Chapter 11 Chapter 10 Conclusions from Twenty-Five Centuries

There were thirty wars, briefly reviewed above.Among them: the Twelve Wars had a decisive impact on the development of ancient European history; the Eighteenth Wars had a decisive significance on European history before 1914.With regard to the struggle against Napoleon, it is only regarded as a war, because these struggles come and go one after another, and they cannot be separated.These thirty major conflicts included more than two hundred and eighty individual battles and battles.Among them, only six campaigns were expected to adopt a direct line strategy against the main force of the enemy and achieve decisive victory.The six battles were: Issus, Gaugamela, Friedland, Wagram, Sadova and Sedan.In the first two of these six campaigns, Alexander, king of Macedon, had seriously weakened the Persian Empire and greatly shaken the confidence of his vassal states in the strength of the empire because of his grand strategy of indirect routes, so he had already been defeated by his direct attack. Ready.In addition, there is another important reason why Alexander can win every battle: he actually has a relatively complete set of tools and always takes the tactical indirect route.

In the next two campaigns, Napoleon attempted to take the indirect line each time he began his operations, but soon switched to a direct attack.Why?On the one hand, he lacked patience; on the other hand, he had confidence in the superior strength of his army.The basis of this superiority of Napoleon was the mass concentration of artillery against vital points of the enemy.His successes at Friedland and Wagram were chiefly due to this new method of tactics.Both victories, however, were costly, and in their ultimate effect on Napoleon's own fortunes, it would have been better not to take such a direct route, even if it yielded a momentary tactical advantage.

As for the two campaigns of 1866 and 1870, we have seen in the previous chapter that, although they were supposed to represent the direct line, in fact, accidental actions But it had an unexpected indirect effect, and the two battles increased the victory because of the tactical advantage of the Prussian army.The tactical superiority of the Prussians was obtained in 1866 by the introduction of breech-loading guns, and in 1870 by the use of better artillery. Through the analysis of the six battles mentioned above, we can see that the method of adopting the direct line in these battles lacks theoretical basis.However, throughout the long years of history, the direct route seems to be the norm, while the expected indirect route is quite the exception.It is worth noting that some generals took the indirect route only under extremely difficult conditions, and did not consider it their basic route.However, this indirect line always leads them to victory after the defeat of the direct line.At this time, they are probably already at a disadvantage, so they have to take the indirect route.It is worth paying attention to this decisive victory achieved under unfavorable conditions.

From the brief discussion of the previous chapters, we can also see that in most battles the indirect line is indeed decisive for the achievement of victory.Among them, the following battles deserve special mention.Of antiquity are: the campaign of Lysander in the Aegean Sea in 405 BC; the campaign of Epaminondas in the Peloponnese in 362 BC ; 338 BC, Philip's campaign at Boeotia; 302 BC, Alexander of Macedon's campaign at the Hetaspes; in the same year, Cassander campaigns with Nessimachus in the Near East; Hannibal's campaigns at Lake Transimeno in Eturia; Scipio's campaigns at Utica and Samar in Africa; Caesar's campaigns at Battle of Illerda (now Lleida) in Spain.To the period of modern history are: Preston, Dunbar and Worcester by Cromwell; Alsace by Dureny in 1674-1675; The Italian Campaign of Prince King, 1701; the Battle of Flanders, 1708, by Marubolo; the Battle of Flanders, 1712, by Villars ; 1794, the Battle of Quebec by Wolfe, the Battle of the Moselle | Meuse by Jordan; the Battle of the Rhine | Danube by Archduke Karl in 1796; The three Italian campaigns in 1996, 1797 and 1800; Napoleon's Ulm and Austerlitz campaigns in 1805; Grant's Vicksburg Battle of Atlanta and Sherman's Battle of Atlanta.In addition, a number of other campaigns are also briefly reviewed, in which the indirect course and the effects produced were not so prominent by comparison.

From the large number of decisive battles in history, we have seen that there are so few examples of victories by the direct route and so many examples of victories by the indirect route. Therefore, it is natural to draw a conclusion: indirect Compared with the direct route, the former is really the most reasonable and effective strategic form. Can we draw a more definite conclusion through the analysis of historical examples?Of course it is possible.All the well-known commanders in history, probably only the Macedonian King Alexander, may not make the decision to attack the enemy directly when they see that the enemy is occupying a favorable natural terrain, or when they are in a strong fortified position.Sometimes, under the pressure of the situation, they had to take the risk of a direct attack, but usually it always ended in failure.Moreover, history proves that a truly illustrious general prefers the most difficult, and even the riskiest, indirect route to the direct one.When necessary, he would rather use only a part of his troops to cross mountains, cross deserts or swamps, or even break away from his own line of communication.He would rather face the odds than accept the danger of failure that the direct route usually entails.

Natural obstacles, however formidable they may be, are in fact less dangerous, because they are always more concrete and less dangerous than a real battle.Any natural condition can be estimated, and any obstacle can be surpassed. Only human resistance is not so easy to deal with.Any natural obstacle can be overcome if a careful and rational plan is made, and the troops are trained and prepared accordingly.for example.In 1800, although Napoleon crossed the Alps as planned, the small fortress of Bard seriously hindered his army's further advance and threatened to bankrupt his entire plan.

Now if we look at it from another side, we can see that in all the battles and battles that have achieved decisive results in history, almost all the victors have made their enemies psychologically active long before the conflict broke out. at a disadvantaged position.As illustrations of this, one may cite the battles or battles fought at the following fortresses and districts: Marathon, Salamis, Egos Potame, Mantinea, Karonia, Gaugamela (due to the grand strategy role), Getaspes, Ipsus, Lake Transimeno, Cannes, Metafer, Sama, Ticarmel, Tagina, Hastings, Poole Ston, Dunbar, Worcester, Blenheim, Odenlaard, Durnan, Quebec, Fleurius, Livery, Austerlitz, Jena, Vicksburg, Kony Gneez and Sedan.

If strategy and tactics are studied together, we can also see that most of the examples of campaigns or battles cited above can be classified into one of the two types respectively.The first type is characterized by taking a leisurely defensive strategy, first making a planned retreat, and then turning to a tactical attack.The second type is characterized by conducting a strategic offensive in order to put oneself in a favorable position to control the enemy, and then turning to a tactical defense when threatening the enemy's rear.The combination of these two strategies and tactics is an indirect route, and its psychological basis can be expressed in the following sentence: lure the enemy into a trap.

In fact, this is the same idea that Clausewitz had envisioned, that defense is a stronger and more economical form of strategy.But what is said here has a deeper meaning.Because the second type mentioned here, from the surface and the characteristics of troop mobilization, is of an offensive nature, but its underlying purpose is to force the enemy to turn to the offensive in advance.The most effective way of the indirect route is to force the enemy to take wrong actions and make incorrect maneuvers, which is the same as the principle of judo, to try to make the opponent use his own strength to hit himself.

In offensive strategy, the indirect route usually takes the form of sending troops to attack the enemy's economic objectives, that is, to attack the opponent's national or army supply source bases.Sometimes, however, such actions may be purely psychological.Some of the campaigns waged by Belisarius are examples.Regardless of the timing and form, such military action should not be detrimental to one purpose, which is to demoralize and disrupt the enemy's operational arrangements.This is the sole criterion for judging any indirect route. According to our research, another conclusion can be drawn.Of course, this may not be entirely without controversy, but we think it's interesting.The conclusion is: in a war, if the opponent consists of several countries or armies, then the best way is to first concentrate on attacking the weakest partner of the opponent instead of trying to annihilate the strongest enemy of the opponent first. , do not think that after the defeat of the strongest enemy, the rest of the weaker partners will collapse of their own accord.

In ancient history, there are two most outstanding wars, that is, Alexander of Macedon conquered Persia and Scipio destroyed Carthage. The victory was achieved by destroying the base of the enemy's strength.It was thanks to this indirect grand strategy that the Kingdom of Macedon and the Roman Empire were built.Their greatest successor, the British Empire, was also established using this strategy.The rise of Napoleon Bonaparte and the acquisition of his national power was also based on this strategy.Further on, the magnificent edifice of the United States of America is also built on the same foundation. There is only one way to master the art of using the indirect line, and to understand its true meaning, and that is the constant study and analysis of the whole history of warfare.Summarizing the experience and lessons in history, we can draw at least two simple principles: one is negative and the other is positive.First, the vast majority of battles in history show that any commander must never launch a direct frontal attack on an enemy that has already occupied a strong position.Second, the enemy's will to resist must first be overwhelmed before he can be attacked. Lenin was quite aware of this basic truth.He once said that the most reasonable strategy in war is to wait until the enemy has lost his mind before starting to fight. Only in this way can he win the victory and achieve the greatest effect with a fatal blow.This is of course not always possible.However, if he can slightly modify his thinking, it seems that it will be more practical.This is: in any battle, the most reasonable strategy is to wait until the enemy has been shaken in spirit before starting the battle; attack; only in this way can favorable conditions be created for a decisive blow.