Chapter 10 Chapter IX 1854-1914

Immediately after the closing of the Great Peace Exposition of 1851, a new era of war began.In this series of military conflicts, the first war did not achieve decisive results in both military and political aspects.However, there are certain negative lessons to be drawn from the worthless and bleak Crimean War.Chief among these is the demonstration that taking the direct route is futile.It is not surprising that an adjutant, leading a light brigade, charged at the muzzles of Russian guns while the generals were blinded and darting about.In the British Army, directness is the characteristic that makes all actions so rigid and rigid.This situation puzzled the French commander Canrobert.After many years, when he was invited to attend a British court ball, he suddenly realized, and said in surprise: So the British are fighting like Queen Victoria dancing!The Russians, however, were no less bound by the direct line than the English.It is said that on one occasion, when they attempted to maneuver, one regiment marched for a whole day and reached Sevastopol at dusk, exactly where it had started in the morning.

In studying the disappointing experience of the Crimean War, we cannot ignore, and certainly should not exaggerate, the fact that during the forty years since Waterloo, European armies were It used to be more professionalized.The significance of this fact, of course, is not used as an excuse to oppose the professional army, but it can prompt people to think about the potential dangers that professionalization may contain.This danger is bound to be more serious among the higher ranks of soldiers, who, because of their long service, are constantly in contact with things and ideas from the outside world, and are exposed to new influences.On the other hand, in the early stages of the American Civil War, the weaknesses of the non-professional army were exposed.To improve the combat effectiveness of the army, the training of the troops is a very important factor.Only training can cultivate an effective tool so that the generals can use it with ease.Therefore, a long-term war, or a short-term peace, is the most favorable condition for building such an army.However, if the quality of the tools of war exceeds the talents of the generals, then, as far as the entire military system is concerned, something is wrong.

In this, as in other relations, a striking contrast can be seen in the American Civil War of 1861-65.Those military leaders, especially in the South, were basically drawn from among those who had chosen the military as their career.They studied the military, of course, but their professional lives varied, with some serving in civilian jobs and others conducting research of a private nature in their spare time.Therefore, the playground is not their base, nor can it limit the development of their strategic views.However, despite the wide range of perspectives and the abundance of sources (raw materials) that can be used to develop them, it can also be said that the local strategy in the initial period of the war and the implementation of the major battles must be determined by traditional goals. to decide.

This trend was exacerbated by the development of the railways.Railroads greatly increased the speed of troop movement.The other component, which is essential to true rapidity, however, is the flexibility of maneuver, which is not increased by the railways.The American Civil War was the first war in which railroads played a major role.However, the route of the railway is fixed, so the strategy of relying on railway transportation to mobilize the army is naturally a strategy of the direct route. Moreover, in this and all subsequent wars, the material support of the army also relied mainly on railways.Since the advent of the railway made it easier to supply troops, those commanders simply increased the number of troops without considering the effect this would have on their combat effectiveness.As a result, an abnormal phenomenon appeared: after the development of this new type of transport, not only did it fail to improve the rapidity of the troops, but even reduced the original rapidity.This is because the railway has greatly promoted the increase in the number of the army, and it can mobilize a large number of troops to ensure that they are provided with various supplies needed for effective combat. However, the railway also makes the material consumption of the army continue to expand. Keep them bound near the supply depot.In this way, when the army is far away, its supplies are hung on a line like a hairpin, that is to say, it is completely dependent on the long railway line for non-stop work, but the railway line itself is extremely easy. destroyed.

These characteristics were already displayed at the beginning of the American Civil War, and by 1864, they were more obvious.Accustomed to a life of normal supplies, the Union Army was more exposed to danger than their enemies.Especially on the western battlefield, the supplies of the troops were supplied by railway transportation, but this railway line could be destroyed by the outstanding cavalry generals of the Confederate Army at any time, such as Forrester and Morgan.Their attack was a harbinger of later combat operations, heralding the lines of communication of large armies that could be disrupted by air and armor.In the end, the Northern Army also discovered the general of Sherman.Sherman understood the reasons for repeated failure better than any of his contemporaries and since.His views continued until after World War I, when a new school of military thought emerged.Therefore, Sherman can be regarded as the originator of the modern mechanized army and the proponents of mobile warfare.At that time, the enemy had cut Sherman's railroad line and dealt him a blow.So Sherman also took the method of attacking the enemy's communication lines to avoid the threat.He firmly believed that in order to maintain sufficient strategic mobility and eliminate the threat of sudden and devastating blows, he must free himself and not be bound by a fixed transmission line like a railway.That is to say, one should try to make one's army carry all the necessary supplies, so it is necessary to reduce the material requirements of the troops to a minimum.In other words, in order to enable troops to march long distances without losing speed, it is necessary to reduce the burden and minimize supplies.Sherman took this method to streamline his rear organization and get rid of his dependence on railroad lines of communication, thus leaping forward to the back door of the Confederate Army.In this way, he was able to cut off the communication lines on which the enemy's main force relied for supplies, fundamentally paralyzing the enemy's supply system.Sherman's maneuver was an astounding achievement.

American Civil War In the early days of the war, both sides tried to win victory by means of a direct frontal attack.Consequently, neither Virginia nor Missouri achieved decisive results.Then, in 1862, McClelland was appointed commander-in-chief of the Union Army.He devised a plan to use the naval fleet to send Union forces to the enemy's strategic flank.This plan would shorten the distance to the enemy's capital, Richmond, compared with a direct land attack.But the designers at the time, it seems, did not regard it as a real indirect route.This plan was rejected by President Lincoln because he was unwilling to take such a deliberate risk.At the same time, the President also left an army of McDowell to defend Washington.In this way, he not only reduced McClelland's strength, but also prevented him from using Washington as an instrument of decoy, which was indispensable to ensure the smooth implementation of his plan.

After McClelland landed, and after a full month's delay before Yorktown, the plan had to be changed.He had to cooperate with McDowell to attack in the centripetal direction.This can only be regarded as a partial indirect route.McDowell was then ordered to carry out a direct land attack from Washington to Richmond.However, Stonewall Jackson, the famous Confederate general, carried out maneuvers in the Shenandoah Valley, and strongly shocked the Washington government, causing it to cancel McDowell's order to participate in this attack.Nevertheless, McClelland's vanguard reached only six and a half kilometers from Richmond and prepared for a final charge, but Lee mustered enough forces to drive them back.In the Seven Days' War, despite tactical defeats, McClelland had achieved a strategic advantage, and the momentum was clearly more favorable than in the previous phase of the war.His plans for a roundabout movement were scuttled, but that did not prevent his own base from moving south to the James River area.In this way, he not only secured his own lines of communication, but also approached and threatened the enemy's lines of communication from Richmond to all parts of the South.

It is a pity that due to the change of strategy, McClelland's strategic advantage was quickly lost.Due to political reasons, Harrick was appointed commander-in-chief of the Northern Army.He then ordered McClelland to lead his troops back to the north by boat, join forces with General Pope, and together carry out a frontal attack on Richmond from land.This is just like the usual practice in history. When directly doubling the force, its assault force cannot be increased accordingly. On the contrary, since it is easier for the enemy to determine the most likely direction of attack at this time, the strength of its army is astonishing. Possibly cut in half.Harrick's strategy, based on the principle of concentration of forces, reveals the weakness of the usual method just mentioned.His direct-line strategy was ineffective.Nowhere until the second half of 1862 was it seen most clearly in the bloody battle of Fredericksburg on December 13th.In 1863 the Union still adopted this strategy, so that instead of being able to advance to Richmond, the Confederates, after smashing their attack, were able to invade Northern territory.

In the initial stage of the Southern Army's invasion of the North, from a strategic point of view, it was mobile.However, when General Lee couldn't grasp it, stretched the front line, and launched a frontal attack on General Meade's position in Harrisburg, the significance of his strategic maneuver was lost.The assault lasted three days, and by the evening of the third day he had lost almost half his force.By the end of the year, both sides had returned to their original starting positions, and because of exhaustion, they had to face each other under the cover of the Rapidan and Labach Rock Rivers.

It is worth noting that in such a battle, where both sides are directly attacking each other, it is usually always in the advantage of the defending side, but only so far as to repel the opponent's impact.Under such strategic conditions, although the defense is relatively passive, it can make fewer unnecessary sacrifices, so it is naturally less direct in the direct line strategy of both sides. It is generally believed that Lee's attack at Harrisburg was repulsed as the turning point of the attack.But this view is not entirely correct.As long as the historical facts are soberly analyzed, it can be seen more clearly that the decisive results were achieved on the western battlefield.

The first victory on the western battlefield was achieved in April 1862.At that time, Farragut's cavalry bypassed the forts covering the mouth of the Mississippi River, thereby causing New Orleans to surrender to the Union army without bloodshed.In this way, the Union Army inserted a strategic wedge into the interior of the Confederacy, dividing the Confederacy in two along the line of the vital river. The second decisive victory was won on the upper Mississippi on the same day Lee withdrew from Harrisburg (the Fourth of July).This was Grant's occupation of Vicksburg, which gave the Northern federal government full control of this important waterway artery.From then on, the Confederate States could no longer obtain food supplies and supplementary troops from the states across the Mississippi River.This method of concentrating first on the weaker parts of the enemy's defenses is invaluable in grand strategy, but the strategic means (tools) used to achieve this result should not be overlooked either.Grant's first attack on Vicksburg, in December 1862, was carried out overland along railroad lines.Meanwhile, Sherman made his way down the Mississippi from the water, preparing to join the attack.Grant's advance, however, was hampered by the obstruction of Confederate cavalry, threatening his communications.The Confederate Army was thus able to concentrate its forces against Sherman.And Sherman's movement was actually direct, so when he attempted to land near Vicksburg, the Confederates easily repelled him. In February and March of 1863, the Northern Army attacked Vicksburg four times successively. Because they all tried to achieve their goals with not too far-reaching flanks, they were defeated four times.Finally, in April, Grant decided to make a truly far-reaching maneuver, like Wolfe's final attack on Quebec.Part of the battleships and transport ships of the Union Army sneaked past the forts of Vicksburg at night to a point fifty kilometers south of the fort, and the main force of the army also moved there along the west bank of the Mississippi River.Sherman made a decoy maneuver northeast of Vicksburg, allowing Grant's forces to land on the east bank of the river.In this way, when he went ashore, he encountered relatively weak resistance from the enemy.After that, Grant joined Sherman's troops and began a planned adventure.He broke away from his new temporary base and moved northeastward into enemy territory, with the object of approaching Vicksburg from the rear and cutting off the city's lines of communication with the main states to the east.In completing such a maneuver, Grant turned almost in a circle and was between the enemy's upper and lower gums, that is, between the two enemy groups concentrated at Vicksburg and Jackson respectively.Sixty-five kilometers from Vicksburg, Jackson is the intersection of the North-South and East-West railroads.As a result of this maneuver, Grant not only escaped the enemy's bite, but knocked out their front teeth. It should be noted that, having reached this line, Grant decided to direct his forces eastward first, in order to force the enemy to withdraw from Jackson.This may also serve as an illustration of how the development of the railways has changed strategic conditions.In the past, Napoleon used a river or a ridge as a strategic obstacle to intercept the enemy, but now Grant's method is different. He only needs to occupy a point, a railway crossing, to achieve the same goal. Purpose.Grant captured the railroad crossing, then turned around and headed for Vicksburg.By this time Vicksburg was isolated and was forced to surrender after seven weeks of siege.The strategic result of this victory was that the Union Army opened the gates to Georgia through Chattanooga.Georgia was the Confederate barnyard, and from there it controlled the entire eastern states. Confederate defeat now seemed inevitable.However, the Northern Army itself spoiled this almost achieved victory.In 1864, the Northern Army was already exhausted due to long battles, so spiritual factors played a decisive role.Due to the war-weariness of the people, the forces of the peace faction are growing day by day.The presidential election was scheduled for November of that year.If Lincoln could not achieve an early victory and pledge of unity, he might be overthrown by a peaceist presidential candidate who pledged to conclude a peace treaty that would not discredit the nation.For this purpose, Grant was called back from the western battlefield to serve as the commander-in-chief of the Northern Army.In what way will Grant achieve the goal of winning quickly?Of course, he reverted to the usual strategy of orthodox generals, that is, to destroy the enemy's army with an absolutely superior force in numbers, or at least to consume the enemy's army by continuous surprise attacks.We have seen that in the capture of Vicksburg he actually took the indirect route, a decision which he made only after several ineffective frontal attacks.At that time, he completed the strategic maneuver with great skill, but he did not learn the proper lessons from it later. When Grant took over as commander-in-chief, things went back to their old ways.He decided to follow the old and direct overland line of attack, southward from the Rabach Rock River, directly attacking Richmond.However, the target this time is somewhat different. The assault is not aimed at the enemy's capital, but at the main force of the enemy army.This view is well founded.In his order to Meade, he said: wherever General Lee is, you must follow there.If it is fair, it should also be pointed out that although Grant's march toward the enemy was direct in a broad sense, he did not rush blindly, and did not always achieve his goal by frontal attack.In fact, he always tried to outflank the enemy, but these detours were not far enough.In addition, he also strictly abides by all military precepts, requiring the army to concentrate frequently, never deviate from the tasks he wants to accomplish, and not be shaken by any seductive actions of the enemy.He had the will to win, not even Marshal Foch.Those generals who used similar methods between 1914 and 1918 should be jealous of him.Because none of those men could match him in obtaining the unanimous support of the whole country and the absolute confidence of the political leader (President Lincoln).Few of the generals who pursued an orthodox strategy of the direct line obtained such ideal conditions as he did. However, in the late summer of 1864, the ripe fruit of victory slipped from Grant's hands.The Union Army was almost at the peak of its exhaustion, and Lincoln had despaired of being re-elected, for the blank check he had given to the implementers of his military policy was now bound to be cashed.It is quite ironic to say that although Grant has the determination to use superior forces to defeat the enemy, after two bloody battles in Wildenness and Cold Harbor, he still failed to achieve the goal of defeating the enemy.The main result at that time was just to go straight forward to the rear of Richmond.But it was still the result of a bloodless detour.In other words, Grant returned to the position McClelland had occupied in 1862 only after a heavy sacrifice. Just when the sky was covered with dark clouds, light suddenly appeared.In the November election, Lincoln was re-elected as president.What helped Lincoln get re-elected?Conversely, what prevented the Democratic candidate from being elected by McClelland, who was desperate for peace and sought to replace Lincoln?Of course, this was not Grant's military action.From June to December he achieved little military success, and after two bloody battles in mid-October, military operations ceased almost entirely.According to historians, Sherman's victory over Atlanta in September 1864 appears to have contributed to Lincoln's reelection. When Grant was called back north to serve as commander-in-chief, Sherman succeeded him as commander of the western field because of his achievements in the Battle of Vicksburg.There is a clear difference in the combat views of the two of them.Grant made the enemy's army his main target; Sherman's method was to first threaten the enemy's strategic positions, or to expose the enemy's attempts to cover these positions to attack, or to make them the enemy. Abandon these strongholds while guaranteeing freedom of movement.Thus Sherman was constantly pursuing two ends, but in the final analysis his main aim was the second, because once he achieved it, he achieved good results.Atlanta was the base of the Confederate Army, not only the hub of four important railroad lines, but also the source of various supply necessities.Sherman once pointed out that the concentration of a large number of iron foundries, arsenals and machine factories in Atlanta, in addition, has a symbolic meaning in spirit.He emphasized that as long as the territory is occupied, the Confederate Army will be sentenced to death mentally. The question of whether Grant's method is better than Sherman's is obviously open to much debate.However, for the psychology of a democratic society, the latter is obviously more suitable.Perhaps, only an absolute ruler, and when he is in power, is qualified to insist on the military concept of defeating the enemy's army, and even he must have enough courage to consider how to make this This concept is adapted to the actual situation, and the possibility of achieving the goal must be weighed.However, a strategist, when he is a public servant of a democratic government, is unlikely to have such great power.He must rely on the support and confidence of his employer, and must therefore act during his more limited period of power without regard to the more limited tools.This cannot be compared with an absolute strategist.He must strive to achieve results as soon as possible, demanding quick wins.And no matter how much he hopes in the end, he can't delay too long in time, and he can't not pay dividends for a long time.Therefore, the strategist is sometimes obliged to temporarily set aside his original goals, or at least to change his course of action in order to take on a new look for himself.When he is faced with these inevitable difficulties, he must be good at asking whether military theory is compatible with his highest purpose, whether it is compatible with the following conditions, that is, his purpose cannot be divorced from the actual situation, and all Every effort must have the support of the masses, and the manpower and material resources of the army must be guaranteed by the support of the masses. Even whether the war can continue depends on whether the general masses agree.Whoever pays can call the shots, and the degree to which the strategist can adapt his strategy to the interests of the general public will likely gain social acceptance. Sherman adopted a roundabout maneuver to achieve the goal of saving troops.It's worth noting.If you compare it with Grant who fought in Virginia, the situation is quite different.Because he has only one railway line, he is limited in supplies.Even under such conditions, Sherman believes that it is better not to use his troops for a direct attack, but would rather temporarily get rid of this only line of communication, during the mobile march for several weeks , he made only one attempt at a frontal attack in the Kenisha area.And what's interesting is that he took the frontal attack this time because his troops were too tired and he couldn't bear to ask them to continue the flank march on the rainy road.The attack was a failure, but the losses were not serious, because the attack was stopped as soon as the enemy counterattacked.In fact, Sherman completed a 200-kilometer march this time on the terrain of rolling mountains and rivers, and it was only this one time that he used the army to carry out offensive battles.He maneuvered with skilful art, and repeatedly induced the Confederates to attack him in vain.These attacks always ended in defeat for the enemy, as his troops were well versed in the art of quickly digging entrenchments and building parapets.Whenever the enemy was unable to penetrate his shield of mobility, he gained a strategic advantage, seizing a new vantage point.In order to force the strategically defensive enemy to continue to take extremely costly tactical offensives, Sherman demonstrated brilliant strategic skills.This is rare in history.Moreover, his achievement stands out because he had only one single line of communication.Therefore, leaving aside the huge spiritual and political effects, from a purely military point of view, Sherman's achievements are also great.Whether viewed in relative or absolute terms, he inflicted much greater losses on the enemy than himself.In that regard, his record compared with Grant's in Virginia is nothing short of astonishing. After capturing Atlanta, Sherman went on to bolder adventures.For this reason, he has been severely criticized by many military critics.However, Sherman firmly believed that if he could penetrate deep into enemy territory, first cross Georgia, which was the barn of the South, destroy its railroad system, and then control South Carolina and North Carolina.Then, by the psychic effect of this invasion, by cutting off the way to the north for supplies to Richmond and General Lee's troops, the Confederacy might cease to resist. So he completely ignored the Confederate Army led by Hood who was driven out of Atlanta by him, and immediately began his famous march to the coast.He traversed Georgia, resupplying local treasuries and sabotaging the country railroads along the way.On November 15, 1864, Sherman led his troops from Atlanta, and on December 10 they reached the suburbs of Savannah.Subsequently, he seized the port and opened up his sea line of communication with the north.Alexander, a general of the Confederate army and also a historian, once pointed out: There is no doubt that the victory of this march has a much greater spiritual impact on the entire southern states than any greatest victory can have. .Later, Sherman turned north, crossed South and North Carolina, and advanced to General Lee's rear, thereby depriving the Confederates of their last important ports. Sherman's method of warfare is worthy of serious study.On his long marches across Georgia, he not only broke away from his lines of communication, but reduced his troop baggage to such a minimum that his entire army became one gigantic flying column.His lightly armed force has a total of 60,000 people, and there are four armies under it, each of which can carry out independent combat activities independently.When the column moved in, its grain-grabbing unit moved in front and on the flanks, which played the role of cover invisibly. In addition, in this march, Sherman also used a new strategic maneuver.In the battle of Atlanta he saw that since there was only one simple object, he was often easily hindered, and that the enemy's method of hindering his progress was very simple and did not vary much.Later, in order to avoid this weakness, he devised an ingenious plan to keep the enemy in as constant a dilemma as possible.He once explained his plan of action in this way: to make the enemy suspicious of the line he took.At first, the enemy couldn't guess whether he was targeting Macon (seventy kilometers southwest of Augusta) or Augusta; then, when Macon was already behind him, the enemy couldn't guess Whether he is targeting Augusta or Savannah.But he himself has the freedom to choose.If favorable conditions are formed, he can at any time direct his forces to another object.However, he never encountered the need to change targets, because his constant deceitfulness kept the enemy from knowing his true intentions. Take the march across Georgia, for example.Sherman proved that an army could accomplish its mission even with the smallest carry-on reserves.He also proves that it is possible to reduce the quantity of this reserve.Before he began his march north, through South and North Carolina, he tried to turn his army into a war machine of only a high degree of mobility, which, when ordered, would only replenish the minimum reserves, and in an instant Time to act.Even the officers were obliged to sleep in the open, in spite of the winter, and two men shared a canvas which was stretched over bamboo poles or branches for the night; for all tents and camping equipment were left behind. In the future, Sherman continued to take a deceptive route, with two interchangeable goals at the same time.As he marched northward with his troops, the enemy could not decide whether it was better to defend Augusta or Charleston.Therefore, the Confederate Army finally dispersed its forces and defended two strongholds at the same time.Later, Sherman passed between the two, and captured Columbia, the capital of South Carolina, in one fell swoop, and captured this important center from which General Lee relied for various supplies.After that, the Confederates were not sure where his next goal was, whether to capture Charlotte (140 kilometers north of Columbia) or Fayetteville (180 kilometers east of Charlotte). ).Finally, when he set out from Fayetteville, the enemy did not know whether he was attacking Raleigh (eighty kilometers northwest of Goldsboro) or Goldsboro.And this time, even Sherman himself could not decide whether to make Goldsboro or Wilmington his final goal. Sherman led his army to complete a long-distance march of nearly 700 kilometers, overcame a large number of obstacles (such as rivers, cliffs and swamps, etc.), and achieved a great victory.At that time, the number of enemy troops was large enough to provide effective resistance to him.But why can't it resist?Some people think that this is because Sherman's maneuver had a huge shock effect on the enemy, causing them to be at a loss.Sherman not only deftly changed the direction of his attack, but also made his strategy flexible, thus achieving the victory of military operations.When he marched on a wide front, he always marched in four, five, or even six columns, and each column sent out a lot of food gathering parties to cover it.Once a certain column encountered the enemy, the rest of the columns continued to move forward.Judging from their mode of operation, these columns are the precedent for the German panzer corps sweeping across France in 1940.The enemy was so terrified and panicked by Sherman's column that they began to retreat before they were really under actual pressure.Due to Sherman's elusive maneuvers, the mental pressure on the Confederate Army reached an unbearable level, and even when they occupied a defensive position, they had already considered how to retreat.Sometimes even as long as the preemptive cry: We are Sherman's shock force!You'd better run for your lives!As a result, the Southern Army will start to flee.If it is said that confidence is equal to half of one's own strength in battle, which is enough to lead to victory, then defeating the enemy's confidence is not only equal to destroying half of the enemy's strength, but more than half, because it may not be possible to gain power after fighting. victory.Sherman, like Napoleon in Austria, could boast: I have crushed the enemy by mere march. On March 22, Sherman reached Goldsboro, where she received reinforcements and various supplies from Sheffield's force.He then proceeded to prepare for the last phase of the war, the final assault on General Lee's troops.At that time, General Lee was also considering how to take Richmond into his own hands.It was not until early April that Grant resumed his operations and continued to attack.The attack was immediately astonishingly successful, beginning with the surrender of Richmond, followed a week later by the surrender of Lee's entire army.On the surface, this victory seems to be a glorious embodiment of Grant's direct line strategy. His strategic purpose is to directly destroy the enemy's army. However, when we discuss it seriously, we should see the decisive role of the time factor.The reason why the Confederates suddenly stopped resisting was that they encountered serious difficulties in food supplies, which affected their morale, and there were many bad news from home.Even before Sherman arrived in Goldsboro, Grant had informed him that Lee's army was demoralized and deserting. For human beings, the most precious thing is country and family.Most people's affection and love for family is stronger because family is more personal.For soldiers, as long as the family is safe and sound, they are willing to risk their lives to defend the country. They believe that this sacrifice also indirectly protects their family.But once soldiers know their families are in danger, their patriotism, discipline, and fellowship lose their hold.Therefore, the greatest effect of Sherman's rear attack lies in this.He not only attacked the enemy's army, but disturbed their rear, where the families of the soldiers lived.In this way, his offensive caused a conflict between family feelings and patriotic ideas among the enemy soldiers, thereby breaking the Confederate will to resist. 在美國內戰的最後階段，薛爾曼採取間接路線，即使用向敵人後方實行突擊的方法，破壞了敵人的經濟潛力和精神潛力。這種間接路線與戰爭初期在西部戰場上的行動比較，具有更大的決定性作用。只要認真詳細地研究一下這場戰爭，誰都可以得出這樣的結論。三十年前，英國的艾德蒙斯將軍，這位第一次世界大戰史作家，曾經對此作過公正的評價。他在其《美國國內戰爭史》一書中作了如下的結論：由於南軍的名將李和傑克遜，都具有偉人的軍事天才，北佛吉尼亞的軍隊，也具有很高超的戰鬥力量，而敵對雙方的首都，又相距如此之近，所以，人們把自己的注意力過多地集中在東部戰場上了。然而，實施決定性打擊的地點卻是西部戰場。一八六三年六月，北軍佔領維克斯堡和赫德森港，這才是戰爭的真正轉機。以後，薛爾曼統率著西部大軍進行敵後作戰，導致了南軍的失敗。 為什麼人們竟會那樣過分重視東部戰場呢？一部分原因是勝利的光輝把多數軍事史學家的頭腦給弄昏了，另一部分原因則是黑德遜所寫的《傑克遜傳》一書所起的作用。該書有點言過其實，其傳奇的意味掩蓋了歷史的真實。從研究軍事理論的觀點來看，這本書的實際價值是不大的。其中充滿了黑德遜本人的戰爭觀念，而對於傑克遜軍事活動的材料則缺乏分析。可是，這本書在英國戰史學家中間是有一定影響的，引起了他們對美國內戰的興趣，使他們也把注意力過多地集中到佛吉尼亞戰役方面，而完全忽視了西部戰場。實際上，決定性的戰鬥行動是在那裡發生的。一個近代的史學家要想對後代作出巨大貢獻，那麼，他就要認真分析，指出美國內戰研究方面的錯誤對一九一四年以前英國軍事思想，和一九一四年至一九一八年英國戰略所產生的影響。 毛奇的戰役 歷史學家一旦把眼光從美因內戰轉移到隨後發生在歐洲的幾次戰爭上，那麼，他最深刻的印象，很可能是這些戰爭特點的明顯差異。 第一點，在一八六六年和一八七○年的歐洲戰爭中，交戰雙方至少在名義上都是對戰爭作了準備的；第二點，雙方在戰爭中使用的軍隊，都是職業性的；第三點，雙方高級指揮官所犯的錯誤，都要比美國內戰雙方的任何一方更多；第四點，德國人在兩次戰爭中所採取的戰略，既缺乏軍事藝術，也缺乏軍事計謀；第五點，儘管雙方都犯了錯誤，但是兩次戰爭都很快決定了勝負。 毛奇的戰略完全是以直接路線為基礎的。他幾乎不使用軍事計謀，全憑著集中優勢兵力的辦法來把敵人壓垮。那麼，我們是否可以據此作出結論，說一八六六年的戰爭和一八七○年的戰爭是超出規律的例外現象呢？誠然，這兩次戰爭有其不平常的一面，但是，卻未必能夠因此就認為這是超出規律的例外現象。戰爭的規律，人們是可以通過大量戰爭的研究來認識的。有人所以提出了這種問題，是因為在這兩次戰爭中，戰敗國竟是如此的兵力薄弱而又指揮無能，以致它的失敗早在戰爭開始時期就已決定了。這種情況，在以往的戰爭中卻是沒有過的。 一八六六年，奧軍的弱點主要是武器裝備落後。普軍使用的後裝槍，就其戰鬥性能來看，要比奧軍使用的前裝槍優越得多。儘管後代的經院式軍爭學派對此認識不足，但是這種後裝槍的優越性在戰場上早已獲得了充分的證明。一八七○年，法軍的弱點則是兩個方面：一是數量較少，居於劣勢；二是也和一八六六年奧軍的情況一樣，訓練差。 這些理由足以說明，奧軍在一八六六年為什麼遭到了徹底的失敗，法軍在一八七○年為什麼遭到了令人震驚的毀滅。不過，在後來進行戰爭準備的時候，任何一個戰略家都不會認為，他的敵人將像一八六六年的奧軍和一八七○年的法軍那樣軟弱無能，都不會魯莽到這種程度，不會以此來作為制定計劃的根據。 還有一點應該指出，德軍在這兩次戰爭中的戰略，在執行過程中並不像計畫所規定的那樣具有更多直接性，而是反映出了比較大的靈活性。 一八六六年，毛奇為了贏得時間，曾利用他所控制的所有鐵路來調運軍隊，因而使其正面超過了四百公里。他的意圖是要採取迅速集中以實施進攻的方法，就是要翻越邊境地區的山嶽地帶，儘快把軍隊集中在波希米亞北部的中心地區。可是，由於普魯士國王不希望承受侵略者的名義，妨礙了毛奇計畫的執行，使他喪失了時間。因此，毛奇不得不轉而採取直接路線，而這卻是原來計畫中所沒有預計的。這樣一來，毛奇就不可能前進到預期的集中地區，而奧軍卻得以實行集中，並先於毛奇發起了進攻。此外，普王太子認為，在當時形勢下，西里西亞已受到了威脅，因而力迫毛奇同意，把他那個軍團開向東南，以便掩護西里西亞省。於是，毛奇不得不使這支軍隊更遠地脫離了其餘的部隊，但因此卻搶佔了一個有利的位置，可以同時威脅到奧軍的翼側和後方。一些腐儒學究曾經為此大肆責難毛奇，認為他不該把兵力分得這樣稀散。事實上，連毛奇本人也未曾料到，這一著正好為他未來的勝利撤下了種子。 毛奇所作的這個兵力部署，曾使奧軍指揮部大為不安。這樣一來，儘管普軍一再地犯了錯誤，但他們還是首先穿過了山地，而後在科尼格內茲一帶獲得了豐盛的穀物。雖然在那裡又犯了新的錯誤，使其行動更不合理，但是卻又保證普軍取得了決定性的勝利。奧軍總司令實際上在會戰開始之前就被打敗了，他在發給皇帝的電報中，曾堅決要求奧皇立刻向普國求和。 應當指出，毛奇把自己的兵力分散在這樣極寬大的正面上，竟使得自己的行動比奧軍有著更大的自由。當時，奧軍已經集中，其正面只有六十五公里。從表面上看，它有一個優點，就是擁有內線作戰的便利。還有重要的一點值得一提，毛奇的意圖，固然是要在與敵人遭遇之前把兵力集中起來，但他的目的並不是要立即開始直接的進攻。他的最初計畫，曾經包括兩個行動方案。如果發現奧軍的預想陣地將在易北河邊的約瑟夫斯塔德地區，而且並不穩定，那麼，王太子所率領的那個軍團，就應該向東機動，從翼側突擊奧軍，與此同時，其餘兩個軍團則從正面進攻，共同釘住奧軍。如果沒有實施這種進攻的可能性，那麼，所有三個軍團都應向西運動，在帕拉都比茲地區（科林以東四十二公里）渡過易北河，而後再調頭向東，威脅敵人通往南方的交通線。而實際上，奧軍竟渡過了易北河並在左岸進行集中，其距離比毛奇所預期的還要近些。所以，普國王太子的部隊沒有花費多大力氣便進到了奧軍的翼側。結果，奧軍終於被全部包圍。 一八七○年，毛奇原來的意圖，是想在薩爾河地區進行一次決定性的會戰。他因此準備把全部三個軍團都集中到那裡。但是他的計畫未能實現，其原因不是由於法軍的行動，而是因為他們的癱瘓。而且，法軍的開始癱瘓，只是因為一個消息引起的。當時，普方的第三軍團在左翼活動。它越過國界深入東方，在魏森堡附近擊毀了一個法軍支隊。以後，第三軍團繼續進攻，當法軍的其他部隊還沒能趕到之前，普軍又在富爾特地區（曼海姆以南五十公里）合圍和殲滅了法軍的右翼軍。結果，這些偶然發生的零星戰鬥，卻產生了巨大的間接作用，其意義比任何一個周密計畫的大型會戰還更重要。因為這樣一來，這個第三軍團就沒有按照原定計劃調動，沒有去同主力會師，而是在一個距離敵人基本集團很遠的地方獨自進行活動。由於這個原因，它便沒有參加在提翁維爾和格雷羅特進行的那兩場組織不好的會戰。按照法軍當時所處的位置來看，這個軍團即使靠得近一點，也未必能夠積極參加戰鬥，也不會有什麼作用。正是由於沒有參加這兩次會戰，它在以後的決定性階段才反而得以發揮重要的作用。 出於受了格雷羅特會戰結果的刺激，法軍主力開始向側翼退卻，進入了梅斯城。當時，普軍第一和第二兩個軍團都已經打得精疲力竭，因而法軍很容易溜脫。可是，由於害怕普軍第三軍團截住退路，法軍總司令巴曾決定在梅斯城進行固守。這樣一來，普軍得以恢復力量，重新組織協同動作。與此相反，法軍則喪失了野戰機會，無所作為地坐守孤城。最後，麥克馬洪終於想到要去救援梅斯城，但其動機並不是出於政治上的壓力，而是受了敵人的引誘，因而他這次作戰在理論和實踐上都無是處。 於是，普軍第三軍團獲得了一個毫無阻礙地挺進巴黎的機會。這是人們未曾料到的。而對於麥克馬洪的軍隊來說，這完全是一種突然出現的間接路線的威脅。第三軍團在前進過程中，急劇地改變了行動方向，由向西改而向北，繞過了麥克馬洪軍隊的側翼，前進到了他的後方。這個機動使得法軍終於被圍，並被迫在色當宣佈投降。 在這次戰爭的決定性階段，作戰行動的間接性，實際上要比表面顯出來的還更多些。可是，在一八七○年以後，正是由於許多純屬表面現象的分析，對歷來軍事理論的發展產生了重大影響。這種影響對於歷史上的下一個大規模戰爭，即一九○四年到一九○五年的日俄戰爭，其作用是很明顯的。 Russo-Japanese War 日本的戰略，完全以其德國師傅為榜樣，基本上是一種直接路線戰略。在日俄戰爭中，俄軍在作戰方面所依賴的，只是一條單一的西伯利亞鐵路。這對日軍來說，當然要造成一些極為有利的條件。可是，日軍對於這種有利的條件，在整個戰爭中卻從來沒有加以利用。在人類的整個歷史上，從來不曾有過一支軍隊會像俄軍那樣，要利用這樣長和這樣窄的一個通氣管來進行呼吸，而且因為這支軍隊的數量如此龐大，所以更使他們感到呼吸困難。然而，日本戰略家們所考慮的，就只是對俄軍實施直接的進攻，沒有其他更好的辦法。日軍集團當時的集中程度，與一八七○年毛奇部隊的集中程度比較，實有過之。誠然，在進行遼陽會戰之前，日軍確曾企圖進行某種機動，而在與俄軍接觸以後，又曾多次企圖從翼側迂迴敵人。這些迂迴機動的線路，從地圖上看似乎還比較深遠，可是就其兵力大小的比例來說，實際上是非常狹窄的。同時，日本人不像毛奇那樣，手中有一個自由行動的軍團，也沒有一個像梅斯城那樣的陷阱，在他們的敵人當中，更沒有一個像麥克馬洪那樣自鑽陷阱的人。日本人曾經幻想著重複色當式的勝利，決心奪取旅順，但卻是自己去鑽陷阱。出此，他們進行了一連串長期流血的戰鬥，沒有取得決定性的結果。後來，又在奉天（即今瀋陽）進行一次毫無成效的會戰，日軍拼到了精疲力竭的地步，因而曾打算同俄國人簽訂和約。幸好俄國人對於這次戰爭也談不到任何興趣，而且俄國用以參戰的兵力，也只不過它的全部兵力的十分之一。於是，俄國也願意媾和。這對於日本人來說，是一個天外飛來的好運氣。 以上對於歷史所作的觀察和分析，都是以事實作為根據。也就是說，我們所觀察和分析的，是曾經真正發生過的事情，以及它產生的結果，而不是假定雙方如何怎樣去做。間接路線的理論，正是通過這種分析得出來的，因此，必須以具體的事例作根據。而這些事例正好證明，採取直接的路線，照例來看，都不能獲得決定性的結果。當然，在某種具體場合下採取間接路線，必然會產生各種困難，但不要因而影響到這個理論。因為無論贊同與否，都可以找到一套辯論的理由，不過實際上並無多大意義。無論哪一位將領，都可以採取不同的方式行動，都可能採取某種另外的路線而獲得某種較好的結果，但是，那已不屬於我們研究的範圍。而從理論上來說，從基本的論題來說，這對於間接路線理論是不起什麼作用的。 不過，站在研究一般軍事學的立場上，則可以指出，這種或那種的假定和設想，常常是頗有興趣的，也是很有價值的。因此，我們也可以撇開當前所研究的問題，即間接路線戰略問題，而指出另一個有意思的情況。例如，旅順和曼圖亞就可能有類似的地位和作用。應該注意到，日本人是在一個複雜的戰區內進行作戰的，因為朝鮮和滿洲（指中國東北地區譯者注）的交通都不發達。在這種戰區內，雖然某些條件比較差，但如果另一些條件比較好，那仍有可能獲得勝利。假使說，日軍當時所面臨的條件要比拿破崙的法軍還更困難，那麼，他們也自有其優點，例如工具比較好些。這樣對比研究，可以針對日本的戰略指出兩個問題：第一，在戰爭的初期，日本人如能效法拿破崙，像他以曼圖亞作誘餌那樣消耗敵人，把旅順當作一個陷阱，看來是不無利益的；第二，在戰爭末期，日軍似乎至少應使用一部分兵力，以來切斷俄軍在哈爾濱和瀋陽之間那條防衛薄弱的交通線。