated operations.The Austrians made use of this direct advance of the French.At first they withdrew their main force eastward via Valsugara, descended into the plain of Veneto, and from there turned their troops westward to the relief of Mantua.However, Napoleon had his own way.Instead of continuing northward, or retreating back to blockade Mantua, he crossed the mountains, closely following the tail of the Austrian column.In this way, he turns the enemy's maneuver into his own counter-maneuver, annihilates the enemy's maneuver and gives his own counter-maneuver a firmer purpose.In the area of ​​Bassano, he surrounded and routed the second echelon of the Austrian army.And when it entered the Veneto Plain, the French army caught up with the first echelon of the Austrian army.Napoleon thus cut off the Austrian army's road to Trieste, and thus to their retreat back to Austria.However, Napoleon did not stop the Austrian army from retreating towards Mantua.In this way, the Austrian troops automatically fell into the trap that Napoleon had set for them in Mantua. Since a large number of Austrian troops were cut off in the Mantua fortress, Austria was forced to take a new adventure.This time, but not the last, Napoleon, by acting tactically on the direct line, brought his indirect line to the brink of failure.At that time, the Austrian army, led by Alvinzi and Davidovich respectively, took a centripetal direction and attacked Verona.Verona was the key to Mantua's defense.Napoleon, therefore, was the first to attack the stronger of the two enemy armies, that of Alvinzi.As a result, a major defeat was suffered at Cardello (forty kilometers north of Trento).After Napoleon's defeat, he did not retreat immediately, but boldly chose a far-reaching route, made a large detour around the south of Alvinzi, and turned to the enemy's rear.At this time, the situation of the French army was very serious, as can be seen from Napoleon's report to the French government.He wrote: The weakness and weariness of our army makes me fear the worst that may happen.Maybe we'll lose Italy.On the road of the French army, there were many obstacles in dry marshes and rivers, which added to the adventurous nature of Napoleon's maneuver.However, Napoleon used such a maneuver to smash the enemy's plan to encircle him in the Verona area.When Alvinzi rushed to meet the French army, Davidovich did not act on the spot.Even so, Napoleon felt it was risky to launch a campaign against Alvinzi against this numerically superior enemy.He fought at last in the area of ​​Arcola, but this battle proved inconclusive, so he turned to tactical maneuvers.Generally speaking, he rarely takes this move.At that time, he sent some trumpeters to sneak into the rear of the Austrian army and blow the charge horn there. After hearing the sound of the horn, the Austrian army was at a loss for a moment, so they retreated and fled. Two months later, in January 1797, the Austrians made a fourth and final attempt to liberate the fortress of Mantua.This time, however, the Austrians were again defeated at the Battle of Liveri.The victory of the French army this time was the result of Napoleon's effective organization and use of separate and independent forces for coordinated operations.The combat activities of these independent troops seem to be a fishing net that has been cast, and some stones are dotted around the edge of the net.Any column of the enemy that touches this net will immediately be drawn in, because all sides of the net will immediately roll away at the point of pressure, and the surrounding stones will also throw at the captured enemy at the same time. Armies are organized in such a way that, once in contact with the enemy, they can be coordinated to carry out an attack.This practice is the result of Napoleon's development of a new teacher system.According to this system, each legion (army) is organized into several independently active corps (divisions).According to the provisions of the old system, a legion (or army) is active as a whole. Only sometimes, in order to carry out individual tasks, several detachments can be temporarily sent out. Napoleon used it in the Italian campaign. The formation method was more perfected in his subsequent wars. He widely adopted the form of battalion and square formation, and replaced divisions with troops. At Liveri, though the open net was an instrument of crushing the Austrian flank, it is more remarkable that the means of crushing the Austrian main body was a daring maneuver by Napoleon.Napoleon sent a regiment of 2,000 men across Lake Garda by ship, with the task of cutting off the retreat of the entire Austrian army.It was with the threatened retreat that the main body of the Austrian army began to crumble.After the failure of the Battle of Livri, the Austrian defenders in the Mantua fortress had to surrender.The Austrians wanted to guard the first gate far away from their own country, but they consumed a lot of troops. Now, seeing the French army quickly attacking the inner gate that has no defense force, they have no choice.This threat forced Austria to conclude an unseemly peace.At this time, the main force of the French army was still hovering on the Rhine River, and failed to cross the thunder pool. In the autumn of 1798, Russia, Austria, Britain, Turkey, Portugal, the Kingdom of Naples, and the Papacy formed the Second Anti-French Coalition, with the aim of releasing the shackles of the French peace treaty.At that time, Napoleon Bonaparte was far away in Egypt. When he returned home, the situation in France was already extremely serious.The French army was greatly weakened, the people were poor, and the treasury was empty. After Napoleon returned from Egypt, he first overthrew the French Directory, established a Consulate, and made himself the first Consul.Then, he issued an order to form a reserve army in Dijon, incorporating all the local troops that could be collected.However, he did not use this army to strengthen the troops in the main theater, nor did he use it to strengthen the main army in the Rhine area.He himself formulated an extremely bold maneuvering plan, and personally led the army to complete a jumping rapid march along a huge arc line, and went out to the rear of the Austrian army in Italy.The Austrians had driven the weak Italian Army almost back to the frontiers of France, and pinned it to the north-west corner of Italy.Napoleon originally intended to pass through Switzerland, pass through the Lucerne or Zurich area, and from there go south, cross the St. Godard Pass, or even enter Italy further east through the Tyrolean mountains.However, when he learned that the Italian Army was in extreme danger, he changed his mind and chose the shorter route through the Great St. Bernard Pass.Thus, during the last week of May, 1800, Napoleon led his corps over the Alps and out to Biella, but he was already on the right side of the Austrians. At that time, the French general Massena was besieged by the Austrian army in Genoa.Napoleon did not go southeast to rescue Massena, but only sent some of his troops to the south, advancing to Cherasco, while under the cover of this tempting maneuver, he led the main force eastward, heading straight for Milan.In this way, Napoleon did not go head-on to attack the enemy defending the area west of Alexandria, but was firmly nailed to the rear of the Austrian army.一條明顯的屏障，或者說是一條戰略性的壁壘。當初，拿破崙打算採取最危險的機動行動，要前出到敵人的後方，其目的就是想要造成這樣一條壁壘。因為有了這樣一條由天然障礙物加固起來的陣地線（防區線），他就使自己的基地得到了可靠的掩護，而有了這種基地作依靠，便可以使敵人落入圈套，置之於死地。當敵人發覺自己的退路和補給線被切斷的時候，他們必然是下意識地往回走，向後逃，而且往往是小股逃竄，潰不成軍，因而這時收拾他們便很容易。拿破崙這個設置戰略性壁壘的觀念，是他對於間接路線戰略的重大貢獻。 拿破崙進到米蘭，切斷了奧軍兩條後退道路之中的一條。以後，他就沿著波河南岸進發，前出到斯特拉德納隘路，這樣又切斷了奧軍的第二條後退道路。可是，到了這個時候，拿破崙手中掌握的工具，已在頗大程度上不能適應他的企圖了。因為總共只有三萬四千人，而根據他的命令從萊茵軍團撥出的一個軍（一萬五千人）的補充兵力，要經過聖哥達爾德隘路才能開來，但由於莫羅的過錯，這支兵力遲遲未能趕到。為此，拿破崙深深感到不安。他的那條戰略性防線，本來只有少量的兵力進行扼守，而現在卻必須予以加強了。所幸的是，熱那亞在這個時候宣佈投降了，因而已不必分兵去救援馬森納。但是卻也喪失了一個拖住敵人的工具。 這時，拿破崙摸不準奧軍究竟會選擇哪一條退卻路線，尤其害怕奧軍向熱那亞撤退，因為在那裡他們可以得到英國海軍艦隊的支援和補給，所以，他只好放棄已經獲得的戰略優勢。他對於當面敵人的積極主動性，估計得比他們實際上所有的要高些，因此，他放棄了設在斯特拉德納隘路地區那道防線，決定向西折回，以來偵察敵人的行動。而在此同時，派出了一個師的兵力，由德賽率領，去切斷亞歷山大里亞到熱那亞之間的道路。這樣一來，拿破崙就使自己陷入了不利的態勢。當奧軍突然地從亞歷山大里亞開出，並在馬倫哥平原與法軍發生遭遇戰時（一八○○年六月十四日），拿破崙手中只有自己的一部分兵力。這次戰役拖延了比較長的時間沒有解決，甚至在德賽率領那個師趕來投入戰鬥之後，奧軍也僅僅是被壓退了一點，並沒有被擊毀。後來，拿破崙的戰略地位有所改善，但他還是同精神沮喪的奧軍指揮官簽訂了一個協定，允許他們把自己的軍隊撤出倫巴第，退到明喬河後面。 在明喬河彼岸地區，軍事行動雖然還在斷斷續續地進行，但只是一些零星的衝突和相互的對射罷了。馬倫哥會戰的結局，給敵人精神上帶來了嚴重的影響，因而導致了雙方的和平談判，半年以後，終於簽訂了和約，結束了第二次反法聯盟的戰爭。 法國革命戰爭作為一個時期結束以後，只經過了幾年勉勉強強的和平，戰爭的幕布又被重新拉開，新的戰爭戲劇又開始上演。這就是拿破崙的戰爭。一八○五年，拿破侖手裡已擁有一支二十萬人的大軍，把它集結在布倫港，準備渡海進攻英國。後來，這支大軍卻突然地進行強行軍，全部調到了萊茵河地區。關於這個情況，至今還是一個疑案：拿被侖真正是想直接進攻英國呢？還是想以這個威脅作為一團迷霧，把它作為突然進攻奧地利的第一個步驟呢？也有可能，他是遵循著包爾色特的原則，使一個計畫同時具有幾種方案。拿破崙在決定向東方調兵時，曾經估計奧軍還可能像往常那樣，派遣一支軍隊進入巴伐利亞，以便封鎖施瓦本汝拉山的各個通道。根據這種估計，他的計畫就是遠遠繞過敵人的北翼，跨過多瑙河，甚至走得更遠，抵達累赫河，並以該河構成一條設在敵軍後方的戰略性壁壘。實際上，這是重複過去在斯特拉德納隘路地區所採取過的那種機動方式，只是規模擴大而已。拿破侖本人在下達給部隊的命令中，曾經強調說明了這一點。當時，由於擁有優勢兵力，拿破崙在組織這條壁壘時，只是使用了快速部隊，因而使它變成了一道活動的障礙物。這樣，拿破崙進到奧軍的後方以後，所造成的戰略性壁壘就成了綿密不斷的障礙，阻塞了奧軍的一切退路，因而迫使駐烏爾姆的奧軍幾乎沒有進行流血戰鬥就投降了。 拿破崙解決了這支比較薄弱的敵軍以後，便著手去對付由庫圖佐夫統率的俄軍。當時，庫圖佐夫已經穿過奧地利，沿途彙集了一些小型的奧軍支隊，剛剛進駐到因河岸邊。另外還有一個比較小的威脅，那就是一支奧國軍隊正在由義大利和提羅爾地區撤回本國。現在，由於兵力過大，使拿破崙反而感到很不方便。這種情況還是第一次，但卻不是最後一次。因為擁有這樣大的兵力，在多瑙河和西南方山地之間的空間，就顯得實在太狹窄，使拿破崙很難對敵人採取局部性的間接路線，同時時間也不夠，更無法採取烏爾姆式的大迂迴行動。而且，當俄軍停駐在因河之上時，他們正佔據著一條天然的防線，可以構成一個掩護奧地利本土的防盾。在這個防盾的掩護之下，其他的奧軍便可從南部經由卡林西亞調回來，與俄軍會師，組成一條可以頑強地抗擊拿破崙進攻的抵抗線。 面對這個問題，拿破崙使用了一整套高明的間接路線方法。他的第一個目的，是要儘量把俄軍逐回東方，距離愈遠愈好，這樣才能把他們同來自義大利的奧軍隔截開來，而後者正從那裡開回來了。為此，拿破崙自己率領部隊向正東方向前進，去迎擊庫圖佐夫，同時派出莫蒂埃率領一個軍沿著多瑙河北岸開進。這個威脅到庫圖佐夫和俄國本土之間交通線的行動，是足以迫使俄軍向東北方向，即向多瑙河上的克雷姆斯作斜方向撤退的。這時，拿破崙又派出了繆拉，命令他去突破庫圖佐夫的新防線正面，搶佔維也納城。以後，繆拉應該從維也納出發，繼續向北挺進，攻占霍拉布倫。這樣，在開始威脅到俄軍的右翼以後，拿破崙本人即從左翼去威脅他們的後方。 由於繆拉犯了一個錯誤，他同俄國人簽訂了一項臨時的停戰協定，使拿破崙沒有能夠把俄軍切斷。但是，俄軍卻也被迫匆匆忙忙地繼續向東北撤退，遠遠地退到了離自己國界不遠的阿羅木次城。現在，他們同奧國的援軍已經相距很遠了，但是卻靠近了自己本國的援軍。實際上，俄軍在阿羅木次就接受了一大批的增援部隊。如果繼續壓迫他們向後退，那就是促使俄軍繼續增大自己的兵力。此外，時機也已迫不及待，因為普魯士的參戰已是指日可待了。 在這種形勢下，拿破崙只好採取心理上的間接路線：他有意顯示自己的弱兵，誘使俄軍轉而採取攻勢。在布魯恩地區，面對著八萬人的敵軍，他只集中起五萬人的兵力，並且派出幾個孤立的支隊朝著阿羅木次方向開進。為了加強這個示弱的姿態，他還向俄奧兩國皇帝放出了和平的鴿子。當敵人吞下這個香餌以後，拿破崙即把自己的部隊撤退到奧斯特里茨的陣地上，那裡的地形條件非常適於他作設置陷阱之用。在緊接著發生的會戰中，拿破崙使用了一個他極為罕用的戰術性間接路線方法，以來補償他在戰場上的劣勢兵力。這種情況對他來說也是很稀少的。他誘使敵人衝擊後退的法軍，從而迫使他們向左側伸展，趁此機會，他自己卻在中央地區調整部署，向著敵人脆弱的接合部施行猛擊。結果，他在這次會戰中取得了具有決定意義的勝利，僅僅在二十四個時之內，奧國皇帝即向他提出了求和的要求。 幾個月以後，拿破崙開始了對普魯士的戰爭。這一次，他差不多擁有二對一的兵力優勢，無論從數量上來說，還是從品質上來說，他的軍隊都是第一流的，而普方的軍隊，則不論從訓練來看，還是從作戰觀念來看，都是既落後又陳腐的。拿破侖佔有的這種絕對優勢，對於他的戰略無疑有著很明顯的影響，對他以後的各次戰役打上了深刻的烙印。一八○六年，拿破崙再次利用了突然性這個因素，並且取得了成功。為了達到這個目的，他首先把自己的部隊分段駐紮在多瑙河的附近，而後在圖林根森林的天然掩護之下，秘密地把部隊集中起來向北挺進。接著，他的部隊在森林掩蔽的山地裡，突然地躍進到了開闊的平坦地上，並以營方陣的隊形直接衝進了普魯士的心臟地區。這樣，拿破崙就前進到了普軍的後方。這個結局與其說是偶然的，不如說是預先考慮到的。拿破崙完成這個迂迴機動以後，就在耶拿擊碎了普軍。看來，這一次主要是依靠了兵力數量上的優勢，其次才是由於技巧地配置兵力而造成的精神因素，儘管這個因素也產生了重大的作用。 接著在波蘭和東普魯士進行對俄戰役時，拿破崙似乎只是關心一個目的，就是如何吸引俄軍接受會戰。他這時已具有堅強的信心，認為不管怎樣，他的戰爭機器都一定可以壓倒俄軍。他雖然繼續採取向敵人後方迂迴的行動，其目的只是為了更加易於取得戰爭的勝利，因此，主要是把這種機動作為抓住俄軍的手段，而不是把它作為打擊敵人士氣的工具。因此，從這裡所看到的間接路線，似乎只是具有物質上的作用，而不具備精神上的價值，並不能使敵人在心理方面喪失平衡。 拿破崙後來在普爾圖斯克（華沙以北五十公里）地區採取的機動，是要引誘俄軍的進攻。他指望，法軍從波蘭向北突進，即可切斷俄軍和其本國之間的交通線。可是，俄國人這一次擺脫了他的箝制。一八○七年一月，俄軍又自動地向西運動，指望同困守在但澤（現為格但斯克）的普軍殘部會師。拿破崙馬上抓住了這個有利機會。他還是想要切斷俄軍同它本國之間的交通線。但由於一個偶然的機會，他的命令落到了哥薩克手中，於是，俄軍又及時撤退了。接著，拿破崙直接追上了俄軍，並在艾勞地區與俄軍進行了接觸。他曾力圖利用戰術機動前出到俄軍的後方，而在完成這個機動的時候，遇到了大風雪的阻滯，結果，俄軍雖然遭受了損失，但是並沒有潰敗。 四個月以後，雙方都恢復了元氣。俄軍突然南下，向海爾斯貝格（科尼希斯貝格以南七十公里）進攻，拿破崙於是立即調動兵力向南進發，用以切斷俄軍與其最近一個基地，即科尼希斯貝格之間的交通。這一次，拿破崙顯然是很想進行會戰的。當其在側翼活動的騎兵報告俄軍在弗里德蘭（柏林東南七十公里）佔領了堅固的防禦陣地時，他立即率領自己的軍隊奔向那裡。在這次會戰中，拿破崙取得了戰術上的勝利，但不是由於利用突然性和快速性，而是由於採取了一種新的炮兵戰術，即把大量的炮兵集中使用在主要的方向上。以後，這種大量集中使用炮兵的方法，就成了他的戰術的基礎。儘管如此，不管在弗里德蘭，還是在以後的許多戰鬥中，這種方法雖然保證他取得了勝利，但是仍然無法減少法軍部隊的大量傷亡。 非常有趣的一點是，一八○七年至一八一四年的戰爭，也和一九一四年至一九一八年的戰爭一樣，無限制地浪費著人力。更為奇特的是，在這兩個時期的戰爭中，大量的人力都是犧牲在炮火之下。其所以如此，可能是因為雙方對於人力和資源的消耗都沒有什麼限制，以致過度地使用和浪費。這與節約兵力的原則是直接相矛盾的。要想達到節約兵力的目的，就必然利用突然性和快速性。從拿破崙的策略和手段中，可以看到好多的結果，足以證明這個原則的正確性。 拿破崙利用了他在弗里德蘭的勝利，加強了自己對俄國沙皇的影響，迫使沙皇脫離其同盟者，破壞了第四次反法聯盟，可是，由於過分地濫用了自己的實力，拿破侖不僅使自己已經取得的勝利不能鞏固，而且最終使自己的帝國也遭到覆滅。他對於普魯士的嚴厲要求，使他與普魯士之間的和約無法穩定和持久，他對於英國的政策，就是一心想著徹底滅亡對方。他的侵略行徑，又使得西班牙和葡萄牙奮起抵抗，變成他的敵人。所有這些，就是拿破崙在大戰略方面的基本錯誤。 在這裡，需要順便指出約翰‧摩爾在比利牛斯半島上所採取的間接路線。他對於布林戈斯的頻繁短促突擊相對於法軍交通線的干擾破壞，打亂了拿破崙對西班牙的作戰計畫，保障西班牙人民獲得了積聚力量的時間和空間。後來，比利牛斯半島終於變成了拿破崙帝國身上一個化膿發炎的瘡口。拿破崙的軍隊在西班牙首次遭到失敗，產生了很大的精神影響，具有決定性的意義。而在此以前，人們曾認為拿破侖的軍隊是不可戰勝的。 拿破崙本人已沒有機會來恢復在西班牙喪失的名譽，因為在普魯士出現了暴亂的威脅，而奧地利也顯示了重新進犯的端倪，於是他只好趕回法國。結果，奧國人果然捲土重來了。在一八○九年的戰役中，拿破崙又曾試圖向蘭德夏特（慕尼克東北六十公里）和維也納地區採取迂迴敵後的機動，可是，在實施機動過程中他遭到了困難。由於急不可待，他便轉而採取了直接路線的行動，急於進行會戰。結果，他在阿斯佩恩和埃斯林戰役中遭到了他有生以來的第一次大慘敗。雖然六個星期之後他在同一地區的瓦格拉姆（維也納西北二十公里）實行了報復，可勝利的代價實在太高，而且所爭得的和平也很不穩定。 比利牛斯半島上的戰爭 此後兩年，拿破崙獲得了一個喘息的時間。他曾經利用這個機會來割治西班牙的潰瘍。可是，在初期，由於英將摩爾的干預，拿破崙未能在病痛剛起之時制止傷勢的發展，而現在，在以後這幾年，威靈頓卻破壞了拿破崙的各種醫傷措施，因而使其瘡口更加擴大，並使毒菌蔓延到整個拿破崙帝國的身上。法軍固然累次地擊敗了，並且繼續擊敗著西班牙的任何一支正規軍，可是，西班牙人卻從這些失敗中總結了有益的教訓，他們懂得了把自己的主要力量用來開展遊擊戰爭。一個捉摸不定的遊擊支隊活動網，代替了那些不夠靈活，因而也較容易被捕捉的正規軍。一些非正統出身而經驗豐富的遊擊隊領袖，指揮著遊擊隊的戰鬥活動，從而取代了那些出身高貴卻能力有限的西班牙將軍。 對於西班牙來說，因而也是對於英國來說，一場最大的不幸，就是西班牙政府曾經企圖組建新的正規軍，以用來獲取暫時性的勝利。可喜的是，這些正規部隊很快又被法軍打散了。於是，西班牙境內的法軍重新陷於遊擊隊的打擊之下。這樣，毒菌又蔓延開來，而不是集中在一個地點。在這場奇特的戰爭中，英國人最大的作用就是給拿破崙的戰鬥行動製造困難，並擴大這種困難的根源。使用如此少量的兵力而使對方受到這樣大的牽制，這在英國歷史上是一個稀有的成就。它在西班牙戰爭中所取得的成就，如果通過一些雖然不大但實際上卻有矛盾的結果來看，就更加清楚了。這就是：一方面，英軍曾經直接地與他們的大陸同盟軍比肩作戰；另一方面，英國又派出了好幾支遠征軍，遠涉重洋去進攻敵人的殖民地，其距離非常遙遠，其目的是想在心理上給敵人以某些影響。但是這些遠征的結果，與西班牙戰爭所產生的效力比較起來，對敵人所起的作用是很微小的，不過，站在英國國家政策的立場上來看，這些遠征對於促使英國的繁榮富強是有價值的。由於這些遠征，英帝國取得了不少的殖民地：如好望角，茅利塔尼亞，錫南（現為斯里蘭卡），英屬圭亞那，以及西印度群島中的若干個島嶼。 一般歷史學家的傳統觀念，都是過於重視各次會戰的結果，因此，英國人在西班牙所採取的間接路線在其大戰略結構中的真正效果，並沒有獲得應有的評價。如果把比利牛斯半島的戰爭史，只看成是威靈頓進行戰鬥和圍攻的編年史，那麼其結果將是毫無意義的。英國史學家約翰‧弗爾特斯丘對於這種趨勢和誤解，曾經作過很多的矯正。他的主要著作是《英國陸軍史》，儘管他在這本書中所研究的問題也是有限的，但是，當他的研究愈是深入以後，他就愈加堅信，西班牙遊擊隊的行動對於這次戰爭的結局，是具有決定性影響的。 雖然英國遠征軍的存在對於產生這種影響是一個必要的條件，但是，威靈頓在那裡採取直接軍事行動所起的作用，卻是微不足道的。在延續五年的戰爭中，一直到法軍被逐出西班牙之日為止，威靈頓使法軍直接遭到的損失，包括擊斃、擊傷和俘虜在內，總共不過四萬五千人。而根據瑪律波特的估算，在這整個時期之內，法軍因傷病致死的人數，平均每天就有約一百人。由此可見，使法國的兵力逐漸消耗殆盡的，使他們的士氣日益低落下去的，是遊擊隊的活動，當然也包括威靈頓的活動在內。他們把西班牙變成了人造的沙漠，使法國人無法再停留下去，否則只有全部餓死。 另外一個值得特別重視的現象，就是在這樣長時期的一連串戰役中，威靈頓進行會戰的次數竟是少得可憐。這究竟是因為什麼呢？傳記家們通常認為，這是因為他對於實際具有健康的思想，而且這是他的個性和觀點的基礎。這樣解釋行得通嗎？現代的一位傳記作家說過：直接的和狹隘的現實主義是威靈頓個性的本質。這正是他產生缺點和招致失敗的原因。但是，就其社會事業的廣闊境界來說，這一點又使他上升到了幾乎接近於天才的地步。這位傳記作家的結論，是研究了威靈頓在比利牛斯半島的戰略以後作出來的。 這次由英軍主力分出的部分兵力所進行的遠征，雖然產生了如此重大的後果，可是在最初的時候，它卻只是英軍主力在謝爾德河地區勞而無功之後，所不得已而採取的一個下策。英國政府派出這支遠征軍，當時的目的只想拯救葡萄牙。並不曾設想什麼更高深的大戰略運用，沒有估量到竟有這樣大的潛力，以致使西班牙潰瘍一發不可收拾。對於這次遠征，威靈頓公爵曾經發表過他的見解：如果葡萄牙的軍隊和民團能夠得到二萬英軍的加強，那麼，法國人要想征服葡萄牙，就必須有十萬人的軍隊；而如果西班牙繼續與法國人進行鬥爭，那麼，法國是抽不出十萬兵力來對付葡萄牙的。換句話說，那就是只要用二萬英軍，即足以牽制十萬法軍，而且至少可以使其部分兵力無法投到奧國方面那個主要戰場上去。 從對奧國進行間接援助的觀點來看，這支遠征軍沒有辜負人們對它的期望。可是，要它充當掩護葡萄牙的一個屏障，卻是遠遠不夠的。作為一種手段，它大大消耗了拿破崙的兵力，給英國爭來了許多利益，因此，它的成績是很傑出的。 威靈頓只領了一支二萬六千人的軍隊，於一八○九年四月到達里斯本。當時，一方面，西班牙各地都爆發了反抗的怒火；另一方面，約翰‧摩爾在向布林戈斯發起一陣進攻之後，又向拉科魯尼阿地區實行撤退，因而引得法軍在整個比利牛斯半島四出活動。奈伊在半島的西北角上，企圖征服加利西亞，但是久攻不下。在奈伊的南面，即葡萄牙北面的波爾圖地區，是蘇爾特的部隊。他也把一支大軍分成為若干支隊在活動。維克多則在梅里達地區，從南面封鎖著通往葡萄牙的道路。 威靈頓登陸以後，利用了登陸地點正處於中央位置這個有利條件，考慮到敵人的兵力業已分散，於是立即向北開進，去進攻蘇爾特。儘管他未能按照預定的設想，把蘇爾特撒在南面的若干個支隊割裂開來，可是仍然使蘇爾特本人產生了驚慌失措情緒。趁蘇爾特來不及收攏部隊之前，威靈頓即破壞了他的作戰部署，在杜羅河的上游渡過了該河，從而切斷了蘇爾特的退路。如同杜倫尼在一六七五年所作的那樣，威靈頓接著就對敵人的殘部進行掃蕩，使其無法進行集結。結果，蘇爾特被迫經過不毛之地，爬山越嶺，向加利西亞實行退卻，其部隊最後遭到了慘重的損失，但不是由於對敵戰鬥，而是因為退卻行軍的過度疲勞和消耗。 然而，威靈頓的第二次戰役，卻進行得不如第一次那樣順利，而且從其目的與手段的配合來看，也不那麼明顯。原來停在梅里達無所作為的維克多，在蘇爾特失蹤之後，隨即被調往塔拉韋臘，以便掩護直通馬德里的道路。一個月以後，威靈頓決定經由塔拉韋臘這條道路向馬德里進攻。馬德里是西班牙的心臟，這就等於直接去鑽獅子口。他選擇這一條進攻路線，恰好給法軍提供了一個方便目標，使西班牙境內的各路法軍都便於向他實施進攻。而且，把自己的部隊這樣集中起來對付一個目標，法軍就能有效地保障自己的交通線。當各路大軍分散在整個西班牙境內的時候，交通線的保障曾是他們最大的弱點。 威靈頓開始進攻的時候，只有二萬三千人，預期對他進行支援的兵力，大概也是這麼多，而且其統率者庫斯塔是一位才能有限的西班牙將領。這時，維克多繼續朝馬德里方面撤退，在那裡有另外兩支法軍可以對他進行支援。法軍的兵力集中以後，大約能有十萬人。誠如弗爾特斯丘指出的那樣，這只是偶然的結果，並非事先有何計畫。當時，奈伊、蘇爾特和莫蒂埃的部隊，都從北面向馬德里開來。由於庫斯塔的優柔寡斷，加上自己部隊的補給發生困難，威靈頓未能拖住維克多進行戰鬥。後來，維克多更獲得了約瑟夫‧波拿巴從馬德里派來的援軍。於是，威靈頓被迫實行退卻。他在塔拉韋臘地區很有成效地抗擊了法軍的猛攻，如果不是庫斯塔拒絕對他進行支援，他還打算實行反攻。反攻沒有實行，這對威靈頓來說卻是一個幸運，因為蘇爾特此時已經逼進到他的後方來了。鑒於向西撤退的道路即將被切斷，威靈頓立即向南溜走，越過了塔霍河，避免了自己的覆滅。以後的退卻雖然遭到了巨大的損失，以致部隊紀律渙散，士氣低落，但他仍在葡萄牙邊境駐止下來，設防固守。由於糧秣不足，法軍也未能對他組織追擊。這樣才結束了一八○九年的戰役。對於西班牙正規軍的脆弱無能，雖然早已從摩爾的教訓中知道一些，但通過這次戰役以後，威靈頓才真正認識清楚了。為了褒獎他在西班牙的功勞，他被晉封為子爵。事實上，他在第二年的成就才真正配得上這樣的獎賞。 拿破崙在一八一○年迫使奧地利簽訂和約以後，一直到一八一二年，曾分出部分精力來關注西班牙和葡萄牙的戰事。這兩年是比利牛斯半島戰爭最緊迫的階段。法軍在這兩年中未能達到自己的目的，其歷史意義的重大，與其以後遭到的失敗比較起來，或者與威靈頓在一八一二至一八一三年所取得的勝利比較起來，都是有過之而無不及的。英軍之所以獲得勝利，是出於威靈頓對於當時的軍事｜經濟因素，有著精確的判斷：第一，他估計到了法軍糧秣來源的有限性；第二，他構築了托里什｜韋德拉什防線。這樣，威靈顧的戰略，實質上就成了對付敵人軍事｜經濟目標的間接路線戰略。 在主要戰役尚未開始以前，仍和往常一樣，威靈頓也還得到西班牙正規軍的支援。西班牙的部隊曾經發起一個冬季戰役，可是卻被法軍徹底擊潰了，此後，法軍沒有遭到任何抵抗，在西班牙奪占了大片新的領土，並且侵入到南部的富饒地區，佔領了安達盧西亞省。 這時，拿破崙決定親自掌握西班牙戰爭的領導權。一八一○年二月末，他已經在西班牙集中了差不多三十萬人的兵力，而且還預計繼續擴大部隊的數量。在這三十萬人當中，他撥出了六萬五千人，指定由馬森納指揮，其任務是要把英軍從葡萄牙趕走。雖然這個數字也已夠大，但就西班牙境內法軍的總數來說，卻還只有較小的一個部分。這個情況說明，西班牙境內的遊擊戰爭，對於法軍已經造成了嚴重的局面。而威靈頓的英軍，包括由英國人訓練的葡軍在內，總共只有大約五萬人。 馬森納對葡萄牙的入侵是從西班牙北面來的，途中經過古達德｜羅德里戈。這樣，就使威靈頓有更多的時間和空間來實現他的戰略企圖。他極力阻滯馬森納的進軍：首先，全部銷毀馬森納必經地區的糧食；其次，在布薩柯以東地區進行頑強的抵抗。對此，馬森納考慮欠周，留試圖以直接衝擊的方法來加以克服。以後，威靈頓退到了托里什｜韋德拉什這條築壘防線之內。這條防線橫切著塔霍河與海岸之間的那個山地半島，正好成了里斯本的屏障。十月十四日，也即是開始進軍四個月以後，馬森納只前進了大約三百二十公里。當他來到托里什｜韋德拉什這條築壘防線面前時，不禁感到大為吃驚。馬森納在這條防線面前徘徊了一個月之久，始終未能把它突破，後來即因饑餓所迫，不得不後撤五十公里，退到塔霍河上的聖塔倫。威靈頓這一次表現得非常高明，他既不組織追擊，也不找他作戰，只是盡力設法把馬森納圈在一個狹小的地區，使他的部隊很難獲得糧食的供應。過去，拿破崙留經痛斥過謹慎的戰略家，說，補給麼？關於這些事情，用不著向我囉嗦。兩萬人的部隊也一樣可以在沙漠中生活！在這一次，以及在以後的戰役中，法軍為了堅信這種樂觀的幻想，不免要付出很高的代價。 威靈頓始終堅持不渝地執行看自己的戰略計畫。而在當時，他是面臨著兩重威脅的：一方面，英國國內有變換政策的可能，這是間接的威脅；另一方面，法將蘇爾特正在南面，經由巴達霍斯實施進攻，極力為馬森納解圍，這是直接的威脅。馬森納也曾經千方百計地誘使威靈頓發起進攻，但威靈頓卻絲毫不為所動。最後，他終於因此獲得了成功。這年三月，馬森納被迫撤退了，當其飽受饑餓的殘餘部隊往回越過葡萄牙邊界時，已經損失了二萬五千人，其中，只有二千人是真正戰死的。 此時，西班牙遊擊隊的活動已愈來愈積極，人數也愈來愈多。僅以阿拉貢和加泰羅尼亞兩個地區來說，就有法軍的兩個軍，總數近六萬人的兵力，一直被困在那裡。他們本來是準備開進到葡萄牙去增援馬森納的，可是在幾個月之內，竟被幾千個遊擊隊和若干支進行遊擊作戰的西班牙正規部隊所牽制，實際上無法開進。在南面也是一樣。法軍一直在對加的斯進行圍攻，由於聯軍方面未能利用自己在巴羅薩的勝利而解除對加的斯的圍攻，結果反而使他們獲益，使法軍捆住了手腳，屯兵於堅城之下作著毫無結果的圍攻。在這幾年，還有一個引起法軍關注的因素，那就是英國仗著自己的海軍實力經常對法國造成威脅，它可以派出部隊在沿海各處實行登陸。 後來，威靈頓對於敵人的影響作用，主要是他的威脅，而不是他的打擊。當他對這一或那一地點構成威脅時，法軍就不得不隨之派遣部隊，因而使得西班牙遊擊隊在其他地區獲得大肆活動的機會。 然而，威靈頓也沒有滿足於只使法軍經常處於受威脅的狀態。當馬森納向薩拉曼卡撤退時，他即跟在後面追擊，派出部分兵力封鎖了北面的阿爾麥達邊境要塞，同時，派遣貝里斯弗德去圍攻南面的巴達霍斯。結果，他把自己的兵力幾乎是兩半平分了，以致喪失了進行機動的能力。幸而命運拯救了他。馬森納在重新收集了自己的部隊和得到少量的增援以後，又匆匆忙忙去救援被圍的阿爾麥達要塞。在弗溫特斯｜德奧尼奧羅地區，由於所處地形不利，威靈頓曾經一度受困，陷入嚴重境地。儘管他終於打退了敵人的進攻，但是他自己也承認說：如果拿破崙本人在這裡，那我們是一定會失敗的。在巴達霍斯，貝里斯弗德也放棄了對城塞的圍攻，而改去迎擊蘇爾特的援軍。由於對戰鬥的組織指揮不當，貝里斯弗德在阿爾布拉遭到了失敗，但是作戰部隊進行了奮勇的抵抗，付出了極重大的犧牲，最後總算穩住了陣勢。 威靈頓現在重新集中起了自己的兵力，即使缺乏攻城器械和武器，他仍然決定再次圍攻巴達霍斯。可是，他這次又把攻城的計畫放棄了，很快解圍而去，因為法將瑪律蒙在取代馬森納以後，正毫無阻礙地向南進軍，企圖與蘇爾特會師。兩位法軍將領立即制定了聯合進攻威靈頓的計畫。可幸的是，這兩位將領發生了意見分歧。蘇爾特耽心在安達盧西亞省重又