Chapter 12 Chapter 11 The plans of both sides in the western battlefield in 1914 and their implementation

The study of military operations on the Western battlefield in World War I should start with the pre-war plans of both sides.The border between France and Germany is very narrow, with a total length of only about 240 kilometers.Therefore, for the belligerents, the introduction of conscription greatly increased the number of troops, so that there was really not much room for maneuver in the border area.The southeast end of this national border is directly adjacent to Switzerland. Except for a small flat area near Belfort, the border is drawn along the Vosges Mountains, with a length of about 110 kilometers.Since then, the national border continued to extend to the northwest.France built a number of forts around its borders, forming a continuous chain of defense.The essential links in this chain are the castles of Urbinal, Tours, and Verdun.After passing Verdun, extending to the north is the border between France and Luxembourg; further west is the border with Belgium.After France suffered a disastrous defeat in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, throughout its recovery period, defense was the basis of the strategic plan for the initial period of the war (the first phase of the war), that is, the fortresses in the frontier areas were first guarded, and the Then a decisive counterattack.In order to achieve this, they built a huge fortress system along the border area between Alsace and Lorraine.Of course, some gaps were deliberately left in it, for example, there were passages in the Chalmis area between Belfort and Tours. narrow passages to counterattack with the most confidence and effectiveness.

This plan of France can be said to have a certain degree of indirect route significance, or it is to do so as much as possible.Because of the limited distance of this section of the border and the consideration of not invading the territory of neutral countries, such a plan was made. During the ten years preceding 1914, however, a new school suddenly appeared, headed by the prophet Colonel Gernand Maison.They believed that the French plan violated the traditional spirit of France and completely lacked the concept of offensive.Those who insisted on attacking no matter what, launched Joffre as their representative.Thus, Joffre was appointed chief of the general staff in 1912.It was the post of chief of staff that gave the new school of thought the opportunity to put it into practice.Having won this post, they immediately took control of the entire military establishment of France, immediately abandoned the old plan, and formulated a new one, which was called Plan No. 17.The plan was based on a direct frontal attack, calling for the concentration of all forces to drive right into the heart of Germany.However, the planners, when anticipating a frontal attack, simply based their strength on the basis of an equal force between the enemy and us. They did not consider that the enemy would rely on fortifications in his own frontier areas, nor did they take into account that Due to their own forward attack, they will definitely lose the cover of their own border fortresses.The only part of this plan that does not violate historical experience and common sense is the decision to only monitor the fortress of Metz instead of directly attacking it. It is expected to bypass the fortress from the north and south and then attack the territory of Lorraine.If the Germans invaded the territory of the neutral country, the French left wing could extend the attack to the territory of Luxembourg and Belgium.It seems almost too far-fetched to say that the French plan was based on the theories of the German Clausewitz, while the German plan was based on the strategy of Napoleon and, of course, Hannibal. as a basis.

To what extent can this battle plan of France win the approval of the British?This should not only take into account the actual needs, but also take into account another situation, that is, the British military organization and war views have been Europeanized since ten years before the war.The influence of this Continental faction made Britain unknowingly accept the French plan and play the role of the French left-wing auxiliary force, thus completely forgetting the British historical lesson, that is, to use sea power to exert their traditional maneuverability strength.It was not until the beginning of the war that Sir French, who was going to be the commander-in-chief of the British Expeditionary Force, raised doubts about the correctness of the original plan at a military meeting; It is suggested that the British army be sent to Antwerp, where it is believed that the resistance of the Belgian army can be strengthened. If the German army passes through Belgium to attack the French mainland, then the British army can also pose a threat to the German flank.However, Major General Wilson, the chief of operations of the British General Staff, strongly advocated direct cooperation with the French army, and actually persuaded the General Staff.From 1905 to 1914, the general staffs of Britain and France conducted continuous informal consultations, which made the British automatically abandon the traditional war policy of hundreds of years.

Such a fait accompli not only changed the strategic thinking of the French army, but also vetoed other British proposals.At that time, Hagrid advocated to wait until the situation was clear and the army had expanded to the necessary number before marching, and Gijchenner advocated concentrating the British expeditionary force near the border instead of rushing forward, but neither was taken seriously. The plan finalized by the French was precisely what the Germans had prayed for, for it made their original plan, the one drawn up by Count Schlieffen in 1905, It has the characteristics of the indirect route.They have long realized that the fortifications on the French border are indeed impenetrable iron walls, so it is natural that they should try to bypass these fortifications. In this way, they need to choose a detour through Belgium.Schlieffen drew up just such a plan of action, determined to attack on as wide a front as possible.Strangely enough, even after the Germans had entered Belgium, French High Command assumed there that the German attack would be confined to the narrow stretch east of the Meuse.

According to Schlieffen's plan, most of the German forces would be concentrated on the right flank.This right wing should quickly cross the border of Belgium, advance to the north of France, then continue to advance along a huge arc, gradually turn to the left, and then drive east to achieve the purpose of roundabout Paris.At this moment, the troops at the extreme right of the right flank were to force the Seine at Rouen in order to encircle Paris from the south and press the French into retreating towards the Moselle.After that, continue to squeeze the French army to the fortified area of ​​Lorraine and the border of Switzerland, and wipe them out there.

However, the indirectness of Schlieffen's plan, that is, its brilliance, does not actually lie in the geographical detours, but in the distribution of forces.The distribution of forces is the basis of this plan.At the beginning of the war, the German side must use the main army and the reserve army in a concentrated manner to carry out concentrated assaults, thus ensuring the suddenness of the offensive.Of the seventy-two divisions they had at that time, fifty-three were organized into the assault group, and ten divisions were deployed in the center to deal with the enemies of Verdun, and the left wing of the entire army and along the Only nine divisions were deployed along the French frontier.From this it can be seen that the intention of the Germans was to reduce the strength of the left wing to the weakest possible level in order to maximize the strength of the right wing.In this way, even if the French army attacked Lorraine and even pushed the German left wing back to the Rhine, it could not prevent the German army from attacking through Belgium.Moreover, the farther the French army advanced eastward, the more difficult it would be to stop the German attack.So there is such a scene: it seems to be a revolving door, if you push this door panel forward heavily, then the other door panel will turn around tightly from behind; The greater the force, the greater the force of the subsequent impact.

The strategic indirectness of Schlieffen's plan of attacking through Belgium was actually very limited, because it would be difficult to stretch so many forces in such a narrow space.But from a psychological point of view, because of his ingenuity in the distribution of troops, his attack also has a certain degree of indirection.And the plan formulated by the French added to the perfection of Schlieffen's plan from the opposite side.If Schlieffen's soul knew, he would have laughed happily when he saw that the French did not need to be seduced to automatically fall into the trap he had set.However, maybe it won't take long before his smile will subside and turn into an angry face, because his heir, Mao Qi, is too cautious about his plan.No matter in the pre-war preparations or in the implementation of the war, Little Maoqi repeatedly revised this plan, resulting in a great change in its appearance.

During the period from 1905 to 1914, due to the continuous increase in the number of troops, Little Moltke repeatedly strengthened the strength of the left wing of the German army, resulting in a considerable change in the ratio of troops between the left and right wings.As a result of his continuous strengthening of the left wing, Schlieffen's original plan was gradually undermined, its foundation was gradually weakened, and finally it was completely destroyed. In August 1914, when the French army began to attack the left flank of the German army, Moltke suddenly became impulsive and wanted to accept the enemy's challenge. A plan to break through the enemy's defenses.Later, although he gradually calmed down and changed his mind, out of a momentary impulse, he had already sent the newly formed six reserve divisions to the Lorraine area, and these forces were originally planned to be used to strengthen the army. on the right wing.After the arrival of these new forces, the German commanders in the Lorraine area were dissatisfied, because they had received orders and were being forced to retreat.In this way, Prince Ruprecht of Bavaria completely forgot the task he had originally received. Instead of continuing to retreat to lure the French army to go deep, he stopped his army and prepared to accept the battle.After he discovered that the offensive development of the French army was slow, he negotiated with his neighbors and turned to the offensive together.In this way, the two German armies had a total of twenty-five divisions, while the French army in front of them had only nineteen divisions.However, with only such a small advantage and lack of favorable strategic positions, it is not enough troops to carry out a decisive counterattack.The result of this counterattack, of course, can only be to drive the French army back and make them hide again in the fortress area on their border.In this way, the French army was able to cheer up, increase its resistance, and was able to transfer part of its troops to the west to participate in the subsequent Battle of the Marne.

German combat operations in Lorraine did more to undermine Schlieffen's plan than they gradually weakened the right wing.However, it is not so obvious on the surface, because the final collapse of the German army occurred on the right wing after all.But this collapse might not have happened had the right wing not been repeatedly cut back. In addition to transferring six divisions to the Lorraine area, the right wing divided another seven divisions to besiege or defend cities such as Antwerp, Jiwei and Mauberge; East Prussian Front.Due to the request of the Neighboring Legion, and of course Moltke's approval, the Crook Army at the top of the right wing turned eastward before the time was ripe.In this way, the enemy finally had an opportunity, and the Paris garrison was able to attack the German flank.At that time, on the right flank, the decisive flank, the German army had only thirteen divisions, while the French and British coalition had twenty-seven divisions.This fact shows to what extent the decisive flank of Schlieffen's plan has been weakened, directly or indirectly.The right wing of the German army was at a numerical disadvantage because of repeated deployments, while the French army was numerically superior because the German army fought against the plan on the left wing.

If the German side had allowed the French army to rush deep into the territory of Lorraine on the left flank and bog it down, it would have been impossible for the French army to quickly transfer the troops on the left flank of the German army to the right flank.Of course, even if the troops are not transferred from this direction, it is still quite questionable whether the German army can obtain superior forces on the right flank.The situation at that time was that the Belgian troops blew up all the bridges over the Meuse River, and it was not until August 24 that the German trains loaded with reserves were able to cross the river to Liege.Thereafter, too, had to take a long detour.Due to such an obstacle, the German army could not strengthen the strength of its right wing according to the original plan.Moreover, all the supplies of the three armies on its right wing are completely dependent on this only railway, almost half of which has been destroyed.The sabotage carried out by the French and British armies during their retreat also greatly hindered the normal supply of the German army.When the German army entered the Marne River, due to overtired marches and lack of food, the troops were on the verge of exhaustion.If it hadn't been for Moltke to weaken the strength of the right wing and allow it to be more numerous, then as the troops advanced farther and farther, their situation would be even worse.The lessons of the American Civil War have never been taken seriously by people, so that similar mistakes are repeated.The development of the railways, and the great dependence of the army upon such lines of communication, resulted in increasing numbers of troops beyond what could be sustained at long distances, and were therefore liable to defeat.

In assessing the battle of the Marne, although we have to cross a vague line between strategy and tactics, we can see that this battle was the turning point of the whole war.It has provided a lot of enlightenment on the issue of the route, and it is worth exploring carefully.In order to really understand these insights, the course of events must first be explained. At first, the attack of the right wing of Joffre's army in the Lorraine area was repelled; then, his central army was defeated in the Ardennes area; Between the Brin River, it was almost surrounded by the German army.In this way, the French Plan No. 17 was actually split into several fragments, and Joffre used these fragments to weave a new plan.He decided to use Verdun as the center to make the left and central troops retreat, and draw part of the troops from the right wing that had stabilized the position to form a new Sixth Army to strengthen the left wing. On the German side, because the commanders of the various corps exaggerated the victory in the battle in the border area, the Supreme Command obtained a false impression that this victory had already had decisive significance.However, the small number of prisoners aroused Moltke's suspicion, which made him make a calmer judgment on the situation.As a result, the combination of Moltke's pessimism complex and the optimism of the commanders of the corps brought new changes to the original plan, thus sowing the seeds of failure. On August 26, the left wing of the British army began to retreat southward due to heavy losses in the Li Katao area.As a result, the German First Army under the command of Crook moved forward again to the southwest.The reason why he chose this direction was, on the one hand, that he could not accurately judge the retreat route of the British army;When Crook went out to the Amiens-Peronne area, it happened that the advance troops of the newly formed Sixth Army of the French army had just arrived from the Lorraine area and were getting off the train there. Crook immediately attacked and forced those The advance force quickly retreated, thus breaking Joffre's plan to move quickly to the attack. However, just as Crook happened to complete this maneuver, he was forced to turn southeast again.In order to relieve the pressure on the British army, Joffre ordered his friendly Langley Chuck Army to stop retreating and counterattacked the German Second Army (Boulo Army) that was chasing after him.Boo Luo finds himself threatened and immediately asks Crook for backup.However, Lanrich's attack was suspended on August 29, so Boulo no longer needed reinforcements, but he still asked Crook to lead his army to the rear of the French army in order to cut off Lanrich. Richack's retreat path.Crook asked Moltke for instructions before expressing his consent.When Moltke received the request for instructions, he was having a lot of headaches. The reason was that he was afraid that the French army would slip out of his pliers, especially a big gap had formed between the second and third German armies.Therefore, Moltke readily approved Crook's request for instructions to change the direction of progress.That is to say, he actually gave up his original plan to detour Paris from the west.In this way, the flank of the German army performing a roundabout maneuver must bypass Paris from the east and need to pass through the defensive area of ​​​​the French army.For safety's sake, Moltke not only narrowed the frontal width, but also made his line more direct, thereby losing those hopes contained in the Schlieffen plan, which were hidden in the deep detours. in the midst of maneuvering.Moltke originally wanted to reduce some risks, but the result was just the opposite. The subsequent counter-assault dealt a fatal blow to the German army and caused serious consequences. On September 4, the German High Command decided to completely abandon the original plan.So Moltke made a new plan.The purpose of this plan is limited to the encirclement of the French army's central and right flank forces.Accordingly, the central German forces, the Fourth and Fifth Armies, should attack southeast; meanwhile, the German left flank, the Sixth and Seventh Army, should attack southwest and Go ahead and break through the fortified area between Tours and Urbinal.This forms a pair of pincers that hold it together in the area west of Verdun.As for the forces on the right, the 1st and 2nd armies, still advancing westward, their task was to block any counter-movement by the French from the outskirts of Paris. However, before the Germans' new plan was put into practice, the French army had already begun to implement counter-maneuvering. At that time, Joffre failed to grasp this favorable opportunity early and ordered the troops to continue to retreat.At this time, Garriini, the commander of the Paris garrison, correctly analyzed the situation.Seeing the significance of Crook's Army turning back, he ordered Maurori's Sixth Army on September 3 to prepare immediately for a counterattack on the exposed German right flank.The next day, at Joffre's headquarters, there was a full day of intense debate.On the one hand was Joffre's military secretary, Major Gamelin, who believed that an immediate counter-offensive was necessary, and on the other was General Berciiro, who had great authority in the General Staff and was firmly opposed to an immediate counter-offensive.They stayed until the evening of the same day, after Bersiro had a long conversation with Joffre on the phone, and Joffre agreed, and the problem was resolved.Once convinced of the correctness of a decision, Joffre is always resolute and decisive in taking action.As a result, the entire left wing of the French army was ordered to deploy, ready to fully switch to the offensive on September 6. On September 5, Maurori launched the first attack.He continued to increase pressure on the very sensitive flank of the German army, forcing Crook to move troops there again and again, at first only throwing part of his army's strength into it, and later using all of it.As a result, a gap as wide as 50 kilometers appeared between the German First and Second Army Corps, and only one cavalry cover team was responsible for the cover task there.Crook dared to take this risk because the British army in front of him retreated quickly in the direction away from the gap.Even on September 5, when the rest of the troops had turned their heads, the British continued south for a day.However, the British army's temporary separation from the enemy had an unexpected indirect contribution to the victory of the French and British coalition forces, and it became an unexpected guarantee for future victory.This is because, when the British army turned around to attack later, Biaoluo immediately got the information that the British army was marching towards the gap formed between the two German armies, so he issued an order on September 5th, Make its second army retreat back.For this reason, the temporary advantage that the German 1st Army had gained over Maurori was immediately offset, and because of its own actions, it put itself in an isolated situation, so it also began to retreat on the same day. On September 11, according to Moltke's order, all German troops retreated in an all-round way.Among them, some acted alone before they were ordered.Their attempt to partially encircle the French army in the Verdun area failed because the Sixth and Seventh Army failed to circumvent the French fortress from the south, and they failed to overcome the French on the eastern border of France. Army fortifications.It seems incomprehensible that the German High Command could have acted so blindly, pinning its hopes of victory on an ill-organized frontal assault on the French fortifications.And it was obvious that, long before the start of the war, they realized that such an attack was hopeless, so the German High Command made the correct decision to attack France via Belgium, regardless of the neutral countries.However, when it came to actual combat, the German High Command believed it instead and temporarily adopted the method of frontal assault. This is really a big strange thing. It can be seen that the outcome of the Battle of the Marne was also the result of the chaos in the German army.Maurori's assault on the right flank of the German army caused confusion in the German army, and a gap appeared in the weak section of its defense. Due to the appearance of the gap, the German high command was shocked psychologically.It can also be seen that Crook's roundabout maneuvers, and his continued offensive after the capture of Lee-Catau, were of great importance in undermining Joffre's second-step plan, which expected a quick transition to the offensive, and in prompting the French The organized retreat of the British Allied Forces was once valuable and played a major role.However, his subsequent attack on the heart of France, that is, directly against the enemy, led to failure and bankrupted the German plan.And it should be pointed out that Moltke's strategic line later became more direct.The left wing of the German army actually launched a frontal attack on the French position. As a result, it not only cost a high price, but also gained nothing strategically. To regard Joffre's retreat as an indirect route is a bit of an exaggeration.The opportunity at the Battle of the Marne had been given to him entirely by chance, and he had not even thought about it beforehand.The timing of Galliini's assault coincided just before the German 1st and 2nd Army Corps had taken up new positions, and thus failed to cover the flanks of the main German group.However, even his assault this time was too direct and not enough to produce decisive results.Had he followed Joffre's first instructions to launch an assault south of the Marne, his assault would have been more direct.It should be pointed out that, judging from the final result, the surprise operation to force the German army to retreat was an indirect route, but the adoption of this operation was completely accidental.It was only an accident that the British Expeditionary Force broke away from the enemy and disappeared for a while.Fortunately, they reappeared belatedly later, just in time to point directly at the cracking and weakened joint of the German right flank.French critics mostly condemn the slowness and mistakes of the British army, but they do not know that it is the slowness of the British that has achieved the opposite result.If the timing of the British Expeditionary Force's return to attack was earlier, it is conceivable that the forces at the German junction would not be so weak.Maurori's attack failed to achieve decisive results, because his offensive had already been frustrated and stopped by the time the Germans drew two corps from the junction.This put the two armies of the German army on the march and failed to have any impact on the outcome of the battle. However, when discussing the reasons for the retreat of the German army, we must also point out a situation that has not been noticed by people.At that time, the German High Command received information that the British army was landing on the coast of Belgium, so they were very sensitive and feared that their rear and lines of communication would be threatened.Therefore, before the Battle of the Marne began, they had plans to retreat.On September 3, Lieutenant Colonel Hench, the representative of the German Supreme Command, was ordered to arrive at the headquarters of the First Army, handed in the latest order, and informed him that the news was very bad.The 6th and 7th armies were blocked in the Nancy and Urbinal areas, and the 4th and 5th armies met with stubborn resistance.France is using the railroad to mobilize troops, drawing troops from the right wing to Paris.New British troops also continued to land on the Belgian coast.There were also rumors that a Russian expeditionary force had also landed in Belgium.A retreat will therefore be inevitable.Just how frightened was the German high command?When three battalions of British marines landed at Ostend, within forty-eight hours they became, in the eyes of the German generals, an army of forty thousand men.Why are there rumors of a Russian expeditionary force?Its source is a story of a conductor on the British railways made from fantasy.It seems that the White House should really cast a bronze statue of this unknown conductor.Historians may draw the conclusion that rumors of the landing of a large force at Ostend, combined with the myth of the arrival of Russian troops, were the main reasons for the decision at the Battle of the Marne. If a comparison is made, it can be seen that the spiritual effect of this phantom force seems to be greater than that of the German forces stationed in Belgium.Therefore, since September 9, the German army was afraid that the British army would attack from Antwerp, so that its actions were also greatly affected.From this point of view, if the British side had adopted Sir French's strategy, the result must have been better.In that case, the British Expeditionary Force would have no negative effect in this duel, but only a positive one. After Falgenhain took over Moltke's position, he fully realized that the British landing forces on the Belgian coast posed a potential threat to the German rear.He had been apprehensive about this, and the first step he took was to capture Antwerp.As a result of this decision, another maneuver with indirect route significance arose.It is a pity that when this maneuver was carried out, it was not at all ideal, because the actions of the German army became more and more direct lines of action.Even so, this maneuver produced good results, causing the coalition forces to fail, almost to the brink of destruction. On September 17, Joffre learned that Maurori's attempt to outflank the Germans had failed, so he decided to form a new corps under the command of Castellau to outflank the Germans.But before that, the frontal pursuit of the German army by the Allied forces had been stopped on the Anne River.At this time, the German army had filled the gap between the troops and resumed its posture, and the German command headquarters guessed the direction of the French army's attack, and was ready to crush this limited maneuver head-on. During the next month, both sides attempted to capture the other's western flank, taking turns attacking each other, but neither achieved their goal.To use a widely used but imprecise phrase about this stage of the war is a race to the sea.Falgenheim, tired of this fruitless attempt long before Joffre, conceived a strategic trap on October 14, anticipating that the Franco-British forces would detour his next attack. When flanked, it will automatically throw the net.He placed on his flank a recently newly formed corps to thwart the attempts of the Allies to turn around the German flank, while at the same time he placed another corps composed of the troops vacated after the capture of Antwerp and the four newly formed corps. The corps, which was used in the west direction, was ordered to move rapidly towards the Belgian coast. Its task was to assault the flank of the besieged group of the Allied forces and then move forward to its rear.For this reason, he even temporarily controlled part of the troops that were about to pursue the Belgian army, and did not chase after the Belgian troops that had withdrawn from Antwerp, so as to avoid giving the coalition command information too early, lest the enemy be aware of it in advance. Fortunately for the coalition forces, King Albert of Belgium was cautious. He saw the situation that had formed at that time, so he rejected Foch's suggestion, did not participate in flanking maneuvers, and did not move his troops away from the coast. area.Therefore, the Belgian army held its position, resisted the onslaught of the German army, and finally flooded the lowlands along the coast, preventing the German army from advancing from the north.In this way, Falgenhain was forced to take a more direct route to attack the flank of the coalition forces.At this time, the British general Hague happened to lead an army from the Anne River area, so this flank had been extended to Ypres. The British troops who had arrived earlier had been placed on the right and center and their advance was held back.Nonetheless, John French ordered the left flank, commanded by Hagrid, to fulfill Joffre's dream of a weaving maneuver.Fortunately, the German army also started to attack ahead of time, and it happened to coincide with the actions of the coalition forces, so the attack was fruitless.At that time, under the influence of Foch, French firmly believed that the British army's offensive would continue to develop within a day or two, but in fact, Hagrid's troops were fighting hard and could only keep their own positions. .The commanders of the French and British armies made incorrect estimates of the situation on the battlefield, which is partly proved by the fact that the battle of Ypres, like the battle of Inkerman, was essentially a battle of individual soldiers, because The battle was really poorly organized, and there was almost no command.As for Falgenhain, the attempt to reach the coast was thwarted, and for a whole month he resolved to attack the enemy head on again and again, hoping to win victory by direct attack.Although there were not enough troops on the defensive side, as usual, a tenacious defense outweighed a frontal attack.As a result, armies on both sides were forced to dig trenches across the front.This line of trenches stretched from the Swiss border to the western coast.In the end, the entire front finally stabilized, bringing the war to a stalemate. The Western Front from 1915 to 1917 For the next four years, the military record of the Allied forces is full of attempts to break the stalemate of the war; sometimes by directly breaking through the lines of defense, sometimes by searching for the weakest link in the enemy's defenses. Throughout the Western Front, the parallel lines of trenches were endless.Strategy thus becomes the servant of tactics, and the development of tactics itself is increasingly regressed.Between 1915 and 1917 there was really little to be desired in terms of strategy.As far as the coalition forces are concerned, they have always insisted on adopting a direct line strategy, so it is impossible to find a way out of the dead end of the war.Whatever we may say about the merits of a war of attrition, and how we may judge the whole period as a continuous battle, in short, this method, which takes four years to achieve its goal, cannot be held up as a model, and cannot worthy of imitation. The offensive at Neue Chapelle in 1915 was the first attempt by the Allies to switch to an offensive. Although the line taken was direct, the tactical surprise in the plan was finally achieved.Since then, due to the long-term artillery preparations that were reported in advance, all subsequent offensive attempts have become purely frontal assaults.As for attacks of this nature, the following examples may be cited: in May 1915, the French offensive in the Arras area; the offensive in the area of ​​the Somme from July to November 1916; the offensive in the area of ​​the Anne and Arras in April 1917; The British attack on Ypres from July to October 917, like that of King Charles II, was gradually lost in the Paschendal swamps.The attack at Cambrai on November 20, 1917 was again won by the concentrated use of a large number of tanks and their sudden entry into battle without a sustained artillery preparation in advance. Tactical suddenness.From a strategic point of view, however, the offensive was limited in purpose and, although well started, did not end well, making it hardly an indirect route. The German army has always adopted a strictly defensive strategy, with the exception of an attack in the Verdun area in 1916.The action taken this time is also essentially a direct route.不過，由於它是連續多次地對著目標實行有限規模的突擊，是一種迫使敵人不斷流血的方法。這也許有一點間接路線的意味。然而，採取這種方法時，本身的消耗也很大，結果使德軍自己也破產了。 一九一七年春天，魯登道夫很好地設想並執行了一個計畫。他把德軍的部分兵力後撤到了興登堡防線。這雖然仍是一種純粹的防禦行動，但卻比較地接近於間接路線方法。預見到法英聯軍將會在松姆河地區恢復進攻，德軍沿著經由朗斯｜努瓦榮｜里姆（蘭斯）的一條大弧線，構築了新的塹壕，並在該線建造了堅固的防禦工事。後來，德軍按照自己的計畫，把這條弧線以內的整個地區作了徹底的破壞，隨後又分步撤退，撤到一條縮短了的新防禦線上。這樣忍痛丟棄土地，可以算是一種精神上的勇敢，所以德軍雖然被迫撤退，但卻破壞了法英聯軍春季攻勢的整個計畫。因此，德國方面又獲得了整整一年的喘息時間，並且避開了最嚴重的危險，使法英聯軍的任何聯合攻勢都無法奏效。而在這個時候，俄軍已經完全崩潰了。這就使得魯登道夫有了一個機會，他可以集中自己的全部力量，用來爭取一九一八年的勝利。